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Abstract 
 
The emergence of hybrid physician managers in hospital management in western 
countries under New Public Management has attracted researchers’ attention in the past 
two decades. However, it is under-explored outside the West. As a former colony of 
Britain, Hong Kong has a legacy of the NHS-style universal public hospital system based 
on western medicine and a liberal profession of medicine. Similar to the UK, the 1990s 
and 2000s saw rapid changes in Hong Kong that aimed to modernize the healthcare sector 
in terms of efficiency and transparency/accountability. The landscape of healthcare 
governance in Hong Kong is in the same way shaped by the interplay between the state 
and professional powers.  
Although researchers in this field are commonly inspired by the Re-Stratification thesis 
that sees medicine as being divided into two groups, rank-and-file doctors and medical 
elites who enrol into the administrative and regulatory posts, only a few empirical studies 
focus on the identity work of hybrid physician managers as the pivotal players in 
healthcare reforms. Indeed, it is not only the capacity but also the loyalty of medical elites 
to their peers that decides whether or not the collective control of medicine on healthcare 
management can be preserved.  
Examining the Hong Kong case, this research aims to have the physician managers’ first 
person narratives on their management role in healthcare, with special attention to their 
social identification with professional colleagues and organizations. In view of a more 
sophisticated understanding of physician managers’ hybrid identities, a new analytical 
approach is developed based on previous studies. It is found that physician managers try 
to satisfice both professional and organizational values, while maintaining respective 
jurisdictions in policy making and clinical governance, as well as their primary self-
identification as rationalizers or protectors of medicine, according to their manager roles 
as directorial and departmental managers.  
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Chapter 1                                                                                               
Background: an overview of the Hong Kong context and case  
 
1.1. Introduction  
This study attempts to understand the interrelation between reforms of the Hong Kong 
healthcare system and its key players, medical professionals, and its implication for the 
state’s capacity in governing welfare provisions. In 1991, a statutory corporate body, the 
Hospital Authority (HA) was established as a unified system of public health services 
planning, delivery and financing in Hong Kong. However, it is contentious whether the 
reforms are a “decentralization” or a “centralization” process - while the healthcare 
system becomes even more professional-led in terms of the medical professionals’ 
entrenchment in its management (Cheung, 1996) and power to veto policy change (Chiu, 
Ho and Lui, 2011), the government has successfully rationalized the system with New 
Public Management (NPM) measures such as performance indicators and businesses-
like management system (Cheung, 2002b).   
Indeed, public management literature has noted such potential contradictions between 
NPM ideals of having health care organizations decentralized or centralized (Lindberg, 
Styhre and Walter, 2012, p. 58).  While publicly operated hospitals are reconfigured into 
a growing variety of independently managed semi-autonomous organizations, in these 
still publicly owned, publicly capitalized, and publicly accountable organizations, 
institution-level managers gain control over important operating levers (Saltman and 
Bankauskaite, 2006, p. 140). It is argued that NPM advocates, on the one hand, to free 
public service managers from the bureaucratic rule (“let the managers manage”), on the 
other hand, to fashion systems to performance-manage them from the centre (“make the 
managers manage”) (Askim, Christensen and Lægreid, 2015, p.973). This debate can 
also be taken in a governance perspective, which is the main theoretical framework of 
this study: the pluralistic position suggests that NPM is a global reform movement 
inspired by a broad neo-liberal ideology “hollowing out the state” (Rhodes, 1994); on 
the contrary, the state-centric position argues that the state’s capacity in steering society 
is actually strengthened by an ever-sophisticated regulation and monitoring system 
(Fawcett, 2013, p.6).  In Chapter 2 we will elaborate governance theory regarding the 
balance of power between state and societal actors in welfare production.      
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In the analysis of decentralization/ centralization in health care, it also important to go 
beyond the organizational level to include the individual as health care practitioners. 
Professional autonomy is undoubtedly a core aspect of the decentralization/ 
centralization of healthcare system in terms of devolution in decision making and service 
delivery (Peckham et al., 2008, p.566). Through the centralizing mechanism of licensing 
and clinical governance, professional work is standardized and regulated with front-line 
doctors’ labour process being more transparent and measurable.  At the same time, this 
process is often independent from the central government under the banner of collective 
self-regulation - the medical profession’s collective control is preserved by “medical 
elites” who act as the proxies for the government to run the healthcare system. This 
widely accepted view, as the Re-Stratification Thesis (Freidson, 1994), singles out 
managers who are medically qualified (physician managers) as pivotal players in 
healthcare system negotiating between the state and medicine. With special attention to 
their dual role representing both managerial and professional interests/agenda, in Chapter 
3 we will establish our argument in an alternative position of governance theory, 
Corporatist theory, seeing the medical profession basically as a partner and sometimes a 
challenger of the state in healthcare governance. This account may help assimilate the 
contradictory movements of decentralization and centralization in healthcare as inherent 
in welfare corporatism.   
It is not only the capacity but also the loyalty of medical elites to their peers that decides 
whether or not the collective control of medicine on healthcare management can be 
preserved. With the enrolment of medical professionals into healthcare management it 
could be the state “colonizing” medicine by the co-optation of doctors imposing a tighter 
self-surveillance regime as “soft bureaucracy” (Flynn, 2004); or conversely, medicine 
“capturing” the state to preserve their control on daily professional operation as “soft 
autonomy” (Levay and Waks, 2009) or “loose coupling system” (Doolin, 2001). 
However, there are rarely empirical studies that focus on the identity work of hybrid 
physician managers in Hong Kong. This study will then strive to have the physician 
managers’ first person narratives on their management role in healthcare regarding their 
social identification with professional colleagues and organizations. In Chapter 4 we will 
develop the method for researching physician managers with reference to literature on 
relevant conceptual discussions and empirical studies.  
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In this background chapter we will first outline the Hong Kong setting of healthcare 
reforms as a “centralized decentralization” (Hoggett, 1991; Watkins, 1993) project. It 
starts with the overall welfare arrangements followed with the structure of healthcare 
governance in the territory. As a former colony of Britain, Hong Kong has a legacy of 
the NHS style universal public hospital system based on western medicine and a liberal 
profession of medicine. Similar to the U.K., the 1990s and 2000s saw rapid changes in 
Hong Kong to modernize the healthcare sector in terms of efficiency and 
transparency/accountability. The landscape of healthcare governance in Hong Kong is in 
the same way shaped by the interplay between the state and professional powers.  
Besides, the very characteristic of the city-state as a “liberal autocracy” (Fareed Zakaria, 
1997; liberal economy and freedom without democracy) has constrained it to adopt a 
non-interventionist and incremental approach to social policy. In view of a small 
government, cost containment, and the lack of legitimacy of the autocratic polity, Hong 
Kong Government is left little choice but a decentralization option and steering role in 
modernizing healthcare. At the same time, in the absence of democracy, welfare 
provisions serve as its substitute in maintaining legitimacy and social stability; and the 
executive-led political system enables the state to intervene in social policy when 
necessary. This also shapes healthcare reform in Hong Kong as another movement of 
centralizing government control.  
1.2. The overall welfare arrangement  
1.2.1. The territory’s features  
At the south-eastern tip of China, Hong Kong was ceded to the UK in 1842. During 
British rule, she made herself a commercial and financial centre in Asia. Following the 
restoration of the Chinese sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong became a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. Under the “one country, 
two systems” principle, Hong Kong retains as an independent customs territory having 
her own government and currency.  
The vast majority of Hong Kong’s population consists of the people of Chinese descent, 
while foreign nationals comprise 8% (Hong Kong Government, 2016). With a tiny 
territory of 1,100 km2, which is only a half of Luxemburg, Hong Kong has a population 
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of 7.15 million people comparable to Switzerland. This makes her population density 
one of the highest in the world, 6,620 people per km2, on par with Singapore.  Hong 
Kong is small but dynamic, managing the world’s 9th largest trading economy. Her 
economy is externally and service oriented, with a trade-to-GDP ratio of 4:1 and a 
services sector contributing over 90% of GDP (ibid). 
Hong Kong is a highly-developed country considering the major comparative indicators. 
Her Gross National Income (GNI) is $57,650 per capita on Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP), ranked 8th in the world, the same as the U.S. and higher than Japan (The World 
Bank, 2016); her Human Development Index (HDI) is “very high” at 0.91, ranked 12th 
in the world (The United Nations, 2016). Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s Gini Coefficient is 
among the highest in developed economies, stands at 0.507 (Census and Statistics 
Department, Hong Kong, 2012b). Given the low tax rates (ceiling of 15% for salary tax 
and 16.5% for profit tax) and low government spending (less than 20% of GDP), the 
redistributive function of taxation and transfer programme is not so significant in Hong 
Kong. Her post-taxation and transfer Gini Coefficient is 0.431 (ibid). In contrast, the UK, 
whose income inequality is among the highest in OECD countries, is relatively 
successful in reducing its Gini Coefficient by taxation and transfer, from 0.527 to 0.358 
(OECD, 2016a).   
As the above listed figures suggest, Hong Kong successfully averts a substantial transfer 
system along the way she achieves a first-world economy. This may have to pay tribute 
to the “liberal autocratic” polity in Hong Kong as Fareed Zakaria (1997) depicted. On 
the one hand, she has a long tradition of constitutional liberalism and the rule of law 
“protecting its citizens’ basic rights and administering a fair court system and 
bureaucracy” (p.29). On the other hand, her democracy is very limited and the 
representatives of professional and business elites enjoy veto power in the legislature. 
Taken together, what Hong Kong has been practising is very close to the ideal of classical 
liberalism that favours accumulation of wealth but hinders its ability to promote 
distributive social policy. All these constitutional rights and restrictions have been 
preserved by the Basic Law (Article 6 for private ownership of property and Articles 27 
to 38 for civil liberties), the mini constitution of Hong Kong after she was handed over 
from Britain to China in 1997 as Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.   
Under the Basic Law, the head of HKSAR Government, Chief Executive (CE), is 
indirectly elected by 1,200 electorates mainly from professional bodies and commercial 
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chambers. The Legislative Council (LegCo), which is the law-making body of HKSAR, 
is divided into two groups: half of the seats are from the geographic constituencies and 
the other half from the functional (occupation-based) constituencies. While every voter 
in Hong Kong has one vote in respective geographic constituencies, the functional 
constituencies are again reserved for the powerful few. Considering the small number of 
240,000 voters in the election of CE electorates and functional consistencies, against all 
3.4 million voters in Hong Kong, the upper-middle class population receives 
considerable political privileges.  
Under the Basic Law, the selection of CE and LegCo Members is to be ultimately by 
means of universal suffrage. However, in 2014 Beijing proposed a CE election method 
that allows her to preselect CE candidates through the nomination committee (to be 
elected by the same method as the current CE electors), insisting that universal suffrage 
without CE nominators will result in more redistributive social policies that violate the 
Basic Law’s requirements for Hong Kong to maintain its low taxation and capitalist 
system (Articles 107 and 108). Hong Kong citizens accused Beijing of broking its words 
and huge street protests, known as Umbrella Movement, took place. As long as political 
disputes and deadlock between Hong Kong and her new sovereignty China continues, 
the prospect of democratization is uncertain and the current liberal autocratic polity may 
survive for a longer time than expected. The principle of liberal economy/ small 
government and associated non-interventionism in social policy will still govern Hong 
Kong in the near future.  
1.2.2. Modest yet universalist “four pillars” 
When discussing the logic governing the Hong Kong welfare state, we should not 
overlook the influence of liberal ideology as an official doctrine. Hong Kong’s long 
tradition of commitment to free trade and non-interventionist policy makes her the best 
example of a free market economy for Milton Friedman (Friedman and Friedman, 1980) 
and an ideal-typical liberal welfare state (McLaughlin, 1993). It has been rated the freest 
economy in the world by the Heritage Fund for over 20 years since the creation of 
Economic Freedom Index (The Heritage Fund, 2016).  
As characterised by the last Financial Secretary of the colony, Macleod (1995), the Hong 
Kong capitalism is “a consensus about the need to encourage free enterprise and 
competition, while promoting equity and assistance for those who need”. Specifically, 
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the government explicitly rejects the idea of promoting social equity by large-scale 
distribution of wealth through taxation and public welfare on the ground that it would 
mean interference with the free market and would discourage investment (The Hong 
Kong Government, 1977). In practice, the Hong Kong Government maintains income 
and corporate tax-rates around 15% and public expenditure of less than 20% of GDP (for 
a comparison with other developed economies, see Appendix One). That iron rule was 
laid down by Sir John Cowperwaite, the Financial Secretary of the colony in the 1960s, 
and it was preserved by Basic Law of the new Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
of China after 1997 (Chiu and Wong, 2005). As Tang (1998, p.71) recorded, the annual 
growth rates of GDP and government consumption were basically identical (6.83%) 
throughout the period of the 1960s to 1990s. The cut in social expenditure by the 
government during the economic downturn from 1998 to 2004 seems to support the 
preservation of this principle that any increase in public provision could only be realised 
if it were funded by sustained revenue (Chiu and Wong, 2005). 
The capability of the Hong Kong welfare state in wealth redistribution is predominantly 
restricted by the idea of “small government” (see Appendix Two). While the Hong Kong 
government are spending 60% of its expenditure in public welfare, the government 
expenditure itself is lower than 20% of the GDP. As a result, the Hong Kong 
Government’s social expenditure in housing, healthcare, education and social welfare 
(social security and social services) is comparatively low, standing at less than 10% of 
GDP throughout all its history compared to 20% to 30% of other developed countries, 
and the transfer system is extremely minimal with a social assistance programme covers 
only 7% of its population and spending 1% of its GDP (CSSA allowance for households 
of 3 persons is approximate to 37% of the median income for the economically active 
households with the respective size; see Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong, 
2012a; 2012b). The entitlement of welfare as social rights and the de-commodification 
effects of Hong Kong’s public welfare system are actually very modest.  
Yet, on top of a modest transfer system, the Hong Kong welfare state actually delivers 
fairly universal social provisions in public housing, education and healthcare as the four 
pillars of public welfare. Firstly, public housing in Hong Kong covers a half of the 
population and is heavily subsidized by the government. It may be seen as a quasi-
universal social policy. In 1973, Hong Kong Housing Authority was set up to be 
responsible for the Ten-year Housing Programme (later extended to a 15-year 
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programme). By 1987, the Programme had provided 1.5 million people with public rental 
housing (PRH). The PRH is highly subsidized as the rental is set lower than 10% of the 
median income level of the tenants. For the social assistance benefits recipients, their 
PRH rental is covered by their cash assistance. In spite of the means-test, 30% of the 
population in Hong Kong are living in public rental housing; in the late 1970s, the Home 
Ownership Scheme (HOS) was introduced to subsidize middle income earners who are 
ineligible for public rental housing and at the same time incapable of affording private 
ownership. This Scheme provides accommodation at 30% below market price and with 
cheap mortgage and generous repayment schedules. Currently, 17% of the population in 
Hong Kong live in the HOS accommodation. In total, the public housing protects half of 
the households in the territory. (Hong Kong Housing Authority, 2013; McLaughlin, 1993, 
pp. 118-119)  
Secondary, public primary and secondary education in Hong Kong covers 80% of the 
school children. In 1978, a nine-year compulsory and free education was introduced for 
all school children aged 6-15. In the 1980s, the government expanded publicly funded 
high schools and the high school enrolment rate reached 90% (Mok, 2003). The publicly 
funded tertiary education rapidly expanded in the 1990s to reach the enrolment rate of 
15%.  To prevent any students from being denied to university education for economic 
reasons, tuition fees were set lower than 20% of the cost of provisions and there is a 
means-tested tuition fee waiver and student loan scheme.  
Thirdly, the government has implemented a universal healthcare system directly funded 
by taxation since 1974 with the underlying principle that “no one should be prevented, 
through lack of means, from obtaining adequate medical treatment” (Medical 
Development Advisory Committee, 1974). Nowadays, public hospitals provide over 
90% of in-patient services in terms of bed-day occupancy and 20% of public primary and 
secondary care services in terms of attendance. The Hong Kong Government is 
responsible for 90% of the public hospitals’ income. Medical fees and charges for public 
hospital services are less than 5% of the cost (Food and Health Bureau, Hong Kong, 2008; 
See also Appendix Three)   
Taken together, the Hong Kong welfare state provides minimal social security as “safety 
net” while allowing middle income earners access to highly subsidized public education, 
healthcare and housing (see Appendix Four for a wide range of their coverage in the 
population and Appendix Five for a fairly equal accessibility among different income 
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groups). Social provisions in Hong Kong are modest but well accepted by Hong Kong 
society as universal entitlements considering their accessibility. By the 1990s, as reported 
by a series of public opinion survey, a sense of entitlement to public welfare among the 
citizens and their support for collectivist welfare in Hong Kong had been created (Lau 
and Kuan, 1990; Tam and Yeung, 1994). When China announced the Basic Law of the 
coming Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 1991, “rights to social welfare” 
was accepted as one of the residents’ basic rights in Hong Kong that had to be preserved 
(Article 36), although the Basic Law also provides that public welfare shall not 
compromise the idea of small government and liberal economy (Articles 107 and 108; 
Aspalter, 2002, p.101).  
As Holliday (2000) argues, the appearance of Hong Kong as a liberal welfare state is 
somehow misleading. While social rights to public welfare is limited, its production 
elements (housing, education and healthcare) are expanded on a universal basis for 
maintaining a productive workforce. The Hong Kong welfare state is not only facilitative 
(non-interventionist, small government) but also developmental-universalist (pp.709-
710). More importantly, as Chiu, Ho and Lui (2009) suggest, “on top of being a central 
component of the government’s developmental project, the socialization of collective 
consumption has been one of the primary pillars of the legitimacy of the colonial 
government, and the SAR government has continued to use the provision of various kinds 
of public services to boost its political ratings” (p.241). Similar to the western 
democracies, “the welfare state retains considerable legitimacy as a source of social 
stability and guarantor of basic rights of citizenship” (Pierson, 2001, p.413).  
Indeed, the building of Hong Kong welfare state in the 1970s was clearly a plan to expand 
social rights in the colony as a substitute to democracy that was denied. As the UK’s 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office archives disclose, the efforts to modernize Hong 
Kong’s public welfare were actually a strategy of the British Government. Considering 
that the lease of Hong Kong to Great Britain was about to expire in 1997, the British 
Government had to ensure the special status of Hong Kong under Chinese sovereignty 
by building Hong Kong as a model city and empowering its citizens (Lui, 2010). In Lord 
Maclehose’s (Governor of Hong Kong, 1971-1982) own words, it was to “close the gap” 
between the colonial state and the Hong Kong society in order to create and foster loyalty 
of the people to the colony (Carroll, 2007, p.159). While the absence of democracy may 
help the state uphold the doctrine of small government and incrementalism in social 
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provisions, it does not make social policy irrelevant. As the primary source of legitimacy, 
the efficiency and performance in social provisions has become even more carefully 
watched by the state itself and the society in Hong Kong.  
1.2.3. New Public Management in Hong Kong  
Interestingly, in response to the growing demand for social provisions in Hong Kong, the 
reluctance of the government to maintain a large squad of public servants for social 
provisions made the voluntary sector the major agency of social provision delivery. 
While the Hong Kong welfare state leaves little room for the private market in social 
provision, it is not always the direct service provider. Non-government organizations 
(NGOs) play an important role in delivering public welfare and the state rather manages 
public welfare through mainly its role as sponsor and regulator. Since the 1980s, the New 
Public Management notions of accountability and efficiency in western countries have 
been employed by the government to develop an ever-sophisticated system monitoring 
public funding.   
Notable cases of NGOs in Hong Kong are the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals and the Po 
Leung Kuk. In the nineteenth century, the former gave free medical care and burial 
service for the deprived labourers while the latter specialized in women protection. Free 
schools and healthcare services provided by Western missionary bodies were of high 
importance as well. The important role for a “vigorous voluntary sector” has been 
recognized by the government (The Hong Kong Government, 1973, p.24). The colonial 
government found NGOs a readily available partner when it launched the massive 
investment in public welfare in the 1970s. In White Paper, Social Welfare in Hong Kong: 
The Way Ahead, it is stated that: 
[W]hilst the Government accepts ultimate responsibility for the provision of social 
welfare services in Hong Kong, experience has shown that if there is a vigorous 
voluntary sector, with agencies specializing in differing areas, then the Government 
can make fruitful use of these agencies’ services so that together the Government and 
the voluntary agencies share in the extension of services. In other words, there are areas 
of service, e.g. children and youth centres, where the Government sees a need and is 
prepared to meet that need not by the direct provision of services but by providing a 
financial subvention to an agency, or group of agencies, so that they can provide the 
service. If the extent of services provided by the voluntary sector were to decline then 
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the Government would have less choice in deciding how to pioneer new services, or 
extend into new localities. (ibid) 
The heavy use of NGOs reflects the colonial government’ reluctance to commit too much 
in the early period of expansion of social provisions. However, the continuous economic 
success of Hong Kong in the 1970s supported a regular increase in social spending. From 
1975 to 1985, social expenditure in Hong Kong grew 300% in real term (see Tang, 1998, 
p.72). On the other hand, following the introduction of social assistance of social welfare 
in 1970s, voluntary agencies transformed from charity dispensing relief to NGOs 
delivering professional healthcare, education and social services. Injection of public 
funding, in addition to Hong Kong’s democratization, made accountability necessary. 
Under the name of new public management, government monitoring and regulation 
regimes have been consolidated over time (Chow, 1995).   
By the 1990s, Hong Kong NGOs had delivered 90% of personal social services, such as 
family counselling, youth work, rehabilitation, elderly care, and community services. 
The fact that and the government sponsored over 70% of their funding turns them into 
the state’s agents under service contracts. Since the 1970s the government’s role in 
regulating social services spending has been paramount - over policy formulation, policy 
review, service delivery, coordination, and professional guidance. In particular, the 
government setup Service Quality Standard to enhance NGO’s “management 
responsibility” (Chan, 2003; Wong, 2008).  
In the provision of public education, subsidized schools operated by missionary bodies 
and voluntary organizations account for over than 80% of primary and secondary schools 
in Hong Kong, while less than 10% are government-run. The voluntary organizations are 
responsible for the cost of construction of the school building and assume the 
management duty. The bulk of the budget, the operating cost and the staffs’ salary of 
subsidized schools, are paid by the government. In return, those schools are under the 
government’s monitor in curriculum design. Other means of control by the government 
are quality assurance inspections in four major domains: management and organization, 
learning and teaching, support for pupils and school ethos, and attainment and 
achievement. Outside the monitoring system, autonomy has been allowed to individual 
schools with school based-management (Mok, 2003).  
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In public healthcare, the government expanded the public hospital network by 
subsidizing not-for-profit hospitals in the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, while 47% of the 
hospital services in Hong Kong were provided by the government-run hospitals, a 
considerably high portion of 41% were provided by those publicly funded hospitals 
operated by NGOs (in terms of hospital beds). Their activities had already been 
integrated to the public hospital networks, and a number of their key staff was seconded 
from the government (Scott & Co., 1985). In order to better control the public hospital 
networks, the government incorporated the publicly funded hospitals, together with those 
that are government-run, into a statuary organization, the Hospital Authority (HA) in 
1991. On the one hand, government-run hospitals were separated from the civil service. 
On the other hand, the role of voluntary organizations in managing public hospitals was 
largely reduced to a mere monitor role. They retain presence in Hospital Governing 
Committees and receive regular management reports from Hospital Chief Executives and 
monitor operational and financial performance of individual hospitals. By appointing the 
Board of Directors, the government holds the HA management accountable at arm’s 
length while it devolves responsibilities of managing and delivering public healthcare 
services. Among others, the HA has developed an ever-excessive managerialism and one 
well-known example of which is the publication of “Business Plan” couched in 
management jargon. It sets out key major result areas, initiatives planning and targets to 
be achieved intending to provide a yardstick whereby performance of the frontline staff 
can be handily monitored and measured (Cheung 2002, pp.352-353). 
The abovementioned setting may explain why New Public Management (NPM) could 
well settle Hong Kong in the past two decades as a “centralized decentralization” project. 
On the one hand, the tradition of laissez faire and small government had left the 
healthcare system, as well as other pillars of public welfare in Hong Kong, prone to a 
decentralization approach. Under non-interventionism and incrementalism in social 
policy, charities and NGOs were increasingly subsidized by the government and 
eventually became the major providers of public services in view of avoiding a big 
government and cost containment. On the other hand, quality control was stressed for 
their quasi-public status. Another goal of NPM, accountability, was put at the top of the 
agenda when the reforms took place in Hong Kong in the 1990s. The institutionalization 
of those autonomous organizations as public arm-length bodies under NPM therefore has 
two contradictory goals: first to decentralize the healthcare system from the government, 
and second to enhance its accountability. The establishment of the HA perhaps is a best 
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example.  In the next section, we will turn to the Hong Kong healthcare system per se to 
depict the basic characteristics of its governance and the historical background of the 
1991 reform as a “centralized decentralization” project.     
1.3. The overall structure of healthcare system  
1.3.1. The Hospital Authority  
Established in 1991, the Hospital Authority (HA) is the statutory body responsible for 
managing Hong Kong’s public hospitals and their services to citizens. It is the 
centrepiece of public healthcare services delivery in Hong Kong and currently manages 
42 public hospitals and institutions, 48 Specialist Out-patient Clinics and 73 General Out-
patient Clinics, providing annually 1.5 million inpatient and day patient discharges, 2 
million Accident and Emergency attendances, 9 million Specialist Outpatient Clinic 
attendances (clinical and allied health), 6 million primary care attendances and 2 million 
community outreach visits. It is also the largest public corporation in Hong Kong, hiring 
64,000 employees, near to 2% of the working population in Hong Kong. In financial 
terms, the government allocates 14% of the public general expenditure to the HA. The 
provision of services in the HA is divided into 7 hospital clusters, each serving 0.5 million 
to 2 million population of respective geographic districts in Hong Kong. Cluster 
Managers are responsible for coordinating the services among different hospitals and 
clinics within the clusters, with a view to create a continuum of care within the same 
geographical setting throughout patients’ episode of illness - from its acute phase through 
to convalescence and rehabilitation, and community after-care. (Hong Kong Hospital 
Authority, 2016)    
With a budget and manpower which is only one-tenth of that of the HA, the Department 
of Health (DH, the Medical and Health Department before 1988) is responsible for public 
and community health, such as education and prevention of infectious decisions. While 
healthcare includes both “health” (public health) and “medical” (treatment) in a broad 
sense, our further discussion of healthcare refers to the latter. In contrast to the dominant 
status of modern scientific (western) medicine, the role of Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TMC) is rather a supplement to the private primary healthcare, providing 10% of 
outpatient services in Hong Kong (Holliday, 2003, p.88). Despite recent efforts of the 
government to develop some TMC centres for teaching and research, TMC has never 
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been a formal part of public healthcare services. For instance, the output reported in 
Annual Reports of HA does not include TMC. 
1.3.2. The government’s role as sponsor  
While the government bureaucracy handed off the provision of healthcare to HA as an 
arms’ length public corporation in 1991, it did not bring any significant changes to the 
direct state funding in public healthcare as the government is still responsible for over 
90% of its budget. In Hong Kong, the government’s general revenue provides the budget 
support for the public healthcare and there are no compulsory contributions from health 
insurance, medical saving or any other health tax. Paying less than 3% of inpatient cost 
and less than 10% of outpatient cost, Hong Kong citizens enjoy a heavily subsidized 
public healthcare (see Appendix Three for costs and fees of healthcare service in the HA). 
The universal healthcare in Hong Kong is somewhat a “slimmed-down version of 
Britain’s Nation Health Services” (Holliday, 2003, p.76) as the governments’ investment 
in public healthcare has been restricted to the inpatient services from the outset of the 
mid-1960s. There are no general practitioner contractors of the NHS or their equivalents 
in Hong Kong. Outpatient services are predominately delivered by private practitioners 
without government subsidies or public contributory programmes. While public 
hospitals account for 90% of hospital beds and services workload (in terms of bed days) 
in Hong Kong, public outpatient clinics have only 20% of the market share mainly 
serving the elders and low-income populations. Although a means test does not apply to 
public outpatient services and the service charge is minimal, the younger and better-off 
populations who are more sensitive to waiting time than price usually exercise choice by 
using private services (Food and Health Bureau, Hong Kong, 2008, Appendix C).  
The limited (universal yet modest) public outpatient services can again be explained by 
the nature of welfare in Hong Kong as a safety net which targets those who are the 
neediest: compared to inpatient services, financial risks involved in outpatient services 
are much more modest for most people, thus the provision and funding of the primary 
care can be left to market and the hospital care is centralized by the state. As a result, 
private medical expenditure accounts for half of the total medical expenditure in Hong 
Kong. This partial patterning of NHS model of direct state provision in secondary but 
not primary care is also a common phenomenon in other former British colonies where 
the welfare state is limited, such as Singapore and Malaysia (Ramesh and Holliday, 2001). 
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In a broad sense, the creation of HA even centralized the direct state provision: before 
that there were half of the hospital services provided by not-for-profit hospitals, which 
were publicly-funded yet independent (Scott & Co., 1985, Ch. 3); since that, those 
independent hospitals have been managed under a unified system as well as government 
hospitals, though considerable autonomy is allowed to HA and the government-run 
hospitals has been separated from the civil service.    
1.3.3. The government’s role as regulator  
Since the establishment of HA in 1991, the role of the government itself in public 
healthcare has shifted from direct service provider to a pure regulator. The legal 
framework of the Hospital Authority Ordinance (Ch. 113 of the Laws of Hong Kong) 
holds the HA accountable the Secretary for Health through its governing body, the Board 
of Directors at the Head Office (HAHO) as well as the Hospital Governing Committees 
(HGCs). Their members are appointed by the government and are responsible for guiding 
and overseeing HA Chief Executive and Hospital Chief Executives in formulating and 
implementing policy strategy. In order to facilitate the scrutiny of the HA’s affairs, “the 
Ordinance also requires the government to table in the Legislative Council the annual 
report together with the statement of accounts and the auditor's report on the accounts; 
the Director of Audit can conduct an examination into the economy and efficiency with 
which HA has expended its resources in performing its functions and exercising its 
powers, and to report to the President of the Legislative Council the results of such an 
examination; the Secretary for the Treasury can give directions to HA to limit its total 
expenditure in any financial year. Although HA will be provided with a considerable 
degree of financial autonomy, including the power to borrow money and to invest surplus 
funds, the exercise of these powers may be subject to direction in certain cases” 
(Legislative Council Handsard, 2 May 1990). In sum, the government is still responsible 
for overseeing the HA’s overall performance in proving public healthcare services and 
monitoring its finance.   
1.4. The 1991 reform  
The 1964 White Paper had marked the Hong Kong Government’s interest in developing 
public healthcare “to provide, directly or indirectly, low cost or free medical and personal 
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health services to the large section of the community which is unable to seek medical 
attention from other sources” (The Hong Kong Government, 1964). To actualize the idea, 
the 1974 White Paper further proposed a ten-year plan to expand public healthcare 
(Medical Development Advisory Committee, 1974). From 1974 to 1984, the 
government’s healthcare expenditure grew by 119 % in real terms against a population 
growth of 24%. By the mid-1980s, such a massive investment, as well as socio-economic 
progress and improvement in the environment of Hong Kong, had brought about a high 
standard of health which can be measured by an average life expectancy of 74 for men 
and 79 for women and the low occurrence of major communicable diseases (Scott & Co., 
1985, Ch. 3).   
However, the overall inefficiency of the system had become obvious confronted with the 
problem of overcrowding and low staff morale. The fragmentation of the public hospital 
networks (government-run versus not-for-profit hospitals) and the rigidity of the 
bureaucratic structure were blamed. Before the reform, public healthcare was directly 
delivered by the Medical and Health Department in the 1980s. The Department operated 
government hospitals and supervised publicly-funded not-for-profit hospitals. Those 
independent hospitals mainly served public patients for they relied heavily on 
government subsidy and they had been an integral part of public hospitals network for a 
long time. The entire public hospital network constituted almost 90% of hospital beds in 
the territory. In 1985, the government-commissioned Australian consultancy firm, WD 
Scott & Co. Pty Ltd, recommended a single body, outside but accountable to the 
government, to coordinate the entire public healthcare network and facilitate managerial 
and structural reform that makes it function like a corporation (Scott & Co., 1985). Under 
the Hospital Authority Ordinance, all public hospitals, both government-run and 
publicly-funded not-for-profit hospitals, were incorporated into a unified system. 
The government’s first three specific references for the Scott consultancy are (Ch. 1A):  
1) To review the organizational structure for managing government and publicly-
funded hospitals, with the aim of assessing the potential for achieving better 
integration between these hospitals on a functional basis and to advise whether 
this aim should be met through the establishment of autonomous authorities for 
managing government and publicly-funded hospitals; 
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2) To advise how more effective use might be made of existing resources in order 
to overcome the problems arising from overcrowded conditions in government 
and publicly-funded hospitals and to suggest what alternative methods or 
facilitates should be planned to relieve the load on hospital beds; and 
3) To examine the internal administration of government and publicly-funded 
hospitals with particular regard to roles of the senior medical and nursing staff 
and of non-medical administrators, and to advise on the changes needed to 
strengthen hospital administration, including the training required to enhance 
the administrative skills of senior medical and nursing staff. 
1.4.1. Inadequacy of civil servant structure  
The most compelling justification for the reform, as the Scott Report put it, was that “the 
system lacks the flexibility to be able to cope with the range of problems facing it at the 
present time. Many initiatives to ease the current situation are precluded on the grounds 
of civil service implications” (Ch. 3.6). The report further lists the potential benefits of 
locating the authority outside the civil services: 1) a greater measure of freedom for the 
addressing of those problem peculiar to medical service, without direct comparisons 
elsewhere in the civil service; 2) the development of new staff terms and conditions 
appropriate to medical services activities, free from those civil services wide implications 
which are inappropriate to hospitals; 3) flexibility to develop appropriate relationships, 
both formal and informal, with the public sector and those outside; 4) the capacity to 
innovate and develop new services rapidly in response to identified community needs; 5) 
the opportunity to develop and offer career prospects to non-medical staff without the 
probability of their being moved elsewhere in the civil services as a matter of course; 7) 
the ability to use public or private sector facilities, on a contract basis, for the construction, 
development and maintenance of facilitates and services; 8) an independent and objective 
approach to the difficult problems associated with staff employment in the new 
organization; and 9) the authority focussing its attention on its prime objective of using 
the available resources efficiently in the provision of medical services. (Ch. 5.2.4) It 
strongly suggested that the rigid civil servant structure had outlived and must be modified 
in order to rationalize the overall management of public healthcare system, especially the 
devolution of decision making power to the delivery level.  
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At the organizational level, structural reform was seen as a solution to the institutional 
inefficiency. It was believed that the new structure of HA as an independent corporation 
will facilitate: 1) the establishment of a clear line of accountability, for the management 
of the extensive resources devoted to the provision of acceptable standards of medical 
services in all government funded hospitals; 2) a high level of accountability in that 
senior authority staff can be held responsible for performance, and in the extreme, 
replaced if results are unacceptable; 3) the identification of inputs and outputs to and 
from the system for medical delivery, leading to the opportunity for some level of public 
scrutiny as appropriate; 4) the optimum use of resources throughout, in particular 
addressing the imbalance between bed occupancy rates in government and not-for-profit 
hospitals; and 5) wide ranging opportunities for career development for all staff in the 
system; this will lead to better staff morale and job satisfaction, and thus greater retention 
of staff and development of medical and other staff skills. (Ch. 5.2.1) 
1.4.2. The legislation  
The government listed four major objectives of HA when introducing the Ordinance to 
the Legislative Council in 1990. “First, it will bring the government and subvented 
hospitals together within an integrated public hospital system, and the Authority will 
offer common terms of service to its staff. The second benefit is that by being established 
outside the Civil Service, the Authority will be better placed to demonstrate flexibility 
and to respond quickly to changing demands. Third, there will be more effective and 
accountable hospital management, with greater devolution of authority from the central 
to the operational levels. Finally, community participation in the provision and operation 
of public hospital services will be enhanced”. (Legislative Council Hansard, 2 May 1990)  
At first glance, while the first objective tackles the imbalance of resources between 
government and not-for-profit hospitals, the others are mostly regarding a more 
decentralized system. At the time, it was believed that the rigidity of the bureaucratic 
system should be accountable for the institutional inefficiency of the public hospital 
network. However, the creation of HA was also driven by the need of management 
reform as the solution to the poor coordination across the entire public hospitals network.  
When identifying the problems and needs of public healthcare reform in Hong Kong, the 
Scott Report states, (my emphasis) 
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Throughout, the aim has been to develop a framework within which the system for the 
delivery of medical services in hospitals can become more effective and efficient…This 
new framework should have by its very nature, the inbuilt flexibility to respond to the 
many conflicting pressures which it will have to face, whilst retaining the strength to 
maintain the overall direction which the government, in its policy properties, and the 
people of Hong Kong wish it to follow.  
The critical need is to harness all available scarce resources and focus them on the 
provision and further development of medical services in hospitals. This calls for the 
effective integration of the structures at the top and the controlled devolution of 
responsibilities to the main operating units, the hospitals. (Scott & Co., 1985, p.2) 
The emphasis in management measures and control is materialized in the Hospital 
Authority Ordinance, which sets out the legal functions of HA as to “manage and develop 
the public hospitals system with the following objectives:  
1) to use hospital beds, staff, equipment and other resources efficiently to provide 
hospital services of the highest possible standard within the resources obtainable; 
2) to improve the efficiency of hospital services by developing appropriate 
management structures, systems and performance measures;  
3) to improve the environment in public hospitals to meet the needs of patients;  
4) to attract, motivate and retain qualified staff;  
5) to encourage public participation in the operation of the public hospitals system; 
and 
6) to ensure accountability to the public for the management and control of the 
public hospitals system.”  (Laws of Hong Kong, Ch. 113, Section 4) 
Such a choice of reform was based on a narrow scope that the government identified the 
major problems in the public healthcare system as the rigidity and lack of management. 
In this connection, “effective integration of the structures at the top” and the “controlled 
devolution of responsibilities” were emphasized.  
As Yip and Hsiao (2003) put it, the decentralization reform of public hospital system in 
Hong Kong can be characterized as “corporate control by central authority”. Firstly, the 
reform did not touch on the issue of financing. The government still directly funds the 
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HA with general taxation and money does not follow patients but is allocated by central 
planning. As purchaser cum supplier, the HA determines both the demand for and supply 
of hospitals services via a central planning mechanism (The Harvard Team, 1999). 
Secondly, as a result of the lack of market elements, the performance of the HA Head 
Office and individual hospitals is measured by the efficiency they achieve in meeting the 
targets of output predetermined by the central planning. The headquarter holds regular 
meetings between cluster managers, and hospitals, where hospital chief executives report 
key results for performance targets agreed in the annual plan and service agreements; 
then the hospital chief executives and the senior management at the department-level 
initiate planning adhering to the board product list. In a sense, the HA are acting as the 
corporation headquarter that relies on a centralized planning mechanism to manage and 
control individual hospitals. Through the Board of Members which is appointed by the 
Secretary for Health, the government can easily impose its policy objectives on the HA.    
1.4.3. Medical power and the centralized decentralization  
In Pollitt’s (2007, pp.375-376) terminology, the HA reform is an “administrative” and 
“non-competition” decentralization: the recipients of the spreading out of authority are 
managers and administrators but not elected politicians; and the authority is parcelled out 
on the basis of an allocation rather than or a competition which is more common way of 
decentralizing decision making in NPM. Such distinction may imply higher public 
accountability and overall coherence of national policy making. As discussed in the last 
section, the official claim of reform to strive for a clearer line of accountability and tighter 
fiscal control of the allegedly irresponsible and irresponsive public service is in line with 
a vision to enhancing the state’s capacity coping with ever-increasing demands for 
healthcare and its cost containment, efficiency and quality control.   
At the same time, the HA reform can also be characterized as “external” and “horizontal” 
(ibid). Authority is now transferred to a new organization instead of being parcelled out 
within an existing organization as an internal decentralization. It takes the form of 
“devolution” of power to entities that are legally separate from the state having their own 
“legal personality”, and are in contractual relationship with the reporting ministry. 
Compared to “delegation” of power to entities that remain legally indistinguishable from 
the state but which are given some autonomy and/or independence, this form of external 
decentralization gives more room for managers to act autonomously from the state 
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control. More importantly, it is observed that medical professionals took advantage of 
the reform to entrench themselves in the HA’s management structure, replacing the 
bureaucrats without opening up the system to non-medical general managers (Cheung, 
2002b). That means, the reform is not only a vertical decentralization but also a 
horizontal decentralization in which professional experts have considerable discretion 
and control on policy process based on networks and partnerships.  
For instance, all Hospital Clusters Directors in HA are doctors; as of now, only 4 out of 
41 Chief Executives of public hospitals or institutes are not medically qualified (Hong 
Kong Hospital Authority, 2016); in contrast, doctors comprise only less than 10% of the 
Regional General Managers and District General Managers in the NHS (Ham, 2009, 
p.33). In addition, as aforementioned, markets were absent in the HA reform and the role 
of the HA as the monopolistic supplier and purchaser in public healthcare remained 
unchanged. So why did the reformers prefer “command and control” under professional 
dominance over the market which is a common NPM practice to discipline public service 
providers, if the reform was to favour the medical power?   
Alternatively, Cheung (1995; 2002a) offers a public choice explanation seeing the 
coalition of the colonial government and medicine as the prime driver of the HA reform. 
First of all, the reform was rather a strategy of the colonial government to “de-politicize 
performance evaluation of the public sector, hence reducing the pressure for greater 
political accountability” (p. 248). Under a partial yet rapid democratization of the 
legislature prior to the handover of sovereignty to China in 1997, the colonial government 
was facing increasingly turbulent and pluralist social forces in social policy. To help play 
down political tensions, the reform was presented as a management improvement in 
order to “managerialise” politically loaded health policy issues. At the same time, 
Cheung underlines the medical profession as an emerging power in the Department of 
Health demanding a more balanced power-sharing regime against their administrative 
officer counterparts in the Health Ministry. Taken together, the creation of the HA was a 
part of the bureau-shaping strategy to re-delineate the policy secretary (ministry) – 
department relationship. By the agencification reform, the Health Ministry avoided 
blame on the failure of healthcare delivery while preserving her policy and resources 
control through framework agreements with the HA. In return, the reform granted 
managerial and micro-budget autonomies to departmental officials as executive agents. 
In this sense, efficiency as a reform theme was just a convenient platform for 
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reconfiguration of that institutional relationship (see also Yeun, 1994 for a similar public 
choice explanation for the HA reform).  
This interpretation sheds some light to our discussion on NPM reforms in Hong Kong as 
a centralized decentralization process: the state relies very much on the medical 
profession as an agent to govern healthcare for its legitimation function to de-politicalize 
decisions in health policy. At the same time, the decentralization has to be a controlled 
one safeguarding the state’s ultimate control against the “turbulent and pluralist social 
forces”. The decentralization therefore has to be an administrative and non-competitive 
one to maintain a tight central planning and co-coordination; while the medical 
profession is the chosen state partner receiving its external and horizontal devolution of 
power in order to legitimize (de-politicalize) health policy. In Chapter 2 we will further 
explore this particular arrangement in welfare production as corporatism, and its 
implications for the power dynamics between the state and sectoral interests of producers 
(medical professionals) in governing healthcare systems.  
The story of the HA reform does not end in the 1990s. As Cheung has also observed 
(2002b, pp.352-353), the relationship between the management and frontline doctors has 
intensified since the establishment of the HA in 1991. Among others, the HA has 
developed ever-excessive managerialism with squeezed planning and targets. Meanwhile, 
when HA experienced its first budget deficits in 2000, it introduced measures (for 
instance streamlining services and requesting hospitals to reduce their expenses by 
“productivity gain” program) aiming at improving efficiency and hired new junior 
doctors on less attractive terms, which caused deterioration in morale and inequity in pay 
among staff. As a result, public doctors joined citywide protest against the Government 
in July 2003 and launched a ten-year long lawsuit against the HA’s denial to their 
overtime pay (Yuen, 2005). The cleavage in the medical sector and public doctors’ 
resistance against their professional peer managers indicate that the HA systems cannot 
be simply be labelled as doctors’ captive. Rather, in a governance perspective, we argue 
that it is an uneasy balance between the state and the medical profession based on the 
latter’s re-stratification: “medical elites” are an emergent group who act as the proxies 
for the state control in healthcare while “rank-and-files” are subject to tighter surveillance. 
With the guide of the Re-Stratification Thesis (Freidson, 1994), in Chapter 3 we will seek 
a further conceptual crystallization of the medicine elites’ role as both the receivers of 
the decentralization of state power and the agents of centralizing state control.        
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1.5. Research questions 
This chapter has outlined the major background and conceptual issues regarding the 
Hong Kong Hospital Authority as a typical case of professional-led governance in 
healthcare. We started at a phenomenal level asking:  
1) Who governs healthcare? The state or medicine? To what extent does the HA’s 
governance reflect state control or professional hegemony? 
Why the decentralization of healthcare in Hong Kong is an administrative and 
non-competitive one to maintain a tight central planning and co-coordination, 
while the medical profession is the chosen state partner receiving power via both 
external and horizontal devolution?  
Why do we have a professional-led model that is dubbed “medical hegemony” 
in local political discourse, while ordinary professionals are feeling alienated 
from the Hospital Authority in New Public Management reforms?   
Chapter 2 will try to put these phenomenal questions into perspective by questioning:  
2) What are the relative positions / autonomies of the state and welfare state 
professionals in welfare production and politics?  What are the possible ways of 
organizing welfare production? To what extent can the HA’s governance be 
defined as a state-centric, society-centric or corporatist models?   
Are policy networks pluralistic or asymmetric in Hong Kong? What are the 
characteristics of the health policy communities where medicine is co-opted? 
What are their implications?  
Chapter 3 will further apply the welfare governance literature to the healthcare sector. 
Drawing on the state-centric, society-centric and corporatist models, the discussion will 
be guided by the following questions:  
3) What are the challenges for medicine’s dominance and autonomy in healthcare 
management from the state control and other social actors? How does medicine 
cope with those challenges? In particular, how do the state and medicine manage 
to stabilize the health policy community? 
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What are the characteristics of such a bargain, known as welfare corporatism? 
What are the implications for the power dynamics between the state and sectoral 
interests of producers (medical professionals) in governing healthcare systems, 
as well as the internal changes within medicine, known as “re-stratification”?    
Chapter 4 will explore the approach to researching physician managers who are the 
pivotal players in healthcare governance, situated in the middle stratum of re-stratified 
medicine and bridging rank-and-file practitioners and the policy/managerial agendas. 
The guiding questions are:   
4) What can we learn from previous studies of physician managers? How can they 
inform the development of the Re-stratification Thesis? Drawing on them, how 
can we examine their social identification with or loyalty to the organization or 
profession?  
Chapter 5 will turn to discuss methodological issues facing this study:  
5) What are the rationales for this study to adopt a qualitative case study approach 
using elite interview as the main tool of data collection?  How can it address the 
potential criticisms regarding objectivity and reliability in recruiting 
interviewees and interpreting their narratives?      
Chapter 6 will unpack the empirical findings of the study led by the following questions:   
6) To what extent are physician managers developing a manager-self at the 
expense of their clinician role, or bringing a clinician-self to their manager role? 
Do their positions as frontline and pure management divide them with two 
different types of identity work? If so, what do they look like in these different 
dimensions?   
Chapter 7 will  attempt to offer a new analytical approach to explore the blurred identity 
work of physician managers: 
7) To what extent is the dichotomy of profession-oriented and organization-
oriented identities valid? At the interface of different social forces driving 
healthcare reforms and the forefront of changes, how do physician managers 
negotiate between them? What are the implications for our understanding of the 
power dynamics in healthcare systems and Re-stratification Thesis?   
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While the corporatist setting in healthcare is a contested arena of professional 
and managerial powers, how is the equilibrium achieved so both the state and 
sectoral interests can be represented? Given that they see themselves as 
rationalizers as well as advocates of medicine, how do they reconcile those 
conflicting demands? 
The remainder of this thesis will be organized around this series of questions set out 
above.  
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Chapter 2                                                                                                   
Theorising governance and welfare production 
2.1. Introduction  
This study is set within the wider context of healthcare reform debates in which 
governance is a core concept. In this chapter, we will first discuss the major theories of 
governance regarding the balance of power between state and societal actors in welfare 
production. Their application to healthcare governance will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
First of all, a clearer definition is needed for the discussion of the widely used term 
“governance”. It has become a part of day-to-day vocabulary for management or 
leadership, particularly of a corporate body or organization, for example good 
governance; its traditional use in political science and public administration is not much 
different from government, that is, literally, to rule or control with authority (Bell and 
Hindmoor, 2009, p.xiii). Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1991) define governance as “how 
people are ruled, and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated” (p.304). 
Similarly, Healey and Robinson (1992) define governance as to “the use of legitimate 
authority exercised in the application of government power and in the management of 
public affairs” (p.163). Following this, the World Bank (1992, p.1) adopts a narrow 
definition of governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management 
of a country’s economic and social resources for development”.  
However, such essentialist definition is rather tautological and provides little clarification 
and empirical relevance. With regard to the public sector reform in Western countries 
since the 1980’s, Rhodes (1996, pp.652-653) argues that governance signifies “a change 
in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed 
condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed”. In this view, 
there are at least six uses of governance as a vogue word for reforming the public sector 
(ibid,  653-659; Rhodes, 2007; see also Hirst, 2000, pp.14-22 for a similar classification) 
as: 1) “the minimal state” (a strategy to redefine the extent and form of public 
intervention in social provision, replacing ownership with regulation of [quasi-] markets 
and networks of public agencies); 2) “corporate governance” (a more commercial style 
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of management departing from traditional public service ethos, emphasising on 
accountability and transparency); 3) “good governance” (an efficient public service with 
accountable administration of public funds as defined by the World Bank to promote 
liberal democracy); 4) “the new public management” (less government [rowing or 
service delivery] but more governance [steering by entrepreneurial concern with 
competition, markets, customers and outcomes]); 5) “a socio-cybernetic system” (a new 
centre-less pattern of socio-political interactions in social policy backed by shared goals 
instead of formal authority, for example, self- and co-regulation, public-private 
partnerships, co-operative management, and joint entrepreneurial ventures, at local and 
international level); and 6) “self-organizing networks”.  
In short, social scientists tend to use the term to describe a political phenomenon of 
transition of public policy “from government to governance” and even of the exercise of 
“governance without government”. It is a thesis that the state has been “hollowed out” or 
decentred and must work with a range of non-state actors in order to achieve its goals. 
As Stoker (1998, p.17) suggests, governance “is ultimately concerned with creating the 
conditions for ordered rule and collective action. The outputs of governance are not 
therefore different from those of government. It is rather a matter of difference in 
processes”. It may be defined as “a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but 
also beyond government” (ibid). In a relatively society-centric account, it may be seen 
as the state engaging non-actors into public policy process and steering such participation, 
or “government of governance” (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009, p.xiii; Kjaer, 2004, p.3). With 
special attention to the field of welfare production, a third perspective, namely 
Corporatist theory of governance, will be proposed to assimilate the state-centric and 
society-centric arguments.  
2.2. From government to governance:  Society-centric Theory  
2.2.1. Pluralistic networks  
Rhodes (1996) gives special theoretical attention to the use of governance as “self-
organizing, inter-organizational networks”, which are the permutation of government 
and the private and voluntary sectors. These networks are made up of organizations that 
need to exchange resources (i.e. money, information and expertise) to achieve their 
objectives, to maximize their influence over outcomes, and to avoid becoming dependent 
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on other players in the game. The network form of governance highlights “reputation, 
trust, reciprocity and mutual interdependence” (p.659) and therefore is an alternative to 
markets and hierarchies. As a result, integrated networks resist government steering and 
develop their own policies and mould their environments. 
Integrating those essential elements of governance of public sector reform 
aforementioned, Rhodes (ibid) refers governance mainly to “self-organizing, inter-
organizational networks” of which the characteristics are: “(1) interdependence between 
organizations. Governance is broader than government, covering non-state actors. 
Changing the boundaries of the state meant the boundaries between public, private and 
voluntary sectors became shifting and opaque; (2) continuing interactions between 
network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared 
purposes; (3) game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game 
negotiated and agreed by network participants; and (4) a significant degree of autonomy 
from the state. Networks are not accountable to the state; they are self-organising. 
Although the state does not occupy a privileged, sovereign position, it can indirectly and 
imperfectly steer networks” (p.660).  
Rhodes further argues, “these networks complement markets and hierarchies as 
governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and 
co-ordination” while “interdependence, fragmentation, the limits to central authority, 
agency autonomy and attenuated accountability are all features of governance as 
alternative to government” (ibid). Therefore, effective governance requires for 
“intergovernmental management” (IGM) to bridge that gap. In networks of governance, 
the effective manager plays a facilitative role with two broad strategies: 1) game 
management or identifying the conditions which will sustain joint action; and 2) network 
structuring which involves changing the rules of the game. There are twelve management 
approaches to IGM, including “grantsmanship” or the several members of the network 
acquiring grants from several sources for numerous purposes; “process revision”, or 
“smoothing grant management through managerial process changes, such as joint 
applications”; “bargaining and negotiation”; “problem solving” through “mutual 
adjustment”; “co-operative management” or management by agreement; and “political 
games” such as lobbying. (ibid, p.664)  
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2.2.2. The theory of the state  
In this sense, managing policy networks has become the core of public management. In 
an institutional approach, governance thus be defined as “the setting of rules, the 
application of rules, and the enforcement of rules” (Kjaer, 2004, p.10), or at its simplest, 
a “system of rules” (March and Olsen, 1995). “Meta-governance” is a concept developed 
in the mid-1990s to conceptualize such networked interactions where the state actors 
confer a degree of input and output legitimacy on policy networks and their activities. 
While the state plays an important role in managing networks, policy networks are 
autonomous and decentred and the state’s capacity to intervene is restricted (Fawcett, 
2013): the use of governance as policy networks is also rooted in pluralist theory seeing 
the state as a “broker” or even a “weathervane”; the autonomy of the state is 
circumscribed by the preferences or the interests of most of the strongest groups in 
society (Levi-Faur, 2012, p.12).  
With regard to the theory of the state, this use of governance denotes a thesis of “the 
retreat of state” from a strong role of rowing and steering in society, losing these roles to 
other non-state actors. In the first place, the state limits it role to steering and leaves the 
rowing function to the society as the main body of public services delivery. Subsequently, 
the state loses some of its steering role to other non-state actors for they have become an 
integral part of the policy network and developed as forces driven by their own 
orientations. The state “becomes a collection of inter-organizational networks made up 
of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate” 
(Rhodes, 1997, p.57); the state is also “de-governmentalized since it no longer 
monopolizes the governing of the general well-being of the population in the way that it 
used to do. The idea of a sovereign state that governs society top-down through laws, 
rules and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by new ideas about a 
de-centered governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust” (Sørsensen and 
Torfing, 2005, pp.195-196). Therefore, “the growth of governance reduced the ability of 
the core executive to act effectively, making it less reliant on a command operating code 
and more reliant on diplomacy” (Rhodes, 2007, p.6).  
In short, the idea of governance indicates a transformation of public policy process from 
“government”, which is the formally structured authority of state actors, to “governance”, 
which is a center-less network where non-state actors take part in governing public 
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services. Power and authority “drift away upwards toward transitional markets and 
political institutions and downward toward local or regional government, domestic 
business communities and non-governmental organizations” (Levi-Faur, 2012, p.11). 
This transformation is best epitomized with the pervasive use of privatization, quasi-
markets, NGOs and public organizations as alternative tools to transitional bureaucracy 
of public services delivery. For example, healthcare reform in the UK transformed the 
command-and-control mode of bureaucracy of the National Health Service (NHS) into 
networks of independent organizations - the hospital trusts independent from government 
as providers and local Health Authorities as commissioners (later Primary Care Trusts 
[PCTs] and then Clinical Commissioning Groups [CCGs]).  Under this network mode of 
governance, the core executive of the state is rather governing at distance with other 
semi-autonomous actors in a partnership. Neither hospital providers nor commissioners 
dominate the policy process as they are functionally differentiated and need to exchange 
resource with each other.  To ensure the delivery of services, framework agreements and 
quality assurance agencies are used instead of hierarchical orders from the Department 
of Health. The state also introduces other actors in civil society, such as patients and 
community representatives, to the boards of hospital trusts and Health Authorities in 
order to legitimize the input of the policy process. The state actors, healthcare 
professionals and civil society are now acting in a more pluralistic setting; the policy 
process can be seen as a result of the interaction of those actors in the network.       
2.3. Asymmetries of policy networks in reality: a critique of pluralism  
Although Rhodes’ idea that contemporary government is a “differentiated polity” or 
“governance without government” has become “the new orthodoxy” in policy studies 
(Marsh, 2008, p.735), there are some obvious shortcomings of this model in appreciating 
1) the role of the state in governance and 2) the structure of policy networks.  
Using the Asymmetric Power model, Marsh, Richard and Smiths (2001, p.234) address 
some interrelated questions which are core to Rhodes’ Differentiated Polity model: has 
governance replaced government? How important are policy networks in policy-making 
and who dominates these networks? Is the executive segmented? To what extent are the 
relations within the core executive and between the core executive and interest groups 
based upon the exchange of resources and power dependency? To what extent has the 
state been hollowed out? With his empirical studies on the UK civil service, Marsh, 
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Richard and Smith (ibid, pp.198-199) argues, while contemporary policy process is 
characterised by exchange relations, many of them are asymmetric and the government 
has always been the most important actor. Firstly, the distribution of resources between 
the government and interest groups is an asymmetric one. The government has the unique 
authority to make law and control financial resources that non-state actors need. As a 
result, the government controls, and can always effectively cut off, those groups’ access 
to the policy process. Secondly, there is a pattern of closed networks where the economic 
and professional groups have privileged access and they, plus the government, dominate. 
Thirdly, there is a self-perpetuating element that groups privileged in tight policy 
networks are those who have already possessed resources, and the network membership 
itself becomes a key resource. Therefore, “networks and plurality do not confirm 
pluralism. Power seems concentrated in the hands of a limited number of interests” 
(p.199).  
2.3.1. Closed policy communities, insider groups and formal co-option  
Such understanding of network governance echoes Jordan’s (1981, p.105) definition of 
the term “policy community” as “a comparatively small circle of participants that civil 
servants might define as being of relevance for any particular policy”. Indeed, Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992) have distinguished between “policy communities” and “issue networks”. 
While the former are highly integrated networks where relationships are stable and 
exchange is based on exclusive narrow interests, the latter are unstable networks which 
are loosely interdependent, less predictable, with a large number of members, usually 
serving a consultative function which is limited to particular policy issues. In both cases, 
the state exercises significant control as the constant actor picking its partner in the policy 
process.  
Grant (1995) adds that there are “insider” and “outsider” interest groups in the policy 
process in respect of how far they are recognized or legitimized by governments. Insider 
groups are closely involved in testing policy ideas at the early stage of policy formulation 
and are expected to play by the rules of the game, for example, to regularly sit on a 
government committee and accept the confidentiality of the discussions. Saward (1990) 
argues, some insider groups do better out of formal relations with government than others 
for they may have any of the six resources to contribute to the policy process: “non-
positional authority” (skills, expertise and status), “size”, “group cohesiveness”, “labour 
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inputs” and control of these, “capital inputs” and “the salience of group values to the 
wider society”. In return, those resourceful groups receive government resources of 
“positional authority” and “access to government”, institutionally incorporated into 
government decision-making as an adviser, informant or colleague.  Based on the 
mixture of the resources those groups provide to the government, there are three ideal 
types of formal co-option: “value-based”, “expertise-based” and “production-based”.  He 
suggests that co-option of health consumers to the government groups is at best a “value-
based” one while they rely on a narrow value set and may lack wider support. In contrast, 
medical professional organizations are high in all these resources, co-opted on an 
“expertise” and “production” basis and exercising more influence on policy.     
Typically, medical associations are frequently consulted or directly involved as producer 
groups in health policy. In the UK, the Department of Health has also granted insider 
status to the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI). In addition to 
regular meetings between the industry, senior officials, and ministers, civil servants are 
recruited by ABPI to help it negotiate with government over drug regulation and prices 
(May, 2008, p.117). On the other hand, patient consumer groups are usually issue-
oriented, divided by objectives, interests, size, structure, strategy, tactics and degree of 
stability. Whether they have aggregated themselves into networks with resources (such 
as expertise) which policy makers may need and value is contentious (Allsop, Baggott 
and Jones, 2002, p.61). The fragmented character of health consumer “issue networks” 
may make those groups the “outsiders” of the health policy community (May, 2008, 
p.119).   
2.3.2. Explaining the asymmetries 
In sum, the inclusion of civil society within the policy process is highly structured and 
biased. Firstly, the state has always been a constituent actor in steering policy networks 
for its unique functions. Secondly, there are structural advantages for some interest 
groups among others to exercise control in networks. Such closed networks are not based 
on the open-access of interest groups, neither is it competitive. Rather, it is a state-
sponsored domination. The reality that power relations in policy networks are always 
asymmetric suggests the pluralist approach of understanding governance is inadequate.  
So what exactly is the force forging the asymmetric structure of governance or policy 
networks? Fawcett (2013) suggests that there are two functional interpretations of the 
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state in answering this question. The first one is the Weberian approach seeing recent 
trends in the public sector reform of Western governments as a “strengthened 
bureaucratic and political control” (p.5) responding to the changing policymaking 
environment and its increased complexity, particularly “by the role played by central 
agencies, using tools such as performance management, strategic management, budget 
and personnel controls, soft law and trust and values” (p.6). The second one is the Critical 
approach seeing the state’s autonomy in governance as circumscribed by “the social 
political structure that has already existed in society, including the organization of 
interests” (Kajer, 2011, p.111) and that the state’s privileged role in governance is 
“necessarily redefined as a result of the more general re-articulation of the local, regional, 
national, and supranational levels of economic and political organization” (Jessop, 2004, 
p.67). We shall now turn to discuss those explanations in detail.  
2.4. “Government of governance”: State-centric Theory 
2.4.1. The state’s institutional capacities and functions 
Similar to Marsh, Pierre and Peters (2000) develop a state-centric account of governance 
seeing it as a process in which “the state plays a leading role, making priorities and 
defining objectives”, increasing “the intervention capacity of the state by bringing non-
state actors into the making and implementation of public policy” (p.12). In detail, there 
are four classic activities that are components of governance for dominant actors (Pierre 
and Peters, 2005, p.3). 
1) “Articulating a common set of priorities for society”. Such process must 
logically include a mediating role exercised by political institutions that are 
perceived as legitimate in a democratic manner, which is the traditional sense 
of government.  
2) “Coherence”. There is a need for those goals to be consistent and coordinated. 
Networks and markets, as alternative forms of governance are generally not 
capable of creating coherence, especially coherence across a large range of 
policy areas.  
3) “Steering”. There is the need to find ways of achieving those goals and steering 
the society to attain those goals, that is, the capacity and autonomy of the state 
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to mix “hierarchy” (direct state provision and regulation, for services that 
involve basic citizens’ rights), “market” (for services that involve some 
possibilities of pricing and exchange and efficiency goals are paramount) and 
“network” (for not marketable services and that involve close interactions with 
clients) as different means of governance. 
4) “Accountability”. This is to hold those actors delivering governance to the 
society to be accountable for their actions while it is a particular weakness for 
the nongovernmental actors, given that markets and networks in particular tend 
to have little concept of accountability compared to the state. (ibid, pp.3-5) 
Pierre and Peters (ibid, p.5) argue that a high degree of “institutional capacity” of the 
state to perform those four functions is necessary for effective application of governance. 
First, the “institutional resources” such as staff, financial resources, professionalism 
expertise and legitimacy. Second, the “institutional integrity” regarding the two 
fundamental activities of governance – goal setting and creating coherence – that 
promotes crosscutting interests independent from the captives of sectorial interests. Third, 
the “institutional ability to provide and process reliable information”. Institutions need 
contact points or channels of information to society in order to know the societal effects 
of previous decisions and make decisions which are appropriate. As a result, attempts “to 
eliminate government from governing may not only reduce the coherence of any 
governing that may be undertaken, but also reduce its democratic content” (ibid); 
governments must retain a central, if not exclusive, position in governance for those 
functional imperatives of the state in maintaining legitimacy.    
2.4.2. A spectrum from “government” to “governance”  
In this connection, Pierre and Peters (2005, pp.10-12) further suggest that the State-
centric Model, instead of Rhodes’ notion of “governance without government”, stands 
out in a spectrum of five possible models of state-society interaction operating among 
contemporary democratic systems (from “étatiste” [the state dominates most], “liberal-
democratic”, “state-centric”, “Dutch governance” and “governance without government” 
[the state plays the least role]). The “institutional capacity” of these models of 
governance are determined by two variables: first, the authority of the state, that is, the 
capacity of the state “to make and enforce binding decisions on the society…without 
significant involvement of or competition from societal actors” (p.46); second, the 
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information gathering and processing capacity of the state. The state must “be in close 
contact with the society and utilize social information openly and accurately when 
governing” and “engage in a formal or informal exchange of power over decisions for 
that information” (p.47).  At one end of the spectrum, the “étatiste model” ranks very 
high on the variable of authority but lacks connection with society, making it a powerful 
but often blind governor. At the other end, the “governance without government” model 
ranks high on information but lacks the legitimate authority to make effective decisions, 
especially those that apply across the range of society. Balancing between the decisional 
capability and sources of social intelligence, the “state-centric model” has the highest 
governance capacity. 
Here again we see an implicit functional interpretation of the state’s role in the 
asymmetric structure of policy process - the real choice of models of governance in 
modern societies are rarely at the two ends of the spectrum (“étatiste” or “governance 
without government”) as the functional imperatives of the state is to maintain its capacity 
in governance by balancing between its authority and connection to society.  
2.4.3. State-centric Relation Approach: governance as the government’s tools 
Based on Pierre and Peters’ state-centric notion, Bell and Hindmoor (2009) develop the 
State-centered Relational Approach seeing governance as “the tools, strategies and 
relationships used by governments to help govern” (p.2). As they conceptualize, the state 
now has a much broader range of policy instruments at its disposal, including “hard 
instruments”, such as hierarchy, regulation, markets and contracts, but also “soft 
instruments”, such as persuasion, community engagement and network associations. To 
specify, there are five distinct modes of governance as the state’s options in forming and 
implementing public policy (pp.16-18):  
1) “Hierarchy”, or top-down governance (direct allocation of resources through 
taxing and spending, order, rule, regulatory, legal and enforcement measures by 
governments and state agencies);  
2) “Persuasion” (inculcating modes of self-discipline or compliance in target 
subjects trying to change their attitudes and behaviour);  
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3) “Markets and contract” (for example, contracting out services to private firms, 
encouraging the development of public–private partnerships, privatising state-
owned industries, deregulating the markets);  
4) “Community engagement” (for example, deliberative polling surveys, public 
hearings, focus groups); and  
5) “Association” (the state works with firms, private associations and interest-
groups to develop and implement policy).  
Bell and Hindmoor (ibid) argue that, the autonomy of the state in governance should not 
be overlooked for it can select and mix the “instruments of governance” that it thinks fit, 
including hierarchical authority among market and networks, if necessary, for particular 
policy arenas. Therefore, the use of network in governance does not necessarily imply a 
loss in the state’s control on society as long as it is the choice of the state. Instead, the 
state remains the pivotal player in all forms of partnerships and mixes of the modes of 
governance as its governance strategies. For Bell and Hindmoor, “[g]overnment and 
governance are not mutually exclusive alternatives between which societies must choose” 
(p.12). 
Another crucial argument Bell and Hindmoor make here is that, the state has also 
enhanced its capacity to govern by its closer relations with non-state actors strengthening 
its own institutional and legal capacities in managing the society. Via “markets and 
contracts”, governments actually enhance or restore their power to achieve their 
economic and social objectives, while minimising any loss of efficiency, especially when 
the practice of markets that the state created are managed markets rather than free 
markets (p.17); via “community engagement”, governments seek to enhance their 
democratic credentials and legitimacy through the devolution of decision-making powers 
to local citizens and communities (pp.17-18); via “association” as corporatist and private-
interest government arrangements, governments offer business associations and other 
groups influence over the contents of public policy in exchange for public support, access 
to information, and direct assistance in implementing policy. Bell and Hindmoor refer to 
this mode of governance as what Rhodes calls “network”. They argue that the 
involvement of non-state actors in the policy process actually has a long history and that 
now “networks in which public and private sector actors exchange resources” (p.18) have 
proliferated with a larger scale of interest group involvement and the legitimacy accorded.  
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2.4.4. The theory of the state 
As Fawcett (2013) put it, the state centric-account of governance sees that “the state still 
remains responsible for securing the conditions necessary for the institutional integration 
and social cohesion of society” (p.6). The focus of governance is not only on networks, 
but the “coordination of complexity” by the government between hierarchy, markets and 
networks, as three different modes of governing. In governance, the state actually gains 
power by extending its influence into previously uncharted territory, “including a wide 
range of businesses, voluntary groups and charities as it has recruited, and then regulated, 
those non-state actors” (ibid). In a Weberian perspective, the rationalization project of 
modern societies therefore is not retrenched with the decline of the state but ever 
entrenched with the state’s coordination and regulation efforts.    
The use of governance as a spectrum from government to governance leaves some room 
for researchers to empirically examine, in a particular country and policy area, the actual 
combination of different modes of governance (hierarchies, markets and networks) and 
its impact on the state’s authority. The State-centred Relational Approach of Bell and 
Hindmoor may also enriches our discussion of how the state excises and enhances its 
autonomy with the five instruments, including networks, in the state-centric model of 
state-society interaction. However, while Pierre and Peter suggest that the functional 
imperatives of the state to perform the highest institutional capacity yield an 
institutionalised relation between the state and society actors in state-centric networks, 
in reality, governments are not always rational in adopting the most effective mode of 
governance: it is an empirical question whether the state is performing the highest 
institutional capacities; in theory, state-society interaction could be state-centric or 
society-centric. So, in the empirical world, does the use of markets and networks in 
public policy challenge the authority of the state, and to what extent is the state 
autonomous in placing its “shadow of hierarchy” on networks and markets (Jessop, 1997; 
Scharpf, 1994)?   
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2.5. The synthesis of State- and Society- centric Theories 
2.5.1. The Critical approach to understanding governance  
Critical Theory is an alternative explanation for the asymmetric structure of policy 
networks. In this perspective, the traditional governance literature has some 
shortcomings in bringing political economy to the discussion about governance, 
especially the autonomy of the state. As Davies (2011, p.144) argues, “the study of 
networks should be placed squarely in the political economy tradition, examining how 
they reproduce and embed power asymmetries or generate conflict and resistance”. For 
the critical theorists, governance as a structure or process of policy making does not 
emerge out of the void but is shaped by the broader power relations in society “within a 
structurally-inscribed, strategically selective context, which asymmetrically privileges 
some outcomes over others” (Fawcett, 2013, p.7).   
There are two major points of the critical analysis. First, as the state-centric account 
suggests, the state is autonomous in governance with the “shadow of hierarchy” and its 
ability to intervene where necessary. As Jessop (2004, p.70) suggests, the state plays an 
ongoing role in: “judiciously mixing the balance of hierarchy, markets and networks in 
order to achieve the best outcome from the viewpoint of those engaged in 
metagovernance”. Second, more importantly, the state’s autonomy in governance is 
indeed circumscribed by the social-political structure that has already existed in society, 
including “the organization of interests, the strength of civil society, and traditions of 
state-society interaction” (Kajer, 2011, p.111). Jessop (2004, p.6) refers this to the state’s 
privileged role as “the highest instance of bourgeois democratic political accountability”.  
The politics of cost containment in health policy is a good example. In the critical 
perspective, public healthcare is no more than “social consumption” and “social 
investment” that lowers the cost (wages) and improves the productivity of the workforce, 
reproducing and legitimizing the capitalist order (George and Wilding, 1994). Although 
policy networks appear to be more pluralistic nowadays, the engagement of citizens and 
various interest groups hardly undermines the prime agenda of efficiency and budget 
control in public services. The classic notion of Klein (1990) of “the politics of double 
bed” in the NHS reveals the “implicit rationing function” (Mechanic, 1978) performed 
by the medical profession - in the name of clinical judgement, the state buffers social 
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conflicts set around its unpopular yet necessary decisions in distributing scarce medical 
resources; at the same time, with the input of expert labour and legitimacy to healthcare 
services, the medical profession has gained a privileged place as the formal partner of 
the government in governing the health sector. As Moran (1999) suggests, the wider 
community interest of maximizing welfare entitlement in health policy is compromised 
by a state/industrial complex, and the interests of capital is a part of it. 
In summary, while the society-centric account of governance as networks in a pluralist 
approach has exaggerated the extent to which the state has been undermined; the state-
centric account of governance as government’s device in the Weberian approach tend to 
ignore the fact that state authority is exercised in certain social political structure of 
interests, and basically on behalf of them. The critical approach therefore can be seen as 
an attempt to clarify the position of the state by suggesting the rule setting or steering 
functions it plays in policy networks are largely structured by those dynamics of interests.  
If we return to the discussion of Marsh and colleagues’ Asymmetric Power Model earlier 
in this chapter, we would find that the asymmetric policy networks refer not only to the 
state’s power over society actors but also that of some society actors over others. The 
corporatist mode of governance in welfare is a typical case of this collusion of special 
interests and the state in dominating policy networks.   
2.5.2. The Corporatist model of governance  
Bell and Hindmoor (2009) define “associative governance” or “corporatist arrangement” 
as “governance through a formal partnership with interest groups” in the formulation and 
implementation of public policy. With respect to the complex, and usually secret, 
negotiations between expert producers with public agencies in many of economic and 
welfare organizations, Corporatist Theory provides an alternative view to Society-centric 
Theory by questioning whether: (a) there is some rough equivalence of influence among 
citizens and different interests within society; (b) the leadership of interest associations 
are ultimately under the control of the members; (c) the state is an essentially democratic 
or neutral set of institutions; and (d) there are opportunities for participation in interest 
group politics (Williamson, 1989, p.19). Nevertheless, Corporatist Theory does not see 
associative governance merely as one of the devices at the government’s disposal as Bell 
and Hindmoor define it in a state-centric account. 
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Indeed, Corporatist Theory emerged after the Second World War to describe the political 
economy of interest representation and policy formation in contemporary Western 
democracies - in contrast to the Classical Corporatism that flourished in the 20th-century 
Continental Europe as an authoritarian political system, Neo-/ Liberal Corporatism 
emphasises a regular process of negotiations and collaboration between state agencies 
and interest groups; while the former is based on functional interests arising from the 
division of labour in society along a hierarchy of corporate bodies, in the latter policy 
agreements are implemented through the latter’s ability and willingness to secure the 
compliance of their members. Given an emphasis on the bargaining between 
governments and producer groups, the essence of Corporatist Theory (as the shorthand 
of Neo-/Liberal Corporatism in this study) is more indicative of the autonomy and power 
of producer groups (accurately their peak associations) than the dominance of the state 
(Wallerstein, 1988, p. 1500).  
Corporatist theorists first focused on the tripartite bargaining between government, 
labour and capital on a national basis (marco- level), and extended their study to the 
phenomenon of the attainment of privileged positions by particularistic interest groups 
in sector-specific policies at the meso- (specific industry sector) and mirco- (firm) levels 
(ibid). For Williamson (1989), welfare production is the most noticeable case of 
corporatist arrangements at the meso-level, with respect to the power resources held by 
the professionals as key welfare producers that preclude the state from directly imposing 
authoritative decisions (p.169). He suggests, in “welfare corporatism”, “negotiation is a 
matter of necessity, not choice…the dependency relationship entailed in production 
politics means that the state has only influence, not control, over what changes the 
intervention might bring about and, therefore, over its direction and success” (p.170). 
Williamson (ibid) defines “welfare corporatism” as a system where “the state cannot 
intervene by means of authoritative regulation and allocations, but because of 
dependence upon others for the successful realization of intervention, has to negotiate 
with interested parties about the form the intervention will take”. He also suggests three 
reasons for why in many instances of welfare corporatism the state intervention is 
“largely powerless to achieve any change against the wishes of producers” (ibid): 1) 
producers can wield a range of sanctions that could adversely affect its effectiveness; 2) 
producers hold considerable amount of information relevant to its formulation and 
execution; and 3) producers are responsible for considerable degrees of judgement in the 
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face of incomplete knowledge and uncertainty. Therefore, “the public authorities cannot 
very readily hold to account the actions of producers, except on the rather tenuous one 
of having superior capacity of judgement” (ibid). For Williamson, the professionals in 
many aspects display the attributes in securing their position in corporatists arrangement: 
1) they enjoy a monopoly position based on their right to exercise particular skills of a 
body of theoretical knowledge; 2) they enjoy the rights to self-regulation; and 3) they 
enjoy the legitimacy acting in an altruistic or public regarding manner. (p.172) Medicine, 
as a strong profession, as we will discuss in later this chapter, is closest to this ideal type. 
For instance, a study of the British Medical Association in the 1960s identifies a 
corporatist attitude in the NHS that the medical professionals had already have some 
right to be consulted in the face of the limited authority enjoyed by government (Eckstein, 
1960, p.25). 
As Williamson (1989) also notices, despite the dependency of the state upon the 
professionals and their relatively strong position in the policy process according them 
considerable autonomy, they are not freestanding to the exercise of such autonomy 
outside the state’s authority. Firstly, the bulk of the welfare professionals are state 
employees that are a part of the state (p.176). The welfare professionals constitute 
“organized interests within the state system” while the “dominant state interest” (e.g. 
fiscal discipline), if threatened, will enter into negotiations to secure the necessary form 
of intervention (e.g. restrictions on the level of spending). In respect of the form of 
interest representation, “the influence of the professional is not transmitted in 
conventional competitive pressure group terms” (ibid), but in a less formally organized 
manner of medical representation or advice by individuals in public institutions. That is 
“professional representation” in the form of “representation by professionals”. More 
importantly, many of those representative professionals are full-time bureaucrats in the 
hierarchy of welfare services. Such functional representation bears a legitimatization 
function in the decision process, especially of rationing, mitigating the needs of outside 
representative bodies (ibid). Offe (1981) refers to this “attribution of public status” that 
the professional groups acquire as a “quasi-public status” by which the professional 
groups become an arm of the state’s policy-making and implementation apparatus. In 
short, the notion of welfare corporatism denotes a highly structured and closed policy 
network that the welfare professionals exercise control as the state employees and a part 
of its formal structure.   
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Secondly, the state sponsors the monopoly status of the professionals in welfare service. 
As Streeck and Schmitter (1985) suggest, this is “an alternative to direct state 
intervention and regulation” that the “public use of private organized interests” takes “the 
form of the establishment, under state licence and assistance, of private interest 
governments with devolved public responsibilities - of agencies of regulated self-
regulation of social groups with special interests that are made subservient to general 
interests by appropriately designed institutions” (p.128). In other words, the state offers 
a monopolized place in policy formulation and implementation and rights to self-
regulation to welfare professionals in exchange for their discipline and support.  The 
regulated self-regulation or private interest governments are specified with the 
“guaranteed access, compulsory membership and/or contributions, institutionalized 
forums of representation, centralized co-ordination, comprehensive scope, jurisdiction 
and control over member behaviour and delegated tasks of policy implementation” (ibid). 
To attain this, the contracting interest associations have to ensure their “capability for 
representing the interests and controlling the behaviour of their members (and where 
necessary outside mavericks), and an effective monopoly in their status as intermediaries 
for a given class, sector or profession” (ibid). Meanwhile, such processes “depend 
crucially on the response of one key interlocutor, namely the state, which must be willing 
and able to use its key resource: legitimate control over coercion and authoritative 
distribution of positions, to promote and/or protect such developments” (ibid). Therefore, 
while devolving public policy functions to private interest associations, the corporatist 
arrangements are not necessarily linked to direct intervention by the state but with 
intervention through quasi-public structures.  
We can take this account of corporatist arrangements in welfare as “functional state-
centric”, as it implies the functional imperatives of the state to perform its institutional 
capacities in order to achieve the highest effectiveness within certain quasi-public 
structures; while it is somehow “functional society-centric” seeing the state as having no 
real choice in picking its partners - if the state was to achieve the highest effectiveness, 
it must work with the most resourceful groups by offering them “public status” and the 
rights of regulated self-regulation or private interests governments.  
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2.6. Supporting evidences from organization researches  
So, how do the three distinctive governance models, namely Society-centric (Pluralist), 
State-centric and Corporatist, fit the reality of public governance? Let us first turn to a 
brief review of relevant debates in organization researches, which are deeply rooted in 
governance studies.  
2.6.1. Society-centric position  
The notion of the pluralistic structure of policy networks is confirmed with the tradition 
in organization studies that present an image of self-organizing policy networks. Knoke’s 
(1993) study on the elite networks of the US suggests that most of the elite power 
structures are “decentralized bargaining systems, rather than hierarchical systems 
controlled by a central economic elite” in which “the most important feature of a power 
structure is its multiple networks of interaction or of influence and domination” (pp.40-
41). In this sense, access to other resourceful actors through multiple networks is 
essential for an actor to increase its ability to influence policy. Extant organization studies 
have suggested that resources dependence on the state for funding, legitimacy and 
protection of rights could be offset by the trust, collaboration, influence, shared goals and 
identities, and institutional and political resources developed by interdependent actors 
(e.g., Huang, Keith and Provan, 2007; Provan, Huang and Milward, 2009; Saz-Carranza 
and Ospina, 2011). With a study on the US policy network of Adult Basic Education 
consisting of services providers and state agencies, Park and Rethemeyer (2012) add that, 
public service providers, who depend on the state’s resources, can exercise “balancing 
operations” with their monopoly of useful information to counterbalance the fiscal 
dominance the state actors. Those strategies include “power network extension” (to seek 
new sources of supply, e.g., private sector funders); “coalition formation” (to work with 
others in coalitions e.g., through industry and interest associations) and “emergence of 
status” (collectively “grant status” by elevating a dominant player into a collective role, 
e.g., the president of an industry association).  
This set of organization researches suggests that, although the primary purpose of the 
hegemonic structure of policy networks is to cope with the state contracts, it is often 
configured to provide alternatives. It has also been suggested that, networks themselves 
are able to shape the policy process at the implementation level (for example, the 
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privatization of water industry and railway in the UK, see Greenway, Salter and Hart, 
2007, p.718).  In this connection, inter-organizational network researches tend to 
emphasise that the structure or characteristics of networks, such as density and 
heterogeneity, affect their resource allocation and mobilization, consequently their 
ability to influence policy (Provan, Fish and Sydow, 2007; Sandström and Carlsson, 
2008).  
2.6.2. State-centric positon   
Quite differently, some researchers argue that there is still a central role and autonomy 
of the state in building and guiding policy networks. Provan, Fish and Sydow (2007) 
suggest that, to create greater social capital and a more co-operative network facilitating 
co-ordinated and effective policy implementation, the government’s direct support for 
networks through partnerships is essential (see also Provan and Kenis, 2008). In studies 
of public health policy networks in the UK, Oliver et al. (2013) conclude that the most 
powerful individuals are policy managers. They identify some strategies that managers 
use to control policy networks: “controlling decision-making organizations” (designing 
the governance structures and founding the organizations involved, writing agendas and 
work programmes for these organizations and using meetings); “controlling policy 
content” (identifying policy options and knowledge brokerage roles); and “controlling 
policy makers” (gate-keeping experts, ﬁnding champions and persuading other policy 
individuals).  
Researchers also suggest, in reality, without effective co-ordination of the state, loose 
policy networks could hardly be a stable partner of governance. With evidence from the 
UK National Health Service (NHS) primary and community care policy networks, Ferlie 
et al. (2011) suggest that the organizational transition from hierarchical to network forms 
is only partial in reality. There is only little change in cross-organizational information 
and communication technologies (ICTs)/databases and inter organizational learning 
(IOL) which are necessary for effective collaboration of interdependent organizations in 
policy networks. Holden and Lin (2007) find that the Australian male health policy 
networks have limited capacity in driving the policy process for their loosely connected 
structures. With low levels of centralization, their collaboration is hampered, instead of 
strengthened.  
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2.6.3. Corporatist position  
On the other hand, Marinetto (2003) suggests that “government of governance” could be 
used to paraphrase a variety of means of the state and societal actors that who would 
benefit to manipulate the policy agenda and in particular, to disrupt and influence the 
workings of autonomous policy networks. They include: “direct pressure”, “institutional 
restructuring” and “setting the intellectual framework of the policy discussion”.  
Greenway, Salter and Hart (2007) also question whether policy networks are operating 
in a neutral value-free zone: although policy networks may operate in a near-autonomous 
manner, they are deeply affected by exogenous factors. They reveal that, in the case of 
the relocation of the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital, negotiation and interactions in policy 
networks were shaped by powerful vested interests of local medical professionals along 
with central government actors. 
There appears to be continuity in NHS politics, in that the power relationships in the new 
networks of Health Service engagement with the private sector are as closed as were those 
of the traditional arrangement between medicine and the state. Health care consumers are 
as far removed from the locus of health policy implementation as they have ever been, and 
Health Service democracy is an irrelevant concept when measured against the reality of 
this study. Ably facilitated by the skills of a policy entrepreneur, central power was 
coordinated with the activities of local elites to overcome a series of formidable decision 
points through the mobilization of novel network dynamics. Sensibly the key local medical 
interests were recognized and brought onside at a relatively early point in the process in 
order to negate any potential medical veto of the new build.  (Pp.735-736) 
They suggest that the public consultation was extremely limited by the elitist 
implementation networks that control the flows of information in the political arena with 
the “expert knowledge” (p.729). To make challenges, information or access to the 
technical specifications were required. However, medical interests effectively excluded 
health consumer groups and District Councillors from the insider groups of policy 
networks by denying the information to those actors. Ironically, the complex framework 
of multi-literal network governance undermined the democratic role of elected members 
of local authorities and active participation of pressure groups (p.730).   
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2.7. Closing remarks  
The debates set around the theory of the state in this chapter shed some light on the 
discussion of welfare governance. Firstly, networks have stood out as a pervasive mode 
of governance alongside traditional hierarchies (bureaucracy) and markets. Secondly, 
this new form of governance has also called for a transformation in the exercise of power 
or influence in the policy process, from the traditional top-down authority of the state to 
a more relational one. Thirdly, the state still exercises considerable steering functions 
and power in the formation of networks while it loses some of those functions and power 
to societal actors. Fourthly, Society-centric and State-centric Theories differ in the way 
they see the autonomy of the state. The former emphasises the self-governing nature of 
networks and power that the state loses to societal actors in exchange for their resources; 
the latter stresses the power the state reserves and the autonomy of the state in choosing 
which part of its power to give up in exchange for a greater control in achieving its goals 
(the state can decide on the extent of “the shadow of hierarchy” it casts, the mix of modes 
of governance, its regulatory functions in privately exercised public functions, and most 
importantly picking the partners it works with in governance). That is a question of how 
the state exercises authority in a system based on governance as a heterarchical 
mechanism of coordination. 
Given a purposive attention to welfare governance, this review proposes a use of 
Corporatist Theory of governance to assimilate the state-centric and society centric 
accounts. It is suggested that the functional imperatives of the state in maintaining 
institutional capacities have compelled it to adopt a state-centric model of governance 
subjecting society actors to its policy goals and regulations, and such imperatives have 
also constrained the state to a highly structured partnership with particular interest groups, 
the welfare professionals who have got the most power resources to exchange with the 
state and curtailed its intervention. Sometimes, corporatist system is even captured by 
welfare professionals. However, it is not a result of the competition among interest 
groups in policy networks; it is, ironically, an unintended consequence of the state’s 
authority and determination in developing quasi-public structures. 
These limited images offered by organizational studies call for more empirical 
examination of public governance in the real world. So what is the implication of New 
Public Management in recent decades for the theory of the state regarding governance? 
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Does the idea of “steering at distance” and “civil engagement” turn governance into 
pluralistic policy networks with a more society-centric model of state-society interaction? 
Or with a more sophisticated, mostly targets-driven, monitoring and accountant system 
for efficiency, governments are creating a more controlled devolution of power that 
weakens the domination of welfare professionals? To what extent can welfare 
professionals successfully buffer the impact of reform, maximizing their dominance and 
interests by maintaining a quasi-public structure that rejects other societal actors and 
circumscribes the state? The next chapter will attempt to discuss these issues in a more 
specific arena of healthcare governance.  
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Chapter 3                                                                                                    
Theorising healthcare Governance   
3.1. Introduction  
In relation to healthcare which is the focus in this thesis, the basic ideas of governance 
in the last chapter can be summarised as follows: 1) the Society-centric Theory or the 
notion of “governance without government” is generally rejected on the ground of the 
asymmetric structure of policy networks as closed communities; 2) while the state’s 
capacities and functions in effective governance upholds the State-centric Theory of 
“government of governance”, they are achieved in a relational approach that focuses on 
the state’s closer partnership with social actors; 3) Corporatist Theory further adds that 
producer groups, rather than societal actors such as service users, are formally co-opted 
into the policy community as insiders for they hold key resources and expertise in welfare 
production.  
Corporatist Theory has the strength in assimilating the State-centric and Society-centric 
Theories, each illuminating an important aspect of the reality - in a liberal or society-
centric account, producer groups could be a countervailing power that checks the 
dominance of state in governance; in a state-centric account, they are the agencies and 
stable partners of the state conferring the latter necessary resources and legitimacy, 
preventing the destabilizing effects of other societal actors from the policy community. 
In this sense, producer groups are the major “partners cum challengers” of the state. Or 
in negative terms, they could collude with the state in dominating the policy process for 
their mutual interests (for the capitalist welfare state, cost containment; for medicine, the 
public-status and associated political and economic interests) at the expense of the larger 
public interests, and sometimes they could “capture” the system and resist necessary 
reforms to modernize the system in a self-serving manner.  
Through the corporatist lens, this study sees the medical profession as the major “partner 
cum challenger” of the state in healthcare governance. It goes beyond a simple society-
centric position that sees the medical profession as merely a societal actor among others 
and a simple state-centric position that sees it as merely the tools of the state - the state 
offers the medical profession a “quasi-public status” in exchange for its support for health 
  
55 
 
policy, particularly the legitimating function of “implicit rationing” of scarce medical 
resources in clinical terms.  
Before going into detail of corporatist arrangements in healthcare, we shall briefly turn 
to introduce two other theoretical positions of healthcare governance set against it. The 
state-centric position holds that medicine is in fact “de-professionalized/ proletarianized” 
under tighter state control and management. According to the society-centric position, 
however, a new social movement has taken place to challenge the traditional heath policy 
community dominated by the medical profession and the state, endorsing new societal 
actors such as patients and subordinate health professionals to participate in the policy 
process. Drawing support from the corporatist position, the following theoretical review 
attempts to argue that the fragmented nature of patient groups has prevented them from 
becoming a significant challenge to the medical power, since their inclusion into health 
policy process is only symbolic. Nor have the state’s efforts in promoting transparency 
and accountability by clinical governance, general management and inter-professional 
networks/ skill mix teams led to a significant decline of the medical power as those efforts 
largely rely on medicine’s authority and expertise to implement.         
Indeed, the debate of healthcare governance is set around different assumptions about 
the mechanism mediating professional power, of which medical autonomy is a key 
dimension. To start with, we will briefly introduce the core ideas of the three theoretical 
positions of governance in healthcare. Then we will discuss their respective theorizations 
of medical autonomy. Empirical examples to illustrate those theoretical concepts are 
mainly drawn from the developments in the UK (generally England) where the NHS 
originated as an archetype of universal healthcare system funded by direct taxation and 
transferred to many of her former colonies, including Hong Kong which is the focus of 
our case study in the later chapters.    
3.2. The central issue of medical power 
3.2.1. Three positions of healthcare governance  
In most modern democratic societies, universal access to healthcare as social rights has 
required a prominent role of the state in its provisions. Considering the technical 
complexity of biomedical knowledge, the state often delegates authority to the medical 
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profession to implement policies on its behalf. It is a political settlement between the 
state and the medical profession in managing, coordinating and controlling healthcare 
delivery. Specifically, it is an “implicit concordat” or a “bipartite corporatist arrangement” 
under which the government does not question clinical decisions, as long as doctors do 
not challenge the state’s authority to set the global budget and ration scarce resources in 
clinical terms (Klein, 1990; Giaimo, 2002, p.34). The privileged place doctors gained in 
policy-making and administration often implies more than mere consultation, according 
them considerable room to determine how to implement policies and to run healthcare 
systems (Schmitter, 1985); if the state lacks the means to set boundaries to the power of 
sectorial actors, corporatism is vulnerable to “capture”, whereby sectorial actors may 
come to dominate policymakers and exploit their privileged position in governance to 
their advantage (Giaimo, 2002, p.11). In this connection, the organized interests of 
medicine embedded in the original corporatist institutional arrangements have always 
been able to curtail or take advantage of healthcare reforms.  
On the other hand, such corporatist arrangements also permit the state the authority and 
means to mandate public policy obligations on doctors. Whereas the medical profession 
gains “public status” to share the state’s authority in governance, the state expects the 
peak associations of medicine to discipline their members with compulsory membership 
and associated control of licensing (e.g., entry, fitness to practice, examination and 
education) so that the workforce of medical service providers will adhere to the 
agreement reached and broader public policy aims (Giaimo, 2002, p.10; Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1985, pp.125-127). More importantly, we should not overlook that such soft 
governance practice is backed by the state’s ability to impose more direct sectorial 
administration measures such as decree and laws, or to threaten such interventions 
(pp.131-135). In addition to those direct (traditional hierarchies) and indirect 
(professional self-governing networks) approaches of state control, a hybrid form of 
“neo-bureaucracy” (Harrison and Smith, 2003) or “soft bureaucracy” (Flynn, 2004) has 
been identified - under New Public Management, the state actors exercise strong 
centralized control in healthcare by targets and indicators via regulatory agencies. As a 
result, the professional labour process is being more measurable and transparent, thus 
more accountable, to the lay management through clinical audit and clinical guidance. 
Medical autonomy has been eroded by new frames of reference in healthcare 
management that doctors must adopt a managerial perspective in order to progress within 
the profession, such as upholding organizational goals of cost containment and efficiency. 
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In addition, the quasi-market reform splits the medical profession’ purchaser and 
provider roles in order to discipline it with market pressures and the monitoring of those 
commissioning roles. These well explain the state’s measure of autonomy from sectorial 
interests in healthcare by transforming corporatist arrangements into a less negotiable 
form.   
While this line of argument supports the state-centric account of healthcare governance, 
the contention here is whether those management efforts are still controlled by the 
medical professionals themselves at large. Freidson (1985; 1994; 2001) and Elston (1991) 
argue that the medical profession as a whole maintains its autonomy because clinical 
audit and clinical guidance is largely anchored in the system of bio-medical knowledge 
that its authority and monopoly rests on. They suggest that the professional power is 
rather “re-stratified” as there are only the junior/ rank-and-file doctors being subject to 
more surveillance. As Harrison (1999, p.56) pinpoints, the marketization and NPM 
measures are exercised by profession-led agencies and medically qualified managers due 
to the technical complexity of commissioning and monitoring healthcare services. 
Therefore, efforts in reforming healthcare systems have mainly resulted in a shift of 
power within the medical profession, from hospitals to primary care groups under 
healthcare commissioning, from practitioners to academia under evidence-based 
medicine and from front line clinicians to managerial doctors under clinical management, 
rather than a total loss of power from the medical profession to others such as patients 
and lay managers.  
Another significant challenge to medicine’s dominance perhaps is stakeholder 
arrangements endorsing other health professionals and patients to participate in 
management and regulatory regimes, giving rise to a more pluralistic structure in health 
policy. Kuhlmann (2006) suggests that the strongest modernizing driver to transform 
corporatism in healthcare systems is a more inclusive professionalism. It is an idea to 
include the entire spectrum of health professions and occupations in the regulatory 
system and advances the primary care system with of inter-professional networks / skill 
mix teams (p.12). The prevalence of the nursing profession in the general management 
posts and regulatory representatives is a good example. In addition, the idea of 
consumerism and democratic renewal of civil participation in health policy brings a shift 
of power from the medical professionals to patients. With more lay members and non-
medical professionals sitting on the board of the medical profession’ self-regulatory 
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bodies and public control agencies in the NHS structure, they can influence health policy 
in stages of formulation, implementation and evaluation (Kuhlmann and Allsop, 2008; 
Newman and Kuhlmann, 2007). However, as early corporatism studies have revealed, 
the state actors may construct a system of countervailing power of opposing interests to 
co-manage the public sector. For example, the “concertation of action” in the West 
German health sector involved the representatives of the federal government, the public 
healthcare insurance schemes, various medical and dental associations, the 
pharmaceuticals industry, the pharmacists, the employers, and the trade unions in 
periodically negotiations over the increase in health expenditure (Lehmbruch, 1984, p.6). 
Such “corporatist concertation” involves “not just a single organized interest with 
privileged access to government but rather a plurality of organizations usually 
representing antagonistic interests” (p.4) with two important aspects: “intra-
organizational mechanisms favouring cohesion and compliance” and “institutional 
constraints preventing disintegration” (pp.10-11; see also Stone, 1980). Whether those 
social movements are promoting the pluralist idea of networks autonomous from 
government (“governance without government”), or in substance, the state’s influence in 
manipulating networks (“government of governance”), is a question waiting to be 
answered empirically.      
3.2.2. Medical autonomy at three levels    
The idea of medical autonomy is that producers of medical service, who know more than 
the state agencies and patients as sponsors and users, should have the discretion in 
running healthcare system. It is the very characteristic of corporatist arrangements in 
healthcare. At root, the aforementioned contention of healthcare governance is about the 
existence or not of medical autonomy, or how much the medical profession retains it 
from the state and patients/other health professions. When defining medical autonomy, 
Freidson (1988, p.369) suggests that the concept of autonomy as an occupation’s position 
in the division of labour combines “the immunity from regulation or evaluation by others” 
(autonomy in a passive sense) and “the control over other occupations” (autonomy in an 
active sense, or dominance). More specifically, Alford (1975, pp.14-15) defines 
medicine as dominant “structural interests” that are “served by the [current] structure of 
social, economic and political institutions”, and hospital administrators and government 
health planners as “challenging interests” or “corporate rationalizers” that share an 
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interest in “breaking the monopoly of physicians over the production and distribution of 
healthcare”.  
In respect of the relation between medicine and management and whether the former 
dominates, Harrison and Ahmad (2000) suggest that medical autonomy/ dominance and 
its challenges can be discerned at the “micro-”, “meso-” and “macro-” levels. At the 
“micro-level”, medical autonomy includes four elements which are directly related to the 
clinical situation: a) “control over diagnosis and treatment” (decisions about ordering 
texts examinations, prescribing drugs and procedure and referral), b) “evaluation of care” 
(judgement about the appropriateness of the care of particular patients), c) “nature and 
volume of medical tasks” (in the industrial sense of own movements, priorities, times 
and workloads) and d) “contractual independence” (unilateral rights such as engaging in 
private medical practice or to criticise employers). (pp.130-131) At the “meso-level”, 
perhaps logically entailed by the micro-level, the medical profession reaches an 
institutional bargain with the state as we have mentioned before as a set of corporatist 
arrangements, including state licensure and self-regulation, joint government/ 
professional committees and official recognition of peak associations (p.131). At the 
“macro-level”, it is the ideology of the biomedical model which assumes that ill health 
equals individual pathology and therefore consists of individual medical interventions, 
favouring a physician-centred approach over broader public healthcare approach. 
Therefore, it legitimises medical expertise in the design of health services and facilities 
beyond individual clinical decisions (ibid). In short, the dominance of biomedical model 
underpins the prevailing place of doctors, who control biomedical knowledge, across 
health policy broadly conceived from policy formulation to day-to-day implementation.  
Early studies of the NHS offer a picture of strong medical dominance where general 
managers only behaved as “diplomats”, whose role was not to lead or change the 
direction of organization, but rather to smooth out internal conflicts and to provide 
facilities for professionals to get on with the job of caring for patients (Harrison, Hunter 
and Pollitt, 1990, p.103). This is linked with the notion of clinical freedom that doctors 
are not subject to supervision in clinical practice by managers. As an illustration, only 
doctors can refer patients to hospital or admit them when they arrive, prescribe drugs and 
refer for other treatments such as physiotherapy; hospital consultants are often treated as 
having quasi-ownership of hospital beds, with the power to retain or discharge patients 
as they see fit. In a sense, the overall shape of the services delivered by the NHS is simply 
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an aggregate of such decisions made by individual physicians, rather than the work of 
politicians, planners or managers (ibid). This is largely because the biomedical model 
has underpinned the central role of doctors in the entire medical process as “clinical end-
users” (of other health professionals’ services and facilities, for example, nurses’ support 
services and tests). As a result, managerial influence is not as great as that of doctors who 
have considerable local control over specific decisions about how to treat particular 
patients. Under this setting, managerial behaviours tend to be a problem-solving or 
reactive, rather than taking the pro-active goal seeking reform; managers are producer-
oriented, paying relatively little attention to patent’s needs and complaints (ibid, Ch. 4). 
3.3. The state-centric position: contemporary challenges from state 
intervention  
However, in reviewing the rise of managerialism and greater state intervention in the 
British medicine since the 1970s, Harrison and Ahmad (2000, p.138) conclude that “a 
not insignificant decline” in the medical autonomy and dominance has occurred. The 
decline is clearest at the “micro-level” (clinical autonomy) and at the “meso-level” 
(corporatist relations with government).   
3.3.1. Meso-level 
The challenges at the meso-level to medical power mainly refer to its rights to self-
regulation and its partnership with government in formulating and implementing health 
policy (Harrison and McDonald, 2008, p.43).  
Firstly, in terms of formal organization, by the late 1990s, the governing bodies of almost 
all NHS institutions had been modelled on commercial organizations’ boards of directors 
with doctors in a very small minority, and the Chief Executives (few of whom are 
qualified health professionals) of NHS service provider intuitions had become legally 
and organizationally responsible for the quality of clinical services delivered, replacing 
the consensus team management which accorded significant veto power to doctors (pp. 
43-44). As a result, the lay managers and non-medical professionals have shared medical 
professionals’ legitimacy and power in healthcare administration that used to be the 
former’s exclusive domain.  
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Secondly, the General Medical Council (GMC) has been compelled by public pressures 
aroused with a series of medical malpractice scandals to review its regulation on doctors’ 
competence so as to be able to deal more firmly with cases of poor clinical performance 
(p.45). In 1999, the GMC was subject to a new overarching Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence (CHRE)’s request to modify its procedures and to refer its 
disciplinary decisions for review by the High Court (ibid). In 2012, the Council was 
renamed as the Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care (PSA) with 
more statutory duties to oversee the performance of 9 health and care regulators including 
the GMC. New duties include advising the candidates of the GMC members to the 
government and an annual review of the GMC’s procedural compliance to Standards of 
Good Regulation on guidance and standards, education and training, registration, and 
fitness to practise. More importantly, the PSA reviews all final decisions made by fitness 
to practise committees of the GMC and carries out an audit of the initial stages of the 
decisions to close a case without referral to a formal hearing in front of a fitness to 
practise committee. The principle of self-regulation has been losing its legitimacy and 
modified with the strategy of “right-tough regulation” based on the concept of risk 
assessment and proportionate intervention (PSA, 2015). Continuing fitness to practise 
mechanisms have been introduced to medical practitioners whose risks are high with 
five-yearly revalidation at one end, and the auditing of self-reported, input based 
continuing professional development at the other (CHRE, 2012, para. 2.4). 
Thirdly, new institutions of surveillance have been introduced.  
At the organization-level, the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) was 
established in 1999 (later renamed as the Commission for Healthcare Audit and 
Inspection and Healthcare Commission) to inspect and report on all NHS institutions, 
based on annual collation of “performance indicators” within a national performance 
assessment framework for healthcare regularly and allegations of service inadequacy 
from time to time (Harrison and McDonald, 2008, p.45). In 2009, a new Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) incorporated many of these functions. Applying the lessons of 
Francis Report on the scandal at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, the 
Department of Health (2015) pledged to re-establish the CQC as “a rigorous inspection 
regime for hospitals and GPs” as “the nation’s whistle-blower” (para. 3).  
1) More performance data are collected and disclosed. MyNHS website has been 
established as a powerful tool of surveillance by disclosing performance data to 
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the public. It allows comparison between organizations on 132 different 
measures that matter to patients, such as safety measures, open and honest 
reporting, staff survey results, healthcare associated infection rates and hospital 
food. In view of rebuilding the public’s trust in the NHS patient’s safety, it has 
been extended to national clinical audits of the treatment outcomes of individual 
surgical consultants, and later on other specialities (para. 8);  
2) New Chief Inspectors have been appointed to identify failures in care, place 
special measures on and turnaround healthcare institutions. Fundamental 
standards whereby the CQC can prosecute organizations that are responsible for 
serious cases of poor care have also been introduced (Ch.1 and 3). In addition 
to the CQC measures, the UK Government has placed a new Duty of Candour 
to the NHS organizations to ensure that patients are informed promptly about 
errors in their treatments in order to counteract the defensive culture in the NHS 
(para. 7).  
At the individual-level, the GMC are introducing consistent responsibilities on individual 
health professionals so that disciplinary actions can be taken when they are not candid 
about errors with their patients. This professional accountability is being reinforced 
through the introduction of the role of the “responsible clinician” in the Name Above the 
Bed initiative that NHS patients will have a named doctor to provide clinical 
accountability (para. 3.15-3.17). Also, a new offence of Wilful Neglect has been 
introduced to prosecute individuals who deliberately allow patients to suffer harm (para. 
21). As a whole, these efforts have created a more robust surveillance regime with a 
clearer line of clinical accountability for doctors who act as a manager, or a practitioner, 
whatever the case may be. As Salter (2001, p.874) has put it, medical self-regulation is 
situated within a “state-administered apparatus of accountability”.  
Fourthly, the quasi-/ internal market reforms have split the purchaser role from the 
medical profession’s provider role by creating GP-led commissioners. From GP Fund 
holders and Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) at 
present, the UK government has continuously expanded the scope of choice of providers 
that the clinically-led commissioners could make for their patients, now including 
elective hospital care, rehabilitation care, urgent and emergency care, most community 
health services, mental health and learning disability services (Schedule 2, Heath and 
Social Care Act 2012). The most significant potential impact on the medical profession 
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perhaps is the balance of power between GPs and specialists. In addition to the specialists’ 
higher level of professional credential, secondary care provider organizations are the 
more technical and costly part of the NHS services, accounting for more than three 
quarters of the total spending (Jones and Charlesworth, 2013, p.13). Set against this, the 
purchaser-provider split reforms have extended the professional capacity of GPs to 
referring patients to a specific provider (beyond merely gatekeeping of patients’ access 
to secondary care) and made them responsible for 90% of the NHS spending, including 
secondary care (ibid). It was anticipated to result in a shift of power to GPs as the 
specialists now have to compete for their custom and lose the control over the biggest 
part of the NHS spending to GPs.  
The abovementioned developments in state intervention in healthcare substantiate the 
state-centric governance argument that the state has managed to redraw the boundaries 
of medical power in the regimes of administration, self-regulation and clinical 
accountability wherein the medical profession used to have the authority to deny external 
security and intervention. In addition to those explicit external managerial efforts in 
rationalizing the health sector, the quasi-/ internal market reform is a more indirect 
“divide and rule” strategy that attempts to dismantle the unified medical power into 
fragmented interests, fostering certain checks and balances from inside (Harrison, 2008, 
p.47).  As a whole, those state efforts have shaped a more vulnerable position for the 
medical profession as a more controllable partner in corporatist arrangements.  
3.3.2. Micro-level  
The meso-level challenges to the corporatist arrangements in healthcare described above 
have been accompanied by the micro-level challenges to clinical autonomy (Harrison and 
Ahmad, 2000; Harrison and McDonald, 2008, pp.46-47).  
Firstly, the introduction of general management to the NHS has further entailed the 
notion of “clinical governance” for controlling the medical professionals. The major 
clinical governance body in the UK, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), 
was established in 1999 with three broad functions: 1) to make recommendations to the 
government as to whether specific treatments are sufficiently cost-effective and 
affordable to be provided by the NHS; 2) to give evidence-based clinical guidelines for 
the management of medical conditions; and 3) to approve models of clinical audit for 
compulsory use by hospital doctors (Harrison and Ahmad, 2000, p.134). Under the new 
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paradigm of evidence-based medicine (EBM), clinical interventions are justified on the 
basis of the formal aggregation of published research evidence rather than personal 
experience or professional consensus – “clinical guidelines” or “clinical protocols”, 
which codify and standardise the treatments, have replaced the former prominent official 
statements about clinical autonomy with a strong emphasis on the need for clinicians to 
adhere to rules and criteria (Harrison and McDonald, 2008, Ch. 3; Harrison and Wood, 
2000). In addition to guidelines/ protocols, tackling “unwarranted” variance in service 
through measurement is another strategy of NICE. Performance data are widely used to 
recognize and tackle variations in clinical activity, expenditure, performance, outcomes, 
quality, and access cross the NHS, at the individual- and team- levels. Clinicians or 
clinical units with large variation from their colleagues are expected to provide an 
explanation; publishing data by ranking or “league tables” has also been shown to 
influence those with lower rankings (Charlton et al., 2011; King’s Fund, 2010). Beyond 
the clinical terms, central specification of service models has also been developed 
through the creation of National Service Frameworks (NSFs) for topics such as coronary 
heart disease, mental health, cancer, services for older people, services for children, and 
diabetes (Harrison and McDonald, 2008, p.66). As a result, Harrison and Dowswell’s 
study (2002, p.221) finds that doctors have become more “bureaucratically accountable” 
for recording their clinical decisions and key data relating to patient cases, resulting in a 
reduction in doctors’ autonomy to “determine their own clinical practices and evaluate 
their own performance without normally having to account to others”.  
Secondly, under tighter fiscal control and internal markets, there is a need for cost 
transparency and the “currency” of treatments bridging the NHS funding bodies and the 
actual providers of NHS care. Methods to formalise and codify medical knowledge have 
been developed as means of providing standardised descriptors of medical workloads by 
which clinical work can be systematically measured, controlled, and finally 
commoditized. “Case-mix” measures, such as “diagnosis-related groups” (DRGs) are the 
examples (Harrison and McDonald, 2008, p.46-66).  Another example is the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF) whereby GP practice payments are calculated on the points 
achieved and prevalence in a range of national achievement indicators based on the best 
available research-based evidence (NHS Confederation, 2016).  
Thirdly, as a result, medical-managerial relationships have developed in a direction 
favouring managers. Managers in the NHS are more ready to take decisive decisions of 
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managerial interventions against medical opposition based on more information 
available. Harrison and Lim’s researches (2000; 2003) have suggested that with growing 
managerial legitimacy, whilst doctors are still enjoying substantial autonomy in day-to-
day clinical decisions, they have been drawn into co-operative networks with managers 
and more responsible to organizational goals of complying with performance indicators, 
targets and cost containment. As a result, central government influence on managerial 
agendas is strengthened and centralized management at the Department of Health is ever-
increasing. The recent developments of the National Advisor for Clinical and Financial 
Engagement substantiate this trend. It promotes clinical and financial engagement in 
order to build “joined-up, collaborative working between clinical and finance teams” in 
which finance managers routinely work as integral members of clinically-led quality 
improvement teams and both groups share cost and quality data on a regular basis to 
improve outcomes (DOH, 2013, p.8).  
In short, the consequence of rationalization of medical knowledge and expertise is that 
indeterminacy gives way to technicality. Clinical activities are now subject to the 
“scientific-bureaucratic” paradigm as clinical guidance is drawn from an externally-
generated body of research knowledge and implemented through bureaucratic rules 
(Harrison and Wood, 2000).  Combined with micro-economic analyses, the scientific and 
bureaucratic approaches of codification and guidelines of clinical activities eventually 
have created more complex systems of “managed care”, “disease management” and 
“patient pathways” where professional discretion is restricted (Harrison and McDonald, 
2008, pp.46-47).  In Dent’s (1993) term, the medical autonomy has transformed into 
“responsible autonomy”. 
3.3.3. Interpreting state intervention: is medicine “de-professionalized and 
proletarianized” or “re-stratified”? 
With respect to the decline or not of medical autonomy, there is a variety of 
interpretations. An intuitive grasp of the above-mentioned evidences of clinical guidance 
and performance management (by indictors and data) is the De-professionalization and 
Proletarianization Theses (Freidison, 1985; see also the discussion of Chamberlain, 2009, 
pp.74-79). 
The De-Professionalization Thesis focuses on the process of closing “the knowledge gap” 
between doctors and laymen by the codification of medical knowledge/ expertise into 
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standardised rules and procedures. Specifically, it is argued that automated retrieval 
systems, such as computer algorithms, for symptom assessment, would result in 
medicine losing its control over its defined body of knowledge, and create the tension 
between the public demand for accountability / transparency and the professional’s 
insistence on final authority (Haug, 1973). Evidence-based medicine which reduces the 
indeterminacy of applying bio-medical knowledge best exemplifies this trend of 
development.   
With a slightly different emphasis on the process of routinizing medical work, the 
Proletarianization Thesis focuses on the managerial bureaucratic control on doctors. 
Under large scale corporate and bureaucratic settings that uphold rules, procedures and 
authority undermining the autonomy of doctors as salaried employees, and in the name 
of economy and efficiency (particularly controlling costs and promoting consumer 
choice), medical knowledge and expertise is open to communication as a set of rules, 
procedures and operational imperatives. That means it could be passed on to others who 
had not received any formal training, and better controlled and measured by bureaucratic 
authorities. As a result, doctors lose their determination on overall working conditions 
and proprieties as well as other professional prerogatives associated with the principle of 
self-regulation (such as control over entrance criteria, training context and content, and 
remuneration of their labour), being proletarianized. (McKinlay and Stoeckle, 1988; 
Oppenheimer, 1973) This trend of development can be identified with the state efforts in 
promoting performance management and clinical guidance that turn medical practices 
into more routinized and measurable activities.   
As we have discussed above, the internal division of medicine also provides the 
opportunity for governments to employ “divide and rule” strategies. As Harrison (1999, 
p.56) has argued, what actually occurs in the NPM reforms in healthcare is a 
“redistribution of autonomy and dominance” in three dimensions: 1) from consultant 
doctors to GPs for their purchasing role in the internal market; 2) from ordinary clinicians 
to medical managers in the general management; and 3) from ordinary clinicians to 
academia under evidence-based clinical governance. The first dismantles the medical 
power by altering its structure set around the supremacy of specialists and hospital care; 
the last two may also distance medical elites from identifying with rank-and-file doctors, 
making more cleavages that weaken the medical collegiality from within.  
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Freidson (1994), the key author of the Re-Stratification Thesis, refers this regime to a 
“new professionalism” in which individual and institutional transparency and 
accountability of medicine is ensured with quality control carried out by “administrative 
elites” of medicine, who serve in executive management and supervisory roles with 
workforce surveillance and disciplinary tools. Contrary to the De-professionalization and 
Proletarianization Theses which emphasize the external scrutiny on medicine, this line 
of “re-stratification” argument presents a more “relational approach” that the national 
agenda of NPM is achieved by co-opting those administrative elites. To rebut the over-
simplified “de-professionalization/ proletarianization” interpretation, Freidson (1994) 
has offered two major arguments. 
First, with a continual knowledge gap, the medical profession has managed to preserve 
its control of the monopoly over medical knowledge and expertise. Freidson argues, 
“[n]ew knowledge is constantly acquired that takes the place of what has been lost and 
thereby maintains the knowledge gap…it is the members of each profession who 
determine what is to be stored and how it is to be done, and who are equipped to interpret 
and employ what is retrieved effectively” (p.135), therefore the medical professionals 
“continue to possess a monopoly over at least some important segment of formal 
knowledge that does not shrink over time, even though both competitors and rising levels 
of lay knowledge may nibble away at the edges” (p.134). 
Second, consequently, new techniques of clinical governance to monitor and rationalize 
clinical works arrangement and resources allocation do not in themselves reduce medical 
autonomy. Those measures, for their technical complexity, are mainly exercised in the 
principle of peer review; and the major agency of surveillance and evaluation on medical 
works is a newly emerged group of medically qualified managers co-opted to the 
management. As Freidson argues, the consequence of “elites” placing formal 
surveillance and control on “rank-and-files” is the consolidation of medical 
professionalism as a methodology of occupational control. While this creates the segment 
of elites and rank-and-files, it is a sign of “re-stratification” rather than 
“proletarianizaiton” or “de-professionalization” - professionalism is just being reborn in 
a hierarchical form that “everyday practitioners become subject to the control of 
professional elites who continue to exercise the considerable technical, administrative, 
and cultural authority that the professions have had in the past” (p.9).  Based on these 
observations, Freidson concludes, “there is little evidence that the special status of rank 
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and file professionals will deteriorate so much that they will find themselves in the same 
position as other workers” (p.145). As they can participate in formulating standards and 
evaluating their own performance through some type of peer review, more discretion 
than other workers in performing their work will be accorded.  Finally, “they will still 
enjoy at least occupational kinship with their superiors” (ibid).  
Central to the Re-Stratification Thesis is that the collective power of medicine is retained 
by its control over the biomedical knowledge. As Harrisons and colleagues suggest, the 
dominance of the biomedical model at the macro-level remains largely intact (Harrison 
and Ahmad, 2000, p. 137) so that radical organizational changes or re-engineering in 
hospitals are rare: managers are not always able to control the day-to-day operation of 
the acute medical sector or to make other than incremental adjustments to services 
(Harrison and McDonald, 2008, p.47). The stratification or redistribution of intra-
professional authority can therefore be seen as medicine’s adaptive response to state 
interventions rather than its overall decline.  
3.3.4. Evidence for the Re-Stratification Thesis   
In the face of the evidences of state interventions, empirical studies suggest the producers’ 
power is basically intact in the NHS. In respect of EBM, Armstrong (2002) argues that, 
as a distinctive form of formalised tools of clinical guidelines and audits, the 
standardization of clinical judgments through the results of randomised controlled 
clinical trials in the NHS primary care groups has actually upheld the “value-neutral” 
scientific methodology of medicine that the medical profession’s authority rests on. A 
group of medical “administrative elites”, rather than lay managers, has emerged around 
“the academy” and the “professional colleges” who are concerned with standardizing the 
everyday clinical decisions of “rank and file” doctors by evidence-based medicine. In a 
case study on the implementation of Obesity and Chronic Heart Failure guidelines, 
Spyridonidis and Calnan (2011) also reveal that doctors with the same clinical interests 
have worked together to develop and innovate their own rules of governance and body 
of expertise/guidelines to meet their clinical needs under EBM. It is argued that doctors’ 
increasing expertise has made them more innovative and general guidelines increasingly 
redundant.  
The implication here is the application of clinical guidelines and protocols itself, at the 
same time, increases the complexity of healthcare management by creating a new body 
  
69 
 
of professional knowledge and associated professional capacities. More fundamentally, 
as clinicians treat individuals, instead of populations, the basic assumption of EBM of 
moving from the knowledge of a treatment’s effectiveness in a population to the 
knowledge of its probable effectiveness in an individual is questionable (Byrne, 2004, 
pp.84-87). This calls for a bottom up Critical Appraisal approach of EBM that 
emphasizes “the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient 
values” (Sackett et al., 2000, p.1) - that practitioners are not taking everything academic 
research or clinical guidelines offer and should assess the validity and applicability on 
their own. It is the medical expertise that decides whether the external evidence applies 
to the individual patient and how it matches the patient’s clinical situation, predicament, 
and preferences (Sackett et al., 1996, p.72). In sum, the medical profession’s monopoly 
over the interpretation of biomedical knowledge exercises not only in the position they 
hold as administrative elites but also in the non-linearity and diffusion in the process of 
implementing clinical guidelines day-to-day. 
Consequently, such resilience of medical autonomy at the mirco-level has conferred 
considerable advantages for the medical profession to resist external intervention and 
negotiate for a more consensual style of clinical management at the meso-level. Indeed, 
the early work of Ham and Hunter (1988) on the NHS clinical governance strategies has 
suggested that, the NHS reformers tend to avoid overt confrontation with doctors but 
create a culture in which doctors regard themselves as having a legitimate management 
role in order to promote efficiency and effectiveness in health service. Among the three 
broad strategies of clinical governance - 1) self-help among doctors to raise professional 
standards by medical audits, the use of standards and guidelines, and the accreditation of 
hospital services; 2) involving doctors in management by the resource management 
initiative in which doctors are responsible for their budgets and appointing doctors as 
managers; and 3) external management control of doctors by changing their contracts 
and encouraging managers, supervise medical work more directly and extending 
provider competition – the first two are always the NHS reformers’ focus and the last 
one is intentionally avoided. Kitchener (2000) has also observed that medically qualified 
Clinical Directors have successfully resisted any significant appropriation of clinical 
tasks and decisions by other groups on overall budgets, the recruitment of staff and 
monitoring service quality; and peer review is still the primary means of quality control 
in the UK hospitals. So it is concluded that clinical governance is far from an “externally 
driven performance analysis to reduce clinical autonomy and costs” but “proved 
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successful in protecting medical autonomy and resisting the increased managerial control” 
(p. 149). Even after the 20 years of reform in the NHS, the medical professionals’ co-
operation is still the key to successful implementation of health policy (Castro, Dorgan 
and Richardson, 2008; Nelson, Batalden, and Lazar J, 2007).  
Perhaps the best example for the consolidation of provider’s power is the notion of 
clinical engagement. Recent reforms of the NHS in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, 
which largely involve the role of GPs acting within the new Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs), are based on the principle that the commissioning of healthcare services 
should be clinically-led (Beasley, 2013, p.1). Besides, in a hospital setting, service-line 
management (SLM) is being increasingly used in view of fostering clinical leadership. 
In SLM, a hospital trust is divided into specialist clinical areas called service lines that 
are then be managed as distinct operational units; clinicians, often consultants, typically 
lead these service lines. By devolving management decisions to the service-line level, it 
is believed that the SLM structure can facilitate clinicians to lead and better manage 
services, i.e. to control budgets and tackle variation (Foot et al., 2012, p.3; Lemer, 
Allwood and Foley, 2012, p.16; NHS Confederation, 2010). The basic ideas of clinician-
led management in the turn of the 21th century is not different from those in the 1970s 
and 1980s engaging hospital clinicians in management - “doctors have a large influence 
over how money is spent; they lead health care teams and can directly influence the 
success of initiatives to address productivity” (Lemer, Allwood and Foley, 2012, p.4).  
Nor does the possibility of provider competition created by the quasi-/ internal market 
reform substantially affect service outcomes in the ways that English NHS 
commissioning policies assumed (Sheaff et al., 2015, p.v).  “Negotiated order” and 
“discursive control”, rather than “financial incentives”, “provider competition” or 
“juridical controls”, are used by the commissioners as the major media of influencing 
providers. It is found that the associations between competition and service outcomes 
were more often weak as commissioners avoid financially destabilising their main local 
providers and the potential bidders are concentrated. Heavily dependent on “micro-
commissioning” (collaborative care pathway design) than contract negotiations or 
removing ineffective activities, “negotiated order” is often protracted and inconclusive 
when commissioner and provider interests differed. Although managerial evidence-
based performance monitoring (service specifications and performance indicators) is 
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sometimes employed by commissioners, existing providers still play a large part in 
formulating it (ibid, p. xxiii-xxv).  
3.3.5. The relational aspect of re-stratification: governmentalized or loosely coupled?   
As a whole, the above offers a consistent picture of “soft management” in NHS which is 
placed at the hands of elite doctors favouring medical self-regulation in substance for 
their integral functional positions in healthcare service production. Whereas Freidson’s 
re-stratification interpretation resonates with those evidences, he has also noticed that 
“administrative elites” are working in ways that mediate competing expectations in an 
increasingly managed workplace, i.e. safeguarding collective professional interests and 
national agendas of managing the health sector (Waring, 2014, p.692). This relational 
aspect of medicine’s stratification, i.e. medicine’s relations with the state or corporate 
interests, however is relatively undefined in Freidson’s works and most studies of the 
Re-Stratification Thesis, leaving the Re-Stratification Thesis inadequate to explain the 
dynamics (p.696).  
In this regard, Coburn, Rappaport and Bourgeault (1997) have questioned about the 
loyalty of the co-opted “administrative elites” of medicine to their clinical colleagues 
against their “corporate masters”. They suggest that “medical institutions are being used, 
co-opted by external forces into constraining their own members” (p.18). This is because 
government has become very involved in managing the content of medical care beyond 
its financing, and those administrative elites are socialised into a less professionally 
dominant view of healthcare as a result of contact with other health professions, the state 
and regulatory agencies. Flynn (2002) offered a more pessimistic interpretation of 
“governmentality” in Foucauldian thought, seeing the new self-regulation regime of 
medicine as a system of self-surveillance which socializes or co-opts medicine into 
alignment with managerial ideology. Flynn argues, although the medical self-regulation 
has been preserved in form, in substance it has transformed into “soft bureaucracy” where 
“processes of flexibility and decentralisation co-exist with more rigid constraints and 
structures of domination” (Courpasson, 2000, p.157).  
In this light, Waring (2014) further develops the conceptual tools of “administrative elites” 
of medicine for a better understanding of the “professional-managerial hybrid” of those 
elites and whether they retain or compromise the collective professional interests. He 
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argues, in the recent organizational context of healthcare reforms, six types of medical 
elites have emerged (pp.699-701):  
1) “Political Elites” represents the interests of their profession within political 
processes and policy making. They hold formal leadership or representation 
appointments within professional associations, learned societies or political 
organizations. They help secure and maintain statutory legitimacy and status, 
but equally might be seen as serving to articulate political interests downwards 
within the profession; 
2) “Knowledge Elites” are those who have moved into the realms of knowledge 
creation and dissemination, and often education, usually through taking up 
appointments within universities or learned societies. The knowledge produced 
by these elites is often used to inform public debate or contributes to national 
evidence-based guidelines that are expected to be followed by the wider 
profession;  
3) “Corporate Elites” are those who have significant financial or commercial 
influence over the organization of work related to wider corporate interests or 
capital markets in the private practices, which are not our focus in this study;  
4) “Managerial Elites” are typically located within operational organizational 
structures or hierarchies and have close and conjoint working relationships with 
various non-professional and managerial groups, such as finance, procurement, 
contracting, performance management and workforce planning. As discussed 
above of “administrative elites”, these elites are at the forefront of the 
managerialisation of professional work and are often described as being co-
opted into or colonised by management practices and identities, while they are 
also defined in the policy discourse as “leaders” transforming professional 
services without “management”; 
5) “Governance Elites” are those who hold responsibility for monitoring 
colleagues’ adherence to the standards of practice or payment systems. They are 
described by McDonald (2012; cited in p.700) as “chasers” with specialist 
knowledge and skills in assessment and management of performance issues or 
by Becker (1963; cited in ibid) as “moral entrepreneurs”. Acting as a conduit to 
both the local service leaders (managerial elites) and the external regulators, 
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they also serve to restrict management scrutiny and protect professional 
reputations; and 
6) “Practicing Elites” are those who have influence in the immediate work setting 
on the basis of their specialist expertise. Working closely with the knowledge 
elites and managerial elites while embedded in day-to-day operation, they are 
able to avoid or shape organizational change and retain some local autonomy.  
This extended framework of the Re-Stratification Thesis helps appraise the contingencies 
of the “professional-managerial hybrid” in a more recent organizational/ institutional 
setting, regarding expectations and sources of legitimacy from both the elites’ 
organizational stakeholders and professional peers (p.701). Before going into detail of 
the research strategy addressing the issue of medical elites in the later chapters, some 
remarks should be made here.  
First, considering those contingencies, medicine’s success in retaining collective 
professional interests is rather a dynamic and contested process. It is bought at a price. 
As Evetts (2003; 2009) suggests, professional identities are being reconstructed to align 
with the changing expectations of the state, corporations and consumers, shifting from 
the “occupational” professionalism to the “organizational” one. In this sense, the re-
stratification of medicine could be a case of “governmentalized” elites compromising 
their rank-and-file colleagues for their self-interests or national agenda. At the same time, 
in the real world, as the evidences of producers’ power in the NHS we discussed in the 
previous section tend to support, it could also be a case of medicine elites leading medical 
organizations to “loosely couple” with their environment in order to legitimize their daily 
operations without substantial changes in the professional logics (Staniland, 2010).  
Through the Neo-Institutionalist lens, the state’s requirement for the NHS provider 
organizations to conform to certain processes, policies and protocols is however 
considered largely as ceremonial - while coercive isomorphic pressures shape 
organizations into similar formal structures, they lead to a focus on outputs that are 
unrelated to the real work of the organization (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Drawing 
evidence from the implementation of clinical governance in one English NHS hospital 
Trust, Staniland (2008) argues that, the external legitimacy could be achieved without 
any evident improvement in the quality of care received by patients, merely as a response 
to state coercion. Therefore, clinical guidance can be considered as essentially a 
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“ceremonial” body. For example, approval of protocols and policies appeared to be just 
a paper exercise and many inconsistencies were found in these documents; more 
importantly, the dissemination, implementation and embedding of protocols in working 
practice was obscure. Furthermore, Currie and Suhomlinova (2006, p.1) suggest that 
knowledge sharing across professional boundaries is difficult to realize as the means to 
rationalize and manage the health sector - managers, who are orienting to coercive 
pressures from the state, do not always recognize the cultural and political dimensions of 
knowledge sharing, which are oriented to within the normative frameworks of 
professionals. They argue this will result in the “triumph of professional power” in the 
“inconsistency of policy”.  
Second, we see empirical study of medical elites as central to resolving the theoretical 
contention about interpreting the decline of medicine. Medical elites are at the interface 
of different social forces driving healthcare reforms and the forefront of changes; their 
role in the balance of power between the state actors and medicine as a whole is crucial. 
Should they internalize the national managerial agenda and be able to discipline their 
rank-and-file colleagues, medicine as a whole can be interpreted as being 
“governmentalized”; should they maintain their loyalty to the collective professional 
interests, medicine can rather be interpreted as being “loosely coupled” with the state 
agenda, and ceremonial compliance without actual changes to day-to-day practices is 
predicted. Although evidence suggests that the latter is a more promising interpretation 
of medicine’s reaction to state control, actual situations across health systems may differ 
and further empirical researches are called for.   
3.3.6. Brief summary   
To summarize, based on the notion of medicine’s ultimate control on biomedical 
knowledge and expertise, the Re-Stratification Thesis 1) rebuts an oversimplified 
interpretation of the concession in rank-and-files’ working conditions as de-
“professionalization” or “proletarianization” for “the formulation, direction and 
execution of the control of professional work remains in the hands of members of the 
profession” (Freidson, 1994, p.144), and 2) holds that the medical profession as a whole 
is able to cope with the rise of managerialism and market mechanism by taking part in 
the reform efforts actively. At the same time, the notion that the medical profession has 
been re-stratified itself indicates some inroads of state control and recognizes that the 
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state’s efforts in rationalizing healthcare still have considerable impacts on medicine, if 
not de-professionalizing and proletarianizing it. With the Re-Stratification Thesis, it 
could also be argued that the state has extended its “governmentality” in a relational 
approach through its co-option of medical elites, subordinating the healthcare production 
process to more sophisticated control (though still indirect). As one may notice, the 
clinical engagement program we discussed above is a double-edged sword for the state: 
while doctors working as managers may be receptive to EBM and heavily constrained 
by contractual agreements and performance targets, they gain a formal position to 
reinterpret them and share the authority and power of the state in health policy. This 
suggests that “public status” as the core corporatist structure may be far more resilient 
than we imagine and may support another possible interpretation of medical decline with 
the Neo-Institutionalist lens seeing it as a loosely coupled system, which is compliant in 
form but preservative in substance. 
3.4. Society-centric position: challenges from other social actors  
In healthcare governance literature, state intervention is not the only challenge to the 
medical dominance in health policy community. In a contrary position, it is also 
suggested that a new social movement has taken place to transform the health policy 
community into more pluralistic networks. The most significant “outsider” groups 
challenging the traditional corporatist arrangements in healthcare are patients and other 
health professionals.  
3.4.1. Patient power: citizen participation and co-production in health service  
Clarke et al. (2007) suggest that users and carers self-help groups create a social identity 
and possible platform for oppositional behaviour. Their own definitions and sets of 
behaviour increase their perceived control over their physical and social conditions, 
enabling their members to challenge the medically dominated institutional assumptions 
that circumscribe the delivery of care (Kelleher, 1994). At the micro-level, the 
demystification of biomedical knowledge and expertise by the more educated and 
internet-informed patients renders practitioners’ daily clinical judgements more 
amenable to lay scrutiny; at the meso-level, it results in a more active participation of 
health consumer groups in the health policy process challenging medicine’s legitimate 
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place. This can be epitomized by the “patient empowerment” policy in the UK that 
formally incorporates patient interests (Salter, 2003). As Allsop Jones and Baggott (2004) 
suggest, the UK health consumer groups have developed a “new social movement” as 
they have managed to form structured alliances campaigning effectively to amend or 
delay legislation and have been represented at the policy-level such as NICE and other 
government consultation bodies. 
Bovaird (2007) further argues, health policy in the UK, as well as other areas of public 
services, has gone beyond simply “engagement and participation” to “user and 
community coproduction” - public service is directly produced by users (with providers) 
in terms of a range of stages of policy process such as service “planning” (e.g. 
deliberative participation), “design” (e.g. user consultation), “financing” (e.g. 
fundraising, charges, agreement to tax increases), “management” (e.g. leisure centre 
trusts, community management public assets, school parent-governors), and “assessment” 
(including monitoring and evaluation, e.g. tenant inspectors, user on-line ratings); it can 
also take place in a more direct role in service “delivery” such as peer support groups of 
patients and Expert Patients Programme (see also Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012).  
Based on Pestoff and Brandsen (2008)’s modification to the concept of “co-production”, 
Poocharoen and Ting (2015) segregate it into four sub-types with the “planning 
/production” and “individual/ organization” dimensions.  
1) “Co-governance”: the arrangement that allows the third sector to participate in 
the planning and delivery of the service formerly or normally produced by 
public service professionals (co-planning at an organization-level). 
2) “Co-management”: the process where the third sector organizations produce 
services in collaboration with government agencies (co-production at an 
organization-level). 
3) “Co-consultation”: the process where individuals as citizens, experts or 
stakeholders are of equal status with professionals in the planning of public 
services (co-planning at an individual-level). 
4) “Co-production”: the arrangement where individual citizens produce their own 
services in full or part with public service professionals (co-production at an 
individual-level). 
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These typologies all point to the core idea of co-production which is “the provision of 
services through regular, long-term relationships between professionalized service 
providers and service users, where all parties make substantial resource contributions” 
set against the traditional provider-centric and paternalistic form of public service seeing 
users as a passive receiver, or their active involvement a burden (Bovaird, 2007, p.847). 
In this connection, evidence suggests that active involvement of patients in health policy 
as co-producers of healthcare service is increasingly observable in the NHS across a wide 
range of stages of the policy process, from the narrowly defined end of co-production to 
the broadly defined end of co-planning.  
At the individual-level of “co-production”, patients have taken up some direct roles of 
healthcare provision in the Expert-patients Programme (EPP) that involves them in the 
self-management of health, especially in chronic illness, mental health and rehabilitation; 
carers and support groups are also important forms of involving the community in health 
service production. More generally, the official policy of discourse has encouraged 
patients to be treated as “equal partners in the decision making processes” by health 
professionals (DOH, 2000b, p. i). The White Paper, Equity and Excellence: Liberating 
the NHS (DOH, 2010) proclaimed the NHS’s official vision to “put patients and the 
public first”, where “no decision about me, without me” is the norm (para.1). Specifically, 
the measures include:  
1) “Patient involvement” embedding personal care planning, shared decision-
making and providing information and support necessary to enable people to 
manage their own condition (para. 5.10). In support of this view, the NHS 
Constitution (NHS, 2013) has added the pledge to involve patients in discussins 
about planning their care and to offer them a written record of what is agreed 
(p.9). Under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, involving each patient in 
decisions becomes a legal duty of the NHS commissioners (Sections 13H and 
14U);  
2) “Choice Framework” to set out, for the first time, the choices available to 
patients all along the care pathway and across services - choosing the GP 
practice (and the particular GP within), choosing where to go for the first 
appointment as an outpatient, choosing the consultant in charge, choosing to 
change hospital if have waited longer than the maximum waiting times (18 
  
78 
 
weeks; 2 weeks for those who see a specialist for cancer) and choosing who 
carries out a specialist test etc. (DOH, 2012, para. 5.32).  
At the policy planning- level, lay members are given statutory and bureaucratic presence 
in the NHS structure. The General Medical Council has increased the proportion of lay 
members, according them more important roles in revising poor performance and 
revalidation procedures. In addition to the lay members presenting in National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence (NICE), the Healthwatch has established as a national consumer 
champion body that “enables the views of the people who use (or may use) NHS and 
social care services to influence national policy, advice and guidance” (para. 5.16). The 
views of the public, patients and service users will, through Healthwatch, form part of 
the advice to the Secretary of State, the NHS Commissioning Board, Monitor and the 
English local authorities, all of whom must have regard to that advice; local Healthwatch 
will give citizens and communities a stronger voice to influence and challenge how 
health and social care services are commissioned and provided in their local area (para. 
5.16-17).  Through those reform efforts, greater choice and voice is conferred to patients. 
They are not only entitled to but also able to co-produce healthcare.   
3.4.2. Limitations of patient movements: still a closed policy community?   
Here the question is: “to what extents have those reform efforts established a power-
sharing relationship between communities and decision-makers?” As Arnstein (1971) 
suggests, citizen participation consists of a wide range of activities from “Manipulation” 
to “Citizen Control”, not necessarily enabling citizens to participate in planning or 
conducting programs. He describes three levels on the ladder of degrees of citizen 
participation:  
• Rungs 1) Manipulation and 2) Therapy describe the first level as “non-
participation” that power-holders “educate” or “cure” the citizens;  
• Rungs 3) Informing and 4) Consultation advance to the second level of 
“tokenism” to allow the citizens to have a voice but they lack the power to 
ensure that their views will be heeded. Rung 5) Placation is a higher level as 
“tokenism” sees some “muscle” changing the status quo, while power holders 
continue to decide;  
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• Rungs 6) Partnership, 7) Delegated Power and 8) Citizen Control are the third 
level as “citizen power” with increasing degrees of decision-making power. At 
the top of the ladder, Partnership enables citizens to negotiate and engage in 
trade-offs with power holders; Delegated Power and Citizen Control enables 
citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats or full managerial power.  
In this regard, Salter (2003) has questioned the actual power-sharing between the UK 
patient groups and the state and medicine as traditional power holders in healthcare: 
“whether at the political level their challenge to the values and organization of 
conventional NHS medicine has then been translated into policy networks with access to 
the policy community, is debateable” (p.930). Adopting the idea of “policy community”, 
he suggests, policy networks access to policy community when they become routinized 
with the state’s engagement, i.e.  boundaries are established to identify “insiders” and 
“outsiders” in the policy domain, and a policy paradigm is institutionalised based on 
shared values, a common understanding of “the rules of the game”, trust between its 
members, and an acceptance that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals.  
He further refers to Coleman’s (1999) concept of five phases of the policy process 
(“agenda-setting”, “evaluation of alternatives”, “policy formulation”, “policy 
implementation”, and “policy evaluation”) in the sense that a stable policy community 
shall be able to dominate all of the five phases.  
Salter (2003) stresses, “whilst the process of policy formation may adjust to pressures 
for greater patient power, how far those policies can be implemented will depend on the 
malleability of the patient-doctor relationship” (p.929). He further suggests that in the 
traditional patient-doctor relation, patient demand is defined within the orbit of medically 
defined patient needs. This has helped the state to perform implicit rationing in the name 
of clinical judgement and conferred legitimacy to the health policy making and operation. 
In the early and mid-1990s, the UK government recognized that the strategies insisting 
that doctors be more accountable to their patients would bring about possible effects of 
destabilising the policy community. It sought to return to a reluctant acceptance of the 
importance of the medical profession in the policy community (see also Hunter, 1994; 
Klein, 1995). Therefore, an approach of “sponsored consumerism” was adopted as 
“consultative, strong on rhetoric, and ambiguous in its commitment to patient influence” 
(Salter, 2003, p.931). In practice, purchasing agencies simply created a novel form of 
patient dependency organised at the level of population rather individual patients and 
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doctors. A “consultation industry” as “technologies of legitimation” developed with no 
firm commitment to following the results of the consultation, with local NHS managers 
treating user groups “as a recognised feature of the organizational landscape, but not one 
to which any superior degree of legitimacy was accorded” (Harrison and Mort, 1998, 
p.66). Likewise, the reforms introduced by the profession’s self-regulatory bodies 
generally aimed to improve their internal efficiency rather than opened themselves to the 
external scrutiny of health consumers (Salter, 2001, pp.875-891). As Salter (2003, p.931) 
argues, it has resulted in the ability of doctors to hinder or facilitate “policy 
implementation” remained unchecked by the patients at large: “medicine’s entire system 
of autonomous professional governance continued on its serene, unaccountable course, 
a separate and parallel system of power within the NHS with which all service delivery 
policies must engage in one way or another”.  
In addition, the fragmented character of health consumer policy networks also 
undermines their ability to provide resources (such as expertise) which policy makers 
need and value (Salter, 2003, p.933; see also Allsop, Baggott and Jones, 2002, p.61). As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, health consumer groups are usually issued-based and 
divided by objectives, interests, size, structure, strategy, tactics and degree of stability. 
Therefore, their co-option to policy community is “value-based”, differing from the 
“expertise-based” and “production-based” co-option of medical profession (Saward, 
1990). For example, Wood’s research on orthodox, disease-based patients’ associations 
found that, at the local level, they usually lack political legitimacy in the eyes of Health 
Authorities (later Strategic Health Authorities and now Trust Development Authorities), 
which prefer to rely on consultative methods (Wood 2000, p.14). In this regard, Salter 
(2003) goes further to suggest, “of itself, consumer involvement in the policy process is 
no guarantee that the state has recognised the political utility of this contribution in 
anything other than a symbolic sense…the immaturity and fragmentary quality of the 
health consumer policy networks renders them potentially unreliable allies, should the 
state choose to incorporate them at the agenda setting stage of policy formation” (p. 934; 
my emphasis).   
So have the recent developments in the NHS, as we discussed in the previous section, 
reversed this development? Counter evidences to patient power at both the individual- 
and policy planning- levels suggest that barriers to genuine citizen participation and 
power sharing in healthcare are still strong. 
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At the policy planning- level, a recent systematic scoping review by Conklin et al. (2015) 
find that evidence of longer-term impact of public involvement is limited. This is 
consistent with previous studies which found the inﬂuence of public involvement 
minimal or uncertain on decision-making of healthcare organizations (Anderson, 
Shepherd and Salisbury, 2006; Baggott, 2005; Milewa, 2004; Mitton et al. 2009). When 
public involvement initiatives aimed to engage diverse actors or had constraints on the 
involvement of the public, minimal effects on strategic decisions were found (Bauld et 
al., 2005). In respect of the representativeness and legitimacy of public involvement in 
health service management, Martin (2008) suggests, health professionals tend to retain 
control over decision making by two strategies: 1) as academic studies have found, 
undermining the legitimacy of involved members of the public, particularly by 
questioning their representativeness (Crawford et al., 2003), and 2) as found in the 
cancer-genetics projects he studied, downplaying the legitimacy of public representatives 
by technocratically defining their contribution as patient-hood or biomedical lay subjects, 
bounded to the narrow questions of patient satisfaction and information provision. This 
suggests the knowledge gap based on the technical complexity of clinical activities 
continually upholds the medical dominance in the symbolic struggle over legitimacy in 
decision-making and representation.  
In line with this argument, the case study on hospital planning in the UK by Jones and 
Exworthy (2015) further suggests that managers and doctors have managed to constrain 
public participation in decisions with clinical rationale. They defined hospital planning 
as a clinical issue and framed decisions to close hospitals or hospital departments as 
based on the evidence and necessary to ensure safety. This identifies a shift in the framing 
of the policy, from one that presented the policy as a means of improving access and 
making services more responsive to patients, to the centralized policy under the name of 
clinical necessity. Likewise, McDonald et al.’s (2014) case study reports that the Council 
of Governors (CoGs) meetings of Foundation Trusts may rather be “business as usual” 
than promoting accountability as they are bureaucratic, requiring governors to engage 
with dense, and sometimes technical, paperwork, leaving limited opportunities for 
questions, debate and agenda setting. In the absence of strong supporting mechanisms 
such as eﬀective subcommittees feeding meaningfully into CoGs’ business, user 
governors are precluded from holding the trust to account on service delivery issues. In 
addition, Rose et al. (2014) find that user-led organizations (ULOs) were being forced to 
adapt in an organizational climate of change and complexity, and that decision-makers 
  
82 
 
no longer claimed the high moral ground for working with ULOs, but expected them to 
work within a system of institutional behavioural norms. Service Users Governors of the 
NHS Foundation Trusts, too, had to work within a system of norms deriving from the 
organizational structure and culture of the NHS, and this impacted on how far they were 
able to exercise inﬂuence. In respect of the patient safety issue, the Health Foundation’s 
(2013) recent evidence scan reveals that patients are likely to be involved in educational 
initiatives and strategies designed to make them more aware of, and comfortable with, 
raising the subject of safety and feeding back safety issues to professionals on an 
individual basis, than in making collective contributions to system improvement. 
As Hardyman, Daunt, and Kitchener (2015) would argue, “value co-creation” in health 
services by citizens is a process that mainly happens at the micro- level and therefore 
should be articulated in a micro-level research approach. Veronesi and Keasey (2015) 
also suggest that, those “micro-dynamics of interaction” are more significant than the 
“macro-abstractions of organizational engagement” (p.562) - the “administrative 
approach of patient involvement” (hierarchical and highly structured implementation) 
limits discretion, yielding compliance and almost by default the intended results; these 
top-down policy efforts have generally shown a poor fit with the contingent situation at 
the local level (see also Wright et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the flexible strategies within 
the implementation process, on the other hand, can reshape aims and purposes of health 
policies locally, leaving the impact of patient involvement uncertain or subject to 
willingness of particular professional groups to co-operate.      
At the individual- level, there is ample evidence that patient involvement may be 
vulnerable to medicine’s resistance or manipulation. Firstly, the patient involvement 
process is highly selective by health professionals in terms of eligibility and scope. In an 
ethnographic study (Fudge, Wolfe and McKevitt, 2008) of user involvement programme 
to improve stroke services in London, only a small proportion of the stroke population 
actually participated, and the domains in which users could exert their expertise were 
limited. Users were more interested in participating in time limited projects with tangible 
outputs related to training health care professionals, developing information and 
supporting stroke survivors rather than project management. So it is concluded that 
patient involvement did little to alter patient-health professional relationships. Drawing 
on an in-depth case study in mental health between 2008-2012, Enany, Currie and 
Lockett (2013) suggest, unrepresentative involvement occurs through a combination of 
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self-selection by those wanting to be involved, and professionals actively selecting, 
educating and socializing certain users. The selected users tend to be more articulate and 
able to work with professionals, and are more complicit in the processes. Interestingly, 
“user stratification” also occurs as the selected users pursuing their own professional 
status by delineating a distinctive body of “expert” management knowledge and 
excluding those who they perceive as “less expert”. Renedo and Marston (2011) observe 
that involvees of the PPI activities of CLAHRC (Collaboration for Leadership in Applied 
Health Research) in London must negotiate professionals’ negative discourses to develop 
self-images that reﬂect their own interests. They struggle ﬁrst to “assert a legitimate 
identity” as a public participant, second to “survive” as a lone outsider and a minority in 
complex expert-systems, third to “exercise agency” when having to adapt to institutional 
top-down forms of PPI, and fourth to “cope with threats to lay identities and derogated 
common-sense knowledge”. It is argued that these processes can hinder successful 
patient participation even where there is an institutional infrastructure to promote civic 
engagement with healthcare. In the case study by Ledger and Slade (2015) on two 
patients support groups (mental health and chronic illness) in the UK, it is further 
revealed that “expertise by experience” of facilitators (who are former users) does not 
lead to a clear transfer of power from professionals. Although developing new 
knowledge over time, facilitators’ expertise was downplayed as the solely a result of their 
past experiences of illness and care, and they seldom articulate it as expertise; neither 
acknowledgment of professionals and users’ equal contributions nor their reciprocal 
relationships, which is the co-production notion’s emphasis, is found.  
Secondly, self-management of illness and choice themselves do not imply more patient 
control over the treatment process. As Fotaki (2011) highlights, researchers have recently 
pointed out that the project empowering patients as “citizen-consumers” to challenge 
providers’ dominance is at the risk of turning them into a “responsibilized agent” who is 
free to choose but has little control over available choices (Newman and Clarke, 2009; 
Newman, Glendinning and Hughes, 2008; Scourfield 2007). It is suggested that : a) under 
efficiency considerations, choices offered to patients could be affected by the resource 
constraints in terms of doctors’ time during the consultation; b) due to an inherent 
asymmetry of information between patients and doctors, patients still rely on doctors’ 
involvement in decisions concerning their treatment; c) patient choice is mainly 
concerned with the time and place of treatment, rather than patients’ autonomy or their 
involvement in decision making which are the more striking mechanisms of individual 
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involvement; d) and most importantly, effective co-production of treatment requires an 
increase in consumers’ skills and knowledge, or health literacy, which in many cases the 
patients are unable or reluctant to acquire. Fotaki (2011, p.947) then turns to argue that 
the policy ideal of empowering patients as a “citizen and consumer” assumes that they 
are acting as a co-producer with voice and political influence (for the former), and exit 
and control over resources (for the latter) - however, in case they lack those resources, or 
they are forced to produce services that are no longer available against the background 
of cost containment, a “forced-coproduction” by “responsibilized agent” would be the 
result instead. Renedo and Marston (2015), in their studies of PPI activities of CLAHRC 
in London, have also revealed that the neoliberal ideals about individual responsibility 
and discipline moves patients away from the idea of the accountable state and healthcare 
providers for upholding patients’ quality care, towards the idea of citizens needing to 
work on self-improvement.  
Thirdly, patient choice and shared-decision making in treatment is redistricted by another 
major theme of healthcare reforms, evidence-based medicine. Sanders, Harrison and 
Checkland (2008) interviewed doctors in heart failure care and found that their content 
and style of the consultation is affected by evidence-based clinical protocols. They 
argued that the scientific nature of EBM acts to limit the degree to which doctors solicit 
patient involvement in decision-making. For instance, references to big studies and 
treatment being proven to work were used to persuade patients to take treatment and to 
pre-empt resistance. As evidence in favour of treatment is so compelling, doctors are 
more concerned to persuade and cajole their patients than to engage them in any 
meaningful discussion. In contrary to the new paradigm of patients’ rights to decline 
beneficial interventions, patient participation in decision-making can only occur at the 
margins. In addition, Solomon et al. (2012; 2013) interviewed GPs and patients about 
the compatibility of prescribing guidance and doctor-patient partnership. They reported 
that evidence-based guidance served to limit patient choice: guidelines are written from 
a state actors’ perspective of financial costs (budget control), efficacy, risks and clinical 
evidence at a population level, different to the worldview of patients, and they tend to 
downplay the criteria most important to patients, such as personal financial cost 
(affordability), human cost (bereavement and loss of ability) and personal experience. 
Although GPs tried to adopt a mid-point between the two polar views for maintaining a 
good relation with patients and trust, certain patient choice and participation in decision-
making was compromised.    
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In sum, basically remained valid is Salter’s (2003, p.931) notion of “sponsored 
consumerism” which is a controlled inclusion of patients in the policy process where 
they are consulted on a preordained agenda acceptable to medicine and the state, 
conferring legitimacy on the latter as a “symbol legitimating device”. Again, it is the 
ultimate control over biomedical knowledge and expertise which confers the medical 
profession autonomy and legitimate place in the stable community of health policy. Here 
the conceptual distinction between “formation” and “implementation” in health policy 
process well annotates Corporatist theory of welfare governance - producer groups’ 
interests are mainly mediated through implementation rather than formal representation.  
Such mechanism well matches the ideal of all the three types of formal co-option 
(“value”, “production” and “expertise”; see Seward, 1990) and accords them an “insider 
status” in policy community; in contrast, patient’s influence is indeed restricted to the 
symbolic representation in policy formation.   
3.4.3. Inter-professionalism: renegotiating professional boundaries   
Finally, as Kuhlmann (2006) suggests, the strongest modernizing driver to transform 
corporatism in the healthcare system is a more “inclusive professionalism” or inter-
professional teams/networks which include the entire spectrum of health professions 
(p.12).  Given that corporatist arrangements are anchored to the producer’s control on 
policy implementation, the idea of “inclusive professionalism” promoting multi-
professional management in welfare production seems to be the most direct challenge. It 
is suggested that the rationalisation of health care, in terms of the expansion of health 
promotion and prevention in primary care, has created considerable potentials for 
enabling GPs and allied health workers to take over some tasks hitherto carried out by 
specialist doctors and therefore eroding their hegemonic position. Furthermore, the circle 
of actors which does not belong to the orthodox medical knowledge system is 
increasingly in demand. As a result, new global models of decision making and new 
patterns of quality of care are also introduced (Kuhlmann, 2006, p.52). This is the “future 
health workforce” anticipated to better sever the demands for co-operation and integrated 
care, bringing about flatter hierarchies to the healthcare workplace (Davies, 2003). 
In the UK context, GPs and nurses are seen as the key players in modernising the NHS. 
Polices to “shift the balance of power” away from hospitals initiated in the 1990s under 
Conservative governments to empower GPs as commissioners of care in an internal 
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market, and advanced under successive Labour governments (DOH, 2001). To further 
shift services delivery from hospital to primary care settings, and “build jobs round 
patients, rather than round professions” (DOH, 2002, p.7), the new General Medical 
Services (GMS) contract was implemented in April 2004. GPs and the allied health 
professionals they employ are given greater discretion to innovate and make decisions 
about services delivery. In addition to expanding the GPs-led commissioning, which we 
have discussed in the previous section, this shift saw also 1) specialist services such as 
ear, nose and throat (ENT) and dermatology carried out in new community hospitals/ GP 
surgeries as alternatives to second care hospital admission, and 2) nurses, pharmacists 
and other health professionals being given more responsibility in managing chronic 
diseases (DOH, 2006). As Currie, Finn and Martin (2009) put it, the subtitle of The NHS 
Plan, “More Staff Working Differently” (DOH, 2002) has epitomized the idea to “change 
traditional roles, conventional team structures, hierarchies and existing care processes, 
and allow greater scope for overlapping responsibilities, flexibility, multi-skilling and 
generic work” (Currie, Finn, and Martin, 2009, p.269).  
Those changes were in company with Agenda for Change (DOH, 2004a), a new system 
of remuneration based on an evaluation of job roles, skills and knowledge rather than the 
traditional hierarchy based on professional status. It applies to all health professionals in 
the NHS, providing new ﬂexible career progression pathways and therefore the basis for 
their extensions to “mini-doctor” roles, such as nurse specialist, prescribers and 
consultants (Currie, Finn and Martin, 2010, p.946; McDonald, Campbell and Lester, 
2009, p.1206). Also, NICE has developed Clinical Pathways as “a documented sequence 
of clinical interventions, placed in an appropriate time frame, written and agreed by a 
multidisciplinary team” (The National Assembly of Wales, 1999, p,10). The Pathways 
represent the ideal patient journeys that map out healthcare activities and specify the 
input of various professionals, functioning as a shared language for discussing patient 
care and encouraging inter-professional communication (Hunter and Segrott, 2014, 
p.721). 
New professional roles, most prominently GP with specialist interests (GPSI) and Nurse 
Practitioners (NP), have emerged to take over clinical duties and blurred the traditional 
boundaries drawn by bio-medical specialism. The key roles of GPSI, as foreseen by the 
government, are to take referrals from their fellow GPs, offer diagnostic and some 
treatment services, and provide leadership in primary care re-shaping services around 
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particular disease areas (DOH, 2004b). Regarding these new functions performed by 
GPSI’s bypassing specialist doctors, Gerada, Wright and Keen (2002) suggest that the 
boundary between hospital-based and primary care is spanned by GPIS’s disseminating 
expertise, smoothing care pathways and acting as “champions” within primary care for 
the clinical speciality of interest; Harrison (2002) also argued, decisions previously in 
the hands of hospital consultants might now lie in the hands of GPs.  
Other than this intra-professional dimension, the development of Nurse Practitioners (NP) 
presents an inter-professional dimension of challenges to medicine. The upgrading of 
nurse training to academy has conferred nurses considerable legitimacy and power to 
deliver health services in their own right, together with the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council’s (formerly UKCC) changes in its code of practice, which emphasize “principles 
for practice” (a holistic concept of nursing) rather than “certificates for tasks” (based on 
activities) (Witz and Annandale, 2006, p.41). In the NHS, NPs are experienced nurses 
who work with patients with long term conditions and provide preventative healthcare in 
the local community, offering aspects of care previously carried out by GPs, such as 
consultation, physical assessment, diagnosis, prescribing, research and health promotion. 
With a prescribing qualification and master-level training, Advance Nurse Practitioners 
(ANP) are even able to: take a full patient history, carry out any physical examinations, 
use their knowledge to identify a likely diagnosis, request appropriate tests to aid 
diagnosis (blood tests, x-rays, scans), refer patients to an appropriate specialist (in the 
practice or hospital), prescribe medicines and non-medical treatments, and arrange 
follow up/ ongoing management (Health Education England, 2015).  
Studies suggest that practice nurses are becoming the ﬁrst contact providers of care with 
minimal input form GPs in relation to the management of chronic disease (Campbell, 
McDonald and Lester, 2008; McDonald et al., 2007; McDonald, Campbell Lester, 2009). 
For example, PN-led clinics/teams are providing preventive care to patients with 
coronary heart disease, prescribing of hypotensive agents, lipid lowering and antiplatelet 
drugs, recording of blood pressure and ordering serum cholesterol and plasma cotinine 
levels, integrate rehabilitation services with secondary prevention for people who survive 
a myocardial infarction, and long-term optimal care (Hoare, Mills and Francis, 2012, 
p.972). Quality assessment is another example of new nurse management roles in relation 
to the increasing emphasis on patient care and customer satisfaction as the health service 
organization’s remits (Witz and Annandale, 2006, p.40). In view of assisting patients to 
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return to work, increasing responsibilities have also been placed upon nurses and 
physiotherapists in sickness absence management and access to state funded 
occupational health. To endorse such role extension, the government has expanded the 
professional capacities of nurses and physiotherapists to sickness certification (Welsh et 
al., 2014, p.3). Gemmell et al.’s (2009) study of work diaries of staff in general practices 
indicates that nurses perceive expanding nursing staff roles that routine care for people 
with long-term conditions are almost wholly provided by nurses. The increase in nurses’ 
autonomy is followed by their job satisfaction (Maisey et al., 2008). 
In short, the UK Government’s strategic move towards inter-professional practice, with 
a team-based approach to health service, has increased the likelihood of role blurring and 
relinquishing claims of exclusivity and ownership to health care practices and knowledge 
by the medical profession (Masterson, 2002). King et al.’s (2015) systematic review of 
the literature on the contested professional boundaries resonates with those findings and 
supports that healthcare management is based not on “immovable professional 
boundaries” but on “dynamic shifts” which “may not always favour the traditionally most 
powerful profession” (p.7). Yet, they argue that this may signal “a reduction in 
professional power and autonomy by some of the professions, each of which is 
increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of the healthcare market, and the fiscal restraints 
imposed on healthcare budgets” (ibid). It presents a state-centric account of “de-
professionalization” or “proletarianization” of all health professionals, more than a 
society-centric account of pluralistic network of empowered healthcare providers. Indeed, 
some also suggest that it is not the push from the representative bodies of the subordinate 
professional groups to make their role expansion, but the state’s agenda of cost 
containment by creating a flexible (or controllable) healthcare workforce to deal with 
unmet demands at lower costs (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2006, p.898 and 912). As we 
will discuss as follows, compared to the medical profession, those subordinate 
professional groups are actually more vulnerable to the state’s efforts in breaking 
professional boundaries and centralizing control in healthcare, offering a little hope of 
checking the medical dominance.  
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3.4.4. Boundaries reproduced: substitution or delegation, expansion or 
enhancement?   
Paradoxically, the state-sponsored challenge to medicine by subordinate professional 
health workers is at the same time hindered by another NPM agenda of healthcare reform, 
accountability/ efficiency. It is reported that the emphasis on EBM (e.g. population-based 
clinical protocols/guidance and performance targets) has undermined the holistic or 
patient-centred approach of care on which the GPs’ and nurses’ professional identities 
and legitimacy claims are rooted against specialist doctors. As a result of the skill-mix 
policy, the medicalization (being more bio-medical and disease-oriented, for example, 
being more involved in prescribing controlled drugs) of GPs’ and nurses’ clinical work 
has also strengthened the position of specialist doctors in the division of labour in 
healthcare for the latter’s ultimate authority over bio-medical knowledge. It is suggested 
that while GPs and nurses are encroaching the territory of previously superior groups by 
the reallocation of tasks, their activities are now at the risk of further subordination to 
latter’s regulation (for doctors, see Checkland et al., 2008; Martin, Currie and Finn, 2009; 
Currie, Finn and Martin, 2009; for nurses, see McDonald et al., 2009; McGregor et al., 
2008; Latimer, 2014; Witz and Annandale, 2006; we will turn to a more detailed 
discussion of these studies later). In view of patient safety and cost efficiency, training, 
accreditation and regulation by specialist doctors are crucial to maintaining a controlled 
and accountable delegation of clinical works to the less specialized groups of health 
workers.  
As Currie, Finn and Martin (2010) argue, new professional roles introduced by policy 
initiatives inevitably have to interact with the pre-existing institutional orders of 
profession, involving “formal recognition of new sets of knowledge” through training, 
accreditation and regulation” (p.945). Therefore, “professional bodies can mediate state 
influence on professional work jurisdictions and roles through the extent to which they 
support and institutionalize developments” (ibid). Considering that the line of the 
organizational accountability, control and power in healthcare system is largely 
underpinned by the institutional (professional) one, it is not surprising that the latter has 
considerable mediation effects on the reforms to the former. Moreover, the state’ 
emphasis of the on accountability/ efficiency has actually strengthened the position of 
the medical professionals who are at the top of the line of institutional accountability. 
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We then turn to the second line of analysis that focuses on the institution of profession 
power itself. As Abbott (1988) suggests, in the “professional jurisdictions wars”, 
professions can gain privilege by successful claims to jurisdictions, but can also lose 
privileges too; during this process, there are certain constant “boundary work” by which 
the professionals preserve and expand their territories (Fournier, 2000). On this basis, 
Nancarrow and Borthwick (2006) further develop a framework of the four directions of 
change in the professional boundaries among health workers: 1) Diversification; 2) 
Specialisation; 3) Vertical Substitution; and 4) Horizontal Substitution. It is argued that, 
overall, the medical profession is pivotal in defining professional boundaries in 
healthcare. 
“Diversification” involves the creation of new tasks, or simply new ways of performing 
existing tasks, resulting in the expansion of the role for that discipline. The ownership of 
powerful technologies such as antibiotics and anaesthetic by doctors are early examples; 
the use of video laparoscopy that expands of the roles of surgeons is another. Based on 
the access to new research knowledge and ability to control or regulate the new 
technology, medicine, as the oldest formal profession in healthcare, has the greatest 
control over its scope of practice of all the health disciplines, as well as other health 
professions’ diversification (pp.905-906).  
“Specialisation” is “the adoption of an increasing level of expertise in a specific 
disciplinary area” with “membership to a closed-subgroup of the profession’ by which 
“profession recognises a specialist technology or skill in healthcare delivery that extends 
beyond the core, pre-registration training for that discipline” (p.907). In medicine, 
specialisation arises to enhance medicine’s superiority over their technical assistants and 
lay therapists (ibid). While diversification and specialisation enables the 
professionalization and expansion of the medical workforce, in order to have enough 
time and capacity to undertake new roles, doctors have to discard the routine or less 
skilled components of their work (p.908).  
“Vertical Substitution” therefore is needed as an “internal closure” strategy by which 
subordinate sub-groups within a profession are undertaking lower status duties to free 
the professionals to specialise and pursue higher-status and autonomous “virtuoso” roles. 
GPs’ own specialisation moving into the domain of specialist practitioners as GPSI is a 
good example. In a down-up direction, it may also promote the paraprofessionals’ 
specialisation, for example, the extension of nursing roles to prescribing as nurse 
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specialists that trespasses the traditional medicine’s domain (pp.909-910). However, 
while vertical substitution generally increases the scope of practice of a historically 
subordinate profession, the level of increase in their status or rewards varies and the 
extent of substitution tends to be controlled by the more powerful disciplines. For 
instance, nurse prescribers and GPSI are not rewarded the same status or financial 
rewards as doctors and consultants. Their works are regulated and supervised by the latter 
who are responsible for the final outcomes of care.  Nor can they be employed in isolation 
from the latter or access to the medical components of the tasks unless adhered to the 
formal training recognized by the latter (p.910). Delegation of routine or less desired/ 
skilled tasks to subordinate groups therefore is not only a policy requirement but also 
driven by the internal logic of the profession system to expand the workforce, providing 
the most powerful group with the capacity to diversify and specialize, and the subordinate 
groups the chance to extend their supplementary roles.  
“Horizontal Substitution” mainly arises as a result of the inter-professional practice that 
aims at creating a flexible workforce, and involves role overlap between practitioners of 
similar status and power. Good examples are the training of physiotherapy and 
occupational therapy assistants to become generic assistants, and the sharing of tasks of 
physical functioning and transfers between occupational therapists and physiotherapists 
(p.911). Horizontal substitution is rarely to be associated with an increase in professional 
status, power or income. It occurs more frequently between the subordinate healthcare 
occupations whose roles lack of clarity, than with medicine whose roles are well 
diversified and specialized (better defined, protected by regulation and access to 
restricted technology) (p. 912). While nurses and therapists are also introducing their 
own supporting workers, it is seen as a devaluation of the respective professions rather 
than an opportunity to “delegate the dirty work” as it acknowledges that less qualified 
workers could do components of the work (p.913).  
In this light, compared to para-professions such as nurses and therapists, the medical 
profession is indeed the less vulnerable group to the state’s efforts in breaking 
professional boundaries. As Nancarrow and Borthwick (2006) conclude, while the 
dynamics have “the potential to challenge the monopoly of all the healthcare professions”, 
the professions appear to be safe if they can: 1) retain a high level of demand for their 
specialised services, 2) retain sufficient control over their own roles, 2) diversify to 
deliver new roles or retain ownership over the technology required to deliver them, or 3) 
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compete with existing providers on the basis of cost, quality or novelty for the delivery 
of those tasks (p.914). Undoubtedly, the medical profession is that one in a relatively 
safe position considering all these conditions.  
Although their later work (King et al., 2015) presents a more pessimistic picture of 
overall decline of professional power seeing the “boundary work” steered by the state as 
“a reduction in professional power and autonomy by some of the professions, each of 
which is increasingly vulnerable” (p.7), we hold that the corporatist account of medical 
service providers’ power is a more promising explanation for the dynamics in healthcare 
reforms. As discussed above: 1) overall, the medical profession still maintains its control 
over its professional boundary through effective diversification, specialization and 
vertical substitution, and is less vulnerable to horizontal substitution than para-
professionals, 2) the internal conflict of NPM agenda between accountability/control 
(evidence-based clinical governance) and decentralization/networks (skill mix and inter-
professional approach to preventive care near patients) has opened a window of 
opportunity for medicine elites to reclaim power in the course of interpreting and 
operating the monitor regime on behalf of the state, reinforcing the traditional 
institutional force of professional hierarchy. These two arguments find further support 
from recent researches.   
For GPs, Checkland et al. (2008) identify a real shift towards the delivery of a more 
biomedical or disease-orientated model of care as a response to the imperatives embodied 
in the new GMS contract. The clinical indicators in the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) are very specific and narrowly medical in focus, specifying quite 
challenging targets that are unlikely to be met without the adoption of a pharmaceutical 
approach (pp.793-799). Also, GPs turn to seek legitimacy with a specialist role as 
community-based specialists (GPSI) mirroring the past strategy of moving closer to the 
secondary care setting (e.g. appointment as “clinical assistants”) (p.800). However, in 
these moves, GPs’ unique identity and legitimacy claims to holistic and patient-centred 
care against their hospital colleagues are undermined.  
Currie, Finn and Martin, (2009) find that, in the case of Genetics, Geneticists who are 
the established experts in the field have the power to constrain the development of the 
GPSI role in two related ways. First, to define the nature of Genetic expertise and 
knowledge, control access to it, and thus the right to practise (p.275). Upon 
indeterminacy of professional knowledge, Geneticists claim that immersion in the day to 
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day Genetics work (lengthy professional training and socialization/ ongoing interaction 
with other experts) is required to achieve necessary experiential and situated knowledge 
to practise (p.281). Second, to place GPSI in a “relationship of dependency” where they 
depend on Geneticists’ ongoing support for everyday practice (p.275). Some of the GPSI 
are restricted to the educational role; others are restricted to a role that supplements 
existing service provision (e.g. to take account of family histories and made referral 
decisions) under the auspices of the Regional Genetics Centre, whereby Geneticists take 
on the role of appraiser, inspecting all referrals to the GPSI and filling an ongoing 
supervisory role (pp.276-277). Remarkably, Geneticists are found supportive to the 
complementary role of GPSI, as long as they can be relieved of workload pressures whilst 
retaining ultimate control of services (p276). As a result, GPs are at the risk of becoming 
“clinical assistants” to expert Geneticists (p.278). The state’ efforts in building a 
collaborative healthcare workforce may paradoxically render GPs more subordinate to 
specialist doctors in hospitals. 
For nurses, Laughlin, Broadbent and Willig-Atherton (1994, p.117) have depicted nurses 
as an “absorbing mechanism” that absorbs unwanted GPs’ workload. This notion 
resonates with the national policy agenda to extend nurses’ roles to provide out of hours 
and other enhanced services that GPs may choose to opt out of (DOH, 2003). Witz and 
Annandale (2006) also suggest that primary practice nurses simply take on routine tasks 
formerly performed by GPs without necessarily expanding decision-making role (p.39) 
as nurses are still the employees of GPs whose control of resources and management is 
intact under the new GMS contact 2004. Interestingly, she identifies a reluctance of 
nurses themselves in unstreaking new tasks for more liabilities they will bear (p.24).  
Studies of the new GMS contract 2004 (Gemmell et al., 2009; McDonald, Campbell, and 
Lester, 2009; McGregor et al., 2008) confirm that that the workloads generated by the 
new GMS contract are basically absorbed by nurses without adequate rewards in 
financial terms or involvement in decision making in GP practices. It is also revealed that 
those new nurses’ activities are target-driven and narrowly defined by template - taking 
responsibility for meeting the contract targets, nurses are described as engaging in 
excessive data recording, the tick-box approach, and the stringent focus on incentivised 
QOF areas. These are seen as detrimental to the more holistic, patient-centred approach 
of nursing rather than encouraging innovation of services (McDonald et al., 2009, 
pp.1209-1210; McGregor et al., 2008, p.6). Those evidences suggest that task 
reallocation between GPs and nurses in the primary care setting is basically an effective 
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“vertical substitution” strategy used by GPs to discard less desired tasks whilst 
maintaining overall control.  
The systematic review of Niezen and Mathijssen (2014, pp.163-164) on the task 
reallocation from the medical to nursing domains further suggests that full substitution, 
that medical responsibility is entirely transferred to the nursing domain, rarely happens 
as the extent of delegation or substitution is linked to the ownership of medical 
responsibility. The full substitution is also hindered by the organizational (e.g. 
availability of protocols) and institutional environments (e.g. legislation and ﬁnancial 
support), as well as the complexity of tasks affects the probability to standardise the tasks 
and thus legitimize the substitution (ibid). A good example is the uncertainty in the nurses’ 
role extensions to the core medical domain of prescribing. Analysing the NHS workforce 
database, Drennan, Grant and Harris (2014) find that the prescriptions written by nurses 
in primary care in England is minor in comparison to physicians (only 1.5% of all items). 
In most PCTs, Independent Nurse Prescribers contribute under 0.5% of items (p.5). The 
largest volume of items prescribed by nurses in primary care are those items used in 
common nursing care activities practice, such as wound dressings, incontinence and 
stoma devices. Beyond these, the medicine categories are those that could be bracketed 
as health promotion, such as contraception and smoking cessation (p.6).  
In a hospital setting, Latimer (2014) suggests the expansion of nurses’ roles is no more 
than a “delegation of work without power”. Firstly, with clinical practice having to 
conform to clinical decision-making protocols on the one hand, and the demands of 
administrative agendas on the other, discretion are located at an ever-increasing distance 
from the bedside. For example, admission and discharge are now not simply matters of 
clinical discretion that they may share with doctors (p.540). Secondly, being increasingly 
preoccupied with ﬁnancial and administrative responsibilities, nurses are spending less 
time in specific nursing activities with individual patients; however, minimal meaningful 
status and authority seem to accrue when nurses shift from clinical roles to managerial 
ones. Although former nurses occupy leading managerial positions, few have suﬃcient 
voice at key strategic points in the NHS over the setting of policy, organization design, 
and distribution of resources (p.538). In the NHS, it is clinical authority that still matters, 
though the authority is being centralized top-down under EMB.  
As a whole, the tasks reallocation of in healthcare workplace does not imply a role 
substitution in the profession system between the dominant groups (doctors or specialists) 
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or the subordinate groups (para-professionals or GPSI) as anticipated by the skill mix 
and inter-professional management policies. It is rather a controlled delegation as the 
scope of tasks reallocation is predefined and limited by the dominant groups. Moreover, 
the subordinate groups are further subject to supervision; and the role expansion of the 
subordinate groups to supplemental works does not see a definite enchantment of their 
status, autonomy or rewards. In sum, health policy communities are still closed networks 
dominated by strong corporatist forces of medicine. The state’s efforts in re-negotiating 
professional boundaries have turned into reproducing those boundaries.       
3.4.5. Brief summary  
Stakeholder arrangements in healthcare systems appear to challenge medicine’s 
dominant position and support a pluralist account of health policy networks. However, 
they are not as successful as at first glance. 
Firstly, citizen participation in health service co-production and co-planning is far from 
a full control over health services but in some way manipulated by healthcare 
professionals. Due to the technical complexities involved in health services, doctors as 
professional bureaucrats have always managed to control the access to key information 
for agenda setting, downplay the legitimacy of patient’s opinion, and predefine the scope 
of patient involvement. Interestingly, clinical guidelines provide a solid base upon which 
doctors can stand to deny or limit patients’ influence in clinical decisions and their rights 
to choice. Patients’ lack of time and knowledge to excise choice also help this asymmetry 
to flourish.  
The control over biomedical knowledge again offers an overarching protection for 
medical autonomy from patients influence. Noticeably, this protection is reinforced by 
the state’s agenda of cost-containment and accountability - under cost-efficiency 
considerations, the ideal of patients’ choice and voice has to be compromised, and this 
mediation process relies very much on the medical profession’s interpretation of clinical 
rationales. In view of effective governance, the state may also need to sponsor patients’ 
participation in the health policy community under the banner of public control and 
accountability. However, patients’ power has to be controlled and symbolic in nature to 
reconcile it with another principal legitimating device working in parallel, the “implicit 
rationing” function of medicine. 
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Secondly, the state-sponsored challenge to medicine from inter-professional networks/ 
skill mix team policy is also found as hindered by the state’s own efforts to rationalize 
healthcare governance. With the strategy of clinical guidance and substituting core health 
professionals by less trained workers, “de-professionalization” or “proletarianization” 
occurs, but more likely among para-professionals than the medical professionals. In 
contrast to the medical profession whose effective diversification, specialization and 
vertical substitution are guaranteed by their ownership over biomedical knowledge and 
final liabilities for clinical decisions, allied professionals can merely extend, not enhance, 
their roles in task reallocation. They simply take on routine tasks formerly performed by 
doctors as an absorbing mechanism; but if they encroach into the medical domain, the 
dilemma is that, they are at the risk of being more bio-medical oriented and subject to 
the regulation exercised by medicine. Also, they are more vulnerable than the medical 
profession to the downward substitution of work by ward assistants and horizontal 
substitution by other para-professions.  
If we apply the De-professionalization or Proletarianization Thesis to the entire 
healthcare workforce, it may simply predict the triumph of the state with an overall 
decline in producers’ power; while it could also lead to a consolidation of corporatist 
arrangements favouring medicine as discussed in this review. At best, it may leave other 
health professionals in a more vulnerable position offering a little hope for challenging 
medicine. Furthermore, the state actually accounts heavily on medicine to interpret and 
implement clinical governance. In view of a controlled and accountable delegation of 
clinical works to the less specialized groups of health workers, the inter-professional 
networks/ skill mix team policy may at the same time create a demand for extending the 
jurisdiction of clinical governance, which is based on medical science, to the formally 
unchartered areas of non-medical activities. The intra-professional conflicts between 
GPSI and specialist doctors are of no exception. In this sense, the re-stratification within 
medicine does not necessarily favour GPs over specialists.   
In sum, stakeholder arrangements in healthcare are aligned with the capitalist welfare 
state’s dedication to more rationalized or manageable systems. The shortcomings of 
patients and other health professionals, as well as the advantages of medicine (specialist) 
in controlling over bio-medical knowledge, make the latter’s a more stable partner for 
the state in the rationalization project. Two functions performed by medicine (specialist) 
are identified as core to the corporatist relation: the “implicit rationing” of welfare 
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consumption and the rationalization of the whole line of clinical activities. In such 
dynamics of the state cum medicine versus patients and other health workers, evidence-
based medicine arises as the major mediation mechanism and deserves further empirical 
investigation.       
3.5. Closing remarks  
This review attempts to make three contributions to the theoretical debate of healthcare 
reforms. First, to calibrate the socio-political theories of medicine with general theories 
of governance in welfare production, referring the De-professionalization or 
Proletarianization Thesis to State-centric Theory, the Re-Stratification Thesis to 
Corporatist Theory, and the “citizen-consumer” and “jurisdiction war” theses to Society-
centric Theory. With special attention to the field of welfare production, this review 
proposes Corporatist theory to assimilate the state-centric and society-centric arguments 
by suggesting that doctors as welfare producers are actually partners cum challengers of 
the state in healthcare governance.  
Second, given that the Re-Stratification Thesis is generally supported by literature, to 
further identify the role of medical elites (as at the top of the strata) in balancing between 
the state power and collective professional interests/ autonomy, and to depict the 
dynamics with the “governmentality” thesis and the “loose coupling” thesis respectively. 
While the former implies a proneness to the state control that leads to the “de-
professionalization/ proletarianization” of the rank-and files in medicine, with medical 
elites being co-opted to the managerial ideology, the latter implies a proneness to medical 
power that its collective professional interests/ autonomy are preserved by ritually 
coupling to the state-sponsored monitoring systems without any substantial changes in 
the professional domain of daily operations.  
Third, to put such state-medicine conflicts in a wider context of their relation with other 
societal actors, such as patients and subordinate health workers. In the face of an overall 
tendency of “de-professionalization/ proletarianization” in the entire healthcare 
workforce, it could be argued that the medical profession has relative advantages over 
other health professions, who are countervailing actors in the health policy community, 
in buffering the impacts. On a contrary premise, interestingly, the active participation of 
those challengers to medicine in the health policy community are not only providing an 
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opportunity for pluralistic policy networks to flourish, but also creating an extra demand 
for medicine’s enrolment into corporatist arrangements to maintain the states’ effective 
governance.  
In this regard, certain important concepts have already been outlined in this review and 
some further research questions can be asked as follows: what are the role of “medical 
elites” in managing a re-stratified healthcare system? How do they maintain their 
authority over the rank-and-files?  Are there any cleavages or noise created in corporatist 
arrangements? How do they reconcile the state and professional agendas of healthcare 
governance?  To what extent is this group of pivotal players being “governmentalized” 
to impose self-surveillance, or leading a ritual “loose coupling” with the institutional 
structures without substantial changes in the professional logics of day-to-day operations? 
The next chapter will attempt to develop research strategies to examine those power 
dynamics in healthcare governance. 
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Chapter 4                                                                                                     
Researching physician managers 
4.1. Introduction  
The last chapter highlights the theoretical relevance of physician managers (clinicians 
who are medically qualified and carrying management duties) in healthcare governance 
studies. Due to the interdependence of the state and medicine in running healthcare 
systems, as Corporatist Theory suggests, dynamics and struggles rarely take an extreme 
form of overall dominance of one group. Rather, it is the state “colonizing” medicine by 
the co-optation of doctors into healthcare systems management to impose a tighter self-
surveillance regime, or conversely, medicine “capturing” the state by the enrolment of 
themselves into it to preserve their control on daily professional operation. In this process, 
the medical profession undertakes a significant restructuring as “re-stratification”, 
dividing into two functional sectors: “producers” who work in clinical practice as rank-
and-files, and “elites” who work in academic and administrative posts as the proxies of 
state regulation (defining and implementing clinical protocols, reporting systems and 
performance measurements). In this relational approach, physician managers act as the 
intermediaries between the state and medicine negotiating managerial and professional 
agendas/ interests. They face conflicting expectations arising from the organizational and 
institutional logics, i.e. the managerial agendas of efficiency (value for money, 
productivity) and accountability, and the professional agendas of effectiveness (quality 
of care) and autonomy. Regarding the balance of power in healthcare governance, a more 
empirical examination into this pivotal position of physician managers is required. 
This chapter will attempt to develop strategies for researching physician managers in this 
study. Firstly, we will look further into the discussion of physician managers in the Re-
stratification Thesis. Secondly, we will offer a more sophisticated theoretical 
understanding of physician managers per se, locating relevant studies in the research 
tradition of social-political theory on managerial hegemony versus professional 
resistance.  Finally, we will develop our own research design with reference to the review 
of relevant studies’ methodology.  
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4.2. Physician managers and the Re-stratification Thesis  
4.2.1. Knowledge elites, administrative elites, and rank-and-files  
The very characteristic of the re-stratification of medicine, according to Freidson (1984), 
is “the formalization of the methods by which professions control their members” (p. 1). 
Under the political pressure or the administrative requirement of greater accountability 
and control, a) “an administrative elite of professionals” who serve as professionally 
qualified administrators, e.g. supervisors, managers, and chief executive officers, “is 
being formed in order to guide and evaluate the performance of rank and file 
professionals”; b) the “knowledge elite”  based primarily in professional schools devise 
the technical standards employed by administrative elites; and c) “rank-and-file” 
practitioners are “no longer as free to follow the dictates of their individual judgments as 
in the past” although they can still exercise some discretion on a daily basis (ibid). While 
such stratification in medicine has always existed, Freidson argues that it has become 
more “formal and overt” than in the past, leading to divisions and conflicts within the 
profession (p.1-2).  
It is suggested that the re-stratification of medicine has transformed the traditional 
controls of professionals, which were “largely informal, sustaining a live-and-let-live 
relationship among colleagues and preventing open conflict between professional elites 
and ordinary practitioners”, and has “weakened the grounds for such a relationship, while 
reinforcing and formalizing the differences in prestige and authority” (ibid, p.13). In 
particular, formal review and evaluation of clinical decisions by colleagues have become 
mandatory. Given physicians must now judge each other, formally and sometimes 
publicly, the “facade of equality in probity and competence”, or the “conspiracy of 
silence / tolerance” has been defied (ibid, 15). The “trust in one’s colleagues’ discretion 
and good” (ibid), which was guided by the traditional norms that “prevent that control 
from being exercised judiciously and systematically” (ibid, p.3) and informal methods of 
control, has also been undermined.  
Freidson further suggests that it is especially the case for healthcare organizations that 
are large enough to require full-time administrative officers: physicians who serve in 
executive, managerial, and supervisory roles are “clearly delineated by their formal rank”, 
and “their authority is distinct from that of their rank and file ‘colleagues’” (ibid, p.15). 
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Most importantly, the re-stratification of medicine involves “differences in official 
authority and power that in tum produce varying perspectives on the professional 
enterprise”: rank and file physicians are primarily preoccupied with their own view of 
the “intrinsic practical problems”; supervisory physicians are “accountable for the 
aggregate performance of the workers under them”, and tend to “have an organizational 
perspective” and “identify….with the type of professional organization they represent as 
with the practicing profession” (ibid). As a result, administrative elites will have “a less 
collegial and a more superordinate relationship with their subordinate colleagues” (ibid). 
Issuing directives governing the work of rank-and-file practitioners, they “violate the 
traditional etiquette of an earlier day and so mark their distance from their nominal 
colleagues” (ibid). 
The formalization of controls on the rank-and-file practitioners also involves the 
knowledge elites who aim at formulating and evaluating their work. It is an authority of 
expertise that the administrative elites lack and must invoke from the knowledge elites. 
As standards and guidelines of the knowledge elites are “grounded in the abstract world 
of logic, scientific principles, and statistical probabilities rather than in the concrete world 
of work”, there has always been resentment and tension between “town and gown” 
(practitioner and academic) (ibid, p.16). With the use of standards and guidelines in the 
increasingly formal and public control of everyday professional practice, practitioners 
have become even more sceptical to the knowledge elites. If the former were to ignore 
the standards established by the latter, “a deeper division between them than existed” 
(ibid).  
Freidson concludes that such formalization of collegial relations will be followed by “a 
division into administrative elites, knowledge elites, and rank and file workers” as 
“distinct and separate corporate entities” (ibid, p.18). Also, the level of conflict will 
intensify as “the formalization of professional control creates organized groups with 
different perspectives, interests, and demands” and “poses new and unaccustomed 
obstructions which reduce practitioners’ capacity to perform their daily work in a manner 
that satisfies them” (ibid). In Freidson’s subsequent work (1985) on the reorganization 
of medicine, he further elaborates:  
[T]he authority of both the physician-administrator and the physician-researcher has 
become more extensive and definite and has become more binding on the practitioner. 
Formal administrative authority and formal cognitive authority analogous to “line” and 
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“staff” authority in industry become much more definite, leaving rank and file 
practitioners with considerably less freedom of action than existed in the past. This does 
not mean that they are no longer professionals with a significant degree of discretion; 
rather, it means that their discretion must take into account the authoritative norms laid 
down by other members of their profession that they become in some sense subordinate 
to a select group of their own colleagues (p.29) 
Whereas the knowledge elites are excising their power at a rather remote distance 
from everyday clinical workplaces, direct contact or conflict with rank-and-file 
practitioners will be more observable for the administrative elites, who apply 
standards and guidelines they create in the supervision over the rank-and-files. As 
will be shown later in this chapter, researches of physician managers tend to focus on 
those who have management roles in healthcare organizations rather than academies.             
4.2.2. Identity and ideology  
Freidson’s discussion on the formalization of collegial relations in medicine stresses the 
“perspectives, interests, and demands” that are different from rank-and-file practitioners 
which medical elites identify themselves with.  
Above all, medical elites are suggested to be more committed to the “macro care” of 
populations, emphasising the “rationalization of practice in the interest of scientific or 
therapeutic knowledge” as “adequately serving a population or organization within the 
limits of available resources” (Freidson 1985, p.30), while practitioners are oriented to 
the “micro” or clinical care of individuals.  These are, what Freidson sees as, “the major 
lines of cleavage within the profession with far deeper implications for the unity of the 
profession as a whole” that are “more than mere differences of specialty, prestige, or 
income” (ibid). Freidson depicts “the organized division of interests that arises between 
practitioners as a whole and physician-administrators, policymakers, and researchers” 
(ibid, p.30) as:  
Where once all practitioners could employ their own clinical judgment to decide how to 
handle their individual cases independently of whatever medical school professors asserted 
in textbooks and researchers in journal articles, now the professors and scientists who have 
no first-hand knowledge of those individual cases establish guidelines. Where once all 
practitioners were fairly free to decide how to manage their relations with patients, now 
administrators attempt to control the pacing and scheduling of work in the interest of their 
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organization’s mission, which may regard the collective interests of all patients (or of 
investors or insurance funds) to be more important than the interests of individual 
practitioners and their relations with individual patients. (ibid, pp. 30-31) 
As Freidson stresses, such “organized division” within medicine is not “mere differences 
of specialty, prestige, or income”, but different perspectives of practicing medicine and 
associated interests based on their different positions in the re-stratified medicine. In this 
regard, he agrees with Alford’s (1975) distinction of medical elites from practitioners as 
“corporate rationalizers” versus “professional monopolists” for the “important differ-
ences in their aim and orientation” (Freidson 1985, p.30).  
However, Freidson also argues that Alford is “wrong to separate them because all three 
are essential parts of the same organized profession” (ibid). Without physicians serving 
in administrator and researcher roles, Freidson suggests, the profession “could only sus-
tain a position that is at best like that of the crafts, dependent on its organization but at 
the mercy of others’ technological innovations and administrative practices” (ibid).  
In relation to the knowledge elites:  
Those in medical schools, teaching hospitals, and the like control, codify, refine, 
communicate, and augment the profession's body of knowledge and skill: their activities 
maintain control by the profession over knowledge and technology and discourage 
“expropriation” by outsiders. (ibid) 
In relation to the administrative elites:  
Those in administrative positions in practice organizations balance the necessity to carry 
out the collective ends of a governing board, municipality, state, firm, or whatever against 
the needs and desires of those who do the medical work, thereby buffering the practice of 
medicine against the political and economic pressures of the environment. (ibid) 
With those new roles in the re-stratified medicine, Freidson suggests, the profession as a 
whole may “sustain the plausibility of that part of its ideology that claims to be concerned 
with the collective, public good” (ibid). In particular, Freidson mentions the 
“occupational kinship” with the superiors by which rank-and-file practitioners can 
“probably continue to have distinct occupational identities, rather than being mere 
jobholders” and “participate in formulating standards and evaluating their own 
performance through some type of peer review” (Freidson 1984, p.18).  
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The picture offered by Freidson of medical elites’ social identification and ideology 
therefore is ambiguous: medical elites are depicted as having a “macro” orientation to 
rationalize medicine on the one hand, and as the advocates of medicine aiming to 
maintain the profession’s control over knowledge and autonomy on the other. This leads 
to the question that we have discussed in the last chapter: whereas medical elites are 
working in ways that mediate competing expectations in an increasingly managed 
workplace, i.e. safeguarding collective professional interests and national agendas of 
managing the health sector (Waring, 2014, p.692), how can we assume an equilibrium as 
implied in Freidson’s Re-stratification Thesis, and if so, what are the dynamics and 
process by which such equilibrium can be achieved? In this regard, “governmentality” 
(Flynn, 2002) and “co-option” (Coburn, Rappaport and Bourgeault, 1997) as well as 
“loose coupling” (Doolin, 2001) and “soft autonomy” (Levay and Waks, 2009) are 
possible outcomes of physicians’ enrolment into management of healthcare 
organizations.  
In conclusion, Freidson has correctly identified physician managers’ social 
identification and ideology as the core issue of the re-stratification of medicine, but 
leaves its future tendency and overall implication for the balance of power in 
medicine unclear: on the one hand, he does not “see changes that will actually 
transform rather than merely alter the position of the medical profession in either 
the nation or the health care system”, one the other hand, he warns “there is the real 
possibility that medicine is losing its cohesion and thus its capacity for effective 
political organization” (1985, p.32). In the coming sections, we will explore how 
more recent researches and theories on the re-stratification of medicine can further 
develop our understanding of the identity or loyalty issue regarding physician 
managers, as well as its impact on the balance of power. Before that, we will first 
briefly discuss how two important issues, namely specialism and gender, can be 
related to the Re-stratification Thesis, i.e. how physician managers’ ability to exert 
authority and to claim legitimacy over their medical peers is affected.  
4.2.3. Specialism and the encroachment of managerialism    
While Freidson’s (2001) later work does not provide further empirical examination 
for the Re-stratification Thesis, it clarifies the ideological elements of 
professionalism that must be preserved if medicine is to maintain its dominance. 
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Above all, the “ideological core of professionalism is its claim to a discretionary 
specialization” (p. 109) and it has been challenged by “populist generalism” 
(consumerism) and “elite generalism” (managerialism).  
There are three major claims of specialism. First, it stresses “the lack of uniformity 
in the problems its work must contend with, therefore emphasizing the need for 
discretion” and “its capacity to be flexible and adaptive in dealing with qualitative 
differences among individual tasks” (p.111). Second, it claims  that “the work of a 
trained and experienced specialist is superior to that of an amateur” and “the work 
of a specialist with professionally controlled training is both superior to and more 
reliable than that of someone who may have experience but lacks training” (ibid). 
Third, as a result, “only the specialists who can do the work are able to evaluate and 
control it properly” (p.115).  
Contrary to specialism, generalism claims “a general kind of knowledge superior to 
specialized expertise that can direct and evaluate it”. “Populist generalism” 
(consumerism) is “deeply embedded in the assumptions of liberal economics and 
closely related to those of liberal democracy” that “average people with ordinary 
human abilities are capable…to make economic and political choices that will serve 
their own best interest without specialists to choose on their behalf” (p.116). “Elite 
generalism” (managerialism) goes beyond consumerism and claims “the authority 
to command, organize, guide, and supervise both the choices of consumers and the 
productive work of specialists” (pp.116-117). It emphasizes “a special kind of 
preparation for positions of leadership” which is “an advanced but general formal 
education that equips them to direct or lead specialists, consumers, and citizens” 
(ibid). With this form of general knowledge, management is superior to 
specialization because it can organize production rationally and efficiently.  
As discussed in the last chapter, consumerism on its own can hardly present 
significant challenge to professional dominance in medicine. The real threat rather 
comes from the managerialism that aims to standardize and monitor clinical work 
and “governmentalize” professionals themselves under the banner of science. This 
sheds light on the discussion of re-stratification by clarifying the ideology that 
drives the transformation of the traditional forms of professional controls: “elite 
generalism” serves to legitimatize management as another kind of expertise that is 
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superior to medical specialism in organizing the delivery of healthcare services. It 
challenges specialism which is the central claim of professionalism.    
Drawing on this understanding of the contesting ideologies in health politics, the 
physician managers’ identity issue is largely determined by how well medical 
specialism is replaced with generalism (managerialism). The following sections will 
explore recent studies on the re-stratification of medicine that attempt to 
operationalize that generalism and specialism as embodied in physicians’ acting as 
managers.     
4.2.4. Gender and the Re-stratification Thesis     
Whereas the divisions or internal differentiation in medicine are not perceived by 
Freidson as overlapping with gender, critics attest that the Re-stratification Thesis 
is a gender-blind theory (Riska, 2001). Yet, the feminization of medicine is a major 
change in medicine’s structure in recent decades. Theorizing the future of medicine 
whilst neglecting a gender perspective would undermine the whole theoretical 
enterprise.  
Feminist studies in medicine suggest that “a gender perspective would have implied 
an identification of women physicians as increasingly occupying the rank-and-file 
positions” with men maintaining the positions of medical elites (p.15). So it is 
“possible to include gender in the accommodation argument of the restratification 
thesis” (ibid). This is what called by Reskin and Roos (1990) as the “ghettoization” 
version of the Feminization Thesis of medicine, as opposed to a version that 
emphasizes women’s genuine integration in the profession.  
The “ghettoization” version of the Feminization Thesis of medicine suggests gender 
segregation is created by two types of dynamics (Riska 2008, p.5). “Horizontal 
dynamics” refer to the male dominance in specialist area, which is rooted in “gender 
essentialism” that “defines women as more competent than men in service, 
nurturing, and social interaction” (Charles and Grusky 2004, p.15), e.g. women in 
paediatrics and men in surgery. “Vertical dynamics” refer to male dominance in the 
most desirable occupations and positions, which is reproduced by “male primacy”, 
a view that “represents men as more status worthy than women and accordingly 
more appropriate for positions of authority and domination” (ibid.). As a result, it 
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is suggested that “the female-dominated niches are characterized by low status and 
pay, while the high-status specialties and the organizational leadership of the 
profession tend to be dominated by men” (Riska 2008, p.6).  
In theory, there could also be a “sociology of numbers” (Kanter, 1977) that predicts 
the feminization of medicine will change the professional identity, favoring more 
humane and empathic attitudes toward practice. In this connection, female 
physician managers may act as the agency of change as to turnaround the current 
structure of medicine which is male-dominated. Also, the shifting of power in 
medicine from specialist care to primary care and public health, as discussed in the 
last chapter, may interact with its feminization conferring these female-dominated 
niches more resources and authority.   
The NHS’s recent workforce statistics echoes to “ghettoization” arguments 
aforementioned, suggesting that women physicians’ increasing numbers does not 
imply their equal status in the profession, and pointing to the ghettoization 
prediction that structural and cultural barriers will prevent women’s full integration. 
Even nowadays, female doctors are still facing a glass-ceiling in terms of horizontal 
and vertical barriers. The former refers to the male dominance in specialist posts 
(the proportion of females was only 34% in 2015; the figure for Surgery was only 
12%) (GMC 2016, p.32), and the latter refers to the male dominance in consultant 
grades and GP providers (only 34% of consultants and 39% of GP providers were 
female) (NHS Digital, 2016).  
More importantly, it has been argued that both professions and organizations are 
inherently gender-biased, favoring features associated with masculinity such as 
scientific objectivity, efficiency, hierarchical structures, autonomy of the 
professions (Riska 2008, p.6). Under “inequality regimes” (Acker, 2006) of 
medicine where the knowledge and power of the profession is controlled by men, it 
is suggested that “the profession’s values and organization of work will remain 
male-gendered” and “organizational equality projects have failed or have had minor 
impact” (Riska 2008, p.6). The challenges facing female physician managers 
therefore are twofold. As the world of management is as male-dominated as the 
medical one, being a physician manager female physicians may have to overcome 
two barriers they face – one for becoming a manager and one for becoming a 
medical leader. Moreover, recent studies of female physicians’ gendered skills, i.e. 
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more caring and empathic towards patients than male colleagues, have suggested 
that these skills have not been shown to “generate gender differences in the 
biomedical content of practice” (ibid).  
The difficulties this study encountered in recruiting female physician managers 
perhaps are testament to the pessimistic explanation for feminization in medicine, 
suggesting that gender integration has largely stalled. At the time of recruitment, 
there were only three female Chief Executives out of all forty-one public hospitals 
in Hong Kong. The final fieldwork sample included only one female physician 
managers at the frontline level. This has limited the study’s capacity to capture 
adequately gender issues. Yet, it does not mean gender is unimportant in the study 
of healthcare governance. With a focus on gender, future studies that strategically 
recruit enough female physician managers may concentrate on how gender has 
mediated the way they act as a manger and medical leader as compared to their male 
colleagues, how gender identity has interacted with identities in other dimensions 
(e.g. organizational versus professional), or the other way round, the implication of 
feminization for healthcare management as women physicians are increasingly 
occupying the rank-and-file positions.  
4.3. Conceptualization of hybrid managers in healthcare 
4.3.1. Uncertain truce between competing logics   
In a recent systematic literature review, Byrkjeflot and Jespersen (2014) summarise over 
60 studies on the new healthcare management role that combines the managerial and the 
professional one. They search the terms hybrid leadership, hybrid management with 
hospital and health care and define “hybrid” as combinations of “two or more elements 
that normally are separated” (p.442). In the case of healthcare management, the term 
denotes a mixture of “various types of expertise, structures and logics”, i.e. a mixtures of 
medical and managerial forms of expertise, and their associated institutional logics (ibid).  
Based on their findings, there are three conceptualizations of hybrid management in 
healthcare: 1) the “clinical manager” who combines professional self-governance with a 
“general management logic” that implies “a stronger management and a more efficient 
and hierarchical system of management with less ambiguous accountability relations” 
  
109 
 
(p.442); 2) the “commercialized manager” who combines professional self-governance 
with an “enterprise logic” that implies “budget and delegated responsibilities for results 
and quality” (p.448); and 3) the “neo-bureaucratic manager” who combines professional 
self-governance with a “neo-bureaucratic logic” that implies soft regulation where 
“professionals scrutinize themselves and are controlled at a distance” by professional-led 
clinical audits, performance reviews, customer feedback schemes and league tables 
(p.451). These three specific sets of institutional logics are imposed by New Public 
Management on healthcare systems challenging the originally dominant professional one.  
However, Byrkjeflot and Jespersen argue that “hybrid managers seem to have been able 
to cope with the management reforms in ways that do not threaten their established 
positions. In most respects clinical professional autonomy is maintained or only 
marginally affected” (p.452). At the same time, they also run the risk to be bureaucratized 
/ managerialized and isolated from their professional colleagues. Therefore, it is “an 
uncertain truce between competing logics” more than “a replacement of some dominant 
professional logics with others” (ibid). Given that the certain extent of combination of 
managerial and professional roles/logics is enacted in healthcare management, a 
meaningful question for Byrkjeflot and Jespersen is “in what way different logics or roles 
have been combined and what kind of effects such combinations have had on the 
organization” (p.453).  
4.3.2. Continuum from hegemony to resistance  
In a hegemony/resistance framework, Numerato et al.’s (2012) systematic review of 139 
studies classifies the impact of management on medical professionalism in five ideal-
typical outcome categories. Searching the terms professionalism, professional control, 
professional autonomy, professionalization or professionalization, they find: (1) 
Managerial Hegemony; (2) Co-optation; (3) Negotiation; (4) Strategic Adaptation; and 
(5) Professional Resistance. At the two ends there are hegemony and resistance where 
one dominant role/logic unconditionally entrenches. In these extreme cases we may 
conceive that the possibilities of combination are actually precluded. In reality, forms of 
combination and associated effects are often in-between hegemony and resistance in this 
continuum. In a governance perspective as we discussed in the last chapter, the 
equilibrium will be determined by the relative capacity of the state to govern and the 
medical profession to co-produce/plan healthcare service.  
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“Co-optation” is a relative state-centric account of management-profession combination. 
It is characterised by “soft bureaucracy” (Courpasson, 2000) and “top-down introduction 
of expert networks/ flexible corporatism” (Sheaff et al., 2004) where the responsibility 
for monitoring process is delegated to professionals to secure the centrally and 
managerially deﬁned objectives. As proxies for management, local professional leaders 
assimilate techniques of learning and reporting into their everyday clinical practice as 
their own systematic self-scrutiny (Numerato et al., 2012, p.633). Although direct 
management interference into professional practice and surveillance is reduced to the 
minimum necessary reporting, this process is identified as the co-option of the 
managerial ideology by professions during which the utility of some management tools 
and the ideas of audit and accountability is recognised as an integral part of professional 
jurisdictions (Harrison, 2009). Under Co-optation, the traditional informal peer 
regulative regime has transformed into a durable and collective formal one adherent to 
the content and objectives defined by the state (Numerato et al., 2012, p.634). 
Empowerment of professional leaders is based on their position in the state-sponsored 
networks of professional management and regulation, exposing medical professionals to 
increased accountability and transparency (p.630).   
Nearer to the end of professional resistance in the continuum is “Strategic Adaptation”. 
This account of management-profession combination emphasizes the professionals’ 
ability to absorb changes by proactively negotiating and influencing the implementation 
of managerial measures. Such form of combination can be conceptualized as “reverse 
colonization” (Waring and Currie 2009, p.755; Thorne, 2002), “adaptive regulation” 
(Waring, 2007) and “soft autonomy” (Levay and Waks, 2009). By expending 
professional jurisdiction for management knowledge, medical professionals manage to 
legitimatize the professional-led scrutiny regime which is customized and localized, and 
on this basis, adapt to or circumvent the management-led one, rather than being drawn 
into management roles or bureaucratic ways of working. In this process, professional 
involvement took the form of translation and negotiation in expert networks, and the 
mediation effects of local and informal professional networks and subcultures are 
substantial (Holtman, 2011; McLaughlin, 2001; Southon, Perkins, and Galler, 2005). 
Noticeably, with maintained professional control over evaluation criteria and content, 
professionals also internalize originally non-professional ideas of auditing. Therefore, it 
is “restrained by a certain resistance towards external monitoring, but driven by an 
interest in legitimizing and developing professional work” (Levay and Waks, 2009, 
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p.509). Under Strategic Adaptation, medical professionals are still in a way 
“governmentalized”, but in the form of “soft autonomy” instead of “soft bureaucracy” 
we discussed above that characterizes Co-optation. “Soft autonomy” denotes a centre of 
power exerted by the profession side that is able to redefine, accommodate and 
sometimes circumvent new management or regulative regimes in its own right, “by 
doctors, for doctors” (Waring, 2007, p.176). The distinctive natures of this form of 
management-profession mix are voluntary adaption in view of improving professional 
work and the determinative role of informal professional networks in determining the 
substance (Numerato et al., 2012, p,631-635).  
Another theoretical interpretation of strategic adoption is “loose coupling” (Doolin, 
2001). In an Institutionalist perspective, medical organizations gain external legitimacy 
by retaining external facets of managerial ideology and discourse as isomorphic 
institutional structure, such as total quality management (Audet et al., 2005) and 
accreditation (Pawlson and O’Kane, 2002). Under “loose coupling”, professionals 
comply with managerial and regulative procedures selectively and ceremonially, such as 
paperwork compliance and the use of standardised formal language to hide the real 
aspects of work (Berg et al., 2000). This institutional interpretation of strategic adaptation 
as loose coupling predicts a rather unenthusiastic and opportunistic compliance of 
professionals (Numerato et al., 2012, p.630).  
Interestingly, situated between Co-optation and Strategic Adaptation is “Negotiation”. It 
is defined by the enrolment of doctors into management posts mediating professional and 
managerial agendas/interests (p.634). Rather than favouring one group, hybrid managers 
merge managerial and professional skills, values, tools and knowledge to achieve 
“compatibility” between efficiency/accountability and clinical quality (p.634). 
Specifically, border ideas of justice and morality at the level of overall healthcare system, 
beyond the level of individual-patient interaction, are integrated to professional 
behaviours (Ten Have, 2000); management tools such as human resources and 
managerial accounting are not seen as a real threat to clinical autonomy but a facilitator 
of improvement in service quality (Kurunmäki, 2004). Under Negotiation, hybrid 
managers stress the collaborative nature of the relationship between management and 
profession through trust, openness and cooperation (Hoff, 2001); negotiation and respect 
for diversity (Allen, 2009); or the acknowledgement of managers’ or professionals’ areas 
of competence (Grifﬁths and Hughes, 2000). They bridge profession and management as 
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two existing “cultural codes” acting as active change agents of medical organizations 
that have dual loyalties (Mo, 2008).   
Noordegraaf’s works give an exclusive focus on the physician managers’ negotiation 
role. He distinguishes hybrid managers from the “purified” and “controlled” 
professionalism as a third form, the “managed” professionalism. He (2007, p.774) argues 
that professionals under “managed professionalism” actually form a distinctive social 
category/class which called by Schön (1983, p.49) as “reflexive practitioners” that bring 
artistic, intuitive processes to situations of “uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value 
conflict”. Specifically, they hybridize professional and organizational logics to cope with 
clients and cases in the face of costs and capacities: (Noordegraaf, 2007, pp.778-779).  
By mixing-up control types, new occupational linkages between working floors, street 
levels, clients, and organized action are established. Professionals who become (partly) 
managers and managers who become professional are not necessarily about destroying 
professional practices - they may be coping with clients and cases in the face of costs 
and capacities. Problems do not so much arise because professional work is controlled; 
they arise because neoliberal and business-like paradigms are at odds with the 
inferential nature of professional case and client treatment. Hybrid professionalism may 
offer new ways of controlling or “standardizing” practices, with soft and selective 
standards…that do not prescribe how trade-offs must be made but provide direction for 
making trade-offs. Ethical, budgetary, and service standards enable professionals - 
managers and non-managers - to meaningfully align clients, costs, and capacities. 
To further elaborate this negotiation process, Noordegraaf (2015) later suggests a fourth 
from of “organizing professionalism” in which hybridization become normal and natural 
rather than combined as different features and values, i.e. values of both quality and 
efficiency belong to professional work and the organizing work is taken within 
professional fields and actions. He argues that in “organizing professionalism” (p.15): 
Values are not singular, but multiple. Professionals know how to serve multiple values 
at the same time, forcing them to make trade-offs which are not a matter of quality 
inside professional work and efﬁciency outside work. Quality and efﬁciency both 
belong to professional work. In addition, organizing professionals are aware of the fact 
that their work must be seen as legitimate in order to be valued. This explains the strong 
emphasis on responsibility, connections and stakeholders.    
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According to this organizing perspective, hybrid managers organize their work at three 
levels (p.12-13): 1) “case treatment” - professionals know how to organize the updating 
of expertise, usage of new technologies, implementation of innovations, working in 
teams and cooperating with others. Instead of managers who try to initiate collaboration 
and innovation, professionals take an active share in organizing better case treatment; 2) 
“multiple case treatment” - professionals know how to select cases, prioritize case 
treatment, make treatment efﬁcient and establish collaborative cultures. Instead of 
organizational (decision) systems that formalize how organizations deal with client ﬂows, 
professionals are (co-)responsible for selecting and prioritizing patients or judicial cases, 
related to professional/organizational considerations, including strategic and budgetary 
decisions; and 3) “case treatment in context”, they know how to detect and prevent risks, 
deal with errors and failure, and account for action. Instead of merely implementing 
organizational safety systems and formal procedures around professional work, active 
coping with stakeholders, risks, and outside pressures becomes embedded within 
professional practices. 
Similar to Numerato et al., Waring and Currie’s (2009) suggest three “mediated 
responses” of professionals to management power, namely Co-option, Adaptation and 
Circumvent between Compliance and Resistance, representing an axis of the locus of 
power shifting between management and professionals. They elaborate this classification 
with the case of hospital knowledge management (KM): 1) under Co-option, 
professionals assimilate management practices and have extensive experience in the 
management system; 2) under Adaptation, professionals modify and apply management 
practices and have little experience in the management system; and 3) under Circumvent, 
professionals reject management practices by giving superiority to the existing one in 
national professional systems (p.774). This typology is basically compatible with 
Numerato et al.’s (2012) one, with Circumvent being clearly defined as an indirect form 
of professional resistance and Co-Option as an indirect form of management 
encroachment.  
While the term Adaptation here is not equal to Strategic Adaptation in Numerato et al.’s 
(2012) power continuum and is placed further far away from the end of professional 
resistance, they actually have the same connotation that forms and content of regulative 
regimes are proactively channelled by the medical professionals.  Indeed, In Waring’s 
earlier work (2007), all those three strategies fall under the category of Adaptive 
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Regulation where “management techniques are co-opted into professional work as a form 
of resistance, with professionals becoming competent in management” (Waring and 
Currie, 2009, p.774). This understanding of adaptation is rather akin to Strategic 
Adaptation which is near to the end of professional resistance in the hegemony/resistance 
continuum. 
However, it is also stressed that Adaptive Regulation is a two-way street of managerial 
and professional influences, potentially fostering professional compliance to managerial 
intent under the soft bureaucracy that gives an impression of autonomy (p.775): 
As professionals internalize management techniques in an endeavour to stave off 
management encroachment, they become increasingly managerial in terms of their 
practice and identity - the implication being that it negates the need for top-down 
management controls over professionals, as it foster conformity from within 
professional work.         
The implication is that “adaptation” is rather a vague concept that can be specifically 
defined as a “strategic” one and another one that is in a more enthusiastic or unquestioned 
manner. Here the usage of “adaptation” is not different from hybrid that denotes a wide 
range of intermediate accounts of management/profession mix. 
Table 1 (see below) summarizes the major conceptualizations of the management/ 
profession mix in healthcare offered by researchers. Against the background of NPM 
reforms and resilience of medical power, researchers conceptualize a broad range of 
intermediate accounts in-between the absolute dominance of either management or 
profession. As abovementioned, Doolin (2001) and Levay and Waks (2009) argue that 
such mix should be conceptualized as “loose coupling” systems or “soft autonomy” that 
favours professionals; Sheaff et al. (2004) and Harrison (2009) argue that it is rather 
management-led as a “co-optation of bio-medical model by management” and “flexible 
corporatism” that runs in a logic of “soft bureaucracy”. In the hegemony/resistance 
continuum, these two intermediate forms of management/ profession mix are termed as 
Co-optation and Strategic Adaptation. The negotiated position in-between is best 
conceptualized as “organizing/ managed professionalism” (Noordegraaf, 2015) and 
“adaptive regulation” (Waring 2007; Waring & Currie, 2009). 
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Table 1 Typologies of management/profession combination in healthcare governance 
Studies/Power centre Management    Profession 
Numerato et al. 
(2012) 
Hegemony  Co-optation Negotiation  Strategic 
Adaptation  
Resistance 
Doolin (2001)    Loose 
coupling 
 
Sheaff et al. (2004)  Flexible 
Corporatism     
   
Harrison (2009)  Co-option    
Levay and Waks 
(2009) 
   Soft 
autonomy  
 
Noordegraaf  
(2007;2015) 
Controlled  Organizing
/ managed 
 Purified 
Waring and Currie 
(2009) 
Compliance  Co-option  Adaptation   Circumvent  Resistance  
4.3.3. Clarifying the “negotiation” position and the “subjectivity” issue     
While the ideal types of Co-optation and Strategic Adaptation are discussed in detail in 
Numerato et al.’s (2012) notion of power continuum, Negotiation is relatively ambiguous. 
As they suggest, all the five ideal types in the power continuum are only the theoretical 
possibilities for conceptualization (p.628). In reality, the Negotiation position, as well as 
the two extremes cases of managerial and professional dominance, may not exist; and 
the actual situation probably falls in certain kind of Co-optation or Circumvent/Strategic 
Adaptation. As Noordegraaf (2015, p.16) also admits, the speculative account of 
organizing professionalism, i.e. valuing both quality and efficiency perhaps, may only 
be a normative account (what “should” be done to be an “organizing” form of 
professionalism beyond the management/profession conflict) rather than a descriptive 
one (an existing model). In addition, there are two specific problems in giving 
Negotiation a conceptually crystallized definition.   
Firstly, the enrolment of physicians into management is not an exclusive definition for 
Negotiation because Co-optation and Strategic Adaptation may also involve hybrid 
managers. Strategic adaptation is defined by the local control over evaluation criteria and 
content by professionals as “soft autonomy”; Co-optation is also referred as managerial 
ideologies and being incorporated by physician managers in the self-surveillance regime 
of “soft-bureaucracy”.  
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Secondly, the hybridization of professional and organizational values may also occur in 
Co-optation and Strategic Adaptation”. Numerato et al. (2012, pp.630-631) argue that 
the “continuity of an imaginary axis delineated by the hegemony ⁄ resistance framework” 
and “the nature of ideal-typical categories” can be well captured by Waring’s (2007) 
definition of “adaptive regulation” of medicine as (p.176):  
In being adaptive and seeking to limit managerial involvement, doctors are seemingly 
re-articulating what it means to self-regulate, absorbing managerial assumptions and 
recreating themselves as the managers.       
However, while “soft autonomy” emphasizes the professionals’ local control over 
evaluation criteria and content, it is also defined by the professional leader’s acceptance 
to the needs of medicine to be regulated. Also, the concept of “soft bureaucracy” itself is 
to denote a self-surveillance regime in which managers regulate themselves by absorbing 
managerial assumptions. One could equally argue that this form of “professional 
rationalizers” (Checkland, Harrison and Coleman, 2009), as opposed to “professional 
monopolisers” and “cooperate rationalizers” (Alford, 1975), is even closer to the idea of 
governmentality and soft bureaucracy where the objects of surveillance internalize and 
justify it as self-discipline. Therefore, simply define Negotiation as the medical 
professionals’ openness to managerial ideas or a collaborative relation with management 
may offer little clarification for its distinction from Co-optation and Strategic Adaptation.          
Perhaps Waring’s (2007) definition of Adaptive Regulation as “by doctors” and “for 
doctors” can help crystalize the conceptual difference between those ideal types. 
Following the abovementioned quotation, Waring indeed goes on to interpret another 
scenario of professional resistance (p.176):  
It remains important, however, to consider the limitations of this interpretation and to 
recognise that the extent of self-surveillance and governmentality maybe overstated or 
partial in nature. It may well be the case that, rather than internalising this discourse, 
doctors are in fact “going through the motions” of taking up these new procedures in an 
effort to resist regulatory change.  
Obviously, Waring has noticed an important issue of subjectivity in the uncertain 
outcomes of hybridization of management and medicine. In the first half of the statement, 
the process of professionals’ “recreating themselves as the managers” or internalizing 
the managerial discourse involves their “re-articulating what it means to self-regulate” 
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and “absorbing managerial assumptions”; while in the second half, another possibility of 
“going through the motions” is also a physiological process that involves professional 
leaders’ intentions. As Levay and Waks (2009) also define, “soft autonomy” is “driven 
by an interest in legitimizing and developing professional work” (p. 509). It is in the 
same way defined with the intention of professional leaders to pursue certain outcomes. 
In this connection, Co-optation and Strategic Adaptation are both “by doctors”. The only 
difference is how well they are “for doctors”.   
If the question whether the professional leaders are governmentalized or strategically 
adaptive to change (by loose coupling or active channelling) must be examined with the 
subjective interpretation of their own actions, how can we define Negotiation as part of 
the “continuity of an imaginary axis”, situated between Co-optation and Strategic 
adaptation? If Negotiation cannot simply be defined with physicians’ enrolment into 
management (“by doctors”), then what is the subjective dimension (“for doctors” or not) 
of their position as Negotiation?   
In this connection, we may have to explore the identity issue of hybrid managers in the 
negotiation between management and professional interests/ agenda with the conceptual 
tool of subjectivity. Should such alternative identity exist, hybrid managers are able to 
act independently from their management and professional identities. Specifically, they 
1) keep a psychological distance to both the management and professional identities and 
2) aim at rationalizing both management and profession. In Noorgraff’s (2007) terms, 
that is to form a social category/class as “reflexive practitioners”. If the notion of 
“adaptation” refers to a locus of change that is neither top-down nor bottom-up as Waring 
and Currie (2009) suggest, then changes should be manipulated by this group of pivotal 
players who act independently from neither the top nor bottom. Although we can identify 
the Negotiation position with relatively objective criteria, i.e. balance between 
management and profession interest/power/agenda in a particular setting of 
policy/procedure/structure, an independent identity is the prerequisite for its existence.  
Taken together, identification of the three possible hybrid identities, namely co-opted 
(managerial), strategically-adaptive (professional) and negotiating will be an 
indispensable part of researching physician managers. With special attention to the 
ambiguousness of the negotiation position, the next section will also attempt to search 
for feasible criteria to define it in previous studies on the identity issue of physician 
managers.     
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4.4. Operationalization of hybrid identities  
4.4.1. Scoping review  
To further inform our research design regarding the three possible hybrid identities of 
physician managers, this section attempts to systematically review the previous studies 
relevant to the concepts of hybridity and identity. Our own review first narrowed down 
the scope of search to all peer reviewed articles related to physician managers written in 
English. We searched the terms physician manager, clinician manager, medically 
qualified manager and medical manager in the electronic data bases of ProQuest Applied 
Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) and Scopus and Web of Science. A total 
of 14,539 articles (including duplications) were found in this pool of literature (see 
Appendix Six). With the research focus of hybrid identities, we further searched the 
terms hybrid and identity and got 433 articles (including duplications) for the next round 
of abstract screening (see Appendix Seven). Finally, there were 14 articles selected for 
full-text review based on three inclusion criteria. They are: 1) empirical studies on 
physician managers, 2) relating to identity work or hybridity, and 3) relating to the theme 
of professionalism versus managerialism (see Appendix Eight).  
The characteristics of selected studies are listed in Appendix Nine. Most of them (12 out 
of 14) are published in 2000 or later. Six studies are conducted in the UK; three in 
Norway; two in Australia; two in the US; and one in Ireland. Only two studies are 
questionnaire surveys using random sampling; twelve are qualitative semi-structured 
interviews using purposive sampling to get a small number (approximately 30) of key 
informants. In those twelve studies, five further employ the method of field observation 
or document review to supplement interview. The most common roles of physician 
managers are department-level managers /consultants, and medical/ clinical directors 
who are responsible for more than one department. A few of selected studies also include 
section-level first line supervisors or board-level managers. Noticeably, while nine 
studies focus solely on physician managers, the other five studies include other personnel 
into their sample as well, such as physicians without management duties, nurses, allied 
healthcare professionals and managers without medical qualification. For the time frame 
of study, there are five studies collecting data in different phases to evaluate the impacts 
of certain reform or policy on physician managers (usually before and after). The lengths 
of those studies vary from six months to five years; the other nine studies that are one-
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off survey or one-phase designed interview/observation, usually finished in 3 to 15 
months (with an exception of 5 years).  
Analyses of the findings are presented in the main theme of the operationalization of 
physician managers’ hybrid identities. In those 14 studies, managerial and professional 
identities are conceptualized and measured in different ways. In this regard, the aim of 
this section is to give a comprehensive summary of those conceptualization and 
measurement, and to create our own indicators and theme of analysis informed by it.    
4.4.2. Managerial acculturation overwhelming professional identities     
There are three studies presenting a picture of managerial acculturation of physician 
managers that overwhelmed their professional identities.  
Using quantitative method, Martinussen and Magnussen (2011) measure physician 
acceptance to managerial identity with how they viewed the effects of the reform in the 
Norwegian public hospital system. Since 1997, there have been three reforms in Norway 
that could be labelled as NPM: ﬁrst, the introduction of (partly) activity-based ﬁnancing 
in 1997; second, the introduction of the free choice of hospitals in 2001; and third, the 
recentralization of hospital ownership from the counties to the state in 2002. Based on a 
random sample of 1,200 hospital physicians drawn down from the register of medical 
practitioners, the authors use questionnaire survey to collect respondents’ answers to four 
questions related to effects of the reform in a 5-point Likert scale. The first question is 
about how physicians perceived the reform’s overall impact on the hospitals (“Overall, 
did the hospital reform mainly have negative or positive results for the hospitals?”; 1= 
very negative, 5 = very positive). The second to fourth questions are about whether they 
believed that the reform has led to “more equal access to health services”; “better medical 
quality”, and “increased hospital productivity” (“To what extent do you feel that these 
goals have been realised?”; 1= moved substantially away from the goal, 5 = moved 
substantially closer to the goal). Against the background of a generally critical attitude 
to the reform among physicians (almost 50 per cent viewed the reform as having had 
“very negative” or “negative” effects for the hospitals; 38 per cent viewed the reform as 
having failed to achieve better medical quality and 54 per cent reported that no change 
has taken place), individual physicians who were involved in management work reported 
a statistically higher acceptance to management identity.  
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Three explanatory variables are identified. The first one is “being department chief 
physician/ clinic”. Respondents with managerial responsibilities were signiﬁcantly more 
positive than others to the reforms. This correlation suggests that managerial positions 
typically reﬂected a greater degree of responsibility and beneﬁts, associated with higher 
loyalty to the organization and greater identiﬁcation with its goals and values. The second 
is “the amount of time allocated to direct patient-related work during an average week”. 
Independent of physicians’ position in the hospital organization, those who had less 
affiliation to clinic and patients rated the reforms higher than those who were working 
closer to the patients. This correlation suggests that involvement in management work 
had an impact on physician’s professional identity. The third one is “the percentage of 
department leaders with medical backgrounds” at the hospital-level. Physicians whose 
department were more dominated by physician-managers were more positive in their 
assessments on the reforms. This correlation suggests that those co-opted managers had 
the capacity to buy-in their professional peers.    
Also in a Norwegian setting, Mo (2008) employs qualitative method interviewing 10 
department managers in a large teaching university to understand their perceptions of 
management, professional practice, new roles and identities. Specifically, they ask those 
department managers to describe their new practice in relation to existing institutional 
boundaries (their professional background and managerial function), and how they have 
chosen to perform within a new regime, based on how they interpret the manager role in 
their context. They reported “an extension of managerial scope in physician managers’ 
identity” and “a strategic use of their affiliation to clinic”. 
Firstly, managers saw themselves as responsible for the department as a totality, 
including personnel administrative responsibility for all professional groups. They 
described a change in perspective and an opportunity to change practice, e.g. to relate to 
the nurses much more than before. Regarding their responsibility for strategic planning, 
they faced the conflicts between the professional goals/norms of expert groups and the 
narrowly defined organizational goals pursued by management. Taking treatment 
options in the department as an example, while the urge to developing one’s professional 
field could be strong, daily activities related to well-known diagnoses did not have the 
same professional appeal. As a result, they had to balance professional development and 
treatment of patients in the department.   
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Secondly, affiliation to clinic is found to be central to physician manager’s identity work. 
They had to keep their clinical engagement as authority in a medical setting would have 
to be maintained through a clinical affiliation, such as being present when medical 
matters were discussed, participating in morning meetings, going rounds or taking on 
late night shifts, consciously doing certain procedures or operating techniques to 
maintain specific technical skills, being on-call, and doing extra work when needed. They 
were also aware that colleagues could give negative comments if they “chose to be in the 
wrong place”, to attend administrative meeting rather than working in the clinic. In this 
light, they constructed management as someone who was “elsewhere”, doing other things 
than department managers, and who did not understand the department, in contrast to 
themselves as managers being part of the department and belonging there. Moreover, 
affiliation to the clinic is negotiable. It could be postponed (being manager for a limited 
time period), reduced (being in the clinic on and off) or re-shaped (being present at 
meetings, participating in discussions, etc.). In this connection, it was rather a symbol of 
belonging in a strategic use than a wholehearted commitment. This actual relinquishment 
of physician manager’ clinical commitment and affiliation is consistent with Martinussen 
and Magnussen’s findings above-mentioned.  
Focusing on the facilitators and barriers encountered along the way physician managers 
moving into a management role, Ham at el. (2011) interview 22 medical chief executives 
in the UK HNS. Interviewees expressed certain level of “compromise of clinical 
commitment” and “re-definition of their professional identities”.  
Firstly, the transition from senior medical leadership roles to chief executive led most 
interviewees to relinquish clinical work. Consistent with Mo’s findings, some physician 
managers had a reduced level of clinical work to retain credibility among clinical 
colleagues and maintain the stimulation of seeing patients. Moreover, to avoid the 
perception of being merely keen amateurs, and given the risk of being seen to be partisan, 
some physician managers in this study suggested that it was not appropriate to continue 
practice in their own specialty. They also saw the management role as opportunities and 
challenges that brought about organizational and service improvements on a bigger scale 
than they could in clinical work.  
Secondly, while some interviewees continued to see themselves as “first and foremost 
doctors who were also chief executives”, others redefined themselves as “a general 
manager first and a doctor second”. The former described a sense of loss, “going over to 
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the dark side” and “leaving the professional family”; the latter, however, felt they were 
well placed to overcome the tribalism in the NHS because they were able to bridge the 
worlds of management and medicine. Ham et al. suggest that a more common response 
for interviewees was to describe themselves as leaders who combined clinical and 
managerial experience taking on a dual identity. Yet, the authors do not explain in detail 
about such dual identity. Considering the impacts of managerial acculturation on 
physician managers’ self-definition, their findings can be taken as foreseeing a more 
robust management identity.  
4.4.3. Professional identities overwhelming managerial acculturation  
On the contrary, there are six studies presenting a picture of professional identities 
overwhelming managerial acculturation.  
Similar to Ham et al., the study of 13 physician managers in the Norwegian public 
hospital system by Spehar, Frich, and Kjekshus (2015) identify a moderate view on being 
managers as “ambivalent” between the other two views they call “positive” and 
“negative”.   
The “positive” group spoke of themselves as “managers first and doctors second”. They 
expressed the enjoyment of being able to plan their own workdays and influencing 
decisions as a key factor in sustaining their management position. They saw increased 
responsibility and an ability to see the larger picture, e.g. length of stay. They also used 
the word “fun” to describe their work and stated that management had become more fun 
as they had gained more experience and become more competent in management.   
The “negative” group spoke of themselves as “doctor first and manager second”. They 
were frustrated with the managerial role, experiencing little freedom in how they could 
enact the role, because of a high amount of administrative work and a lack of support 
staff.  They also spoke of the managerial role as a form of extension of their professional 
identity, serving as a means to protect or promote their professional sub-discipline.  
The “ambivalent” group found enjoyment in influencing decisions but also spoke of a 
desire to be closer to the staff and to reduce the amount of administrative work. They 
expressed a sense of being lonely or left in the managerial role, having few social arenas 
for meeting other clinical managers. They considered activities in which they had less 
  
123 
 
experience and competence, such as finance, as a less rewarding part of their role; while 
clinical and academic activities were perceived as more interesting. This group of 
physician held a moderate stand but was far from being “reflexive practitioners” as an 
independent social category. Neither the authors of this study nor Ham et al. can identify 
a distinctive group of physician managers holding an independent negotiating identity 
that aimed to rationalize both management and profession.  
Focusing on healthcare professionals’ difficulties in reconciling their professional role 
with the role as manager, Spehar, Frich, and Kjekshus (2015) also reveal the prominence 
of the medical identity. Physicians in general expressed a sense of loss in relation to the 
termination of their clinical commitments and a sense of disillusionment as they took up 
the role as “not to let the others down” (or just did not want to impose the role on the 
others). In this connection they often expected to use more time on clinical activities than 
on administrative tasks when they became a manager. Administrative work was usually 
described as “boring” and something that interfered with their attempts at being good 
leaders. They would have liked to be more visible and engage in more small talk with 
their staff. In relation to their peers, they saw professional background as personal assets 
in their role as managers and expressed a sense of pride related to their professional 
background. They also mentioned the need to demonstrate clinical competence in 
meetings with staff to maintain legitimacy, as well as a sense of meaning and satisfaction.  
Another attempt to understand the effects of physician managers’ dual role in healthcare 
organizations is Kippist and Fitzgerald’s (2009) study on a clinical leadership 
development program in a large teaching hospital in Australia. They find two distinctive 
attitudes towards management role among physician managers who participated in the 
program. On one hand, the role of the hybrid clinician manager was attractive to some 
clinicians as it allows them more autonomy, decreasing their clinical workload and 
having a broader range of tasks and responsibilities in the health care organization. They 
also identified the need for assistance with staff issues and increased performance 
management knowledge and skills.  On the other hand, not all hybrid physician managers 
see management training or education as important. They did not they see themselves as 
an organizational leader, nor desired to taking on full time management roles. Time to 
devote to management education or training is not the only challenge. Many of them had 
to juggle several roles as they did not wish to be seen as a “traitor” by their medical peers. 
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As managerial responsibility increases, more conflicts and frustrations arose with the 
lack of autonomy and little control over their budget. 
However, when the recruitment process and organizational conflicts among physician 
and managers are further looked into, the representativeness of those proactive physician 
managers is doubtful.  The authors suggest that most of them did not take on a dual role 
as an attractive role or as part of their career path. Rather, they took the role reluctantly 
to prevent someone else from getting the role. The lack of succession planning and 
recruitment process for the role further supported that the hybrid role was not part of a 
physician’s career development. Interestingly, there was no evidence of the human 
resources department being involved in the recruitment of the physician managers in this 
department. So physicians could select who they wanted for the role; and the lack of job 
descriptions allowed freedom in the role as incumbents saw fit. Organizational-
professional conflicts sometimes resulted in one hybrid manager going off management 
meeting under the banner of to do some “real work” of direct patient care. This statement 
indicated that clinicians who took on managerial roles saw their clinical role as their 
profession and legitimate career. In this connection, the dual role of physician managers 
seemed not effective in bridging the two worlds of management and profession.   
In an Institutionalist perspective, the resistance of local professional leaders can be 
interpreted as “loose decoupling”. In Doolin’s (2001) study on the reform of an Australia 
Crown Health Enterprise (public hospital) that enrolled doctors into management, the 
majority of unit directors were found as reluctant managers and maintaining their day-
to-day professional practice unchanged despite evidences of managerial acculturation of 
senior physicians.   
“Managerial acculturation of unit directors” is identified by their open mind, a high 
degree of cost-consciousness and the opinion that the reform was fundamental and likely 
to persist. Senior directors exhibited an interest in management and found the new roles 
challenging. They deliberately developed more managerial skills and knowledge, 
including formal management education, e.g. MBA degrees. Working closely with 
managers, they reframed clinical issues in economic terms using management tools such 
as budgets and contracts. Those proactive physician managers acted as carriers or 
translators of market and managerial values into the medical culture, with some of them 
becoming spokespersons for the new strategy. The reform therefore provided a vehicle 
for subjecting professionals to managerial parameters such as budgets.  
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Conversely, from the physician’ point of view, the involvement of senior clinicians in 
the management of clinical units offered a way to protect their clinical freedom. Firstly, 
physicians held “generally poor opinion of managers and management” as something 
separate from medicine, and that becoming a manager would involve a rejection of their 
professional identity. In addition, managers were seen poorly qualified and that 
management was just common sense or easily learnt, contrasted with the medical 
profession, academic qualifications, research and publications that are academically 
oriented and highly valued. Also, they felt that management of clinical practice ought to 
be in the hands of clinicians, i.e. control by unit directors. The part-time nature of the 
unit director role, which enabled unit directors at the hospital to continue with their 
clinical practice and maintained credibility with or acceptance by their peers, in addition 
created the perception of the superiority of medicine over management. Secondly, such 
devaluation of management constrained the roles of unit directors in relation to their 
peers. Most of them were found to be “reluctant managers”. They did not define 
themselves in the role of clinician manager in the clinical leadership strategy. Often they 
did not want to take on the role but were “drawing the short straw”, nominated by 
colleagues to be the consultant team’s representative or spokesperson. Such collegiality 
created their difficulties in managing clinical colleagues or “to be too bossy”. In action, 
they diverted the role defined for unit directors by adopting a coordinating role in their 
dealings with their colleagues and operating the clinical unit as self-managed work 
groups on collegial and clan basis. As a result, decision making remained firmly within 
the team of consultants, and the director acted more as the unit’s titular head working on 
consensus. While shifts in identity of the physician managers were taking place, their 
primary socialization remained in their professional clinical role. These physicians were 
not being transformed into surrogate general managers. Although they acquired attributes 
of management practice and discourse, these attributes were constrained by their 
traditional medical ethos. 
Taken all these evidences together, while some senior clinicians who became unit 
directors increased their participation in management practices and discourse, other unit 
directors were just performing a less active, but necessary, legitimating function within 
the new organizational structure. The author therefore argues that the hospital studied 
was “loosely coupled systems”. Within their clinical units, decision making remained 
group-based and consensus-oriented in the traditional collegial mode. Many of the unit 
directors acted as a buffer between their medical colleagues and the demands placed on 
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them by management, so that the actual internal operations of the unit remained separated 
from the formal unit structure. Some senior consultants suggested that the changes 
associated with the health care reforms had little impact on their day-to-day professional 
practice. The lack of perceived benefits of organizational changes in patient care 
strengthened the tendency for clinicians to remain decoupled.  
The notion that the collective autonomy of physicians is shielded by the majority of 
hybrid managers finds some further support from a study by Spyridonidis, Hendy and 
Barlow (2015). With special attention to cognitive and social dynamics that occur as a 
result of the emergence of physician manager roles, they collect data on 62 physicians 
who had taken on manager role in the UK NHS Collaborations for Leadership in Applied 
Health Research and Care (CLAHRC) in two phases. Core questions in the first phase 
include: the nature of physician managers’ involvement with the CLAHRC; their 
relationship with the CLAHRC programme; their understanding of its aims and 
objectives; their own professional role within the programme; and their understanding of 
what it meant to be an effective professional in the CLAHRC. The second phase then 
captures how they made sense of their developing role and any shifts in the themes 
identified in the first phase. The authors find that physician managers’ identity can be 
categorised as “Innovators” and “Sceptics”, and also “The late majority” who were 
initially resistant but gradually became reconciled to their new role as manager after 
CLAHRC introduced a strategy that emphasized the importance of clinical leadership. 
“Innovators” emphasized the positive elements of their CLAHRC role. They embraced 
new techniques to facilitate quality improvement, believing that by embracing 
CLAHRC’s managerial tasks of knowledge translation they could enhance the quality 
and safety of their own team’s clinical practices. Systematically taking on more 
responsibility under the banner of service improvement, they saw their new 
organizational identity as a service improvement manager a potential avenue to enhance 
their professional identity and their organizational status and legitimacy. In this sense, 
they were trying to minimize the potential conflict between physician and manager 
identities by building an alignment between evidence-based medicine and the service 
improvement approach of CLAHRC. 
“Sceptics” never fully engaged with the CLAHRC. They balanced their clinical interests 
with a conditional acceptance of CLAHRC’s approach. They mentioned that the loss of 
their historical autonomy in setting priorities and targets was the key constraint to 
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engagement, and expressed how CLAHRC sought to reconfigure authoritative control 
through external regulation on physicians. This reveals their desire to maintain control 
and autonomy over their work, centring on the formation of their own rules of 
governance. Differentiating between CLAHRC and their beliefs, they emphasized that 
they could not understand the CLAHRC tools and could not find enough time to engage 
with them, and even distanced from the CLAHRC work that they felt was inappropriate. 
In this way they sought to construct a role that was as close as possible to their existing 
one with limited engagement with the CLAHRC. 
“The late majority” also emphasized the negative sides of a physician manager identity. 
They saw the new organizational structure as a constraint on their professional discretion 
and autonomy, and felt that their physician role was devalued and their clinical 
competence was not appreciated. They also maintained boundaries between themselves 
and the CLAHRC, to the extent of talking about “them” and “us”. Responding to the 
resistance, senior physician managers at the hospital level attuned the program to a more 
professional-led one that emphasized “clinical leadership” and gave some degree 
flexibility within the new role. As a result, the majority of physician managers 1) 
delegated management activities that are less compatible with their physician identity to 
other project members, 2) give away any part in the new role they saw as robbing their 
recognition to the identification as hybrid managers, and 3) ultimately decides whether 
to enact this role individually. The authors argue that this does not only reflect the 
organizational leadership of senior physician managers to buy-in their more junior 
colleagues, but also the resilience of the medical identities. While the majority of 
physician mangers perceived themselves as holding a hybrid role, they prioritized 
physician clinical discretion ensuring that their engagement in management was 
maintained in a manner compatible with being a physician. 
Russell et al.’s (2010) study on the social identity of hospital consultants resonates to 
those findings on the general negative attitudes among physician managers towards 
management role. They interview 15 consultants in Irish public hospitals holding 
appointments in health boards, management and academic positions with the following 
questions: 1) their perceptions about their position in society, 2) their salient targets of 
social identification for hospital consultants, and 3) the extent which they view 
management and management roles as a potential target for social identification. All 
interviewees perceived public attitudes towards hospital consultants as a group to be 
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negative, and were generally involved in management with little enthusiasm and 
considerable caution.  
Firstly, consultants’ perceptions on their position in society are negative.  All 
interviewees perceived public attitudes towards hospital consultants as a group as 
unsympathetic and often hostile, although patients’ attitudes at the one-to-one level were 
perceived as generally positive. Linked to their personal discomfort with this negative 
stereotype, their own perceptions were as powerless to influence change in the wider 
system. Some distanced themselves as individuals from the characterisation of hospital 
consultants as primarily motivated by the financial rewards of private practice.   
Secondly, consultants’ salient targets for social identification most derived from sense of 
belonging from group membership within their immediate work area (department). It 
was based on a shared purpose, on experiences of personal efficacy and of 
interdependency with other in achieving consultants’ clinical goals. In contrast, 
identification with larger organization is not evident, i.e., consultants conveyed a sense 
of detachment, ambiguity and confusion in describing their relationship with their 
employer members of the group - not an employee of the broad. In this connection, they 
also expressed a sense of being removed from the more strategic elements of healthcare 
delivery.   
Thirdly, management as a salient target for social group identification was perceived as 
unattractive and associated with powerlessness and lack of respect. Most hospital 
consultants regarded the prospect of greater involvement in management with little 
enthusiasm and considerable caution. Fears of associated loss of autonomy, diminished 
recognition and esteem were commonly expressed, while the alternative options of 
clinical work and academic activities were seen as offering more status and recognition. 
In addition, consultants regarded 1) freedom from external financial pressure in the area 
of clinical decisions and 2) the principle that do not report to each other in a hierarchical 
manner as preconditions to their acceptance of formal management roles.  
In a different approach, Hoff’s (2000) US-based survey confirms that physician 
managers’ social identity is largely and stably professionally oriented. 294 respondents 
from the American College of Physician Executives (ACPE) were asked to answer a set 
of statements including their professional commitment, belief in individual physician 
autonomy and collective self-regulation, in a seven-point scale ranging from strongly 
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disagree to strongly agree: “Professional commitment” (the extent to which physician 
executives identified with and were attached to the medical profession); “Belief in 
individual physician autonomy” (to the extent to which physician executives believed 
that individual physicians shall have a high degree of discretion in their clinical work); 
“Belief in collective self-regulation” (to the extent to which physician executives 
believed in the exclusive right of the medical profession, as opposed to an external entity, 
to regulate collective norms and behaviors).   
“Professional commitment” was the strongest belief held by respondents in the study 
(mean = 5.14, S.D. = 1.05). This finding supports the idea that physician executives 
remained oriented to professional interests. Contrary to the assumed correlation between 
management commitment and the seniority in management post, it is also found that 
physician executives increasingly saw themselves as a doctor over time across 
management career stages. However, for those physician executives who perceived 
erosion in their clinical skills, intensive involvement in management work would 
undermined their professional loyalty.     
Noticeably, compared to “professional commitment”, physician executives on average 
held weaker beliefs in the traditional value of “individual autonomy” (mean = 3.27; S.D. 
= 1.18). At the same time, the traditional value of “self-regulation” remained strong 
(mean = 4.63; S.D. = 1.52).  These findings suggest that physician managers accepted 
the managerial idea of accountability in medical work but insisted their control over its 
process to preserve self-regulation in a collective form.  
Moreover, physician executives’ belief in collective self-regulation was positively 
correlated (r = 0.161, p < 0.01) to their professional commitment after controlling other 
factors. It can be argued that physician executives experienced greater professional 
commitment to the extent that they believe in the exclusive right of the profession to 
police itself. This further confirms the relevance of physician managers’ identity work in 
the maintenance of professionalism.  
4.4.4. Mixed outcomes and identity work  
There are five studies presenting a rather uncertain picture of the power dynamics 
between management and profession. Instead of predicting the outcomes on the balance 
of power, those studies identify a hybrid identity of physician managers. 
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Fitzgerald’s (1994) early work interviews 31 clinical directors/medical directors in a 
NHS health-care provider unit and find that they saw themselves as playing a critical 
boundary role between management and clinical professionals. Those directors 
presented a mixed perception of both management and collegiality. Firstly, although they 
perceived managers as not well qualified and management as easy to learn or relatively 
unsophisticated, they realized areas of management which were outward looking to the 
interfaces between the whole organization and its competitors, customers and suppliers. 
Secondly, while they suggested that issues of professional performance and professional 
standards should be addressed and handled by clinical managers, they saw themselves as 
separated or isolated from clinical colleagues. Whereas some were facing a degree of 
downright hostility from medical colleagues for employing management terms which are 
not understood, some commented on the importance of not exhibiting too much 
missionary zeal on management topics, as this would have a dysfunctional effect on some 
colleagues. 
Such multiple occupational identities of physician managers are also reported in 
Spyridonidis and Calnan’s (2011) study on the implementation of National Institute of 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines in 2 PCTs and 2 NHS hospitals in the 
UK. Using two phases of face-to-face informal interview with 8 hospital consultants, 8 
doctors and 12 other personnel, they collect data of 1) the events associated with the 
implementation of NICE guidelines, 2) the roles of doctors and managers, how they 
organised their work, the reactions of doctors and managers to these guidelines, and 3) 
consequences from NICE guidelines implementation. Three major themes emerged from 
the analysis on doctors’ receptiveness to NICE guidelines implementation.  
The first one is “organizational values”. It was found that senior physician mangers 
tended to be more receptive to performance-managing their peers. Whereas they 
emphasised that to have more doctors into management positions was a way of exercising 
professional influence, they also claimed that medical professionalism should be wider 
than treating patients effectively. They interpreted targets as a good and legitimate thing 
to do and the target-driven culture currently dominant in the NHS as an initiative that 
could deliver benefits to patients, although they might be used against their professional 
interests. In addition, they were receptive to the development of “strong vertical 
structures” that assured adherence to demands from government policy.  
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The second one is “proactive professionalism”. It is defined as the tendency for doctors 
to establish local flat professional networks with their peers that shared similar clinical 
interests. Led by the local experts, those networks enabled doctors to form their own 
rules of governance, influence the priorities of the local health service, and introduce 
alternative forms of organising at work. They showed more support for clinical 
guidelines such as those developed by professionals: guidelines produced by Royal 
Colleges were seen by doctors as more legitimate forms of knowledge, while NICE 
guidelines were considered implying a greater degree of centralised control over medical 
work. They portrayed medical work as being beneficial to patients and patient care as the 
primary aspects of their agenda. For example, in order to meet clinical needs, some 
doctors used their specialist knowledge to create clinical guidelines attracting funding 
from their Trusts for new care Patient Pathways. 
The third one is the “prominence of clinical autonomy”. Consultants involved solely in 
clinical practice (without senior management posts at the hospital level) showed a degree 
of caution, reluctance to adhere to NICE guidelines. They deliberately strove to escape 
from the pervasive features of top-down driven performance control, and favoured 
individualised critical appraisal approaches that operated within social interactions with 
peers when necessary or desirable. In making medical judgments, they invoked moral 
reasons concerning particular circumstances of their patients, rather than performance 
management. In this way, they exercised clinical freedom with their discretion in the 
daily routine of the implementation, ignorance and non-compliance of NICE guidelines. 
Also, they showed low receptiveness to complying with management demands, and 
systematically avoided any attempts by management to standardise their labour process. 
Doctors’ disengagement from and non-adherence to local implementation plans for 
guidelines was justified on the grounds of non-relevance (to the specialised knowledge 
of medicine) rather than resistance.  
Spyridonidis and Calnan conclude that multiple occupational identities have emerged as 
a result of hybrid manager roles. While senior physician managers showed some 
managerial acculturation and acted to balance their peers’ clinical interests, those who 
have more clinical commitments and affiliations tended to be more resistant to 
management demands. Interestingly, as a compromise, senior physician managers also 
delegated power to their local peers to control the local policy agenda as to mediate both 
the worlds of management and profession. This involved networks of social relationships 
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connecting physicians who were involved in developing local clinical guidelines to who 
were largely insulated from top-down driven governance structures to achieve shared 
clinical interests. The authors suggest that it may also be interpreted as the use of multiple 
occupational identities as a form of proactive professionalism, where the doctor is both 
clinician and entrepreneur.  
The last three studies below present not only hybrid identity or uncertain outcomes of 
management/profession confrontation, but also offer their own typologies that focus on 
the identity work itself to capture the managerial and professional sides of the hybrid 
identity.  
Forbes and Hallier (2006) offer a typology of “Reluctants” and “Investors” to capture 
how clinicians tackle and assign meaning to their new roles in middle management. They 
interview 18 clinical directors based at NHS acute hospitals in the west of Scotland in 
five core aspects: 1) the reasons for moving into management roles; 2) experiences of the 
transition from a clinical to an emerging management role; 3) expectations of the 
management role; 4) whether these expectations were met; and 5) conflicts and 
ambiguities associated with the move. Three strategies of self-enactment of physician 
managers were identified according to Social Identity Theory, namely “Individual 
Mobility”, “Social Creativity” and “Social Competition”.      
“Reluctants” came into management not because of a desire to manage, but because they 
felt pushed into accepting the role for worries about being managed by someone they 
objected to (e.g. other medical specialities or non-physicians), or the need to defend their 
specialism in the wake of restructurings within their hospitals. They expressed a 
profound reluctance to be identified with management, a lack of commitment to the role, 
and a negative attitude towards management intrusions into the clinical arena. 
Accordingly, Reluctants felt no need to develop a “managerial self” and perceived that 
managerial duties were simply an additional burden tagged onto their clinical role.  
“Investors”, in contrast, came into management with a specific agenda and saw potential 
opportunities for influencing health service delivery, or as an escape from the pressures 
of clinical work. Some of this group also viewed themselves as transferring their qualities 
of leadership and innovation in clinical arenas to the managerial one, providing an 
opportunity to influence the delivery of health care. They saw management concepts as 
being easily acquired, whereas leadership and purpose were qualities intrinsic to a few. 
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A “managerial self” was developed even at the expense of their clinical role and enabled 
them to develop an explicit managerial agenda.  
“Individual Mobility Strategy” was easily identified in the group of Reluctants. It was 
associated with a belief in the possibility of advancement through transferring to a higher 
status group. They disassociated themselves from the clinical group and were attracted 
to pursuing personal goals to improve their position; in identifying with management, 
they saw their role as one of contributing to the new group and living up to the norms of 
management. They saw their career advancement as coming from reinforcement with 
hospital management. 
While it is suggested that Reluctants could use “Social Creativity Strategy” to continue 
management’s perceived inferior status by certain psychological withdrawal from 
management imperatives, a more common case the authors observe is physician 
managers using “Social Competition Strategy” for self-protection where the 
management role itself was used as the means to challenge the legitimacy of 
management’s authority. In case medical autonomy was increasingly threatened by 
management advances, the status of hospital doctors was perceived as declining and 
insecure. Physician managers’ role dissatisfaction and opposition to the hospital 
management would take the forms of 1) hostility towards particular senior figures in the 
organization, and 2) exploiting weaknesses in the management system in order to 
distance themselves from aspects of their managerial duties. The latter includes: being 
unwilling to represent management interests neither to colleagues nor to hospital 
management; doing the bare minimum required in the management role, but in ways that 
still attempted to represent the local interests of patients, their specialisms and their 
clinical colleagues. Such selective approach to non-compliance was provided by the way 
that they chose to absent themselves from management activities because of clinical 
commitments. In doing so, they were also intended to signal to their clinical colleagues 
their desire to “return to the fold”. 
Hoff’s study (1999) on 22 physician managers in an American MCO (Managed Care 
Organization) identify two vastly diverging portraits of the management role by 
physician managers as “Profession-Compatible” (PC) and “Organization-Compatible” 
(OC). With special attention to how physician managers see themselves and others as 
managers, and what types of social relations are associated with these views, Hoff 
compares PC and OC in three dimensions: 1) attitudinal distinction, 2) belief and 
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orientation, and 3) strategy/ action. This offers a distinctive example of operationalizing 
the managerial and professional identities.   
Firstly, “attitudinal distinction” among PC and OC is compared in 7 themes.  
1)  View of management role: PC saw themselves as “advocators and protectors”; 
while OC saw themselves as “supervisors and leaders”. PC defined their role 
chiefly in terms of protecting and serving the interests of physicians employed 
in their immediate office setting, and was proud of being advocates for these 
physicians when dealing with the organization. They originally assumed the role 
to prevent someone “who would make their lives hell” from taking it. Also they 
expressed empathy for rank-and-file seeing them as overworking, increased 
alienated and unfairly targeted by recent HMO policies. In contrast, OC did not 
mind thinking of rank-and-file doctors as employees who they had to manage.  
2) View of responsibilities: PC saw themselves as “communicators and doctors’ 
lobbyists”; while OC saw themselves as “educators, salesmen and decision 
makers’. PC regularly voiced their opinions during management staff meetings 
about new policies complaining that the HMO was projecting problems onto 
physicians. They defined their responsibilities as keeping fellow clinicians fully 
aware of the MCO’s attempts to exert greater control over medical work. Quite 
differently, OC believed that their primary management responsibilities were 
two-fold: to persuade physicians that change was necessary and to implement 
policies directed at that change. They were feeling bound to meet organizational 
expectations as well as to avoid the resentment and opposition from frontline 
colleagues. In this connection, they expressed an awareness of the risk of getting 
“caught in the middle” and were hesitant to act too authoritative, and mentioned 
the strategic importance of collegiality in running the department well.   
3) View of management: PC held that management “should help practicing 
physicians but not dictate”; while OC saw it as “legitimate means of control 
over other doctors” - at management staff meetings, various members of the OC 
group consistently defended HMO policies as legitimate and necessary.  
4)  View of management work: PC described it as “boring”, not what “real” 
doctors do with their time and believed that the practice of medicine was where 
they could contribute the most as physicians. They made it clear that they had 
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gone to medical school to be doctors and not managers, having little training for 
the job and less interest in doing it on more than just a token basis. In contrast, 
OC described management work as “challenging” and “an alternative to 
practicing medicine”.  
5) View of practising physicians: PC saw those physicians as “doing best they can” 
and “needed to be left alone to do jobs”; while OC saw them as “coddled, 
insulated and needed to wake up”.  PC argued that “practising physicians are 
not the problem in the organization” and “people in the trenches are sick of 
being micromanaged”. Conversely, OC argued that rank-and-files were too 
protected from the reality of a healthcare environment that they saw everyday 
as managers. They had few sympathies for physicians of the bottom line who 
perceived new HMO policies as limiting professional autonomy. Some even 
criticized that what practising physicians were doing was more often in the best 
interests of physicians rather than patients’ well-being.  
6) Common verbiage: PC used “squeezed, remaining loyal and enduring 
headaches”; while OC used “buying in, credibility and being accountable”. PC 
referred to their management responsibilities as headaches and “pains in the ass”; 
their language also reflected anxiety about being “sucked into” the role. On the 
other hand, OC were convinced that the rank-and-file needed to become more 
business-oriented in their work. They also believed that the rank-and-file needed 
formal guidance to “buy into” this view.   
7) Goal/value alignment: PC showed loyalties to “doc in the trenches” and 
reflected scepticism toward management and the HMO. In contrast, OC’s values 
and commitments were more multidimensional and management-oriented, 
aligned to the organization mostly. They saw themselves as “doing the job right” 
and “understanding the bigger picture” in relation to managed care, and 
reluctantly accepted the possible negative consequences of management 
reforms for physicians (i.e., layoffs, physician turnover, decreased clinical 
autonomy, etc.)  
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Extracted from Hoff (1999, p.331) 
Secondly, PC and OC have their respective “beliefs and orientations” promoting and 
reinforcing their physician manager identities. 
PC stated that “those in full-time management positions are non-doctors” when asked 
about how they viewed who had largely given up practicing medicine for management. 
PC saw them as “administrators” in contrast to “providers”, and even as “outsiders” and 
“traitors” to their profession as the deviants from their agreed norm (i.e., treat patients). 
PC also stated that “the only people who understand and can comment on my work are 
colleagues in the trenches with me every day” when were asked about whether they 
believed that only rank-and-file colleagues in their immediate work setting could exert 
control over their work. They believed that full-time physician-managers had no clue 
about the everyday life and thinking of the rank-and-file doctor, and talked to members 
of the OC group in full-time management positions as if the latter had never even seen 
the inside of an exam room. The final belief PC held was “I’m committed to my fellow 
clinicians”. They expressed this localized solidarity when lecturing OC group members 
on what they perceived as “lies” propagated by the HMO.  
OC stated that “going from medicine into management full-time is like ‘crossing a point 
of no return’”. At medical staff meetings, OC appeared speaking with rank-and-file 
physicians about various clinical issues at ease. However, in private they spoke of being 
“afraid of harming patients” and “having to learn things all over again” if they went back 
  Table 2    Summary of attitudinal distinctions among physician managers 
View/attitude Organization-Compatible Group  Profession-Compatible 
Group  View of management role Supervisor, leader Advocate, protector 
View of responsibilities Educator, salesman, decision maker 
Communications, 
doctors’ lobbyist 
View of management Legitimate means of control over 
other doctors 
Should help practicing 
doctors but not dictate 
View of management work Challenging, an alternative to 
practicing medicine 
Boring, not what “real” 
doctors do with their time 
View of practicing 
Physicians 
Coddled, insulated, need to “wake 
up” 
Doing best they can, need 
to be left alone to do jobs 
Common verbiage Buying in, credibility, being 
accountable 
Squeezed, remaining 
loyal, enduring headaches 
Goal/value alignment The organization mostly The doc in the trenches 
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to doing clinical work, left little choice but to pursue a full-time management career. In 
action, no one from this group gave up management work for patient care. OC also stated 
that “I’m committed to the organization” and “I’m committed to my management job” 
to the extent that they interpreted policies as correcting problems of the rank-and-file’s 
work.   
Table 3 Summary of beliefs and orientations of physician managers 
Belief or Orientation Expressed by 
“Those in full-time management positions are ‘non-doctors’” PC 
“The only people who understand and can comment on my work are 
colleagues in the trenches with me everyday” 
PC 
“I am committed to my fellow clinicians” PC 
Going from medicine into management full-time is like crossing a 
point of no return” 
OC 
“I am committed to my management job” OC 
“I am committed to the organization” OC 
Extracted from Hoff (1999:336)  
Thirdly, PC and OC have different “strategies/actions” based on their respective 
identities. OC adopted three “strategies of manipulation” out of the belief that practicing 
physicians would naturally resist formal control over their work and thus control had to 
be exerted unobtrusively:  
1) “Participatory Rituals” were used intentionally to legitimate the decision-
making process in the eyes of rank-and-file physicians and PC group members. 
To convince those physicians that they could influence decisions already made 
at higher levels of the hierarchy, “going around the room” - framing a policy in 
vague and nonthreatening terms, then asking each physician at the meeting to 
give an opinion on it, such as personal feelings about the specific policy, venting 
concerns about its fairness in relation to practicing physicians - was a common 
form of this strategy. OC defended this approach as they believed the hospital 
would never get anything done if it was to be totally democratic. 
2) “Rationality Strategies” involved using data selectively to convince physicians 
of the logic behind a particular policy or decision. OC only presented data with 
new policies when confident that the data strongly supported the policy. They 
filtered data before they were made available to physician-managers at lower-
level meetings, on the basis of whether or not the data supported the particular 
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decision they wanted to make. Sometimes they asked PC at lower-level or rank-
and-file physicians to provide data to support a different policy or approach, 
which are probably not available for the latter.   
3) “No-Choice Appeals” was a reflex or last resort action through mimetic-type 
“sales pitches” that emphasized how other HMOs were doing the same thing, or 
through “coercive-type appeals” that stressed negative factors in the 
environment (such as increased competition) and presented specific policies as 
alternatives to worse actions that could be taken by the HMO toward rank-and-
files. 
On the other hand, PC adopted another three “strategies of resistance” out of the belief 
that the HMO was using physician managers as tools to gain greater control over rank-
and-files, and it was not necessary to “play manager” in the meetings because their views 
were only being cosmetically sought:  
1) “Tuning Out” took the forms of a) little or no note taking in management meetings, 
b) almost no questions asked about new policies, decisions, or issues except 
questions that challenged the organization with respect to its treatment of rank-and-
file doctors, c) a general lack of interest and effort in discussing meeting agenda 
items from any kind of management perspective, and d) the disregard shown by the 
PC group towards any management duties that exercised formal authority over other 
physicians. An example of the last one was spending their allotted management time 
doing clinically related tasks, including updating patient charts, returning patient 
phone calls, following up on lab work and tests, and seeing additional patients, rather 
than the utilization, personnel, and productivity issues that were part of their 
management duties. 
2) “Undermining the Data” involved one or more PC group members openly 
questioning the integrity or appropriateness of data used to support a specific policy. 
Instead of quickly buying into a specific policy, PC used data to undermine the 
policy by asking whether better information could be obtained to supplement 
existing data. In this way PC individuals claimed a normative basis for their 
behaviour using the same general approach in the debates of clinical policies and 
actions.   
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3) “Work Group Empathy” toward non-physicians in their local practice setting 
involved physician managers viewing nurses, physician assistants, and even 
receptionists as victims of management control. PC expressed a concern for how 
other employees were treated by the organization and included other employees with 
rank-and-file physicians into their discussion. Some saw non-physician 
administrators in their offices as allies against organizational intrusion on their 
clinical work, as long as physicians themselves are legitimate authority in their local 
practice setting.  
Although more physician managers were found to be “organization-compatible” than 
“professional-compatible”, Hoff reminds that the generalizability of this study is limited. 
More importantly, consistent with the findings of abovementioned studies, 
characteristics of those two groups were quite different. Members in the professional-
compatible group were usually in first-line management positions practicing medicine 
for most of their weekly work time (50-100%), and had a shorter management tenure 
(4.37 years); while members in the organization-compatible group primarily were in the 
higher ranks of management spending little time with patients or practicing physicians 
(0-50%), and had a longer management tenure (8.5 years). Taken together with the 
struggles between those two groups observed in this study, social relation between 
physician managers were characterized by conflict, distrust, and game-playing, moving 
towards more communal notions of cohesion from the collective solidarity ideal implied 
by the professionalism model.  In short, the homogeneity of physician managers as a 
social group is questionable.   
Another breakthrough in typology is McGivern et al.’s (2015) study on 43 hybrid 
managers’ professional identity work. They use comparable data from three of their 
previous studies on organizational changes in the English NHS, relating hybrids’ identity 
work to managerialist institutional logics. Synthesizing the findings of many studies 
aforementioned, they offer a typology of “Incidental Hybrids” and “Willing Hybrids” to 
classify physician managers and a two-dimensional operationalization as “role claiming” 
and “role use”.    
“Incidental Hybrids” claimed their roles in three narratives.  
1) “Passive professional obligation”: they claimed to be volunteered by 
professional colleagues for hybrid roles and felt obligated to do a “turn”. This 
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identity work downplayed agency and highlighted the maintenance of a 
professional social identity.  
2) “Reactive professional obligation”: they claimed to take a hybrid role to address 
departmental or wider organizational or managerial problems. They 
acknowledged the need to engage with management (hybrid roles) to maintain 
professionalism and buffer managerialism, which was a reality other 
professionals did not see.  
3) “A senior professional representative”: they saw themselves not taking a 
substantively managerial role. They asserted professional identity downplaying 
the managerial component of hybrid roles.  
“Willing Hybrid”, conversely, claimed their role in two other narratives.  
1) “The fruition of formative identity work”: it involved early hybrid role models, 
positive experience of management, and inter-professional working. They 
reconciled managing and professionalism as complementary, but recalibrated 
medical management as more interesting and difficult than medicine, 
positioning medical management as an elite professional subspecialty.  
2) “A mid-career opportunity”: they saw hybrid roles as providing a permanent 
career or autonomy to organize services. They looked for a promising career 
path more than clinical role. Taking on the corporate ethos, they distanced from 
clinical colleagues and were seen as “selling out”. 
In terms of “role use”, incidental and willing hybrids acted in quite different ways.  
• “Representing and protecting professionals” vs. “transcending/disrupting 
professional boundaries”: incidental hybrids buffered professionalism and good 
patient care (constructed individually) from managerialism. They also noted the 
importance of being seen to represent professionals to “get their support” rather 
than being seen as a “management nark”. To improve patient care, however, 
willing hybrids reconstructed professionalism as involving inter-professional 
teamwork, focused on delivering “the best service” for patients collectively, as 
opposed to institutionalized mono-professional working focused on individual 
patients.  
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• “Using habitual interpretive agency” vs. “using practical/evaluative and 
projective interpretive agency”: incidental hybrids valorised professionalism 
and demonized managerialism by glorifying past professionalism and drawing 
upon lessons from history to interpret the potentially disruptive effects of 
managerialism. Also, they enacted hybrid roles on a clinical basis, contrasting 
“jumping through hoops and fill in lots of forms” to “professionally appropriate 
ways of assessing your achievements”. The latter was specified as “looking after 
patients within the constraints” and “trusting professionals while keeping a 
professional eye on them”. Acting in “practical/evaluative and projective 
interpretive agency”, willing hybrids however used their management role to 
challenge unrealistic and outdated professional mentalities and practices. 
Weighing up collective good against individual needs, they also questioned 
professionals who ignored resource limitations in providing public healthcare 
and acknowledged doctors’ role in rationing healthcare.  
• “Co-opting and loose-coupling managerialism” vs. “using/integrating 
professionalism and managerialism”: incidental hybrids concealed and buffered 
ongoing professionalism by conducting appraisal “like a parallel universe” and 
putting a “professional spin” on it “translating professional speak into 
managerial”. To loosely couple manageralism, they completed “tick box” 
paperwork to provide the impression of managerial regulation. In this way they 
created a “cocoon protecting the boundaries” where professionals were able to 
“get on and do their thing”. For willing hybrids, managerial targets and patient 
care were positioned as complementary. On one hand, they believed the medical 
profession has got to be a lot cleverer about using politics to get where they 
want; on the other hand, professionals could use targets to benefit patients by 
improving professional work.  
• “Influencing maintenance of professionalism” vs. “regulating and auditing 
professionalism”. Engaging in managerial processes as “regulating/auditing 
work”, willing hybrids challenged professional indeterminacy to discipline 
professionals resisting service improvements. They legitimized professionalism 
using organizational processes and calculative expertise to discipline poor 
professional practice. Such hybrids’ roles as gatekeepers of professional 
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indeterminacy were believed to provide significant professional influence in 
relation to the quality of care.  
• “Validating professional identity from professional colleagues” vs. “validating 
a permanent hybrid identity”; “maintaining flat intra-professional relations” vs. 
“positioning hybrid as an elite within their profession”: incidental hybrids saw 
themselves as “a professional temporarily in a hybrid role engaging with 
management by necessity”, and interacted with their peers in institutionalized 
modes of professional communication, i.e., informal chats in corridors. Willing 
hybrids developed a permanent hybrid identity that distanced from rank-and-
file doctors. Unapologetically describing their role in managerial and remarking 
that the management post “looks like the career path”, they developed an 
identity work which was more individual-oriented than towards the professional 
social identity. As a result, incidental hybrids’ were seen by professionals as a 
professional; willing hybrid were seen by professionals as a hybrid or 
sometimes a manager.  
Taken together, incidental hybrids’ maintenance of professionalism was an endogenous 
institutional work, while willing hybrids’ identity involved professional hybridization 
aligning professionalism with managerial organizational and policy contexts which was 
exogenous. Noticeably, being in increasingly senior hybrid roles was correlated to more 
managerial hybrids’ identities as incidental hybrids were often in Clinical Director or 
PEC Chair roles and willing hybrids in Medical, Network, or Public Health Director roles. 
Yet, the authors argue that many hybrids in Clinical Director roles actually chose not to 
advance in their careers as hybrids in order to avoid losing their professional identity. 
Therefore, the underlying driver for claiming senior hybrid roles was identity work that 
cultivated a hybrid self in the first place.  
The authors go on to conclude that, physician managers drew on professional and 
managerial institutional logics as part of their identity work, and this reversely affected 
professionalism. Such understanding of the interrelation between institutions and micro-
level identities does not see hybrids as a homogeneous group affecting professionalism 
and public organizations uniformly. Rather, the authors argue that the impact of 
managerialism/regulation on public services is largely depended on the extent to which 
they were enacted in practice or loosely coupled as a result of hybrids’ identity work in 
the local setting.   
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Table 4 Typology and operationalization of hybrid identities of physician managers 
by McGivern et al. (2015) 
 Incidental Hybrids Willing Hybrids 
Roles Clinical Director; PEC Chair. (Associate) Medical Director; 
Public Health Director; 
Network Director. 
Role claim Passive professional obligation to 
take a “turn” in a hybrid role at 
professional colleagues’ request 
The fruition of formative 
identity work, involving early 
hybrid role models, positive 
experience of management, 
and inter-professional 
working 
 Reactive professional obligation to 
take a hybrid role to address 
departmental or wider 
organizational or managerial 
problems 
 
 A senior professional representative 
(not a substantively managerial role) 
A mid-career opportunity 
providing a permanent career 
or autonomy to organize 
services 
 Role use Representing and protecting 
professionals, professionalism and 
good patient care (constructed 
individually) from managerialism  
Transcending/disrupting 
professional boundaries to 
improve patient care 
(constructed collectively)  
 
 Using habitual interpretive agency 
to valorize professionalism and 
demonize managerialism.  
 
Using practical/evaluative and 
projective interpretive agency 
to influence and challenge 
unrealistic and outdated 
professional mentalities and 
practices 
 Co-opting and loose-coupling 
managerialism to conceal and buffer 
ongoing professionalism 
Using/integrating 
professionalism and 
managerialism. 
 Influence maintenance of 
professionalism using institutionalized 
modes of professional communication  
Regulating and auditing 
professionalism, challenging 
indeterminacy and poor 
professional practice. 
 Validation of hybrid role use and 
professional identity from 
professional colleagues 
Experiences in hybrid roles 
validate a permanent hybrid 
identity 
 Maintaining flat intra-professional 
relations 
Positioning hybrid as an elite 
within their profession 
Extracted from McGivern et al. (2015, p.420) 
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Table 5  Summary of findings on the operationalization of managerial and professional identities (without clear focus on typology) 
 Managerial Professional 
Mo (2008) • extension of managerial scope in physician 
managers’ identity 
• strategic use of their affiliation to clinic 
 
Kippist and 
Fitzgerald (2009) 
• for more autonomy and less clinical 
workload  
• a broader range of tasks and responsibilities  
• did not they see themselves as an organizational leader, nor desired to taking on full time 
management roles 
• juggled several roles as they did not wish to be seen as a “traitor” by their medical peers 
• took the role reluctantly to prevent someone else from getting the role 
• saw direct patient care as “real work” and clinical role as their profession and legitimate 
career 
Hoff’s (2000) • moderate belief in individual physician 
autonomy    
• strong profession commitment  
• strong belief in collective self-regulation   
Fitzgerald (1994) • realized areas of management which were 
outward looking to the interfaces between 
the whole organization and its competitors, 
customers and suppliers  
• separated or isolated from clinical colleagues 
• issues of professional performance and professional standards should be addressed and 
handled by clinical managers 
• managers as not well qualified and management as easy to learn or relatively unsophisticated 
Russell et al. 
(2010) 
 • self-perceptions on their position in society were negative 
• sense of belonging from group membership within their immediate work area (department); 
detached from the larger organization   
• manager identity was unattractive and associated with powerlessness and lack of respect. 
Doolin (2001) Managerial acculturation (senior managers) 
• exhibited an interest in management and 
found the new roles challenging 
• cost-consciousness 
• formal management education 
 
Generally poor opinion of managers and management 
• poorly qualified, just common sense or easily learnt compared to medicine 
• clinical practice ought to be in the hands of clinicians, i.e. control by unit directors 
Reluctant managers (the majority) 
• nominated by colleagues to be the consultant team’s representative or spokesperson 
• performing a less active, but necessary, legitimating function to buffer medicine from 
management  
• co-ordination role; consensus-based; constrained by professional ethos 
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Table 6         Summary of findings on the operationalization of managerial and professional identities (with attention to mixed identity work) 
Study  Managerial  Hybrid  Professional  
Ham at el. 
(2011) 
“A general manager first and a doctor 
second” 
• compromise of clinical commitment 
Dual role  
• leaders who combined clinical 
and managerial experience taking 
on a dual identity 
“First and foremost doctors who were also chief executives” 
• a sense of loss, “going over to the dark side” and “leaving the 
professional family” 
Spehar, 
Frich and 
Kjekshus 
(2015) 
Positive 
• “manager first and doctor second” 
• increased responsibility and an 
ability to see the larger picture 
• able to plan work and influence 
decisions 
Ambivalent 
• a sense of being lonely or left in 
the managerial role 
Negative 
• “doctor first and manager second” 
• frustrated with the managerial role, experiencing little freedom 
in how they could enact the role 
• as extension of their professional identity to protect or promote 
their professional sub-discipline 
Spyridonidis 
and Calnan 
(2011) 
Organizational values 
• receptive to performance-managing 
their peers 
• medical professionalism should be 
wider than treating individual 
patients  
• targets/ vertical structure/ policy as 
a legitimate tool for patients’ good  
Proactive professionalism 
• used clinical guidelines to attract 
funding for new clinical services 
• local professional network that 
enabled doctors to form their own 
rules of governance 
• portrayed medical work as being 
beneficial to patients and stressed 
that patient care to be one of the 
primary aspects of their agenda 
Prominence of clinical autonomy 
• a degree of caution, reluctance to adhere to clinical guidelines  
• favoured individualised critical appraisal  
• placed moral/medical higher than management considerations in 
clinical activities   
• exercised clinical freedom with their discretion in the daily 
routine of the implementation 
• low receptiveness to complying with management demands and 
its attempts to standardise labour process 
Spyridonidis, 
Hendy and 
Barlow 
(2015) 
Innovators  
• embraced new techniques and 
organizational identity as service 
improvement manager to facilitate 
quality improvement and enhance 
professional identity   
• built an alignment between 
evidence-based medicine and the 
service improvement approach 
Late majority 
• gradually accepted the management 
role for the emphasis of “clinical 
leadership” that gave flexibility in 
enacting the role (i.e., delegated 
undesired tasks)      
• maintained boundaries between 
medicine and management ( “them” 
and “us”) 
Sceptics  
• never fully engaged in management  
• saw management as authoritative control through external 
regulation on physicians 
• distanced from management (beliefs, time, understanding)  
• balanced their clinical interests with a conditional acceptance of 
management  
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Table 7         Summary of findings on the operationalization of managerial and professional identities (with clear focus on typology)   
Study  Managerial  Professional  
Forbes and 
Hallier 
(2006) 
Investors 
• influencing decisions, or as an escape from clinical work 
• transferring their qualities of leadership and innovation 
in clinical arenas to management  
• a “managerial self’ was developed even at the expense of 
their clinical role 
• used individual mobility strategy 
Reluctants  
• not because of a desire to manage, but because they felt pushed to defend their 
specialism 
• reluctance to be identified with management, a lack of commitment to the role, and a 
negative attitude towards management intrusions into the clinical arena 
• felt no need to develop a “management self” and perceived that managerial duties 
were simply an additional burden tagged onto their clinical role 
• used social competition strategy   
Hoff (1999) Organization-compatible (OC)  
Attitude towards  
• physician managers: “supervisor and leader”; “educator, 
salesman and decision maker” 
• management: legitimate means of control over other 
doctors; challenging, an alternative to practicing medicine 
• practicing doctors: “coddled, insulated, need to “wake up” 
Belief and orientation  
• “Going from medicine into management full-time is like 
crossing a point of no return” 
• “I am committed to my management job” 
• “I am committed to the organization” 
Strategies of manipulation” 
• “Participatory Rituals” 
• “Rationality Strategies” 
• “No-choice Appeals” 
Profession-compatible (PC) 
Attitude towards 
• physician managers: “advocate and protector”; “communicators and doctors’ 
lobbyist” 
• management: should help practicing doctors but not dictate; boring, not what “real” 
doctors do with their time 
• practicing doctors: doing best they can, need to be left alone to do jobs 
 
Belief and orientation 
• “Those in full-time management positions are non-doctors” 
• “The only people who understand and can comment on my work are colleagues in the 
trenches with me everyday” 
• “I am committed to my fellow clinicians” 
Strategies of resistance  
• “Tuning Out” 
• “Undermining the Data” 
• “Work Group Empathy” 
McGivern et 
al. (2015) 
Willing hybrids 
(see Table 4 for details)  
Incidental hybrids 
(see Table 4 for details) 
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4.5. Remarks on methodological issues  
There are several remarks on the findings of precedent studies to inform our own research 
design. First, whereas the portraits of the balance of power between management and 
profession vary in different studies, we see more attention are given to hybrid identities in 
recent studies (2011 and later on) comparing Tables 5 and 6. The latter exhibits the variation 
in doctors’ stances or heterogeneity of the group of physician managers as being categorized 
into three potential identities or responses to management intrusion.  
Second, however, thoe portraits of hybrid identity between management and profession in 
Table 6 fail to identify independent position they hold in the mediation process as 
“Negotiation” in Numerato et al.’s (2012) power continuum. The notions of “proactive 
professionalism” (Spyridonidis and Calnan, 2011) and “the late majority” (Spyridonidis, 
Hendy and Barlow, 2015) can actually be seen as “Strategic Adaptation” in the power 
continuum near to the end of profession dominance. The former stresses the importance of 
local professional networks and using management means to achieve clinical ends; the latter 
is actually a proof of the resilience of the medical identities to the extent that physicians’ 
engagement in management has to be maintained in a manner compatible with being a 
physician. Nor the notions of “dual role” (Ham et al., 2011) and “ambivalent” (Spehar, Frich 
and Kjekshus, 2015) provide further clarification of the concept of “hybrid”, merely defining 
it as “leaders who combined clinical and managerial experience taking on a dual identity” 
and “a sense of being lonely or left in the managerial role”. As discussed in the previous 
section, indicators of an independent negotiating identity as “reflexive practitioners” 
(Noorgraff, 2007; 2015) should include a clearly expressed psychological distance to both 
the management and professional identities, and an aim to rationalize both management and 
profession manipulating changes in healthcare independently from neither the top nor 
bottom. Unfortunately, such ideal type can draw very little on precedent studies.  
Third, studies with a focus on typology, as shown in Table 7, well capture managerial and 
professional identities in the idea and action dimensions offering a framework to adopt 
indicators used by other selected studies. The idea dimension is specified as “attitude” and 
“belief and orientation” by Hoff (1999) and “role claim/use” by McGivern et al. (2015). It 
includes the personal motivations of why physician managers come into the management 
 
 
148 
 
role (as individual mobility or professional obligation) and that in relation to their 
understanding of the professional and management work (to regulate or represent their peers). 
The action dimension is specified as “strategy of manipulation/resistance” by Hoff (1999) 
and “individual mobility/social competition strategy” by Forbes and Hallier (2006). It 
includes particular actions in physicians’ organization life overserved by researchers’ field 
work.  
Hoff (1999) offers a template of specification to operationalize physician managers’ identity 
breaking down the attitudes and belief dimensions into various aspects (views of physician 
managers, administration, and practicing physicians; commitments to the role, to the 
profession and to the organization). This codification can enrich McGivern et al.’s (2015).  
For instance, “role use” of “representing and protecting professional” (ibid) can be identified 
with physician managers’ “view of responsibilities” as “doctors’ lobbyists” and their “view 
of management” as “helping practicing doctors but not dictating” (Hoff, 1999, p.331). 
Comparing Tables 5 and 6 with Table 7, most of the indicators used by selected studies fall 
in Hoff’s specification, while some of them are exclusive. For instance, Russell et al.’s (2010) 
“self-perception” approach to physician managers’ self-perceptions on their position in 
society as a group, and Hoff’s (2000) quantitative method that measures physician managers’ 
professional commitment and belief in clinical autonomy with their acceptance to relevant 
statements. Those indicators can be added for a more comprehensive understanding of 
physician managers’ identity. In the next section, we will have a more detailed discussion 
on our own interview and coding protocol with reference to Hoff’s one (1999, pp.347-348).  
4.5.1. In search for a possible definition of “negotiating” identity   
Fourth, as related to the second and the third point, typologies of those studies in Table 7 are 
based on a set of contradictory attributes of managerial and professional identities, and 
preclude the possibility of an independent negotiating identity. While it is logically 
impossible to claim as being “first a doctor” and at the same time “first a manager”, those 
studies may overlook the potential of a hybrid identity that a physician manager may at the 
same time have both organizationally and professionally oriented values/ attitudes in 
different aspects of their identity. Whereas physician managers are classified into the 
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organizationally and professionally oriented groups in precedent studies, one may still be 
puzzled of whether they must fulfill the same set of criteria as others in their group. 
For example, as shown in Hoff’s (2000) study, physician managers exhibit a strong 
professional commitment whilst distrust to their peers’ individual autonomy. They may also 
see non-medical managers as inappropriate to regulate professional work and thus hold a 
strong belief in collective self-regulation where they can have clinical governance in their 
hands. One can argue that in this case physician managers accept the need to manage their 
peers while act intentionally to preserve their collective control. However, a critical 
distinction should be made here between this “soft autonomy” (Levay and Waks, 2009) or 
“proactive professionalism” (Spyridonidis and Calnan, 2011) and a salient social 
identification of physician managers seeing themselves as the only group that can serve the 
best interests of the organization, patients and profession as a whole or bridge the gap 
between them.  
Here “loose coupling” may also occur in an exceptional case where the institutional forces 
of management and profession co-exist. As healthcare studies suggest, instead of the 
physicians’ resistance or control, it could be the inconsistency among intuitional logics 
(Reay and Hinings, 2005) and the underspeciﬁed nature of guidance and protocols (Staniland, 
2019) that leaves some aspects of healthcare organizations relatively untouched by reforms 
with professionalism being persistent as the guide of behavior. In an Institutionalist 
perspective, the state-sponsored monitoring systems are actually a modern myth to maintain 
good faith in public organizations as well accountable and managed, while the substance are 
often neglected (Meyer and Rowan, 1983). Segregation between formal structures and 
reality may arise from the impractical nature of the rationalizing tools (e.g. quality control 
guidance/ protocol) in guiding day-to-day actions as well as the conflicting institutional 
logics (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio, 1988). In a healthcare setting, with reference 
to Corporatist Theory we discussed in the last chapter, medical authority and autonomy is 
an important “technology of legitimation” (Harrison and Mort, 1998, p.66) or “symbolic 
legitimating device” (Salter, 2003, p.931) of the state in health policy. In order to maximize 
legitimacy of healthcare organizations in such a complex institutional environment, 
physician managers may have little choice but loosely coupling with the reform rhetoric, 
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e.g., tick-box approach of appraisal (McGivern and Ferlie, 2007), while adhere to 
professionalism that guides daily operations of professional work.  
This interpretation of “loose coupling” attributes the persistence of the logic of medical 
professionalism to the institutional pattern of public organizations rather than the power of 
medical professionals in Numerato et al.’s (2012) control/ resistance framework. Based on 
this nuanced Institutionalist interpretation of “loose coupling” as beyond a specific form of 
professional resistance, we suggest that it may at the same time offer a more promising 
theorization of the ambivalently defined “negotiation” position in Numerato et al.’s control/ 
resistance framework. Defining the power dynamics as rather than one institutional logic 
becoming dominant and organization leadership as settling the conflicts among them, it 
enables us to capture a relatively autonomous or independent way of being physician 
managers in the mediating process.  
In addition to a salient social identification of physician managers and “loosely-coupling” 
of conflicting institutional logics, a third possibility of defining Negotiation is “satisficing” 
(Simon, 1956). Following the complexity arising from the conflicting institutional logics, 
there is lack of guidance for organization managers about how to avoid subsequent identity 
conflicts. As “the real world in all its complexity” (p. xxiii), managers cannot “maximize” 
by selecting the best alternative from among all those available to him as an “economic man”, 
but “satisfice” by looking for a course of action that is satisfactory or “good enough” as an 
“administrative man”. Simon stresses that the “satisficing path” is “a path that will permit 
satisfaction at some specified level of all its needs” (p.136). Applying that to healthcare 
organizations, to avoid failing either professionalism or managerialism, physician managers 
are expected to be negotiate between their clinician- and manager- roles, trying to be “a 
doctor and also a manager” by fulfilling a minimum level of both professional and 
organizational goals. Instead of denying one’s attachment to clinician- and manager- roles 
(“neither a doctor nor a manager”), “satisficing” presents another promising way-out to 
identity conflicts for physician managers. We will discuss those possible explanations for 
Negotiation in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 5                                                                                                     
Methodology  
 
5.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, we turn to both conceptual and technical issues of how to collect empirical 
data of physician managers in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority (HA). As a background, 
we will first clarify some theoretical assumptions of qualitative case study approach as 
adopted by this thesis.  
A general definition for case study is “a detailed study of a single social unit” that may 
comprise a person, an organization, a policy, or a social movement (Exworthy and Powell 
2011, p.6). For Gerring (2004), in such intensive study of a single unit, “the scholar’s aim is 
to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomenon” (p.341); for Hammersley 
(1992), to make empirical generalisations from single cases is possible. Among others, a rich 
description of “context” is essential for determining whether the cases are universalistic or 
contingent (Exworthy and Powell 2011, p.7). In the background and theory chapters, we 
have discussed how the HA case is relevant to the NHS model of healthcare governance 
given the shared landscape, such as strong government presence in health policy as sponsor 
and provider and the dominance of modern medicine.  
Indeed, the case study method was heavily utilised in defining the subject matter of early 
health policy studies - the role of occupational groups within institutional settings and their 
role in providing health services (ibid, p 27). Classical examples include Eckstein’s (1958) 
study on the NHS, Strauss et al.’s (1964) study of the psychiatric profession, and Eliot 
Freidson’s (1961) study on American medical practices. These cases were detailed and 
intrinsic in nature and went beneath the surface to understand micro-sociological processes 
at work (Marinetto 2011, pp. 28-29). While the 1970s’ saw the rise of quantitative method 
in social sciences with the methodological value of focusing on a specific case being 
increasingly questioned by social scientists, it is still widely accepted that case studies can 
furnish the basis for establishing theory (ibid, p.30). In this thesis, the case study around 
physician managers in the HA will serve as the first step to modify the current dichotomized 
framework of their identity, proposing an alternative identity as the third type.  
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As Marinetto (2011) also suggests the case study method “uncovers the complex influences 
that impinge on public bodies and the context-bound, event-driven nature of policy decisions” 
(p.21) and “generates detailed, narrative-like description, which can be of interest in its own 
right” (p.26). For Yin (2009), case studies have a strength when: a) the research question is 
about “how” or “why”, b) the research subject is not “historical” but “contemporary” set of 
events; and c) the investigator has little or no control over the research subject (where 
experiments are not available) (pp.8-13). Yin also stresses the case study method as a better 
option for “an empirical study that investigates contemporary phenomena within a real-life 
context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
(p.18). In this thesis, I attempt to offer a snapshot of how the professional system is working 
in parallel with the increasing government efforts in controlling the Hong Kong healthcare 
system. It focuses on the system or process itself through the investigation on the key players, 
physician managers, and how they negotiate between the institutional forces of 
professionalism and managerialism. Here the context (institutional forces) is interacting with 
the system or process and can be used to explain the outcomes (success, failure or mediation 
of policies). Whereas the pivotal role of physician managers is given as a background by the 
current theories, the empirical value of this case study is largely to answer “how” the balance 
of power is tipped.  
With the shared emphasis on holism, everyday life, the particularities of culture, and a 
strategy of immersion, there is a “methodological affinity” between case studies and 
qualitative research approaches, i.e.  ethnography and semi-structured interviews (Gerring 
2007, p 36). It is suggested that in qualitative researches the researcher’s role is “to gain an 
overview of the whole of the culture and context under study”, and such holism is “pursued 
through inquiry into the particular…with extremely small matters” (Shaw and Gould 2001, 
p.7). In doing so, qualitative research is also interpretive as to “explicate the ways people in 
particular settings come to understand, account for, take action, and otherwise manage their 
day-to-day situations” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p.7), and involves “thick description” 
(Geertz, 1973) about the context of how meanings are created.  
In this regard, Constructionist strategies are essential for qualitative researchers. Above all, 
qualitative method centres on “speech acts” (Giddens, 1993) by which structures are 
constituted and reconstituted “as the reproduced conduct of situated actors with definite 
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intentions and interests” (pp. 133-134). Researchers then must “crystallize institutional texts 
by glossing over the various contingencies and other contextual factors associated with the 
texts’ production and use in institutional settings” (Miller 1997, p.78). The significance of 
language, speech intentions and structures has been illustrated by recent developments in 
conversation analysis, membership categorization analysis and applied discourse analysis 
(Shaw and Gould 2001, p.20). The study of physician managers’ narratives in this thesis on 
their role in governing healthcare system can be regarded as rooted in this research tradition. 
The in-depth interviews allowed physician managers to explain how they reacted to the 
frames of meaning, which were mainly given by the institutional forces of professionalism 
and managerialism. As Miller (1997) suggests, meanings are sometimes contested, and it is 
possible for institutional actors “to construct and justify meanings that might be called ‘dis-
preferred’” (pp.79-80). As will be shown in the following chapters, physician managers 
interviewed did exercise their agency negotiating between their dual roles and identities, 
trying to satisfice both but not fully embracing either one.  
Following Giddens’ (1984; 1993) argument of “structuration” that sees structures as “both 
condition and consequence of the production of interaction” (p. 165), such reaction to frames 
of meaning by individuals, while was a consequence of structures in the first place, would 
in turn create new structures setting rules for a new cycle of social actions. For analytical 
purposes, in the later analysis chapters I will borrow from Sociological Institutionalism 
defining the new structures mediated by physician managers’ agency to blend identities as 
“structural hybridity” (Raynard, 2016). With a focus on the of physician managers who acted 
as “satisficers” of both professional and managerial values, and the loosely-coupled system 
where a boundary between the professional and organizational hierarchy was maintained, 
this study will offer a field-level examination of how physician managers were situated in 
the “competitive” and “cooperative” tensions of conflicting institutional logics (Besharov 
and Smith, 2014; Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Jay, 2013; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010). Instead 
of passively reacting to those frames of meanings, physician managers coupled with them in 
a selective manner to avoid being squeezed by both their clinician and manager roles.  
In sum, based on a non-deterministic model, how individuals react to pre-existing frames of 
meaning – creating meanings with them and for them –  is a dynamic process that requires 
a flexible method open to such contingency. Qualitative case study approach will serve as a 
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good starting point of generating theoretical insights about that process. The following 
sections will unfold the technical details of research design and data collection, as well as 
methodological issues concerning the validity and the appropriateness of the research 
method in this study.  
 
5.2. Research design and data collection  
5.2.1. Source of data and sample  
The basic characteristics of our target population in this study are as fellows. In the Hong 
Kong Hospital Authority, a corporatized public organization responsible for the centralized 
delivery of public healthcare in Hong Kong, there are two layers of managers: a) 127 “pure 
managers” (Chief Executive, Directors, Heads, Cluster Chief Executives, Hospital Chief 
Executives, Chief Managers, Senior Managers, Executive Managers or General Managers) 
for overall service planning or monitoring, and b) 799 consultant doctors responsible for 
clinical departments as Heads, Chiefs of Service or Clinical Service Directors/ Co-ordinators 
(Hong Kong Hospital Authority, 2015, Appendix 11b; full-time equivalent staff). The first 
level may represent the organizationally-oriented physician managers who are commonly 
reported in precedent studies as losing affiliation to clinical work, while consultant doctors 
at the second level may represent the professionally-oriented group. The bottom layer of the 
hierarchy is the rank of 5,000 front-line doctors, including 2,872 Medical Officers/Residents 
and 1,785 Senior Medical Officers/Associate Consultants (ibid).  
To sample physician managers, I emailed the HA in January and February 2016 for the 
access to physician managers but our request was rejected. I also emailed and telephoned all 
the Cluster Chief Executives and Hospital Chief Executives in March 2016. Unfortunately, 
I did not manage to make any successful invitations through such open access route. With 
reference to the selected studies in Chapter 4, a purposive and snowball sample can serve as 
an alternative when a large number of physician managers from a statistically representative 
sample are unavailable. In this study, our access to physician managers was made through 
two key informants. They were Prof Yun-kwok Wing, Associate Dean of the Faculty of 
Medicine at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Chief of Service in the Department of 
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Psychiatry at Shatin Hospital and Prince of Wales Hospital, and Dr the Honourable Ka-lau 
Leung, Legislative Council Member (Medical Constituency) from 2008 to 2016, Council 
Member of the Hong Kong Medical Association, former President of Hong Kong Public 
Doctors Association. Practicing medicine in Hong Kong for 30 years and holding senior 
academic and political positions, they have personal contacts to a wide range of medical 
leaders which are highly valuable to this research.  
In December 2015, I met Dr Wing and Dr Leung seeking their comments on our research 
design and their referral of participants. They nominated 8 physician managers as our first 
group of participants. Then a snowball sampling stage commenced based on the nominations 
made by those participants. Nominated physician managers were contacted via e-mail with 
an invitation letter, information sheet and consent form as requested by the Social Policy 
and Social Work Department Ethics Committee (see Appendices Ten, Eleven and Twelve). 
From February to June 2016, totally 15 physician managers participated in our study. Eight 
of them were “front-line managers”; the other seven participants were “pure managers” (1 
Cluster Chief Executives; 4 Hospital Chief Executives; 1 Chief Manager and 1 Senior 
Manager at the Head Office). As McDowell (1998, p.2135) suggests, social networks and 
serendipity are the key to the success of gaining access to elite subjects. Although I had sent 
invitation email to all Cluster/Hospital Chief Executives in the HA as abovementioned, all 
five interested interviewees at that rank were recruited by personal referral of the two 
informants or snowball strategy.  
To collect data on the identity issue as a subjective matter and allow participants to extent 
our scope of understanding of physicians’ organizational life which outsiders may know 
very little, individual interview was the primary source of our data collection. To supplement 
interview, interviewees were asked to fill-in a short questionnaire before interview. Most of 
the interviewees handed in their questionnaires during the interview and some of them sent 
a soft copy through emails.   
The interviewees were interviewed face-to-face by me, except one that was done through a 
telephone call. The length of the interviews ranged from 30 mins to 60 mins. To be realistic 
about the available time of elite members could spend in interviews, and to ensure access in 
the first place, I used a leeway suggested by Dexter (2006) to “specify a time a little, but not 
much, less than the normal time which interviews on the particular project take” (p.49). I 
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asked for 30 minutes as Dexter suggested and over one-third of the interviews were extended 
to 45 minutes or an hour.  
Full transcripts were produced after the interviews based on digital audio records taken under 
consent. Two Interviewees rejected our request for digital recording so I transcribed those 
interviews with our handwritten records. As English is the working language of the medical 
sector in Hong Kong, the default language of research materials and interview with 
participants was English. On the interviewees’ request, 4 interviews were conducted in 
Cantonese, the language commonly used in Hong Kong. As a local Hong Kong citizen, I did 
the translation to English after the original transcripts in Cantonese had completed. As 
scholars in qualitative method suggest, it is a common and widely accepted method in social 
science research as the risk of misinterpretation can be lowered by researchers’ translation 
of interview words on their own (Marshall and Rossman 2006, p.112), and by their role as 
“cultural broker” finding equivalent meanings in the translated language and conveying 
cultural context from the original language (Temple and Young, 2004, p.171; see also 
Temple et al., 2006; Park and Lunt, 2015).    
5.2.2. Interview protocol and questionnaire  
I adopted Hoff’s (1999, pp.347-348) interview protocol as a template for our semi-structured 
interviews. The original interview questions were organized in four general aspects of how 
physician-managers in an US HMO see themselves and others as managers. There were 
some revisions to it based on Forbes and Hallier (2006) and the HA setting (see also 
Appendix Thirteen): 
1) Reasons for going into management and relevant experiences  
a. How did you first get involved in the physician-manager role? What were 
your reasons for getting involved? 
b. Can you tell me about your experiences in the transition from a clinical to an 
emerging management role? What did you expect of the management role? 
Were these expectations met? Any conflicts and ambiguities associated with 
the move?  
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2) Role-related attitudes and behaviours 
a. How do you act in this role toward others such as administrators, other 
doctors, and senior management? 
b. How do you think you relate to other doctors in your office in this role? Do 
you see yourself primarily as their advocate? Can you give me an example 
when you were/were not acting as an advocate? How do you personally feel 
about telling other physicians what to do or coordinating their work? Does 
the manager role interfere at all in how you get along with them?  
c. Do you see any differences between those in full-time, senior medical 
management positions and those in first-line supervisory positions? 
3) Attitudes toward the HA management  
a. Do you think physicians as a group are treated fairly in this hospital/ the HA? 
Can you give me an example of both fair and unfair treatment? How about 
other groups in this hospital/ the HA? 
b. Tell me about how you think decisions regarding physicians and providers 
get made here. Do you think senior management communicates enough and 
seeks input regarding decisions that affect physicians? Do you feel that you 
can affect decisions in this hospital/ the HA? 
4) Handling of professional-organizational conflicts  
a. How do you feel about the changes in this hospital/ the HA is going through, 
in terms of having to focus on things like utilization and productivity among 
physicians? Are you willing to stand behind it, even if it means significant 
changes for physicians and how they do their work as a group in this hospital/ 
the HA? When wouldn’t you stand behind it (example)?  
Interview transcripts were preliminary coded by Hoff’s (1999; please see Tables 3 and 4) 
original specification as “attitude” and “belief” of “Organization-compatible” and 
“Profession-compatible”. I added “role claim” and “role use” of “willing hybrids” and 
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“incidental hybrids” used by McGivern et al. (2015, pp.416-419; see Table 4) to cover those 
concepts that are not exhausted by Hoff. These predefined themes of coding and analysis 
also guided the me in the interviews soliciting relevant content from interviewees.   
I also used Hoff’s (2000) questionnaire to collect more measurable and comparable data that 
can be benchmarked against his findings (please see the previous section and Appendix 
Fourteen for the details of breakdown indicators).  
1) Professional commitment (the extent to which physician executives identified with 
and were attached to the medical profession)  
2) Belief in individual physician autonomy (the extent to which physician executives 
believed that individual physicians shall have a high degree of discretion in their 
clinical work)  
3) Belief in collective self-regulation (the extent to which physician executives believed 
in the exclusive right of the medical profession, as opposed to an external entity, to 
regulate collective norms and behaviours) 
4) Year(s) served in the management post  
5) Year(s) served in the HA 
6) Management training (whether have a degree)  
7) Proportion of time spent in clinical work  
Although we may not be able to generalize statistically significant results with a limited 
sample, those quantified data on their attitudes and characteristics still enables us to classify 
physician managers into the organizationally and professionally oriented groups on a more 
objective basis and compare our sample to other studies using representative samples.  
To further explore the potential of an independent negotiating identity, special attention shall 
be given to interviews’ inconsistency in their institutionally-driven ideas and critical stand 
to both organizational and professional interests, i.e., distrust in physician individual 
autonomy coupled with strong belief in collective self-regulation (to be revealed with the 
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questions in the questionnaire), and detachment from management/ professional identity 
(individual mobility) besides the  “loose coupling” strategy (revealed with the interview 
questions of why they go into management, how they see different parties in healthcare 
organizations, and whether they will stand behind the management reform). Based on Hoff’s 
(1999) and McGivern et al.’s (2015) codification schemes, I developed an analytical 
approach to take conflicting identity work of professionalism and managerialism into 
consideration. With codified transcripts, interviewees’ combination of professional and 
managerial attributes can be further analysed. The empirical findings based on the above-
mentioned research design and data collection will be reported in the coming chapters. 
Before that we will first discuss some reflections concerning our research design.  
5.3. Methodological issues    
5.3.1.  Definition of elites and access  
The empirical part of this study is largely inspired by the research tradition of elite interviews. 
However, there is much confusion about the definition of “elites”, and a universal definition 
of the term is even more difficult across different corporations, sectors and national 
boundaries (Harvey 2010, pp.195-196). Some suggest numerical minorities at the top of the 
employment and income pyramid (Woods, 1998); some stress the strategic positions within 
a social network that bridges between social structures (Burt, 1992). A flexible definition for 
elites that may broadly be accepted would be people who “carried out predominantly 
occupied senior management positions and were influential decision makers for their 
companies” (Harvey 2010, p.196).  
While being a professional itself may not be a sufficient criterion for one to be defined as a 
member of elites (Harvey 2011, p.433), the targeted subjects in this study, hospital managers 
who were also medical professionals, undoubtedly fall into this category. As discussed in 
the previous chapters, the hospital sector in Hong Kong is medical-led. Those who hold 
management positions in clinical departments and at hospital-level will be influential 
decision makers. They are also mandated by both their professional authority and 
organizational authority to supervise clinical work, playing an indispensable negotiating role 
 
 
160 
 
in decision making as we will discuss in detail in the following chapters. In 2016, the annual 
income of Senior Medical Officer Grade (Associate Consultants) starts at £ 130,000 (Social 
Welfare Department, 2016) or the 95th percentile of the working population in Hong Kong 
(Census and Statistics Department, 2016).   
Access to this privileged group was crucial for me in conducting elite interviews in this study.  
It is suggested researchers of elite interview should attempt to pursue various avenues in a 
persistent and opportunistic manner (Yeung, 1995). In addition to open access routes such 
as potential respondents’ office email addresses and telephone numbers as aforementioned, 
key informants and snowball strategy were helpful in the recruitment of interviewees. At the 
beginning stage of recruitment, my university affiliation was of high importance in terms of 
gaining access to the elite networks of doctor managers in the HA. Both key informants and 
myself graduated from the same university. Most interviewees nominated by the key 
informants were also graduates from that university.  
Yet, it is also suggested that researcher’s affiliation may be received differently, which in 
turn will have negative impacts on gaining access to elites group (Herod, 1999). At the later 
stage of snowball recruitment, where interviews might be graduates from another university 
providing medical training in Hong Kong, I did not emphasize my local university affiliation 
as I would have when inviting those who were my fellow alumni. Instead, I stressed my 
researcher role and the University of York affiliation. Also, one key informant was 
previously a doctors’ trade union leader and the doctors’ representative in the Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong. To avoid giving any negative impression to the interviewees 
regarding my past political affiliation (I used to work for his Legislative Councilor’s Office 
as a policy researcher), my past working relation with that key informants was only disclosed 
when asked. In fact, there were no interviewees who asked about that affiliation except those 
who were personally referred by that key informant. In that case, that affiliation helped in 
gaining access or trust rather than hampering access.   
Another source of difficulty in gaining access that has been discussed in research ethics 
literature may be the restrictions set by university ethics boards (Harvey 2010, p. 196): it has 
been more common in recent years that researchers are requested to receive a complete 
written consent form from respondents before the they take part in the research; transparency 
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requirements for researchers, such as disclosing the research goals, expected results and 
interview questions may also restrict the ability of scholars to adopt critical research 
interrogating the social, economic and political power within organizations. While these 
types of conditions may make it even more difficult for scholars to gain access to elite 
members, relevant requirements as set in my submission to the Department Ethics (see 
Appendix Fifteen) seemed to have no impacts on my recruitment of interviewees. Firstly, in 
most cases paper work was actually handled by interviewees’ assistants so it did not affect 
their willingness to take part in the study. More importantly, as Harvey suggests (ibid), 
proper procedure of prior consent and discourse of information may help to build trust. The 
research’s value and relevance to interviewees was an important concern for them in 
deciding whether to contribute their precious time. In addition, my request for prior consent 
from the interviewees’ organization, or confirming that no further approval from their 
organization would be needed, seemed to be not a concern for interviewees (though it is not 
clear whether approval from the organization was a concern for those who rejected or 
ignored my invitation).  
5.3.2.  The “insider/ outsider” issue  
As aforementioned, access to elite networks that are relatively closed may require some sort 
of insider identity for building rapport. Yet, the advantages and disadvantages of being an 
“insider” or “outsider” have been a longstanding debate in the social sciences. While Abu-
Lughod (1988) and Hill-Collins (1990) suggest that “insiders” have an advantage in using 
their knowledge of the group to gain more intimate insights into their opinions, Fonow and 
Cook (1991) argue that “outsiders” have more objectivity and ability to interpret behaviors 
or narratives without bias arising from the “insider” status; also, “outsiders” are more likely 
to be perceived as neutral and gain access to information that is sensitive for an insider.  
In the real world, researchers may find that the “insider/outsider” binary oversimplifies 
“insider” or “outsider” as a fixed attribute, ignoring the dynamism of positionalities in time 
and through space, and that “no individual can consistently remain an insider and few ever 
remain complete outsiders” (Mullings 1999, p.340). Researchers often have to seek 
“positional spaces” where “the situated knowledges of both parties in the interview 
encounter, engender a level of trust and co-operation”, shift between an insider and outsider 
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identities, or silence some identities to avoid threatening interviewees in relation to their 
disclosure of sensitive information (ibid, p.341).  
In this regard, a “positional space” that researchers shall actively display is a sound 
knowledge of the topic to win the respect and confidence of elites during interviews (ibid, 
p.340). By this the researchers and their subjects can forge solidarity as intellectual equals, 
without attaching to insider/outsider privileges based on visible attributes such as race, 
gender, ethnicity, class, or occupation /education that played an important role in this study. 
My background as a health policy researcher working for the medical professionals’ political 
representative granted me a “temporary insider” status (ibid). On the one hand, I could 
understand sub-cultures of medical professionals and daily hospital operation as a result of 
past working relations with the profession. On the other hand, I was not totally an insider in 
terms of my education and occupation. That means I could easily detach from my affiliation 
with the medical profession and shift to an outsider position when needed. Also, as discussed 
in the previous section, sometimes it might be necessary to silence some identities (e.g. 
university and political affiliation) in building my rapport with interviewees. Representing 
myself as a health policy researcher at the University of York therefore served as a common 
“positional space” in my recruitment and interviews. In view of frank discourse of 
information and discussion, I adjusted my insider/ outsider image from time to time 
dependent on individual interviewees’ reaction.  
Such flexibility was not only crucial for gaining access, but also for balancing the biases that 
might arise from my insider and outsider identities – I might have become sympathetic 
towards medical professionals after years working for them, and less objective in 
interpreting the interviewees’ narratives; but if I had no insider insights it  would be doubtful 
whether I could accurately interpret the interviewees’ narratives, which were sometimes 
embedded in their sub-culture. The ability to see through both an insider and outsider lens 
therefore was necessary for me to balance my potential biases, without losing my connection 
to the research subjects.  
The positionality of elite respondents themselves within an organizational setting could also 
have critical implications for a frank discussion in the interviews – elite interviewees usually 
hold senior management positions in their organizations, therefore more likely to represent 
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the position of the organization rather than their own individual viewpoint, especially those 
opposed to the organization’s line-. It is suggested that an elite member’s power and 
autonomy within the organization is a determinant factor of the researchers’ ability to gain 
access to their personal views (Harvey 2010, p.199).  
In this study, two groups of physician managers were interviewed, organizationally-oriented 
physician managers who were losing affiliation to clinical work, and a professionally-
oriented group whose management work was mainly at a departmental-level. It is reasonable 
to expect that the former group had more pressure on them to align to the organization’s 
policy stand. But as discussed in the previous chapters, reporting organizationally-oriented 
identity or narratives itself was not regarded in this study as a distortion of interviewees’ 
personal views, but a result of the internalization of their manager role at the expense of their 
clinician identity. For instance, when answering interview questions that asked whether 
interviewees would stand behind the HA regarding unpopular policies, many from the latter 
group of physician managers at a departmental-level did express resistant attitudes towards 
those policies they thought unreasonable. Overall, physician managers in the HA enjoyed 
considerable autonomy and cultural authority in hospital operation. Whether they expressed 
opinion opposed to organization policies was largely an identity issue, that is, the extent they 
had internalized a manager role or retained a clinician role in the first place.   
5.3.3. Interpretation of narratives      
While the positionality of physician managers seemed to have no significant impacts on the 
reliability of their narratives in this study, in the research ethics literature   there are still 
some wider issues set around the interpretation of narratives in interviews on whether they 
can be regarded as “authentic accounts” of the social world (Miller and Glassner, 2004). 
Positivists strive for “pure” interviews enacted in a sterilized context through standardized 
interviewing, in view of a “mirror reflection” of the reality that exists in the social world; 
emotionalists propose unstructured, open-ended interviewing as “authentic accounts of 
subjective experience”; radical social constructionists question whether those “authentic 
accounts” are just repetition of familiar cultural tales, and suggest that no knowledge about 
a reality that is “out there” in the social world - but just constructed narrative versions as one 
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could obtain from interviewing. These views all point to the risks that interviewees’ 
narratives may be context specific, invented, and subject to demands of the interactive 
context of the interview (ibid, p. 125).  
Yet, Miller and Glassner (2004) reject the assertion that interviews are meaningless beyond 
the context in which they occur, as it provides “a means for exploring the points of view of 
our research subjects, while granting these points of view the culturally honored status of 
reality” (p.127). For them, knowledge of social worlds is achievable through in-depth 
interviewing as the positivist view ignores important interactive components in the 
achievement of that knowledge, such as “inter-subjective depth” and “deep mutual 
understanding” (ibid). Instead of denying that knowledge, what researchers should do is to 
be skeptical of a romanticized view of seamless authenticity emerging from narrative 
accounts and carefully examine the grounds upon which these claims are founded (p.126).  
Miller and Glassner pay special attention to two types of narratives suggested by Richardson 
(1990) by which “people organize their personal biographies and understand them through 
the stories they create to explain and justify their life experiences” (p.23). The first one is 
“cultural stories” that are typically “told from the point of view of the ruling interests and 
the normative order” (p.25). The second one is “collective stories” that take the point of view 
of the interview subjects, and “give voice to those who are silenced or marginalized in the 
cultural story”, challenging popular stereotypes (ibid).  
As Miller and Glassner (2004) note, both cultural and collective stories provide important 
insights - an interviewee who is too deeply committed to the ruling interests and that order, 
or as clearly outside of them, may restrict the reliability of his or her narratives (p.130). For 
them, the strength of qualitative interviewing is not only eliciting mainstream narratives but 
to access the self-reflexivity among interview subjects, leading to the greater likelihood of 
the telling of collective stories as to “discover the anxiety, ambivalence, and uncertainty that 
lie behind respondents’ conformity” (ibid). Such “ambivalence” and “uncertainty” arising 
from contradictory accounts among interviewees are of high importance in understanding 
the whole picture of the social world. In addition, interviewees may also offer facets 
incongruous with their own narratives (p.137).  
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Therefore, it is possible to find realities within interviews – by juxtaposing an interviewee’s 
narratives to that which is given by others and other inconsistent narratives given by 
him/herself. In this study, two types of narratives were expected from physician managers 
interviewed, one more organizationally-oriented and one more professionally-oriented. As 
we discussed earlier in this chapter, some physician managers in the HA were not taking the 
organization’s line in policy disputes with their professional peers while some reported that 
they were. The contrasting ways of understanding or enacting their manager role imply 
certain forms of “collective stories” were told by the interviewees. More importantly, it was 
also found that some interviewees were giving narratives contradictory to our expectation – 
organizationally-oriented narratives for some managers in departmental management posts, 
and professionally-oriented narratives for some managers at a higher level of the 
management hierarchy. To a certain extent, those narratives different to the HA policy and 
norms in their stereotypical subgroups were not “socially desirable”. The impacts of 
positionality seemed to be very minimal on this study’s capacity to obtain interviewees’ 
authentic personal view points.   
Interestingly, interviewees themselves might also have varied in how they define the 
“cultural” (mainstream) or “collective” (alternative) narratives in the first place. For instance, 
one interviewee stressed to me “as the theories you study may suggest, a physician will be 
loyal to their profession’ before going on the organizationally-oriented narratives. Obviously, 
for that interviewee mainstream narratives would have been the professionally-oriented one 
and he/she was telling me something alternative. Yet, it was not the case for some other 
interviewees who were also giving organizationally-oriented narratives – they were more 
like giving a norm shared by all physician managers.  
In conclusion, to assume interviewees would mislead or distort their narratives for certain 
social norms or positionalities as fixed attributes is as equally assertive as the romanticized 
view that assumes they would not do so. The critical point is whether the research design is 
open to alternative narratives. In the coming chapters, we will discuss how the analytical 
approach in this study attempted to obtain alternative narratives by comparing the different 
narratives as given by two groups of interviewees, and as explored by different interview 
questions (examining different dimensions of their manager/ clinician identity). We will 
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explain how physician managers are “ambivalent” and “uncertain” as a group (Chapter 6), 
as a subgroup, and as individuals (Chapter 7).  
5.3.4.  The problem of data analysis 
Although reliable data can be obtained from interviewees, there could also be problems 
regarding the process that researchers analyse those data. Many qualitative researchers have 
faced the dilemma of whether they should adopt a structured or less structured approach to 
data collection – on the one hand, relying on interview transcripts may generate a huge 
amount of information, leaving researchers overwhelmed by data if there are no proper prior 
conceptual frameworks; on the other hand, to prevent a premature closure of potential 
themes, researchers should adopt a Grounded Theory approach delimiting the areas they are 
investigating to wait for interesting themes to emerge (Bryman 2005, p.138). 
Indeed, Grounded Theory suggests that researchers do not approach reality as a “tabula rasa”. 
Rather, they “must have a perspective that will help [they] see relevant data and abstract 
significant categories from [their] scrutiny of the data” (Glaser and Strauss 2007, p.3). While 
theory is grounded in data it involves constant moving backwards and forwards between 
data and emerging theoretical notions - researchers first elaborate “categories” or “themes” 
with hypothetical links between them, then redefine them empirically during further data 
collection with new themes and recategorizing. Also, when there is a semblance of structure 
within which the data can be organized and tentatively conceptualized, it will be more 
possible to elaborate themes with a conceptual coherence while postponing theoretical 
reflection to a later stage of data gathering (Bryman 2005, pp.139-140). 
In an ideal situation, researchers should first establish rough theoretical frameworks and 
compare them to new evidence, allowing room for adjusting them and planning for a new 
round of data collection. Yet, such back-and-forth movement may be an endless process. 
Redefining research questions may also involve resubmission to ethics committee and longer 
recruitment processes with some elite interviewees being used as pilot cases. Due to 
difficulties in recruiting enough elite interviewees and time constraints, this study did not 
move backward to theory but adopted a flexible framework that expected two types of 
possible narratives of physician managers – one representing the internalization of 
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managerialism and one representing the resilience of professionalism – as apprehended by 
current theories, and allowed a third type of narrative to emerge in the data as independent 
to those existing institutional forces. 
The following chapters will examine how the new themes that emerged in the data can be 
analysed and feedback to the theoretical debates at the later stage of the study. This approach 
balances Miles’s (1979) emphasis on prior framework as to avoid difficulties at analysis 
stage and Glaser and Strauss’s (2007) preference to postpone theoretical reflection. With the 
guidance of current theories on the medical power and governmentalization, working 
theoretical frameworks or themes had been pre-established yet they were open to the 
challenges when the new themes emerged as something outside that dichotomized structure. 
The generation of knowledge in this study therefore was also grounded in data rather than 
purely a “hypothetico-deductive practice” (Haig, 1995).   
5.3.5. Transferability of western research protocols     
In a non-western setting, the indigenization of qualitative method, which is largely a western 
invention and embedded in the western context, may add further methodological complexity 
to this study.  
As Hsuing (2012, p.3) suggests, researchers from a non-western setting tend to simply 
retrieve, modify research protocols presumably created by the western core, with local 
context being ignored. In this connection, Park and Lunt (2015) have explored issues that 
researchers in countries with a Confucian heritage may encounter. For example, the 
importance of seniority, collectivism and personal ties may risk encouraging researchers to 
hand pick respondents, and that subordinates would have felt obliged to participate if asked, 
resulting  in a sampling bias (p.4); interviewees’ sense of “face” and “honour” may deduce 
socially or organizationally desirable answers (p.9); some western social research practices 
of ethics may be ill-fitting, i.e. formal ethics approvals are not valued as promoting 
transparency but seen as strange, and the giving of a customary gift at meeting or visit is 
seen as ethical and expected as a sign of respect (ibid). While these issues may be common 
ones facing all qualitative research in general, researchers in a Confucian setting should pay 
special attention to them as they are particularly central to Confucian cultures.  
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In fact, the Confucian setting seemed not to be predominately an obstacle to applying 
western qualitative research standards to the fieldwork of this study in Hong Kong – consent 
forms and other formal ethical approval procedures were well accepted as protecting 
interviewees’ privacy and a sign of my professionalism; the seniority of nominators did not 
create pressures for participation in this study, e.g. one Hospital Chief Executive invited 
physician managers in his/her hospital to participate in this study, but there was only one of 
them showed an interest and he/she finally rejected being interviewed; while my personal 
ties were used at the initial stage of recruitment as to get the key informants’ nomination for 
the first group of interviewees, as discussed in previous sections, the common “positional 
space” by which I won the respect and confidence of elite interviewees was being equal 
intellectually with a sound knowledge of the topic, rather than personal ties. Instead of 
feeling obligated to entertain the request from the nominators who were seniors or closely 
tied, interviewees decided whether to participate in this study mainly based on their own 
interest in the topic.    
It is not surprising as a number of studies have suggested Hong Kong may be the least 
collectivist society among those that share the Confucian heritage, such as China, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Korea (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005; Tu, Liu and Ting, 2009); the recent 
tendency of Hong Kong society to increasingly promote independence, self, and mobility 
may also have narrowed cultural differences between Hong Kong and western countries 
(Danon-Leva, Cavico and Mujtaba, 2010). It is especially true when the focus of this study 
was medical elites whose education was largely in western style aiming at training highly 
self-processed and autonomous practitioners. Indeed, the Confucian notions of hierarchical 
order and harmony (avoidance of conflicts) found little support from the findings of this 
study: as will be shown in the following chapters, in the power dynamics among physician 
managers the authority mandate of the management hierarchy did not overpower clinical 
autonomy, and the resistance from the frontline was as significant as cooperation. Another 
key Confucian notion of collectivism was contentious as well – in the case of physician 
managers’ identity, the emphasis on individuals’ ties to groups and the priority of collective 
interest over individuals could refer to either their profession or organization. The concept 
of collectivism may therefore help little in explaining the interviewees’ narratives.  
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More importantly, researchers are able to close the gap between locality and the global 
academic practices and interests. For example, Confucian influences in deducing socially or 
organizationally desirable answers from interviewees, if any, could be handled with the 
openness of method and reflexivity to the contested meanings. As Hsuing (2012) proposes, 
while criticising the dominance of western standards in social research, a “globally informed, 
locally situated” analytical framework is achievable by a bottom-down approach that is open 
to local narratives and “plural and multiethnic histories” (p.7): 
Methodologically, the inductive logic of QR encourages bottom-up, locally-grounded research 
as researchers raise new questions, call upon different types of data, and employ alternative 
perspectives in data analysis…Pursuing QR in the periphery therefore promises the possibility 
of a new school of thought that questions the status quo, disturbs taken-for-granted norms and 
practices….  (pp.7-8) 
As the following chapters will unpack, quite different to mainstream western studies in the 
field of physician managers, it is common for physician managers in Hong Kong, from both 
the “pure” or “frontline” categories, to give alternative different to the HA policies or the 
expected image as advocates of doctors by their professional peers. In this open approach of 
analysis, local data of physician managers in Hong Kong, while locally grounded, was able 
to inform the globally interested issues of professional-led governance in healthcare by 
modifying current theories based on the dichotomy of professionalism and managerialism.  
5.3.6. Other research ethics issues  
In practice, there were also some research ethics issues raised by the Department Ethics 
Committee before the fieldwork was launched. Among others, protecting interviewees’ 
privacy was the major concern discussed in length in my submission.    
Firstly, I was asked about the procedure of how informed consent to participate will be 
elicited from participants. This information was contained within an Information Sheet (see 
Appendix Eleven) for potential participants at the first point of contact, with a Consent Form 
(see Appendix Twelve) asking them to read and complete before their interview commences. 
They were given the opportunity to decide if they would like to participate, and provided 
with clear information of: the purpose of the research; what would happen to the results and 
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how they would be disseminated; what their participation in the research would involve; 
what the potential risks and benefits of their involvement might be; how issues of anonymity 
and confidentiality would be managed; and the fact that they were not obliged to take part 
and that they could withdraw from the study if they later changed their mind.  
Secondly, I was asked to state the promise I would make to participants about how their data 
would be used, including in publications and dissemination, for example whether names, job 
titles, or direct quotations would be used, and to state what protection of anonymity I were 
offering.  
In relation to outputs of this study, participants were informed via the Information Sheet (see 
Appendix Eleven) that their words might be quoted in my PhD thesis and associated research 
outputs such as articles, conference papers and web pages. And they were given the option 
to request me to send them a copy of publications that quoted their words. Yet, they were 
not invited to give comments about my analysis before publication. Although that might 
offer a chance of “respondent validation” as to increase reliability of interview data, in view 
of avoiding censorship some research ethics literature regard this method as undesirable 
(Bryman 2005, p.137).  
In relation to anonymity, all research participants were given three options concerning how 
their words would be quoted within research outputs in the Consent Form (see Appendix 
Twelve): A) “You may use my name and my job title”; B) “You may use my job title only”; 
and C) “You may not use my name or my job title” (only their rank and specialty would be 
discoursed). If a participant preferred option B they would be allocated a pseudonym (Dr X, 
Y, Z etc.). Yet, absolute anonymity could not be guaranteed to participants even if they opted 
for option B or C, i.e. participants might still be possible to identify for their distinctive 
insights and the relatively small sample size. At the end, to promote the highest anonymity 
I unified all the anonymity forms as C, hiding all their personal information except their rank 
and specialty, despite that some interviewees agreed to the disclosure. 
In relation to the storage of data and personal information, the anonymised interview data, 
the documentary evidence, my research notes, Consent Forms, other paper-based data/ 
personal information and the keys to those archives were kept securely by me and were only 
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accessible to me and the supervisor of this study. After 3 years of my graduation these items 
will be destroyed.  
In general, all information collected form interviewed during this study was kept confidential 
in line with the Data Protection Act (1998) in the UK and Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance 
(Cap. 486) in Hong Kong, as stated in the submission.  
Thirdly, I was also asked to disclose whether this research would involve payments, 
reimbursement of expenses or other incentives for interviewees to taking part in the research, 
and specific ethical challenges to deal with “vulnerable people”. As stated in my submission, 
these were not relevant situations to my fieldwork.  Concerning the case that the research 
information disclosed to me might legally require my further action (e.g. the participant 
disclosed the potential for harm to themselves or others), I stated I would contact with my 
supervisor. My Consent Form stated that I might be legally required to inform someone who 
may well act on such information.  
5.4. Limitations and future research suggestions   
Although this study is pioneering research of physician managers in Hong Kong, there were 
several limitations regarding its data collection. Firstly, our data sample was only 15 
physician managers in the HA. Secondly, they were recruited by the referral of two important 
informants and snowball strategy instead of via systematic access. Thirdly, our sample was 
male-dominated with only one female. Finally, this study relied heavily on first person 
narratives and lacks cross-validation by archive or other data sources.  
Regarding the first and second points about sample, considerable efforts was made to avoid 
bias by emailing and telephoning all the Cluster Chief Executives and Hospital Chief 
Executives, as well as the HA Head Office for its assistance in sampling, although no 
successful invitations were made through such open access route (a few of them were 
recruited eventually with personal referral by our informants or interviewees). As an 
alternative, we adopted a purposive/ snowball sample which is a common strategy of 
previous empirical studies when a statistically representative sample is unavailable for elite 
interviews. The narrow origin of our sample has caused a geographical bias that half of the 
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interviewees are from the same Hospital Cluster, but we did not observe specific differences 
between their transcripts and those of interviewees from other Clusters. Using questionnaire 
as a supplement, we had also benchmarked our interviewees against a random sample in the 
US (Hoff, 1999).  
Regarding the third point, we particularly invited the three female Hospital Chief Executives 
in the HA but our requests were rejected. While such bias may perhaps reflect the tradition 
of a male-dominated community of physician managers, the cradle of future physician 
managers, medical schools in Hong Kong, have had a more balanced gender ratio in recent 
years. In the coming decades, female physician managers may take a more prominent role 
in the HA. While gender cannot be captured fully in this study, future researches should pay 
attention to it in terms of how female managers enact and reconcile their manager and 
clinician roles compared to their male counterparts, as well as its impacts on healthcare 
governance in Hong Kong. 
Finally, the lack of archive data or field observation limits the cross-reference of our data as 
well as the scope of the research. While I planned access to potential internal documents, 
such as minutes of meetings, organization charts, strategic plan, management consultant 
reports and project documentation as stated in the submission to Ethics Committee, the HA 
rejected such a request to assist in the research project.  
This has narrowed the capacity to only a snapshot for the current order of healthcare 
governance in the HA. Institutional changes are another important academic issue in 
healthcare studies (Scott et al., 2000) and they cannot be effectively examined without 
historical archive data. Researchers who see New Public Management in public service as 
an “identity project” (Du Gay, 1996; Goodrick and Reay, 2001; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010) 
have employed longitudinal data such as media articles, annual reports of public service 
organizations / professional associations to display how old orientations are interacting with 
a new managerial logic. Future studies on the constellation of managerialism and 
professionalism in Hong Kong public healthcare governance may source huge potential from 
archive data in view of a comprehensive understanding of its past, present, future with the 
overall tendency of developments.  
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Considering that the uncertainty in the access to internal documents may also arise in the 
future studies, researchers working on this topic should also undertake a comprehensive 
search for a wide range of published documents to crosscheck the content of interviews: 
national policy documents, newsletters of medical associations, and curriculum of medical 
education etc. 
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Chapter 6                                                                                                                 
Empirical findings: the re-stratification within medicine and physician 
managers’ identity  
6.1. Introduction  
With the rise of the physician managers as elites in the profession and the partner of the state 
under the re-stratification of medicine, the discussion of hybrid identity has drawn 
researchers’ attention as it may affect how the manager role is actually enacted, i.e. as the 
proxies of state authorities or medicine. In the previous chapters, we have discussed such 
theoretical relevance of physician managers (hybrids) to healthcare governance and 
examined systematic methods to research identity issues as developed by precedent studies. 
In this connection, we have outlined our research design and data collection on physician 
managers in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority. In this chapter, we will report the empirical 
findings of 15 interviews in Hong Kong during the first half of 2016.   
The findings confirm the Re-Stratification Thesis of medicine suggesting that the collective 
medical autonomy is preserved by medicine elites who exercise tighter monitoring on front-
line doctors. In brief, physician managers interviewed overall hold a strong belief in the 
physicians’ rights to collective self-regulation but not physician’s individual autonomy in 
clinical work.   
As will be shown, our findings also echo recent researches in the NHS context arguing that 
physician managers are not a homogenous group as stronger managerial identities are 
associated with more senior management roles (McGivern et al., 2015, p.276). Specifically, 
two groups of physician managers are found to be occupying respective levels of healthcare 
management: “Organization-Compatible” or “Willing’ Hybrid” managers are often in 
directorial positions (pure managers; Cluster/ Hospital Chief Executives or Chief / Senior 
Managers at Head Office in the HA). On the other hand, “Profession-Compatible” or 
“Incidental Hybrid” managers are often in frontline management (frontline managers; Heads 
of Department, Chiefs of Service, or Clinical Directors/ Co-ordinators). Given that the spilt 
in medicine under “re-stratification” appears not only between medicine elites and rank-and-
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files but also among the elites as two groups of physician managers, the interaction between 
two groups of managers can be seen as the frontline of the professional-organizational 
conflicts. 
6.2. Characteristics of the sample  
Before we go into detail of our findings we first have an overview on the characteristics of 
our 15 interviewees. We asked the interviewees to fill in a questionnaire before the interview 
to collect their personal information such as age, level of management training, and the 
amount of time they still spend in clinical work. For privacy considerations, we hide 
interviewees’ gender, speciality and medical school in the table below. Our interviewees will 
be allocated a pseudonym from A to O according to the sequence of their interview.   
    
Table 8 Characteristics of physician managers interviewed  
Level Management Post  Training  Clinical work  
(%) 
Age Year(s) as 
manager 
Pure HCE Degree 5 50-54 7 
Pure Manager at HAHO Degree 0 45-49 10 
Pure CCE Degree 0 50-54 25 
Pure Manager at HAHO Course 0 40-44 2.5 
Pure HCE Degree 0 50-54 10 
Pure HCE  Degree 0 50-54 14 
Pure HCE Degree 5 50-54 13 
Frontline Consultant; CSC  Degree 20 55 < 23 
Frontline COS; CSC  Course 60 55 < 10 
Frontline Consultant; Deputy CSC Degree 70 45-49 5 
Frontline COS Course 50 55 < 19 
Frontline COS; CSC Course 50 50-54 8 
Frontline COS No 60 50-54 18 
Frontline COS; CCC  Course 40 55 < 10 
Frontline Consultant; CCC Course 50 45-49 4 
HCE: Hospital Chief Executive; HAHO: Hospital Authority Head Office; COS: Chief of Service; CCC: 
Chairman of the HA Co-ordinating Committee on a specialty; CSC: Clinical Service Co-ordinator/ 
Director; CCE: Cluster Chief Executive   
Management post, training and time spent on clinical work: Seven interviews are at the 
“pure management” level, including one Hospital Cluster Chief Executive, four Hospital 
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Chief Executives and two senior managers at the HA Head Office. All pure managers have 
received management training at degree level except one who holds a Master Degree in 
public health. They are detached from clinical work spending between 0% and 5% of their 
time in clinical work. The other eight interviewers are at the “frontline management” level, 
including five Chiefs of Service who are the leader of a clinical department, and three 
Consultants who are Clinical Service Co-coordinators/ Directors responsible for cross- 
hospital or specialty management duties. Only two of them received their training at a degree 
level and most of them (6 out of 8) received management course training only. They spend 
a significantly larger amount of time in clinical work than pure managers, ranging from 20% 
to 70%. In our sample, the manager roles are closely related to their formal management 
training and attachment to clinical work, which are good predictors of physician managers’ 
identification with the manager role as we will discuss later in this chapter. 
Age and length of service in the management: Almost half (7 out of 15) of our interviewees 
are in their early 50s. Three interviewees are over 55 years old and they are all frontline 
managers in the post of Chief of Service, which typically goes to a senior physician in the 
department. There are also four interviewees under 50 including two pure managers at the 
Hospital Authority Head Office and two frontline managers. The average length of 
management tenure of the interviewees is 12 years and they commonly moved to the 
management in their early to mid-40s. Regarding this pattern, no significant difference is 
found between two groups of physician managers although those managers who are now in 
COS posts tend to be older.  
Specialty and medical school: almost all our interviewees are specialist doctors except two 
pure managers who are GPs. In addition to General Practice, pure managers are mainly from 
a general postgraduate training background of Medicine (2) and Emergency Medicine (2). 
As one pure manager explained in the interview, in a specialist-led hospital care setting, a 
general training background may be a barrier to physicians’ promotion in the mainstream 
specialist departments. General management may then open up a mid-career opportunity for 
them. In contrast, frontline managers are mainly from Surgery (3), Psychiatry (2), and 
Obstetrics & Gynaecology (1) Medicine & Therapeutics (1) and Paediatrics (1) and 
Emergency Medicine (1). For the latter case, the interviewee noted that it was their 
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Emergency Medicine background which drove them to move to management. We will 
discuss it in depth in the analysis of interview transcripts.  
Medical school background Gender: we have a balanced representation in our sample of the 
two medical schools in Hong Kong (eight from the University of Hong Kong and seven from 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong). For the gender distribution, our sample however is 
male-dominated with only one female interviewee. Although the gender ratio of Hong Kong 
medical students has been approximating 1:1 in recent years, the gender imbalance in the 
cohort of late 40s or 50s is determined by the situation three decades ago. For instance, in 
all the forty-one public hospitals in Hong Kong, there are only three female Chief Executives. 
Unfortunately, we did not manage to interview those three female HCEs through recruitment 
strategy by our invitation emails or snowballing. Yet we could see that gender bias as 
reflecting the reality of a male-dominated community of physician managers.   
6.3. Evidence for the Re-Stratification Thesis from the questionnaire  
6.3.1. Professional beliefs as measured by 7-point scale statements  
To supplement in-depth interviews, in addition to the interviewee’s personal information, 
the questionnaire also includes 14 statements that reflect their identity in three dimensions, 
namely “professional commitment”, “belief in individual physician autonomy” and “belief 
in collective self-regulation” based on the template study by Hoff (2000). Interviewees were 
asked to rate the statements at a 7-point scale from strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), 
somewhat disagree (3), neither agree nor disagree (4), somewhat agree (5), agree (6) to 
strongly agree (7). 
Professional commitment refers to the extent to which physician executives identified with 
and were attached to the medical profession: “I talk up the medical profession to my friends 
as a great career”; “I feel very loyal to the medical profession”; “I am willing to put in a 
great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help my profession be 
successful”; “For me, medicine is the best of all possible professions in which to work”; “I 
am proud to tell others that I am part of this profession”; and “I really care about the fate of 
the medical profession”. 
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Belief in collective self-regulation refers to the extent to which physician executives believed 
in the exclusive right of the medical profession, as opposed to an external entity, to regulate 
collective norms and behaviors: “Physicians’ work is something only those trained in the 
field can evaluate”; “Only physicians can make judgements about how well other physicians 
practice medicine”; “Only a physician can fully evaluate another’s medical judgement”; and 
“Non-physicians are able to evaluate a physician's competence in practicing medicine” 
(reversely scored).   
Belief in individual physician autonomy refers to the extent to which physician executives 
believed that individual physicians shall have a high degree of discretion in their clinical 
work: “Individual physicians should make their own decisions in regard to what is to be 
done in their work”; “Individual physicians should be left alone to exercise their own 
judgement in their work”; “Individual physicians should be their own boss in almost every 
work situation”; and “Individual physicians' decisions should be subject to reviews by others” 
(reversely scored).  
6.3.2. Self-regulation at a collective level   
The results in the sample are basically in line with Hoff’s (ibid) study which is based on 
random sampling survey of 293 physician managers in the US. “Professional commitment” 
is the strongest belief held by the respondents in both studies interviewees (5.7 in this study 
and 5.1 in Hoff’s study), followed by “belief in collective self-regulation” (5.3 in this study 
and 4.6 in Hoff’s study) and “belief in individual physician autonomy” (3.7 in this study and 
3.2 in Hoff’s study).  
While our interviewees are scoring higher than Hoff’s, they score consistently higher by 0.6 
in all the three sets of statements so the pattern of divergence is maintained in our sample. 
In both studies, physician managers still hold a strong belief (somewhat agree or agree) in 
collective self-regulation (e.g., only physicians can evaluate clinical work) and at the same 
time a relatively weak belief (somewhat disagree) in the traditional ideas of individual 
physician’s autonomy (e.g., individual physicians should be their own boss). These findings 
suggest that physician managers have accepted the managerial idea of accountability in 
medical work but insisted their control over its process to preserve self-regulation in a 
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collective form. Our sample is basically in line with the pattern as shown in the randomly 
sampled American study while the comparison here does not deduce any statistically 
significant conclusion due to the small size of our sample (15).   
 
Table 9  Professional beliefs measured by Hoff’s (2000) 7-point scale statements    
 Professional 
commitment   
Collective                       
self-regulation   
Individual autonomy 
Hoff’s original study 5.1 4.6 3.2 
This study 5.7 5.3 3.7 
Pure managers 5.5 4.6 3.4 
Frontline managers 5.9 5.7 3.9 
With our sample, the difference between two groups of physician managers can be further 
observed. First of all, both pure and frontline managers hold a strong commitment to the 
medical profession itself, scoring 5.5 and 5.9 respectively. The both groups also have a 
divergence in their beliefs in collective and individual autonomy. So we could say physician 
managers as a whole have a line to take on the fundamental structure of healthcare 
governance positioning themselves as central, the state as outer and frontline physicians as 
subordinate. Yet, pure managers show relatively less enthusiasm in protecting their 
collective rights scoring only 4.6. In contrast, frontline managers score 5.7 for collective 
self-regulation as high as they do in the score for professional commitment. Does such 
difference imply two different types of hybrid identity in terms of their reaction to 
managerialism in healthcare, more than merely different levels or degrees of managerial 
influence? In the analysis of our in-depth interviews we will attempt to examine how 
qualitatively different the two kinds of physician managers could be.  
6.4. Two types of identity as revealed by semi-structured interviews  
6.4.1. Coding of transcripts and typology   
To further examine those two types of physician managers’ identity in different dimensions, 
we created a set of questions following Hoff’s (1999) and Forbes and Hallier (2006) on the 
interviewees’: 1a) reasons and paths of moving into management, 1b) experiences or 
struggles in the management role, 2a) views on and interaction with non-medical managers, 
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2b) views on and interaction with medical professionals, 2c) Views on the fairness of the 
HA’s treatment of physicians, and 3) attitudes and actions towards the organization’s 
management measures or policies.  Based on Hoff (1999), the interviewees’ answers to those 
questions can be classified into two types, namely “organization-compatible” and 
“profession-compatible”. To cover possible answers that are not exhausted by Hoff’s 
codification and those questions originated from Forbes and Hallier (2006), we add the 
codification used by McGivern et al. (2015) which is based on the comparable data of 3 
studies using semi-structured interviews. During the codification of our own interviewee’s 
transcripts, we found that those two codifications are still not exhaustive enough so we add 
two minor sub-items to Hoff’s (see Tables 10 and 11). In this chapter, we will have an 
overview of the ideal typical answers given by pure and frontline managers based on the 
dichotomy of “organization-compatible” and “profession-compatible” identities. With the 
codification schemes we set out here, in the following sections we will further attempt to 
analyse the codified transcripts records of individual interviewees, and give a more 
sophisticated analysis on physician managers’ identity work, its pattern if any, and its 
implication for healthcare governance.  
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Table 10 Codifying identities of physician managers in Hoff (1999) * 
 Profession-compatible (P) 
 
Organization-compatible (O)  
 
Attitude  
towards 
 
1. Physician managers: a) “advocate and 
protector”; b) ‘communicators and 
doctors’ lobbyist 
1. Physician managers: a) 
supervisor, leader; b) educator, 
salesman, decision maker 
 2. Management: a) should help 
practicing doctors but not dictate; b) 
boring; c) not what “real” doctors do 
with their time; d) non-professional or 
inferior to medicine   
2. Management: a) legitimate 
means of control over other 
doctors; b) challenging or worth 
learning; c) an alternative to 
practicing medicine; d) 
professional or necessary   
 3. Practicing doctors: doing best they 
can, need to be left alone to do jobs 
3. Practicing doctors: “coddled, 
insulated, need to ‘wake up’” 
Common 
verbiage 
4. a) Squeezed, b) Remaining loyal, c) 
Enduring headaches 
4. a) Buying in, b) Credibility, c) 
Being accountable 
Goal/value 
alignment 
5. “The doc in the trenches” 
 
5. “The organization mostly”   
Belief and 
orientation 
 
6. “Those in full-time management 
positions are non-doctors” 
 
 
7. “The only people who understand and 
can comment on my work are colleagues 
in the trenches with me everyday” 
 
8. “I am committed to my fellow 
clinicians” 
6. “Going from medicine into 
management full-time is like 
crossing a point of no return” 
 
7. “I am committed to my 
management job” 
 
 
8. “I am committed to the 
organization” 
 
Strategies 
of 
resistance 
9. “Tuning Out” 
 
10. “Undermining the Data” 
 
11. “Work Group Empathy” 
9. “Participatory Rituals” 
 
10. “Rationality Strategies” 
 
11. “No-choice Appeals” 
* Underlined items are added after first round of coding 
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Table 11 Codifying identities of physician managers in McGivern et al. (2015, p.420) 
 Incidental hybrids (I) Willing hybrids (W) 
Roles Clinical Director; PEC Chair. (Associate) Medical Director; 
Public; Health Director; Network 
Director. 
Identity 
(relational) 
10. A professional temporarily in a 
hybrid role, engaging with management 
by necessity 
9. Permanent hybrid manager–
professional identity, interested in 
managing and organizing 
healthcare services 
  11. Seen by professionals as a 
professional 
10. Seen by professionals as a 
hybrid or sometimes a manager 
Institutional 
work 
12. Endogenous maintenance of 
professionalism. 
11. Professional hybridization 
aligning professionalism with 
managerial organizational and policy 
contexts 
Role claim 1. Passive professional obligation to 
take a “turn” in a hybrid role at 
professional colleagues’ request 
1.  The fruition of formative 
identity work, a)  involving early 
hybrid role models, b) positive 
experience of management, and c) 
inter-professional working 
 2. Reactive professional obligation to 
take a hybrid role to address 
departmental or wider organizational or 
managerial problems 
2. A mid-career opportunity 
providing a permanent career or 
autonomy to organize services 
 3. A senior professional representative 
(not a substantively managerial role) 
 
 Role use 4. Representing and protecting 
professionals, professionalism and good 
patient care (constructed individually) 
from managerialism  
3. Transcending/disrupting 
professional boundaries to 
improve patient care (constructed 
collectively)  
 
 5. Using habitual interpretive agency to 
valorize professionalism and demonize 
managerialism.  
 
4. Using practical/evaluative and 
projective interpretive agency to 
influence and challenge unrealistic 
and outdated professional 
mentalities and practices 
 6. Co-opting and loose-coupling 
managerialism to conceal and buffer 
ongoing professionalism 
5. Using/integrating 
professionalism and 
managerialism. 
 7. Influence maintenance of 
professionalism using institutionalized 
modes of professional communication  
6. Regulating and auditing 
professionalism, challenging 
indeterminacy and poor 
professional practice. 
 8. Validation of hybrid role use and 
professional identity from professional 
colleagues 
7. Experiences in hybrid roles 
validate a permanent hybrid 
identity 
 9. Maintaining flat intra-professional 
relations 
8. Positioning hybrid as an elite 
within their profession 
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6.4.2. Reasons and paths of moving into the management (Q1a) 
Pure managers and frontline managers were driven by different incentives on their path to 
management. With early role models of physician managers and positive experiences in 
management and inter-professional working, pure managers tended to see management as 
something meaningful in itself and as another way to practice medicine that benefits patients 
by system improvement. Alienated from the clinician role, some of them had a clear vision 
to modernize healthcare or to challenge outdated traditional professional mentalities, and 
some might see that as a mid-career opportunity for individual mobility asides being a senior 
specialist and moving up to the management in a clinical department. In contrast, frontline 
managers were somewhat “reluctant managers” (Forbes and Hallier, 2006). They tended to 
see their manager role as a professional obligation or incidental to their senior clinician role. 
For them, management is not what a doctor should do with their time or something 
uninteresting. Some of them might have a more proactive motivation seeing management as 
a way they can protect their own department or make policies in the hospital more reasonable 
for clinicians. After all, frontline managers still see themselves first a doctor and a manager, 
instead of a more permanent manager role as developed by pure managers.  
There are three common “role claim” narratives given by frontline managers for why they 
went into the management in the first place.  
 
I (1)  Passive professional obligation to take a “turn” in a hybrid role at professional   
colleagues’ request 
Because I was the Consultant, I eventually became the COS. Naturally it was my 
responsibility to do so. (Doctor C, COS; CCC) 
I (2)  Reactive professional obligation to take a hybrid role to address departmental or 
wider organizational or managerial problems 
• I think it is important to have administrators in the department because it affects the 
department in a great deal, protecting the development of the department in terms of 
getting resources; my mind is always with my department. That's why when the 
department needed somebody to be the COS, I thought I'm the best person. So I came 
back to the position. (Doctor C, COS; CCC) 
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• I felt that the hospital was actually unable to find some good solutions to the 
management problem it faced. You can say it “lacks the means” to deal with 
frontline’s clinical problems…. Some management initiated by the HA were 
unreasonable…I mean the projects and the implementation was problematic as they 
don’t take into account the frontline’s needs.  (Doctor K, COS; original transcript 
was in Cantonese)    
I (3)  A senior professional representative (not a substantively managerial role) 
• People do not choose to become a physician manager. When you want to get 
promoted yourself, automatically you become one…As a doctor you will move on 
to a senior position, and then be a consultant. Automatically you become a physician 
manager already. It's not a matter of choice. (Doctor G, Consultant; CSC) 
• In the HA, usually you get promoted because of your good clinical work; and when 
you get promoted you become increasingly loaded with administrative duties. 
(Doctor C, COS; CCC)    
Doing a manager job on a part-time basis without formal management training, most 
frontline managers actually did not undertake the management post purposely but as an 
obligation for a senior professional. The first frontline narrative that sees the management 
duties as a passive obligation was commonly found among physician managers in the COS 
post. Many senior Consultants actually declined the opportunity to be COS. They did not 
choose to be a manager but were asked by colleagues to take a “hot potato”. A common 
situation is that HCE finally picked one senior Consultant who was less reluctant. As Doctor 
C (COS; CCC) noted: 
At that time, I was pretty young and I was promoted to the COS. The situation 
dictated…When I was put to be the COS, it was a special occasion - not because I was fully 
competent or qualified; just because the chairman of the department became the HCE…It’s 
not by election and actually some of the Consultants chose not to be the COS. At the end 
the appointment came from the HCE. After few years, I decided not to be the COS. I went 
back to the clinical work; it was really above me; I am not interested in management. 
The second frontline narrative is a relatively reactive professional obligation. A good 
example is Doctor C. He/she returned to the management in a few years ago in a crisis 
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situation that many physicians left the department as “the department needed somebody to 
be the COS” in order to “protect the department”. Similarly, Doctor K (COS) addressed 
some management problems in the department. Helping the department to solve 
management problems, he/she earned more opportunities to take up management duties:    
In face of the frontline’s opposition the HCE was looking for someone who may have some 
ideas that can contribute to the committee’s discussion. Then I was invited to the committee 
as a department rep. So I had some initiations from the department level. Somehow why 
they got me involved in the hospital-level management is that my ability was recognized 
and some influential committees got me involved. So I was gradually promoted to the 
higher levels. (Original transcript was in Cantonese)   
The third frontline narrative of manager role is “senior professional representative”. It does 
not emphasize the manager role as something “reactive” or “passive”, but “natural” as senior 
physicians in a clinical department will automatically become a symbolic head in the 
management post. As Doctor G (Consultant; CSC) remarked, when one is promoted to the 
Consultant grade “automatically” he or she has become a physician manager already. 
Management duties are gradually attached to frontline managers along his or her career path 
without a clear-cut transition. Also, frontline management was not a pure management job 
for physicians but primarily was a requirement to be a clinical leader. As Doctor C noted, 
frontline managers usually get promoted “because of their good clinical work” and “become 
increasingly loaded with management duties”. The manager role sometimes was not seen as 
an essential part for frontline management job, but something attached to the clinical leader 
role or as recognition to the seniority of the most experienced doctors in the department.   
In contrast, there are two common “role claim” narratives of pure managers on why they 
went into management.  
W (1) The fruition of formative identity work, involving  
a)  Early hybrid role models  
• By luck, the College wanted to involve some young fellows to help their discussion 
in the Council. I was really young at that time, so I just did what the President told 
me. So I was picked by the College as a Young Fellow Council Member and had 
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got the chance to know many Service Directors at the Head Office before I went to 
the management. (Doctor N, HCE)   
• My predecessor…he got me involved in it and I became a Cluster Coordinator. So I 
worked with him, part-time actually. I was then still COS director in clinical service 
but part of the time I worked with him as Cluster Coordinator for almost 10 years 
before I moved on this job 4, 5 years ago. (Doctor F, Manager at HAHO; original 
transcript was in Cantonese) 
b)  Positive experience of management  
• It's just lucky...it's quite good and it is suitable for me to stay.  (Doctor B, Senior 
Manager at HAHO)  
• I don't consider it as suffering, otherwise I would have left. Because I found the 
meaning in doing this; somehow once I have got the job, I found the meanings and 
my interests. That's why I stayed.  (Doctor E, CCE) 
c)  Inter-professional working  
• My experience is very fulfilling with colleagues from finance, human resources 
administration background. (Doctor J, HCE; original transcript was in Cantonese)    
•  I can say my relation with other colleagues is good and we are willing to 
communicate with each other. (Doctor B, Manager at HAHO) 
W (2)  A mid-career opportunity providing a permanent career or autonomy to organize 
services 
• At that time, I was working in the clinical field, where I did not have much interest. 
That's the problem and I decided to try something else.  (Doctor E, CCE) 
• Somehow my career was in Emergency Medicine where you will easily reach the 
apex of the ladder. After 5 or 10 years you will have learnt everything. There are 
only a few things that are really fresh and how can you pursue excellence and 
creativity? It is because the authority or expertise in any subspecialty of A&E will 
finally belong to another specialty. (Doctor J, HCE; original transcript was in 
Cantonese)      
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Pure managers in the sample were more motivated to take up the manager role. They 
mentioned some of their positive early experiences in management, including their early role 
model and their sense of gratification or achievement gained from management work and 
interaction with non-medical administrators. Those early experiences offered a quite 
different picture of what management work is and drove pure managers to move up the 
management hierarchy. In addition to “pull” factors, there were also “push” factors for pure 
managers to leave the clinical path of promotion. Some of them expressed losing their interest 
in clinical work and looking for a mid-career opportunity.  
It’s something unplanned actually.  My original intention was to be a general practitioner 
in the private market but I considered that it is a bit risky to venture to the private sector. 
At that time, it was a civil service, so I decided to stay and so I discussed with my boss that 
I did not wish to stay at that particular portfolio. Somehow he considered me to be suitable 
to try taking up somebody's management responsibilities, and he introduced me to the head 
quarter of the Hospital Services Department. It was a post in planning. And after a couple 
of years, I was promoted to another layer, and then I decided to stay on.  (Doctor E, CCE) 
While frontline managers were using the manager role to achieve professional aims, such as 
the “the frontline’s needs” (Doctor K, COS) and “to protect the department” (Doctor C, COS; 
CCC), some pure managers saw it as an “individual mobility strategy” (Forbes and Hallier, 
2006). Individual mobility strategy was associated with physician managers’ training 
background. In our sample, 5 out of 7 pure managers were from a General Practice or general 
postgraduate training background (Medicine and Emergency Medicine). As Doctor J (HCE) 
explained, “the authority or expertise in any subspecialty of A&E will finally belong to another 
specialty” and one will easily reach “the apex of the ladder” in the mid-age after 5 to 10 years 
of promotion in one’s own speciality (physicians in the HA typically obtain fellowship at the 
age of 30 after 6 years of residency). The mid-career opportunity opened by general 
management might then be very attractive to some of physicians who have a little chance to 
get promoted via a clinical path, or uninterested in specialist training in the first place (e.g. 
Doctor E).     
Besides individual mobility, a clear managerial vision to reform medicine was found among 
some pure managers at HAHO.   
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W (3)   Transcending/disrupting professional boundaries to improve patient care 
(constructed collectively) 
• For a large-scale institute, good organization and service planning will be the very 
determinant for good outcomes of patient, in terms of quality and quantity’: When 
doctors graduated they will find that how to manage the patients is just part of the 
service….  Public health care system is very much a kind of organization and also 
the delivery of service. These are the questions to professionals. So I tried to explore 
how those services are organized, why and how the funding comes from, what is the 
purpose of delivering services to the elderly, what is the final target you want to 
achieve.  (Doctor B, Manager at HAHO)     
• It’s out of my interest in public health because public health is very important. People 
have been having stronger awareness of it, especially after SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome). Before that people had long accepted our system as a 
specialist-led or clinical-oriented one, but I thought if we want the system to perform 
well we need public health. We are not only facing individual patients but the whole 
Hong Kong as a group of patients…I think people working on public health would 
not be pure clinical as you are talking about population health rather than individual 
clinical heath management.  (Doctor F, Manager at HAHO; original transcript was 
in Cantonese)    
W (4)  Influence and challenge unrealistic and outdated professional mentalities and 
practices 
• As the world is going on, public expectation is higher, technology is improved, and 
also the doctor-patient relationship has changed…when those things changed, how 
can the whole organization change in the same way, right? If you look at the other 
professions, medicine is one not that closely packed with those changes. It’s already 
left behind’. (Doctor B, Manager at HAHO)    
• For the patients, there’s nothing wrong to have a specialist to look after them. Given 
that money is not a concern, this is the optimal option and everyone is inclined to do 
that. This is what I want to change in a public healthcare system. In the private 
market you can do whatever you want, while in the public system resources 
allocation is an issue, especially when medicine is coming up with new evidences 
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and findings in each passing day that are going to have impacts on healthcare system. 
Its impact on Hong Kong is that public health becomes more important.  (Doctor F, 
Manager at HAHO; original transcript was in Cantonese)    
The meanings given by those pure managers to their role were inspired by a bigger vision of 
modernizing the specialist-led public healthcare system. For them, the bio-medical model 
that primarily sees medicine as treating individual patents’ diseases had been proven 
outdated, and the public health model was called for in view of rationalizing the specialist-
led system. In this connection, physician managers were the rationalizers in the profession 
challenging their peers who were coddled in a traditional professional culture. Also, 
management work was not something incidental for pure managers but the key to deliver 
good service to patients at a population level. Organization and evaluation of service 
therefore was as necessary as, if not more important than, clinical expertise in healthcare. 
Those positive purposes for physician managers to go into management were closely linked 
to their attitudes towards management recognizing it as an alternative to practicing medicine. 
As Doctor J (HCE) delineated:    
As everyone in the management would say, you treat individual patients by practicing 
medicine whereas management is talking about to treat the whole system. You want to 
contribute by helping the systemization. (Original transcript was in Cantonese) 
Similarly, Doctor E (CCE) justified his move to the management as “for the benefits of the 
six or seven million population rather than a limited number of individuals under my care”. 
Equalizing the significance of management to clinical work for patients was a core part of 
pure managers’ identity work as to legitimatize their detachment from clinical work in a 
more permanent manager role.      
The personal histories of some pure managers were also related to the rise of general 
management in the HA as a consequence of SARs (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), 
which took place in 2003 in Hong Kong and killed 300 citizens. As Doctor F (Manager at 
HAHO) suggested, the specialist-led system of the HA was heavily blamed for its inadequate 
handling of the crisis, and reforms were urged in response to the deficiency in management. 
As a result, general management was expanded with more permanent management positions 
being created, and some pure managers made their debuts in management. Illustrating 
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examples of how some physicians were drawn to the management post in the crisis are as 
follows.  
• That was after SARS I got promoted to the consultant post. At that time there was a 
problem of the hospital beds in the department. I was asked by the Chief Executive 
and I thought it was a challenge. I think that's how I got in management duties in the 
hospital. And after that I was given more tasks by the Chief Executive and I took up 
those tasks. I thought I did it quite well. When there was a vacancy of the Chief 
Executive in my former hospital, I was asked to apply then I got the job.   (Doctor 
A, HCE) 
• In 2003, the SARS took place in Hong Kong. The Head Office needed someone in 
the Legal Service Department to handle law suits related to the epidemic. So the HA 
picked me as Executive Partner offering support to the Legislative Council. And I 
spent a whole year in the Legislative Council and Law firms. I stayed on in the 
position after that as long as they created a permanent post for it. I did not expect 
anything as I had no idea about management at that times. (Doctor N, HCE) 
Pure managers were not necessarily going into to management with a clear vision but did 
have a relatively formative identity work of the manager role. Enrollment in formal 
management training at the degree level can be seen as an acknowledgement to one’s 
permanent manager role. All pure managers finally obtain a formal qualification although 
they might not have it before entering management. In contrast, most frontline managers do 
not hold a formal qualification. Doctor J (HCE) expressed how they feel pressured to meet 
that implicit requirement for pure managers:  
When you are doing management on a full-time basis, you better have a qualification to 
backup yourself. Actually I was quite ambiguous about the requisite for the master course. 
Since I had the time and the opportunity…and because sometimes people will challenge 
you…even in just an interview you could ask me if I have got any management training. 
Also, you have to manage something other than medical, such as HR, finance, procurement, 
and administrative things. Then you will be not assured or confident enough as you may 
doubt whether you can handle something that they know well and you know very little. 
Although you can learn those things on job, it would be very difficult for you to manage.  
So I went for the master course. (Original transcript was in Cantonese) 
 
 
191 
 
Instead of stepping down as Doctor C (COS; CCC) once did, pure managers decided to stay 
on and tried to back up themselves as a qualified manager. As McGivern et al. (2015, p.426) 
argue, cultivating a manager-self or identity is a cause rather than a result of a manager role. 
Given that one could choose to advance as a physician manager or preserving their 
professional identity, the underlying driver for claiming senior hybrid roles is therefore the 
identity work itself. As abovementioned, pure managers were generally more positive about 
their early experience in management and interaction with non-medical administrators. They 
also had a clearer vision and mission for their management work. Such identify work was 
reinforcing and reinforced by their different experience in the transition from a clinician to 
a manager role as we will discuss in the next section. 
6.4.3. Experiences and struggles in the transition from a clinician to manager role (Q1b) 
Most physician managers expressed that clinical work did mean something to them and there 
was a sense of loss associated with their detachment from the clinical field. However, pure 
managers tended to emphasize the bigger picture of overall benefits they could bring to 
patients in the management position, and their sense of satisfaction or achievement 
associated with management work. Quite differently, frontline managers tended to see 
clinical and management work as conflicting and therefore stuck to the traditional way of 
defining a professional self with their attachment to clinical work.  
As Doctor F (Manager at HAHO) illustrated:  
Facing patients is something gratifying. We can say doctors love to face patients. That is 
your profession itself, something you are supposed to do...It is very satisfying when you 
can see something you can help the patients...There are many gratifying stories about the 
everyday clinical work.  
After all, you are one step back from the frontline. Then what you are seeing is different. 
You can’t just do it in the way like “it is good because I think it is good.” For example, I 
have 10 apples, shall I equally give one to each person, or I give two to those who are 
hungrier, or even more? Most of the management is actually for the patients’ good. When 
moving to a higher position, you have to start considering those factors. There may be 
different service models alongside the one you are using. So how can you integrate them? 
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Such things cannot be done in individual patient’s management, but you can do it in this 
direction’. (Original transcript was in Cantonese)    
Seeing management as an alternative to practicing medicine (O2c), pure managers were 
more likely to replace their sense of loss with a sense of achievement on something “cannot 
be done in individual patient’s management”.  As Doctor F went on to conclude:  
I have achieved something...We can progressively change the things in our positions. We 
can steer something and wait and see them to move slowly...Those are what I need to think 
about how to help the whole the HA.  (Original transcript was in Cantonese)    
Doctor L (HCE) mentioned other sources of frustration and challenges a pure manager could 
perceive, such as “different opinions”, “objections”, “hurdles”, “resistance to change”, “lack 
of resources”, as well as “losing clinical authority”. Yet, most pure managers found that their 
expectations for their manager post were met and felt rewarded. As Doctor L noted:  
I’ve been participating in numbers of projects that can help our staff and patients, and some 
of the projects have had certain impact to the health care system as well. 
The transition to a manager role might actually be a very gratifying experience for some pure 
managers. For some of them, their early experiences in management were seen as a 
preparation for their further promotion as physician managers. As Doctor N (HCE) noted:    
I didn’t feel that’s too difficult for me. Before I moved to the Head Office, I was Associate 
Consultant. So I had been taking some duties that are most “annoying” to the others - duty 
arrangement.   
Some pure managers might even see that management is “worth learning” and “challenging” 
(O2b). For Doctor J (HCE), who deemed him/herself as “a person who hungers for new 
knowledge”, “the opportunity to do management job sounded quite attractive”. He/she also 
thought that “management is funny as there will always be new things for you to learn” and 
“it is quite funny and right for my personality”. For Doctor J, the transition was “a very a 
short period of time”:  
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It was a gradual change. Sometimes I would remember the satisfaction from doing 
particular cases. But there would not be much time for me to think so much as every day 
you feel you are learning something new. (Original transcript was in Cantonese)    
For those who had lost their interest in clinical work like Doctor E (CCE), the transition 
could be an escape. For Doctor E, clinical work was “simple and far too relaxing”:   
I would say I didn’t like that department…to the extent that it has ruined my interest in 
clinical practice because of the lack of the supervision and lack of training…the atmosphere 
was so laissez-faire there. I did not have much to do. Every morning I did ward-round 
before 10 or 10:30 and basically I finished the morning duty. And it was far too 
relaxing…in general, once I was off, and it's off. And then you go to cinema, you go to 
dating, and so.  
Management however was more “challenging” and “meaningful” for Doctor E in a sense 
that looking after the entire population required greater efforts and intelligence from 
physicians:     
For management, one's mind never stops. Even when I was sleeping, watching a movie, 
having dinner with my parents, I kept on thinking about work-related issues, thinking about 
maybe tomorrow's meeting, how to write certain paper, what to do when I meet my director 
tomorrow, things like that. So it is pretty different…I found the meaning in doing this…As 
a clinician, my mission was supposed to look after patients under my personal care. So is 
quite simple. I have 10 patients, 20 patients, that's it. But as a manager or as an executive, 
I don't have a single patient to look after, and many a time what I do was to look after the 
entire population. 
For frontline managers, the transition to a manager role was a rather painful experience.  
Doctor O (COS), who didn’t think management as a “fulfilling job” and “don’t like 
administrative work personally”, explained to in the interview: 
I do see the point but still there are conflicts between what you want to help patients best 
and what actually your duty as an administrator to look at the big picture to contain the 
costs, like you cannot use expensive drugs although there are some marginal benefits. I 
would say the administrative role is not actually very gratifying.   
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The big picture of productivity gains was not valued by frontline managers as something 
beneficial to more patients but as conflicting with the professional idea to “help patients in 
the best way”. Instead of seeing management as something meaningful, they saw it as not 
what “real” doctors do with their time (P2c). For example, Doctor C (COS; CCC) defined 
a clinician with his or her clinical attachment:  
I did not switch to the management. I just took up administrative duties; I still see myself 
as a doctor but part of my duty is to manage the department; I don't consider myself in the 
management as a whole. I'm still a clinician; I still do the ward round…I still operate when 
I’m the (team) leader. So that's why I don't see myself as a manager.            
Time allocation was another issue raised by frontline managers on the conflict between their 
professional and manager roles. As Doctor K (COS) noted:      
Somehow your management duties clash with clinical duties and that may affect clinical 
works…Sometimes it is difficult because some special patients may need an expert care. 
You may need to change your timetable from clinical duties to management duties.  
(Original transcript was in Cantonese)    
In sum, pure managers and frontline managers demonstrated two different types of identity 
work and the associated outcomes in their transition to a manager role. Generally speaking, 
pure managers had a clearer vision and positive attitudes towards management work as 
something meaningful, and this was accompanied by encouraging experiences of entering 
the manager role. Sometimes their manager-self was developed at the expense of their 
clinician-self, justifying their detachment from actual clinical work. For frontline managers, 
the clinician role was rather a permanent identity for them. Their manager role might only 
be a temporary one based on an obligation to their profession or department, instead of a 
robust motivation or meanings attached to the management work itself. As a result, they 
were always in a struggle to reconcile their clinician role to their manager role, unlike pure 
managers whose pains in their transition from their clinician role were compensated by 
gratifying experiences and a sense of achievement in the manager role. In the next section 
we will turn to another dimension of their identity work as revealed by their interaction with 
non-medical administrators.      
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6.4.4. Interaction with non-medical administrators in the manager role (Q2a) 
An indirect depiction of physician managers’ attitudes towards management work and their 
manager role perhaps is their attitudes towards other management personnel. It is also related 
to how the medical power is interacting with other actors in healthcare governance. In the 
management of the HA which is a professional-led system, non-medical administrators may 
probably be seen as an extraneous part by medical professionals. Interestingly, while our 
findings confirm that generally pure managers were more welcoming and frontline managers 
are relatively antagonistic, the overall domination of physician managers as a group was still 
intact and their explicit confrontation with or subordination to general management rarely 
happened.  
Two common narratives that recognize non-medical administrators as the integral part of 
healthcare governance were given by pure managers:  
O (2d)  Management is professional or necessary in medicine  
• Is it that everything in the healthcare system is related to clinical? Not necessarily. 
For instance, for something related to law, a doctor won’t help...The fact is that it is 
something you don’t have in your training, especially now things are becoming more 
and more specialized and compartmented.  (Doctor B, Manager at HAHO) 
• The benefit of having a doctor like me who took on a managerial position is we can 
understand a bit more how doctors think and act. But that's not an absolute necessity. 
Someone else can do that if they spend enough time in the system.  (Doctor E, CCE)  
O (2b)  Management is worth-learning  
• I think the most important point is how to use others’ expertise. Never feel yourself 
like sitting up high here, superior to anyone else, or I can do everything…when you 
have contacts with various people, such as finance, statistics, and the auditor units, 
you will have a different way of planning a service model or handling works.  
(Doctor F, Manager at HAHO; original transcript was in Cantonese)    
• There are so many things you can learn from them as they have their own specialisms 
and perspectives. The most important thing is to have a teachable heart. It is easy for 
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doctors to see themselves as superior to everyone else in the healthcare system, of 
which we know is not real. Management tells you that it is all about team work and 
you need different perspectives.  (Doctor J, HCE; original transcript was in 
Cantonese)    
• Medical profession is actually the easier one. Being a doctor, you just need to think 
about the best interest of the patients. It is very comfortable to act on that moral high 
ground, while in finance and legal service the most difficult bit is the prioritization 
of conflicting needs...The difference in our backgrounds actually means that we can 
learn from each other.  (Doctor N, HCE) 
Pure managers tended to see management as an equally important profession or expertise 
alongside medicine in healthcare governance that requires for specialized training in finance, 
statistics and auditing. Their enrolment in formal management training spoke for itself. They 
also denied the necessity of medical qualification for managing healthcare. For them, 
devotion to management and management skills, rather than clinical knowledge, defined a 
competent manager. This was also associated with pure managers’ positive perception of 
management work as something worth-learning. They showed a “teachable heart” to see 
things differently and work with non-medical administrators as a team, as well as the 
willingness to learn the latter’s management skills such as prioritization of conflicting needs 
and planning of service.       
Contrary narratives that some frontline managers gave on non-medical administrators 
however were:  
P (2d)  Management is unprofessional or inferior to medicine  
I think obviously when people work in the health care area, a strong background in 
healthcare is really very important, simply because there are so many different types of 
work for all going on in the hospital. So if you have not been involved in this, it will be 
very difficult to understand those things. If you do not understand, that will lead to conflicts 
because...“Wow, why do these people lead like that? ” 
To be honest the doctors are always at the top level. The other people they are more looking 
upon as supporting.... So if you're not a doctor, say for example, it would be quite difficult 
to imagine somebody else say administrators or nurse to be in my position.... they always 
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need a doctor in a lead role. Otherwise, you can't drive order changes. (Doctor G, 
Consultant; CSC) 
P (2c) Management is not what “real” doctors do  
You can see the lack of passion...not compassionate…because they have not really seen 
their patients and felt the hardships of both the healthcare workers and the patients. They 
have other competing demands on their side, say for example control budget, all the 
political pressures. If they do not have other things to check and balance on the other side, 
decisions may not always be in the best interest of the patients.   (Doctor G, Consultant; 
CSC)    
Frontline managers expressed an obviously different sentiment regarding the role of non-
medical administrators in healthcare governance. For them, clinical background was a pre-
requisite for one to be a fit manager in a sense that a non-medical manager was seen as 
unable to drive changes or lead medical professionals. Interestingly, while both groups of 
managers were taking about the complexity of healthcare system, frontline managers tended 
to refer to clinical activities instead of management issues. They also defined physician 
managers as those who had commitment and passion to patients in contrast to non-medical 
managers who they saw were compromising those values for budget, cost-efficiency and 
political pressures. In short, the introduction of general management was seen as contesting 
with traditional professional values and professionalism of medicine shall be upheld against 
it.  
Regarding the potential conflicts between physician managers and non-medical managers, 
Doctor F (Manager at HAHO) described how the conflicts with non-medical managers could 
be settled by pure managers’ communication efforts:  
We have goals in common to make things better while we may be out of steps or for some 
difficulties we have different views on the matter. It’s not right or wrong but I have my 
own views and you have your own views. So doing management, you have to spend a lot 
of time in communicating with different people.  (Original transcript was in Cantonese)      
Instead of consensus, communication or a collaborative relation, “social creativity strategy” 
was adopted by some frontline managers to settle conflicts with non-medical managers. 
According to Forbes and Hallier (2006), in contrast to “social competition strategy” that is 
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explicit confrontation to challenge the legitimacy of management’s authority by acts of open 
hostility, “[i]n the situation where the status of doctors in relation to management is seen as 
both high and stable, doctors are likely to pursue social creativity by using their managing 
role to engage in covert undermining of managers in order to continue management’s 
perceived inferior status” (p.38). As Doctor H (COS) remarked, when different opinions 
arose in the hospital, it didn’t concern him/her much as final decisions were usually made 
by Hospital Chief Executives. The unspoken words were that physician managers’ rights to 
speak on policy were well protected as Hospital Chief Executives was usually also a 
physician. In this respect, Doctor O (COS) suggested that administrators were only playing 
a supporting role in healthcare governance, far from a substantial challenge to physician 
managers:       
 I would say in Hong Kong administrators are still clinician-led. So it is slightly different 
on the American system or the UK system, and the conflict is not that sharp.   
While some frontline managers might recognize that non-medical managers were necessary 
for healthcare management, this didn’t imply an equal status obtained by the latter. For 
Doctor D (Consultant; CCC) who emphasized that management was something that cannot 
be done without non-medical managers, management work was actually something rather 
clerical or ancillary. At the end, non-medical managers’ role was seen as supporting the 
frontline clinician as they lacked the necessary clinical background:  
We learn from each other...it is not just doctors and nurses working for the patients, but 
basically you need someone paying the electricity bills, the water bills, make sure we have 
fire safety…They also learn from us in terms of, like the clinical flow, the environment of 
like in the ward or outpatient, which they know what they need to help providing to the 
staff. 
Compared to those who don't have a medical background…I understand more about the 
patients, and the clinical staff's needs...I will say the management role as well as the 
administrative role will be sort of like a supporting role for the clinicians to carry out the 
duties more efficiently.   
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Doctor K (COS), who admitted that even a senior clinician could have no idea of what’s 
happening in management, also concluded that physicians actually had a huge competitive 
advantage over non-medical managers:  
If you don’t have the management background you are really in a huge disadvantage in the 
beginning. Yet, if one keeps going with the management for years, a manager who has a 
clinician background will be superior to those who haven’t. They know what the problem 
is. When they also dabble in other areas of techniques, such as engineering and IT, they 
will know the both ways and become very powerful. (Original transcript was in Cantonese)      
Noticeably, while pure managers did not have such a strong sense of privilege of being a 
physician compared to frontline managers, they did not lose their superiority over non-
medical managers:  
• When you are seeing deeper from others’ perspective, doctors are always advantaged 
- after all, doctors are respected in the healthcare industry. If you are more modest, 
you will easily gain trust and be accepted by colleagues.  (Doctor J, HCE; original 
transcript was in Cantonese)      
• Doctor’s background would definitely be useful - because I have worked in the 
hospital, I understand what's the working pattern; If you don't have this knowledge, 
you will spend a lot of time to talk with so many people; This saves a lot of efforts.   
(Doctor B, Manager at HAHO) 
Although pure managers recognized that the non-medical administrators could be qualified 
for a manager job in theory, in reality the latter can rarely compete with physicians who 
know both the clinical and management expertise. This echoes the questionnaire results that 
pure managers still hold a strong commitment to the medical profession itself and beliefs in 
collective rights of physicians to self-regulation, which emphasizes that non-physicians are 
unable to evaluate a physician's work. Taken together, a flat and collaborative relation 
between pure managers and non-medical managers implies no more than higher acceptance 
to managerial ideas by the former. It is far from evident that the balance of power between 
physicians and general management personnel has undergone substantial changes.  
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6.4.5. Interaction with medical professionals in the manager role (Q2b) 
The Re-Stratification Thesis suggests that physician managers are alienated from the rank-
and-file doctors as a group of elites in the profession. In this connection, the extent to which 
they maintain a goal or value alignment to the frontline doctors will be crucial to the question 
of whether the medical professionals and clinical work can be shielded from managerialism 
in the daily operation. In our interviews, physician managers then were asked directly on 
their views on frontline doctors and how they enacted their role towards the latter.  
Pure managers, who aligned their values mostly to the organization (O5), tended to deny or 
tone down their role in representing frontline doctors or protecting their interest. Their 
responsibility to the organization and a “global picture” of things were preventing them from 
identifying themselves solely as doctors’ advocates, whose views were limited to the needs 
of the frontline or individual patients. On the contrary, frontline managers, who generally 
aligned their values to the doctors in the frontline (P5), showed a stronger commitment to 
the frontline doctors and claimed to be their “protectors” as well as “lobbyists”. They also 
tried to avoid being seen as a manager by close connection to clinical work or a flat relation 
with professional peers.    
Reservations about being an advocate for frontline doctors were commonly found among 
pure managers. Doctor A (HCE), who claimed that he/she disliked using the word 
“management” or “manage” frontline doctors, on the one hand felt some sympathy for the 
“extremely heavy workload” they were having and pledged to “make them feel supported”, 
on the other hand remarked that “I'm not just an advocate for doctors but all colleagues”. A 
similar stand taken by Doctor E (CCE), who identified themselves as “representing the 
management”, and they did not see themselves to have “an additional duty as an executive”:    
From an angle of employer-employee relationship, of course I represent the management, 
I represent the employer. So there are basic things which I need to do…And I'm also a 
doctor; I'm also a part of the profession. Of course it will also be my role to do something. 
But I'm just one of many, just one of the 13,000 medical doctors in Hong Kong. So I don't 
know how much of additional duty as an executive as far as the interest of the medical 
professionals is concerned. 
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For Doctor B (Manager at HAHO), ambiguity of roles between a clinician and manager was 
something a physician manager has to avoid in order to protect the manager role:  
I think we should clearly identify our stand – I am coming down to the front-line as a 
manager. You must be acting in a certain role in the communication and it should not be 
ambiguous. You also have to know their role. They are those who are doing the clinical 
work; you are doing the management. Our roles are clearly defined. 
The explanation given by physician managers for their detachment from a clinician role was 
that clinicians’ views are sometimes “narrow” and limited to their immediate environment 
at the department-level. For them, practicing doctors are “coddled, insulated, need to wake 
up” (O3) and physician managers are elites within their profession (W8). As Doctor B went 
on with their “difficulties in communicating with doctors” arose from the latter’s ignorance 
of the responsibility of the healthcare system as whole:   
At that time the doctor patient relationship has not yet established, for executives like us, 
we have a duty to look after patients before they can see our doctors. But for the doctors, 
since the doctor patient relationship has not been established yet, at least you can see a lot 
of doctors saying that it is none of my business. So if we monitor waiting time, if we 
introduce some initiative to reduce the waiting time, and so on, sometimes we have 
difficulty communicating with doctors at this point.  
In this respect, Doctor J (HCE) suggested that “management is another language that you 
have to consider’ while “for clinician, that may not concern them at all”. Therefore, 
physician managers “have to be more detached when doing management” because “if you 
are still too clinical, thinking like a doctor, it’s easy for you to be narrow”. Talking about 
“the advantage of a doctor in doing management”, Doctor J actually referred it as being 
“easier for you to put yourself in doctors’ shoes”, and remarked that skillful physician 
managers “don’t fully take their point of view thinking totally like a doctor” (original 
transcript was in Cantonese). Put positively, a wider view is what distinguishes physician 
managers from rank-and-file doctors:   
What you can offer to doctors is that you have a wider view than theirs. For instance, they 
know less about HR, financing, they know less about the government’s perspective, they 
know less about the Bureau and Ministry’s perspective, they know less about the Head 
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Office’s perspective, they know less about the general public’s perspective, as well as other 
departments’ perspective. This is the value I can offer them. (Original transcript was in 
Cantonese)      
Or put it negatively as Doctor E (CCE): 
Most of the doctors don't understand what the management system is about...There are 
many other components of the management system which will improve the standard of 
care; all the forms, all the checking, all the protocols… if they can achieve the benefits of 
reducing medical errors, then I see no reason why there’s a dichotomy. 
In this sense, frontline doctors’ resistance to managerialism in healthcare was seen by pure 
managers as hindering its improvement because management is something good for the 
standard of care delivered to patients; and they were “coddled, insulated, need to wake up” 
rather than the guardians of patients’ interest. “Privilege of physicians” was understood by 
pure mangers as offering an advantage to managers over clinicians in the frontline, instead 
of the other way round: 
The main point of your interview is that, as the theories you study may suggest, a physician 
will be loyal to their profession. To a certain extent I agree to that, but the most important 
thing for being a physician manager is to realize that you have a privilege. You have the 
clinical knowledge. So when someone is telling you how to treat a disease, you won’t be 
overawed as you have the ability to analyze whether the treatment is in line with the current 
international standard or it is only your personal idea, or whether a new theory is evidenced. 
If you have the ability to read a journal, I can say you will at least know the general picture. 
This is a really crucial privilege of physicians.  (Doctor B, Manager at HAHO) 
On the one hand, pure managers saw their exploration beyond the clinical field as an 
advantage over their professional peers in the frontline. On the other hand, clinical 
background was valued an asset, especially when they needed to manage the latter.   
Other than positioning physician managers as the elites in the profession, pure managers 
downplayed the potential conflicts between the manager and clinician role by justifying their 
detachment to clinical work as the division of labor between doctors and managers. As 
Doctor B (Manager at HAHO) put it:   
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Nowadays doctors have more knowledge about public admin in public healthcare system. 
They know their role is to treat the patients, and they know that I'm trying to run the system 
for them. If nowadays you are performing your functions well, doctors will appreciate it. 
Frontline managers, on the contrary, developed a different kind of identity seeing themselves 
as frontline doctors’ advocates, protectors and doctor’s lobbyists (P1) and practicing 
doctors as “doing the best they can, need to be left along to do their work” (P3).  For 
example, Doctor C (COS; CCC) who claimed to be “the final leader” of frontline doctors, 
suggested that physician managers and frontline doctors were in a relation that “settled on 
resources”, rather than managers and workers:  
They always need to come to me for resources. As far as possible, I will try to support them 
unless something doesn't make sense…I don't tell people what to do. Because they are more 
than an adult; they are professionals; I believe everyone should do what they believe. If 
they are the team heads in an area, I think that area belongs to them.   
Frontline managers also expressed strong sympathy for frontline doctors as the victims of 
managerialism in healthcare, and more importantly, saw physician managers as one of them:  
I think to be a clinician is always not easy. In Hong Kong, we are using a minimum GDP 
to cater whole healthcare system. It is one of the most efficient healthcare systems in the 
world...but at the expense of over-utilization I would say, over-drafting of lots of things, 
sometimes the communication with the front-line staff. Sometimes the relationship with 
the front-line staff is jeopardized. As a clinician, I think listening more to clinician’s 
thoughts is important. The Hong Kong system sometimes is over-efficient. (Doctor O, COS) 
Maintaining a flat intra-professional relationship (I9), frontline managers held clinical 
freedom as a core value.  
I do not influence how they manage the patients…I mean by exerting any administrative 
influence. They still have the freedom to practice as long as they follow the Code of 
Practice, and for the benefits of patients follow the practice that we have to follow in our 
profession. Otherwise I don’t interfere with them too much. They do have their autonomy. 
They just have to follow the house rules. (Doctor M, COS) 
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Also based on trust and public service ethos, some frontline managers saw a manager 
mindset or management itself as incompatible with the medical workplace where the 
accepted mode of interaction were engagement and reasoning processes.   
• I prefer not to have a very strong mindset of managers. We actually may not be able 
to manage many things. So I think respect is the most important thing…. within the 
public setting, I would be quite comfortable to have an assumption that people 
working here are wanting to help other people.   (Doctor I, Consultant; CSC) 
• I do think first of all we don't use the word quality control. We use the word quality 
improvement. It will be better because quality control is a concept more useful in the 
manufacturing industry: get product, check, throw away right? That is more like 
quality control. And I believe in quality management we are talking more about 
engagement…we have to understand that you can never be successful unless you 
change their mind, and they want to improve. (Doctor G, Consultant; CSC)   
Behind the motivation of entering into a manager role, many frontline managers were 
actually driven by their commitment to frontline professional peers.  
• I still think I am a clinician more than a manager. So why I still work as a manager 
is because I want to have voices of the clinician at the management level so that they 
won’t be like left out...’  (Doctor D, Consultant; CCC) 
• We just bring the clinicians’ perspective into the decisions. It is a reasoning process. 
(Doctor H, COS; original transcript was in Cantonese) 
As well as “lobbyists”, the role claim as “protectors” was found among frontline managers. 
For example, Doctor I (Consultant; CSC) demonstrated a sense of responsibility to protect 
frontline physicians from long working hours:  
Most of our colleagues are working so hard, and the working hours are so long and they 
are so exhausted. At the end this is perhaps one of the most common reason why people 
may make mistakes. And it is actually the responsibility of the manager that how we can 
make sure you have sufficient rest.       
In this connection, Doctor M (COS) mentioned some issues whereon frontline managers 
should fight for frontline doctors, such as training opportunities, promotion opportunities, to 
 
 
205 
 
ensure sufficient staffing for the department, as well as re-engineering work, rearrangement 
of duties and restructuring of the team to lessen the frontline doctors’ workload or make it 
less stressful for them.     
Frontline managers’ resilience to their clinician role was also reflected by their sentiments 
of being distrusted by peers. Rather than complaining about the frontline doctors’ narrow 
vision and their ignorance of management, frontline managers complained about the 
alienation from their professional peers.  
• I think the most difficult bit is to deal with my own peer doctors…They just think 
you are trying to do something very superior and then leaving the duties to the others. 
So that's why you have to spend some time to explain or to make them understand 
that you are actually doing something for them. (Doctor I, Consultant; CSC)  
• Some clinical colleagues will doubt about whether you are…the worst scenario is 
not trusting… the common scenario is having a doubt about what you are actually 
representing…They will see you as a manager, no longer a doctor. They will position 
you as a management position rather than a clinical one. (Doctor K, COS; original 
transcript was in Cantonese) 
As discussed in previous sections, frontline managers’ clinician-self was actually built up 
with their role as clinician leaders. In this regard, some frontline managers emphasized their 
clinical connection as “the clinician hat” that helps them to avoid being seen as a manager 
by their professional peers.   
• As a supervisor of the clinical duties, I still work to a certain extent to instruct what 
they do....my background as a clinician will help a lot, when I say to them as a 
clinician rather than a manager purely. I will try to use the hat as a clinician slightly 
more rather than putting on the hat as “I'm purely a manager”.  (Doctor D, Consultant; 
CCC) 
• Back to my own department…people more view you as a clinician as you are doing 
clinical things again. Being part of my team and with me for many years, many of 
them still receive clinical supervision from me. That's why they see me as a clinician 
and see me doing clinical work as well. So they will see me differently. (Doctor K, 
COS original transcript was in Cantonese) 
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In summary, while frontline managers, who positioned themselves as also clinicians, tended 
to be more attached to the clinical role and acted as a manager to protect or represent frontline 
doctors, pure managers, who positioned themselves more as elites in the profession with a 
wide view and scope of knowledge, tended to be relatively detached from the clinical role 
and acted as a manager to improve patient care at the population level.  
6.4.6. Views on the fairness of the HA’s treatment of physicians (Q2c) 
In this section, we will turn to more sensitive questions on whether the interviewees accept 
the status quo of the HA’s governance. We first asked the interviewees whether they think 
physicians as group are treated fairly in the HA, followed by a more specific question on 
whether they think the senior management communicates enough and seeks input regarding 
decisions that affect physicians. Incongruously, while physician managers were divided by 
two types of identity, one relatively organization-compatible and another one relatively 
profession-compatible, they demonstrated a general acceptance to the HA management.  
Pure managers took a relatively unified stand affirming the fairness of the HA’s treatment 
of physicians, with none of them denying that. Although two of them refused to answer 
directly, they suggested that “physicians are treated equally” in the sense that “there is no 
perception of favoritism” (Doctor A, HCE) and “physicians are having same working hours 
and salary level across specialties” (Doctor L, HCE). Such kind of answer can be considered 
as perceiving no unfairness de facto. In contrast, frontline manager’s answers were more 
diverse, with only two of them perceiving the treatment as unfair, three of them affirming it 
as fair, and two of them giving a mixed answer. One frontline manager denied the question 
as a meaningful question as “there is no fairness” (Doctor C, COS; CCC). We can consider 
this answer as “Yes” for it is de facto suggesting that there are no unfairness issues in the 
HA.  
Taken together, two-third of physician managers in the interview positively commented on 
the HA’s treatment of physicians, including over half of the frontline managers. A similar 
pattern was also found in physician managers’ answers to whether the communication and 
input from the frontline is enough. 9 out 13 of interviewees whom we managed to ask about 
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this question answered “Yes”, including half of the frontline managers and most of the pure 
managers.     
Table 12 Physician managers’ attitudes toward the HA management (whether physicians are 
treated fairly in the HA) 
Type  Answer Remarks 
Pure  Treated equally  No perception of favouritism 
Pure Yes  Public service should not be compared to the private sector 
Pure Yes Same pay scale for all; people can choose to leave   
Pure Yes Public service should not be compared to the private sector 
Pure Mixed Well paid; but work is demanding, long working hours 
Pure Treated equally  Same working hours and salary level across specialties 
Pure Yes Same pay scale; inequalities in payroll have been redressed   
Frontline  Yes No definition for fairness 
Frontline Mixed Clinical autonomy; inequalities in payroll                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Frontline Yes We have gone through the hardship  
Frontline No Not protecting doctors in complaints against clinical accidents 
Frontline No Doctors are not paid for extra workload. 
Frontline Yes  Given the resources in the HA, it is fair 
Frontline Yes We have some people to represent us 
Frontline Mixed  Efficiency is at the expense of quality; due to resources problem  
 
 
Table 13 Physician manager’s attitudes toward the HA management (whether the senior 
management communicates enough and seeks input regarding decisions that affect 
physicians) 
Type Answer Remarks 
Pure  Yes  Both parties have the chance to express their views                                                             
Pure   NA Question was not asked in the interview 
Pure   Yes  
Pure   Yes There is the mechanism 
Pure   Yes There are transparent channels  
Pure   No Frontline doctors are not keen 
Pure   Yes They have every intention 
Frontline  Yes Channel is always open 
Frontline  Mixed There are channels but not effective/ They have tried hard 
Frontline  No Not scientific or structural 
Frontline  NA Question was not asked in the interview 
Frontline  Yes  Channel is more and more open  
Frontline  No No enough channel 
Frontline  Yes  Frontline doctors are not keen 
Frontline Yes  There are Opportunities. They start to learn 
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The focal point of disputes between physicians and the HA in recent years is undoubtedly 
working hours and remuneration issue. Following the government deficits in the early 2000s, 
the HA introduced tight productive gains programs and pay cut to its frontline staff while 
the senior management personnel were rewarded with performance bonus (Yeung, 2005). A 
backlash was doctor trade union’s ten-year long lawsuit against the HA’s policy of depriving 
frontline doctors of overtime payment. The only thing the HA could do was to attain the 65-
hour/week cap for all frontline doctors, and the disputes continued. In our interviews, 
however, pure managers tended to justifying the HA’s treatment of physicians as acceptable. 
Some frontline managers did mention about working time and remuneration issues as an 
example of the HA’s unfair treatment of physicians, but they generally at the same time 
expressed an understanding attitude towards the HA’s senior management seeing it as 
system level problems arising from resources limitation or the complexity of a large 
organization.   
A common justification given by pure managers for their positive perception of the HA’s 
treatment of physicians was the public service ethos. They suggested that unfairness only 
arose when physicians were comparing their benefits to those in private practice which is 
unreasonably good, and that is not an appropriate reference for comparison for those who 
are serving in the public sector.  
• Doctors they have the job that can’t make them rich...when you're working in the 
public, what gives you satisfaction is that you are helping people in that way. When 
you raise salary to the double, the private would be triple; when you raise it to the 
triple the private would be five times or six times. You won't catch them.   (Doctor 
B, Manager at HAHO) 
• For those who want to make more money, they would have already left. Be true in 
private practice there are higher autonomy and better material rewards. In the public 
sector, I believe that our colleagues appreciate that we are serving the patients who 
are needier. This is the ideal we share in public hospitals in Hong Kong.  (Doctor F, 
Manager at HAHO; original transcript was in Cantonese) 
• If you mean their living standard, they are not bad compared to ordinary people. 
Another issue is that they are comparing the public sector to the private sector, which 
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I think is an unusually high standard. (Doctor J, HCE; original transcript was in 
Cantonese) 
For pure managers like Doctor L (HCE), “the problem is that workload is something difficult 
to accurately measure and longer working hours are not equal to more workload”. In this 
sense, overtime payment is not necessarily a fair policy as the trade union leaders would see.                                                                                   
The explanations given by frontline managers who had a negative perception included 
working time and remuneration issue complaining that doctors are not paid for their extra 
work (Doctor D, Consultant; CCC; Doctor I, Consultant; CSC), as well as the HA’s too-soft 
attitude towards patients’ complaints against doctors:    
I don’t think the HA is protecting the medical profession well enough. In handling medical 
accidents, the HA tends to treat doctors as scapegoats. Whenever there is an accident the 
HA will ask the doctors to apologize to the patients and the public, including those who 
might not be guilty.  (Doctor H, COS; original transcript was in Cantonese) 
However, frontline managers who gave such an ideal-typically negative answer were only a 
minority. A little bit surprising, half of the frontline managers were actually satisfied with 
the HA’s treatment of physicians. They demonstrated an understanding attitude towards the 
HA’s senior management, justifying the management problems that led to physicians’ unfair 
treatment as “undeliberated” or due to some inevitable system level constraints, such as 
limited resource and complexity of a large organization.     
• I think that is a resource problem. I think it is because of the lack of resources in the 
public healthcare system. I think the HA is trying to do lots of things to help the 
front-line to understand, but I can see no matter how they try to communicate with 
the front-line, there is still the structural problem. Basically it is an overdrawn 
healthcare system. (Doctor O, COS) 
• Given the resources in the Hospital Authority, I think it is very, very reasonable. In 
many ways it is fair. While some may think it is unfair, I think some unfairness is 
inevitable, in some way at least it is not a deliberate unfairness, but unfairness due 
to history or management difficulties, rather than the results of a deliberate act. 
(Doctor K, COS; original transcript was in Cantonese) 
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• I think when the senior management in the head office make policy, they must have 
consulted somebody...they cannot come every time to go around hospital to talk to 
different people. So they have to get the options from representatives. There are 
different levels so there may be some communication breakdown…Original ideas 
maybe somehow distorted.  (Doctor M, COS) 
Frontline managers’ acceptance of the status quo was not only based on their understanding 
attitude towards the management, but also on another kind of positive perception of clinical 
autonomy they enjoyed in daily operation and that they are well-represented in the 
management.     
• I would say on the whole it's fair as they can still use their clinical autonomy. They 
can manage the patients as much as they would need to and like to. Although they 
are resources-constrained, on the whole the line managers are still supportive in the 
sense that the doctors can exercise their clinical autonomy in managing the patients. 
(Doctor D, Consultant; CCC) 
• I think so. We can express our opinions. We have some people to represent us, I 
mean at the HA level, trade union.  (Doctor M, COS)        
Some frontline managers also justified harsh junior doctors training with long working hours 
and low remuneration as a test for newcomers to the medical community.  It was not related 
to their manager-self but rather the subculture of the medical profession.    
So if you ask me about my personal evaluation. I think it is ok. But if you ask them, 
maybe…because their expectation is not the same...Because all your bosses they have gone 
through their time as housemen. They always think that when they worked as a houseman 
they work harder than you, they worked better than you! Ha-ha...it's like that! I may have 
the same mentality that I have gone through days - when I went through the days, I worked 
harder than you, I worked better than you. 
The general acceptance of the HA’s treatment of physicians as expressed by both groups of 
physician managers can be seen as the result of the HA’s efforts to get their buy-in. While it 
is not surprising to see pure mangers justifying the status quo, one may be puzzled by the 
frontline managers’ attitude. Yet, from a frontline manager’s point of view, does it 
necessarily imply the deterioration of the frontline doctors’ autonomy or rights to speak on 
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policy, giving that they also claimed to be protecting those values in the daily operation? So 
how well are those perceptions reflecting the reality? To further clarify about the physician 
managers’ influence in mediating the impacts of managerialism on healthcare governance, 
we finally touched on the most sensitive issue of how they will act when conflicts arise 
between the management and the medical professionals.  
6.4.7. Attitudes and actions towards management measures or policies (Q3) 
Generally speaking, pure managers and frontline managers expressed two different types of 
attitudes and actions towards the HA’s management measures or policies. Pure managers 
saw management work as a legitimate means of control over doctors stressing accountability 
and regulation of clinical activities. They tended to tone down the resentment of frontline 
doctors to those management measures and justified them with quantitative performance 
data.  Frontline managers however ridiculed management measures as impractical in the 
clinical field. They held the idea of good patient care that was constructed individually 
(quality) against the idea of serving more patients (quantity). Also, they rejected those 
requests from the senior management that were deemed unreasonable for clinicians, and 
fine-tuned policies in the clinical field for the clinicians’ needs.        
The typical negative sentiments expressed by frontline managers on the organization’s 
management measures or policies were that they are “impractical”, “useless”, or even 
“ridiculous”. Seeing performance data as distorting the reality, Doctor C (COS, CCC) 
criticized that it is creating extra workloads for clinicians. Doctor H (COS) further argued 
that “the problem actually is that the HA is doing something not cost-effective” as “ninety-
nine percent of those guidelines are pointless but create extra workload for us”:   
They try everything to prevent one single error, maybe out of 1,000 cases, by issuing many 
guidelines that create extra procedures for all cases. As our resources are not unlimited our 
hospitals are finally packed out. The HA has even issued a guideline on health safety for 
the doctors on how to protect themselves when carrying heavy items! How often would 
you see a doctor carrying heavy items in the workplace?  It’s only for the HA to avoid 
potential blame. (Original transcript was in Cantonese)       
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In addition to impractical guidelines, the Patient Charter which aims to modernize the 
doctor-patient relationship was also deemed by Doctor H to be a dead letter, and even 
harmful to clinical work as “it goes too far” making patients “like kings and queens”:  
Patient Charter is ridiculous. It asks doctors to explain to patients their rights every time 
seeing them. It is totally impractical. So it ends up with nothing. I think the HA wants to 
change the physician-dominated culture but it goes too far. The patients are now like kings 
and queens. They yell at doctors and hospital staff for anything they are unhappy with.  
(Original transcript was in Cantonese)         
For some frontline managers, measures to promote cost-efficiency were having two 
conflicting aims of having less input and more output. Taking the unrealistic policy of “zero 
waiting time” as an example, Doctor O (COS) suggested:   
If you push the front-line clinicians to achieve zero waiting time, or push them crazily, the 
system will burn out. This is the point administrators don't understand…To me, limited 
resources are not necessarily a problem, but they have to accept that there must be long 
waiting time.   
In response to management policies that frontline managers disagreed with, some of them 
might take an overt resistant strategy rejecting those policies, and some would try to fine-
tune those policies in implementation.  
Seniority and experience in the clinical field offered frontline managers, especially COS, the 
authority to overtly reject the management’s request to implement some measures that they 
saw unreasonable, even in front of the very senior personnel in the HAHO:  
• I will say no! For example, increasingly they want to have a unified system of 
waiting time, which is impossible for me. Less urgent patients need to wait and you 
have a streaming system so that you can afford to see more urgent patients, rather 
than squeezing front-line clinicians. So I will say no we cannot change the current 
waiting time system.  (Doctor O, COS) 
• Actually I challenged the (HA) CEO at the time, E.K. Yeoh. I said it is wrong 
because whatever data you collect it is not informative at all. Because you say one 
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hospital get 10 patients died, and another hospital get 100 patients died…which one 
is better? You have the data, but you cannot judge.  (Doctor C, COS; CCC) 
• We are always in this dilemma - We want to do more in terms of number, or wants 
to do more in terms of quality of service? …It has long been a philosophy in this 
department to not lower the standard, not to lower the quality of service to exchange 
for a larger output. That's why we limit the number of cases we do in a session, which 
is lower than our peers. We are facing some pressures because the head office 
administrators are looking at numbers - “why do we see so little patients?”, “why the 
output is so low? (Doctor M, COS)  
They adopted the strategy of undermining the data (P10) and use their role as to representing 
and protecting professionals, professionalism and good patient care (constructed 
individually) from managerialism (I4). Performance data, which are powerful tools of the 
management to make clinical work more measurable and comparable, were undermined by 
frontline managers as imprecise and therefore meaningless. Protecting professionals from 
external scrutiny, they upheld the idea of good patient care that was based on individual 
patients (quality) instead of the population-level factors of standards, access and waiting 
time (quantity). In regard of the long working hours of the frontline clinicians, as discussed 
in the previous section, pure managers tended to justify it as an altruistic sacrifice a public 
servant should do for the public interest. Frontline managers, however, rejected such idea of 
shortening the waiting time by squeezing physicians. 
Withstanding pressures from the HAHO, frontline managers were to a certain extent 
autonomous from the management agenda of running or reforming healthcare. For those 
frontline managers who were not in a COS post and less confident in overt resistance, fine-
tuning policy to cater for the frontline’s needs served as another way of being doctors’ 
advocates.  As Doctor D (Consultant; CCC) explained:  
As a manager, I would say I still act as an advocate for the clinicians. That’s why I work 
in a management position. On the whole I would say I still take sides slightly more on the 
clinician side; I will still view myself as a clinician. So if I have to take sides, I will still 
take the clinician side. Most of the decisions are actually being done when you are doing 
the ward round with the frontline. And you say “is it okay for you?” They will actually at 
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that time also give you the feedback. Therefore you continuously adjust your policy, or 
your decisions, or your plan on how to make particular programs ongoing. 
In contrast, talking about the management as “we” instead of “they”, pure managers tended 
to see management work as legitimate means of control over doctors (O2a) and use their 
role as regulating and auditing professionalism, challenging indeterminacy and poor 
professional practice (W6).  
For instance, Doctor E (CCE) was assured about the necessity of the management measures 
to promote cost-efficiency or productivity for healthcare system as to be accountable for 
public money, and saw it as part of a physician manager’s life:    
Of course we need to measure productivity, mind you we are spending public money; you 
need to know how your doctors are performing.  It is part of our life.    
Doctor L (HCE) was one of the pure managers who were proud of the high efficiency in the 
Hong Kong healthcare system. For them, the HA was seen as contributing to this 
achievement, rather than part of unrealistic system squeezing frontline doctors.        
The whole of Hong Kong only consumes 5% of our GDP on health care, and then we have 
a very what we call a very enviable index which WHO uses to measure the health outcomes. 
So in terms of efficiency, Hong Kong is definitely one of the cities. Contributing to that 
efficiency, the Hospital Authority is actually the major contributor. ….in recent years we 
have set up a lot of systems to measure their performance…So a lot of these formations 
have become transparent, and we can measure productivity. 
Pure managers might tone down those productivity measures as “gradual alignment of our 
services” or “energy saving measures” which will not impact the frontline working 
conditions substantially. They also undermined the resentment of frontline doctors to 
management measures as a normal labor issue or even something frontline doctors would 
support. 
• What we are doing on cost-efficiency is just some gradual alignment of our services. 
The objective has never been cutting your manpower. For those energy-saving 
measures like switching off the light in non-office hours, I don’t think anyone will 
dispute it.  (Doctor F, Manager at HAHO; original transcript was in Cantonese)       
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• There are no conflicts at all! Doctors themselves love efficiency and hate to be seen 
as inefficient. Confrontation arises only when they have resistance mentality, but the 
majority of doctors are excellent people. They love to win. While they have to 
achieve certain level of quality they don’t want to lose in terms of quantity. (Doctor 
J, HCE; original transcript was in Cantonese)                  
• These are some labour relationship issues that happens everywhere. Trade unions of 
course they would like to get paid more, and the employer may not afford to do. So 
that is something not particularly relevant to the medical profession as such.  (Doctor 
E, CCE)          
To handle challenge from frontline doctors, pure managers used Participatory Rituals (O9) 
and Rationality Strategies (O10): 
• When they asked for additional manpower, I always advised them to look at those 
data. Sometimes they realized that they're not the worst one off. And if their 
efficiency or productivity was not good as other hospitals or clusters, they would 
improve a bit. So actually nowadays with information available, it is easier to have 
a dialogue with front-line clinicians about their pressure areas and the ways to 
improve their pressure areas. (Doctor L, HCE)  
• They all know whatever the solution you tell them it is not going to be perfect. So if 
you just go to tell them about your policy actually they are not going to listen. What 
they need is that you listen to them on their dissatisfaction. When you give them the 
chance to express those discontents, things will be much better. But we don’t want 
that to be a lip service. If their demands are reasonable, we will strike to fine-tune 
the policies. (Doctor N, HCE)    
Unlike frontline managers who challenged the use of data in measuring clinical activities, 
pure managers valued data as something offering an objective basis for managers to compare 
performance or justify decisions. Given that pure managers had more data, the “dialogue 
with front-line clinicians about their pressure areas” became “easier” in a sense they could 
counter challenge their perceptions on management policies. Talking about “fine-tuning the 
policies”, pure managers also tended to accept the status quo and downplayed the 
improvements consultation can bring about. They suggested that frontline doctors did not 
care about the details of policies and they just needed a chance to voice their discontent. 
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Compared to frontline managers who saw their contact to the frontline as an effective way 
to seek feedbacks as above-mentioned, pure managers might rather take it as a ritual of 
communication in view of easing frontline doctors’ discontent.   
6.5. Concluding remarks  
6.5.1.  Two types of physician managers                  
With the six dimensions of identity work discussed in this chapter, we now compare the two 
ideal types of physician in terms of how they act as the proxies of the medical profession 
and the state, and discuss the implication for the re-stratification of medicine and power 
dynamics in healthcare governance.    
The two types of physician managers underwent sharply different processes of building up 
their identification with the manager role. Frontline managers were likely be unprepared 
when going into management. They usually were asked by their professional colleagues to 
fill the management post when there was a vacancy. Some might see it as a professional 
obligation to address management problems in the department or hospital in order to 
facilitate clinicians’ work. For them, the manager role might also be something that naturally 
goes to a physician who becomes a senior Consultant, or incidental to their clinician role. 
As a result, they would step down from the management post once they perceived obligation 
is discharged. For such a temporary role they thought unnecessary to equip themselves with 
a formal qualification in management. In the transition to a manager role, they had a 
challenge of seeing themselves as doing something not what a doctor should do with their 
time, as well as a sense of loss for their detachment from clinical work and earning distrust 
of professional peers. Therefore, frontline managers were “incidental hybrids” who took the 
manager role as a temporary position and struggled to reconcile it to their clinician-self.   
Pure managers, however, generally went into management with a clearer vision of system 
improvement or individual mobility purpose, taking the management position as their 
permanent role. Some of them were inspired by the idea of public health, stressing system 
factors that may have impacts on patients’ well-being at a population level, such as standards, 
access and waiting time; some pure managers might simply lose their interest in clinical 
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work or look for a mid-career opportunity in general management as their General Practice 
or Emergency Medicine background had hindered their promotion in a specialist-led hospital 
setting. Valuing management as an equally important expertise as medicine, they thought 
necessary to obtain a formal qualification in management. For them, the manager role should 
not be compromised for their clinician role but was a better way to practice medicine in order 
to help more patients by system improvement. In the transition to a manager role, they had 
a sense of achievement as well as positive experiences seeing themselves as doing something 
meaningful and challenging. Therefore, pure managers were “willing hybrids” who took the 
manager role as a permanent position at the expense of their clinician-self. 
The differences in values and beliefs dimensions were followed by the “role use” dimensions. 
In the interaction with non-medical managers, frontline managers used “social creativity 
strategy” to undermine the non-medical managers’ status as a supporting role. They also saw 
themselves as one of the clinicians and acted as the clinicians “protectors” and “lobbyists”, 
rejecting unreasonable policies and representing clinicians in the management post, or fine-
tuning policy at the implementation stage in view of safeguarding the quality of care. In 
addition, they avoided being seen as a manager by their professional peers with a flat relation 
among professionals or attachment to the clinical field. In short, frontline managers were 
acting first as a doctor and then a manager.  
Pure managers, in contrast, saw non-medical management personnel as necessary stressing 
the importance of team work and learning from other management professionals, if not 
seeing management expertise as equally important as medicine. They tended to tone down 
the HA’s unfair treatment of physicians under managerialistic policies, and saw management 
as a legitimate means of controlling physicians in view of accountability and reducing 
variations or errors in clinical activities. Identifying themselves as elites in the profession 
with a wider view of the big picture of the system and a broader scope of knowledge, they 
use “rationality strategy” to justify management policies by performance data and counter 
challenge frontline doctors’ rejection. In short, pure managers were acting first as a manager 
and then a doctor.   
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Table 14 Common answers given by physician managers in the same manager role  
6.5.2. The power dynamics of re-stratification 
With the prevalence of “willing hybrids” in senior management roles, McGivern et al. (2015, 
p.426) conclude that medical management is increasingly considered as a legitimate sub-
specialty within the medical professional, who “challenged the indeterminacy of poor 
professional practices, which they judged to undermine professionalism, but maintained the 
need for professionals to judge professional practice”. As a result, there is an “intra-
professional battles for jurisdiction over professional work” (ibid) beneath the surface of 
overall dominance of the medical professionals in healthcare governance. Our interviews 
support this line of argument.  
While “willing hybrids” or “organization-compatible” physician managers are occupying 
senior pure management posts, those “incidental hybrids” or “profession-compatible” are 
setting their back against them on frontline management posts. So what is the implication of 
Dimension/ role Frontline  Pure  
Reasons and 
paths 
• Unprepared 
• Professional obligation  
• Incidental manager role 
• Clear vision (rationalizers) 
• Individual mobility  
• Permeant manager role 
Experiences/ 
struggles 
• A sense of loss 
• Earning distrust of 
professional peers 
• Management is challenging and 
meaningful 
• A sense of achievement and 
positive experience 
Interaction with 
non-medical 
managers 
• Undermined non-
medical administrators as 
a supporting role 
• Respected management expertise 
Interaction with 
medical 
professionals 
• Identified themselves as 
clinicians  
• Undermining the data 
• Identified themselves as elites  
• Rationality strategy 
Handling of 
professional-
organizational 
disputes  
• Sympathy for frontline 
doctors  
• Management as 
impractical, useless, or 
even ridiculous 
• Acted as the clinicians’ 
protectors and lobbyists 
• Saw management as a legitimate 
means of controlling physicians  
• Toned down the resentment of 
frontline doctors 
• Reservations about being doctors’ 
advocate   
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such a split in medicine for healthcare governance? Will the balance of power tilt towards 
the state or general management because of “willing hybrids”? McGivern et al. do not offer 
a definite answer but suggest that “the maintenance of institutionalized professionalism 
remains powerful” (ibid).  
Indeed, interviews in this study reveal that frontline physician managers, based on their close 
connection to everyday clinical work and experience in specialties, played an important role 
in mediating management policies at the implementation stage by overt rejection or fine-
tuning. Noticeably, such an intact power base of institutionalized professionalism in the 
frontline was inter-subjectively perceived by both frontline managers and pure managers.  
As Doctor C (COS; CCC) explained on why he/she chaired the HA Coordinating Committee 
in his/her specialty:   
I perceived COC as very powerful because when all the COSs in a specialty say it is very 
important, who can say it is not?  
And also on the COS’s power over the clinical academics from the university:   
We are very powerful. If we do not allow the HA doctors to help them, to allow them to 
teach, to allow them to do the research, they are in trouble. They can’t do any research 
without our help. 
Frontline managers had the cultural authority in agenda setting regarding the HA’s policies 
as well as a solid power base in terms of their control of clinical departments’ human 
resources and budget. In addition to COS, frontline managers might also exercise their 
influence in the macro-level decision making as Clinical Service Coordinator/ Director at 
the hospital cluster- level and the Chairman of the HA Coordinating Committee on their 
specialty service. In response to this, pure managers might always need to compromise on 
policy implementation with the frontline. As Doctor B (Manager at HAHO) commented on 
the importance of communication and engaging frontline clinicians:     
Just like a restaurant - How can the manager always fight with the kitchen? If the chef 
always says no to whatever the manager asks, how can you run the restaurant? ...If you are 
talking down to people of how things should be done, people will probably say “it is 
actually not how it should but if you ask so, well, it may do…” Finally your policy will 
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only be a dead letter.  That’s why engagement is so important. Also, each locale has its 
own characteristics. You may need to reach some consensus or common ground. (Original 
transcript was in Cantonese)                  
In reality, how do pure managers communicate with and engage frontline clinicians? Given 
that they see themselves as rationalizers who regulate or modernize medicine, how do they 
reconcile those conflicting demands? This is a question we may need to think outside the 
dichotomized framework of the “manager vs. clinicians” stereotype.         
Perhaps the major limitation of the dichotomy is that it may ignore the outliers. On the one 
hand, both groups of physician managers were generally in line with their ideal types 
reacting to conflicts between the organization and profession. One the other hand, it is found 
that there are still some outliers in our interviewees who did not fall into their respective 
ideal types in one or more, if not all dimensions of their identity work. In the light of all 
these limitations of the dichotomy framework, in the next chapter we will discuss those 
outliers in detail arguing that outliers from the two ideal types were undergoing two different 
forms of hybridization - “satisficing pure managers” were under pressure to adopting the 
strategy of wearing a “clinician hat”, while “satisficing frontline managers” were also 
exposed to managerial ideas. By those two moves, “satisificers” were aligned to the middle 
from the two ends, bridging the two groups of physician managers and the institutional 
forces of professionalism and managerialism that they represent. The power dynamics in the 
re-stratification of medicine therefore involve not only confrontation in a dichotomy 
framework but also integration, which is a relatively untouched area in the Re-Stratification 
Thesis regarding how the equilibrium is maintained.  
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Chapter 7                                                                                                            
Empirical findings:  mixed identity work and negotiating strategies  
7.1. Introduction  
The discussion on physician managers’ mixed identity work in the last chapter is based on a 
theoretical dichotomy seeing it as a reflection of competing institutional logics of 
professionalism and managerialism. These were strong ideal types but were physician 
managers’ possible identities limited to either one? Also, while the corporatist setting in 
healthcare was a contested arena of professional and managerial powers, how was the 
equilibrium achieved so both the state and sectoral interests could be represented?   
As will be discussed in this chapter, physician managers in our sample faced inconsistences 
in their identity work, thereby not fully conforms with the dichotomy in one or more 
dimensions of their identity work. More importantly, it is found that such there were 
underlying patterns of such inconsistences, creating two different forms of hybridization. On 
the one hand, some frontline managers were exposed to certain managerial influence and 
bought into a minimum level of management of clinical work. On the other hand, some pure 
managers were constrained by the subculture of medical professionals, such as seniority, 
respect for colleagues’ autonomy, and the pressure on them to wear a “clinician’s hat” by 
symbolic contact with clinical work. Instead of maximizing professional or organizational 
values, as discussed in Chapter 4, these outliers were “satisficing” (Simon, 1956) with 
attempts to achieve at least some minimum level of both goals.   
We argue that, an uneasy balance between the managerial and professional agenda in 
healthcare governance is maintained by those two quite different forms of hybridization - 
for “satisficing frontline managers”, who had a stronger clinical attachment the department 
level, their professional beliefs were blurred by their manager role; for “satisficing pure 
managers”, who had more power in resource allocation at the organization level but lacked 
contact with  daily clinical work, they were bounded by a professionally defined mode of 
communication or management strategy in exchange for the authority to align clinical 
activities at the frontline. This may also help explain why the medical power as a whole 
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could still function well as the partner cum challenger of the state in a corporatist setting of 
healthcare, rather than turning into overt internal confrontations. With the proposed concept 
of “satisficers” whose identity work is mixed with professionalism, and managerialism, in 
this chapter we will attempt to understand the waves that lie between the two ends of the 
power continuum in healthcare governance, arguing that it is not merely a dichotomy but a 
spectrum where there is room for the two groups of physician managers to be integrated 
through satisficing.  
Theoretically, “satificers” who identify themselves as “first a doctor then a manager” or 
“first a manager then a doctor” are not the only possible outcomes of mixed identity work. 
We will further explore whether physician managers seek to avoid identity conflicts by 
escaping from that dichotomy in the absence of a dominant institutional logic.  
7.2. Limitations of a dichotomized framework and mixed identity work    
Following empirical studies that employ a typology of identity (Forbes and Hallier, 2006; 
Hoff 1999; McGivern et al., 2015), in the last chapter we have analysed how the two types 
of physician managers were contesting in healthcare governance on behalf of the 
institutional forces of professionalism and managerialism. Yet, in those precedent studies 
relatively little is discussed about how we can analyse outliers who are not typical pure or 
frontline managers.    
In reality, a physician manager could have both types of values or beliefs at the same time. 
Therefore, inconsistency in physician managers’ identity work might arise in two forms: 
first, holding contradictory views within a single dimension (e.g. a frontline manager could 
have a headache of earning distrust of professional peers and at the same time a sense of 
achievement and positive experience in the management post); second, holding 
contradictory views across different dimensions (e.g. a pure manager could have a self-
identification as rationalizer of medicine while feeling pressured to adopt a professional 
mode of communication and symbolic participation in clinical work). In the six dimensions 
where we have examined the identity work in the last chapter, it is found that some 
interviewees were giving managerial as well as professional types of answers in the same 
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dimension, and some could be classified as contradictory types across the different 
dimensions. So to what extent is the dichotomy still valid? How we can systematically 
classify physician managers taking that fuzziness into consideration?   
With the codification scheme we have used in the last chapter (Tables 10 and 11), the 
managerial and professional types of codes are allotted to the interviewees for further 
comparison (Tables 17 to 21). In every dimension of identity work, interviewees are first 
classified as “organizational” or “professional” by their overall tendency in terms of the 
number of the two types of codes (Table 15). Where there are contradictions or no decisive 
results in an interview, the transcript will be further analyzed. If no strong tendency is found 
eventually, the interviewee will then be classified as “mixed” as both institutional logic 
operated in the identity work and neither one could dominate. Combing all six dimensions, 
the overall identity of an interviewee will be generated.               
Table 15  Identity type of physician managers by the six dimensions  
 1a 1b 2a 2b 2c 3a Identity  Remarks  
Pure  M O O M O M Mixed Negotiating strategy 
 O O X O O X Organizational  
 O O O O O O Organizational   
 O O O M O M Organizational Negotiating strategy 
 O O O M O M Organizational Negotiating strategy  
 M O M M O  O Mixed Negotiating strategy 
 O O O M O M Organizational   Negotiating strategy 
Frontline  P P O P O  P Professional   
 O O P P M P Professional   
 O M P M O M Mixed Negotiating strategy 
 P M P P P P Professional   
 O O O M P M Mixed  Negotiating strategy 
 P M P O O  O Mixed  
 M P O M O M Mixed  
 P M P P M P Professional   
Strikingly, the elaborated mode of analysis including the “mixed” identity does not reject 
that the institutional logics of professionalism and managerialism are contesting in physician 
managers’ identity work. Rather, it offers a more sophisticated understanding of how it 
worked. Firstly, the association between manager role (pure vs. frontline) and identity 
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(organizational vs. professional) is still valid. Taking all the six dimensions together, no pure 
or frontline managers eventually fall into the opposite type of identity. Most pure managers 
are still classified as “organizational” and no frontline managers fall into that type. It is also 
noticed that many frontline managers developed a “mixed” identity, but those inconsistences 
were restricted to the beliefs and values dimensions. In the action dimension of how they 
took sides between their professional peers and the organization in conflicts, as well as 
whether they saw themselves or acted as doctors’ advocate, professional identity was still 
intact among frontline managers. So was there any pattern of conflicting identity work 
among pure managers as well? That leads us to the second point.  
The second noticeable finding of the elaborated mode of analysis is that “mixed” identity 
developed in certain patterns in two respective forms among pure and frontline managers. 
As aforementioned, hybrid identity mainly worked to blur frontline managers’ professional 
beliefs in individual clinicians’ autonomy but not their self-identification as doctors’ 
advocates. At the same time, a converse pattern of hybridization was found among pure 
managers with a professional mode of interactions such as symbolic contact with clinical 
work or flat relations among professional peers, together with their strong beliefs in 
managerialism in healthcare. Such pattern of “doctor vs. manager” role conflicts among two 
types of physician managers sheds some light on our understanding of power dynamics in 
healthcare governance - the mainstream of physician managers reached some consensus on 
the necessity of management as well as clan governance of professionals (Ouchi, 1979), so 
that both the state and the medical profession can fulfill their agendas.  
Thirdly, to reconcile the contradictory clinician and manager roles, some physician 
managers in the interviews adopted a “negotiating” strategy’ to circumvent direct conflict in 
view of protecting the dual role. Instead of aligning fully to one side, they played a brokering 
role when conflicts arose between the organization and profession.      
Taken together, between the two ends of the power continuum in healthcare, “satisficers” 
were driven from the polar positions by the contradictory institutional forces, with some pure 
managers being aligned to professionalism and some frontline managers being aligned to 
managerialism. We argue that it is not an arbitrary fuzziness shared by the outliers of the 
two groups as they were undergoing two different types of hybridization that focused on 
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different dimensions of their identity work. After all, “satisficing” pure managers still acted 
as “rationalizers of medicine” while “satisficing” frontline managers still acted as “advocates 
of doctors”. It is also found that some physician managers developed a brokering role and 
negotiating strategies to buffer themselves from potential identity conflicts in their dual role. 
Instead of acting for one side, they repositioned themselves as neither representing the 
profession nor organization, and tried to get decisions making in the organization closer to 
the expectations of both parties or avoid being embraced by disputes as a merely a 
middleman. 
Table 16  Power continuum in healthcare governance by elaborated identity types  
Power centre Organization     Profession 
Identity 
Manager 
(controlled) 
First a manager 
(mixed) 
Doctor and 
manager 
First a doctor 
(mixed) 
Doctor 
(purified) 
Role Pure 
physician 
manager  
Satisficer Broker Satisficer 
 
Frontline 
physician 
manager  
Action/attitude Hegemony Co-optation 
(soft bureaucracy) 
Negotiation Strategic Adaptation                 
(soft autonomy) 
Resistance 
In the following sections, we will examine identity conflicts in each dimension and explore 
how different values worked together to create two forms of hybridity among pure and 
frontline managers.     
7.2.1. Reasons and paths of moving into the management (Q1a) 
Mixed identity work does not influence two groups of physician managers uniformly. 
Regarding their motivation for moving into management, pure managers were a relatively 
homogenous group with organizational beliefs that saw the move as something meaningful, 
while frontline managers were less exposed to the influence of managerialism, with roughly 
half of them preserving a professional identity undermining that move and another half 
turning into the opposite type (see Table 17; please refer to Tables 10 and 11 for the coding 
schemes we are using in Tables 17 to 22).  
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Table 17  Codified transcripts: reasons and paths of moving into management  
Post Identity  
Professional  
 
Organizational 
Pure M I (1), (2) W (4); O (2b) 
 O  W (1b), (3), (4), (6); O (2c) 
 O  W (2); O (2c) 
 O  W (3), (4) 
 O I (1), (3) W (2); O (2b), (2c), (6) 
 M I (2) W (1b); O (2c) 
 O I (1), (2) W (1a), (1b); O (2b), (2c) 
Frontline P I (1), (2), (3); P (2b)   
 O  W (1b), (1c)  
 O I (3) W (1a), (1b), (1c), (2), (3), (4) 
 P I (3)  
 O  W (1a), (1b), (3); O (2c) 
 P I (2)  
 M I (3) W (4) 
 P I (3)   
 
Those organizational values held by frontline managers in the interviews include: 
W (1b)  Positive experience in management work   
• Initially it was just a taste of management as a clinician to work on some of the areas 
which are related to my own specialty. Gradually with the building up of the relation 
and the experience in building infrastructure of various issues related to service 
provision, I become interested in the whole area of the hospital administration as 
well.  (Doctor D, Consultant; CCC)  
• By chance I was involved in the work and I find it quite interesting. So I carried on. 
(Doctor G, Consultant; CSC) 
W (4)  Influence and challenge unrealistic and outdated professional mentalities and 
practices 
• It's actually at that time the department was also facing a manpower shortage 
problem. And there were some senior clinical staff did not do much clinical work. 
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So after I took up the management role, I had to put the things right again. (Doctor 
M, COS) 
• I saw quite a lot of things that need to be improved. When I talked to people, they 
would say that “you bother about your own area. We don't want you to get into ours”. 
But this job in quality and safety it gives me the responsibility - not the rights but the 
responsibility - to look after these things.  (Doctor G, Consultant; CSC) 
O (2c)  Management as an alternative to practicing medicine  
• That will be more meaningful….by your own pair of hands you can only do a little, 
but you can let people do it equally well or even better…Apart from providing the 
critical service we have also to organize or to formulate some of the system to make 
sure that our services are being provided efficiently and being evaluated. (Doctor I, 
Consultant; CSC) 
While taking management as an incidental part of a senior physician’s role, some frontline 
managers were encouraged by their early positive experience in management work or inter-
professional working and decided to stay in the management post. Becoming “interested” is 
their common verbiage. They showed much less reluctance to the manager role than those 
frontline managers who thought management as uninteresting or not what a doctor should 
do with their time. Some frontline managers might find the meaning in the management post 
as an alternative way to serve patients with system improvement such as better evaluation 
and efficiency. They did not see the manager role as merely a passive obligation or a burden.              
Similar to pure managers, some frontline managers became somewhat sceptical towards 
unrealistic and outdated professional beliefs and practices. Still motivated by kind of sense 
of responsibility to their immediate clinical units, they saw the need to “put the things right 
again”. Yet, for them the management problems in the department or hospital arose from the 
professionals themselves instead of unreasonable policies in the organization, such as 
“senior clinical staff did not do much clinical work” and the territorialism that protected 
professionals from scrutiny by peers on what needed to be improved. Such kind of 
motivation as a proactive obligation is combined with the managerial idea to regulate 
medicine, and should be considered as “co-optation” by the state rather than “strategic 
adaptation” that aims to protect professionalism (Numerato et al., 2012).  
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7.2.2. Experiences and struggles in the transition from a clinician to manager role (Q1b) 
Associated with the positive motivations, some frontline managers also experienced a 
relatively gratifying transition to a manager role. Those organization-compatible narratives 
include:  
O (2b)  Management as something challenging  
• I think it is a challenge and it's quite a lot of work to move from a more or less a pure 
clinician to somebody who has to manage a department. But I think it's quite unique 
for me...yea not everybody could go for that. (Doctor G, Consultant; CSC)  
• I will see that as a challenge. There are gains and losses. You gain exposures to 
different kinds of roles and skills that you can learn from, but you also give up your 
family time.  (Doctor H, COS; Original transcript was in Cantonese)   
W (1c)  Positive experience in inter-professional working     
• In medical school we had never been taught about what management is. It was really 
eye-opening in the sense that when you met various people and saw things you would 
never see if you were in ward. (Doctor D, Consultant; CCC) 
• So with the exposure I understand it's not just like having meetings and things like 
that...If you want to deliver the service, actually you understand it is not just 
clinicians, not only to clinical staff, but you also need to build up the whole 
infrastructure for that therefore you have to meet various people and 
management…basically is to liaise all these together and manage things well. 
(Doctor I; Consultant; CSC) 
O (3)  Frontline doctors are insulated                                     
• At the end we management see the big picture…I know it is very harsh to you 
(frontline doctors), but I cannot inject additional resources to your team. It can’t be 
done because we know the whole story is not that simple...as I know the constraints. 
(Doctor K, COS; original transcript was in Cantonese)   
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• So you start to have a macro picture of the healthcare system - clinicians look after 
patients as individuals, get the patients back to recovery, to work and the society. 
However, the manager role focuses on the bigger picture, for example, to utilize 
resources, to make decision looking at the macro picture, the waiting list, waiting 
time, cost effectiveness… (Doctor O, COS) 
They saw the management role as an empowerment process conferring them unique 
experience and skills, as well as the chance to venture to the wider world outside the clinical 
field. “Challenging” and “meeting various people” were common positive comments they 
gave on their experience in the transition to a manager role. Some of them noted about the 
management perspective of healthcare in “the whole story” or “bigger picture” that frontline 
doctors do not know. Mentioning also the negative experience in the transition as being 
“squeezed” by meetings and administrative duties, they might not be fully aligning 
themselves to the manager role, while they showed a consciousness about managerial 
concepts such as waiting list, waiting time, cost effectiveness, and a more understanding 
attitude towards management seeing it as necessary. 
Noticeably, while pure managers were generally more organization-compatible and 
struggled less when moving into the manager role, some of them felt the need to maintain 
clinician work. As two pure managers reported in their questionnaire, between 0 to 5% of 
their time was preserved for clinical work although they were in full-time management posts:  
• I don't see patients in the sense of consultation. I see patients, greeting them, just to 
say hello to them. I think if your colleagues see you in the frontline or wards walking 
around, they will appreciate that…I have to be seen to be in the frontline, not just 
hiding in the office doing administrative paperwork… (Doctor A, HCE)   
• I usually participate in the handover sessions where doctors handover the ward and 
the patients to another team between the shifts… This is to deliver a message to the 
front-line: I would like to know about the clinical field and I actually know about it.’ 
(Doctor N, HCE) 
Certainly, maintaining clinical contact is a kind of Participatory Ritual (O9) as the amount 
of time pure managers spend is too small to be seen as clinical practice in any real sense, 
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and it was intentionally used as a strategy to maintain their authority over frontline doctors. 
Yet, such practice was also due to their clinician-self:   
• I enjoy very much the clinical work actually even now; because I had been working 
in the frontline seeing patients for 20 years before moving to management. I went 
down to give them a hand; I came down to see some of my friends, if they wanted 
to see me and get my medical professional advices. (Doctor A, HCE) 
• It is somewhere I can know about what’s actually happing in the hospital as a 
clinician…I see it as part of my advance incident reporting system. In the medical 
circle, you will easily know about one’s reputation of his or her clinical competence 
if you are in the field...if you know who constantly underperforms or makes some 
mistakes, you may be able to prevent medical incidents. (Doctor N, HCE)   
Attachment to the clinical field was a way that pure managers maintained symbolic 
assurance of their membership in the medicine community, i.e. being seen as a clinician by 
clinicians, as well as their contact with their professional peers who might also be closely 
connected in their social circle. In addition, those pure managers saw true understanding of 
frontline doctors’ clinical competence in the field as a prerequisite for a competent physician 
manager to manage doctors. Influencing professional activities through inter-personal 
contact and informal discussion and in daily clinical unit meetings, pure managers used 
institutionalized modes of professional communication (I7) based on peer reviews instead of 
formal management procedures. Although pure managers finally gave up clinical work for 
their manager role seeing management work as more meaningful or an alternative way to 
practice medicine, they were still constrained by their clinician role or the norms in the 
professional circle. We will discuss this dimension of pure managers’ identity work in detail 
in the section on their interaction with medical professionals (Q2b).   
In summary, conflicts in pure managers’ and frontline managers’ identity work created two 
quite different forms of hybridization. Although still aligned with their professional peers in 
their beliefs and values, some frontline managers were bought into  managerial ideas of the 
necessity for management in clinical activities; some pure managers, on the other hand were 
constrained by the clan model of professional governance based on informal communication 
in the clinical field. They also felt the need to reconcile their manager clinician role by 
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attachment to the clinical field, as well as to be seen as a clinician by clinicians in order to 
maintain authority. By those two moves, frontline managers were aligning with the 
management and pure managers were aligning with the frontline.   
 
Table 18  Codified transcripts: the transition to management  
Post Identity  
Professional  
 
Organizational 
Pure O I (7) O (2c), (7), (9); W (1b), (4) 
 O  W (1c), (3); O (6) 
 O  O (2b); W (1b) 
 O  W (3), (8); O (2c) 
 O  O (2b) 
 O P (4a) O (2c) 
 O I (7) W (1b); O (9) 
Frontline P P (6); I (4)   
 O  W (1b), (1c) 
 M P (6); I (4), (7) W (4), (6); O (2b) 
 M P (2b) O (2b) 
 O P (2c) W (3); O (2c) 
 M P (2c) O (1b); O (3) 
 P I (2)  
 M P (2b); I (5) O (3) 
7.2.3. Interaction with non-medical administrators in the manager role (Q2a) 
Although frontline managers were generally less welcome to non-medical administrators, 
some of them expressed a managerial attitude recognizing management as an integral part 
of hospital activities or expertise as valid as medicine. Examples of those organization-
compatible narratives given by frontline managers are:  
O (4a)  Buying in  
People would perceive the Head Office as a controller...actually they do have a process 
before they are deliberated, before they come out… Because I am the chairman of the COC, 
I can have some influences… (Doctor C, COS; CCC)   
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O (2b) Management is worth-learning  
So you can have more chances to talk to other people. It helps you to know more and learn 
more. In terms of the manager or administrative role, I would consider myself as very junior 
- junior means not only the rank but also about the knowledge level. I think I'm just like a 
kindergarten or a student level, so I really love to learn from all of them. (Doctor I, 
Consultant; CSC)  
O (2d)  Management is professional or necessary in medicine  
I don't think that doctors are the most important people in the hospital… different people 
are actually taking different responsibilities.…for example, operating theatre - it's not 
something that a doctor can know; everything is actually beyond what a doctor can do.  
(Doctor D, Consultant; CCC) 
W (1c)  Formative identity work involving inter-professional working 
• I used to have a good working relationship with them. I learnt the experience of how 
to package my ideas in administrative terms, something convincing, to be more 
likely to get the support. So after I took up the present position, I got a lot of support 
from them. (Doctor M, COS) 
• You’re very frustrated, and you thought your colleagues (同事) with non-medical 
background were antagonistic, which at the end are some misunderstandings. When 
years go by, when you get into the system and understand how the system runs, you 
will know their constraints and you can give them very good advices. (Doctor K, 
COS; original transcript was in Cantonese) 
Being engaged in the decision making process, some frontline managers thought that they 
could exercise their influence. As a result, they were being more aligned to the 
management’s policy and did not perceive the HA Head Office as a “controller” as many 
frontline professional peers would do. They also rethought the perception they once had of 
non-medical administrators as antagonistic outsiders. Being within the system for years, they 
established a collaborative relation with their “colleagues” from a non-medical background. 
In such a collaborative relation, a manager mind-set was not seen as what a physician 
manager should avoid. Rather, it should be acquired by physician managers in order to gain 
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support from non-medical administrators for their work. Some of them even admitted that 
doctors themselves might not be the most important people as management expertise was 
beyond the scope of knowledge a doctor would have. With those organization-compatible 
beliefs being combined with the clinician-self, some frontline managers’ professional 
identity was blurred.     
While physician managers’ buy-in for management in healthcare does not imply the decline 
of medical power as management duties still go to the medical professionals themselves, 
internalizing management values could run them a risk of being “governmentalized” (Flynn, 
2002). If frontline managers, as shown in our sample, were becoming less resistant to 
management in clinical activities as pure managers, the rank-and-file doctors’ defence 
against pure managers’ efforts to rationalize their labour process would be softened up, 
leaving it further exposed to monitoring regimes under managerialism. In this connection, 
management policies in the HA were expected to be implemented more smoothly with some 
satisficing frontline managers being more co-operative and understanding, if not giving up 
their obligation for frontline professional peers fully. We will discuss those impacts in detail 
later in the section of physician managers’ handling of management policies in the 
organization (Q3).  
In summary, in the interaction with non-medical administrators, satisficing frontline 
managers demonstrated significant managerial influences in their identity work aligning 
them to the senior management. Taken together with their overall positive comments on the 
status quo of the HA’s governance as shown in the last chapter (fairness of its treatment of 
physician and communication in policy making in Q2c), the HA has successfully co-opted 
frontline managers into the establishment in view of softening resistance from the frontline.  
Yet, one should also notice that the most common organization-compatible value that some 
frontline managers shared with pure managers was a formative identity work involving inter-
professional working (W1c) that mainly referred to the awareness of other actors or the 
management perspective in healthcare governance. Explicit support for the idea of 
challenging doctors’ indeterminacy however was rarely found among frontline managers. 
Compared to pure managers’ tight embrace, frontline managers’ acceptance of management 
in healthcare, if any, was rather passive and moderate.     
 
 
234 
 
Table 19 Codified transcripts: interaction with mon-medical managers  
Post Identity  
Professional  
 
Organizational 
Pure O  W (1b), (1c) 
 O   
 O  O (2d) 
 O  W (1b), (1c); O (2c), (2d), (12) 
 O P (1d) W(1b), (1c); O (2b), (2d)   
 O P (2c) O (2d) 
 O 
 
W (1c); O (2d), (2b) 
Frontline O P (4) W (1b), (1c); O (2a), (4a) 
 P P (2d)  
 P I (5); P (2d), (2c) W (1c) 
 P I (4); P (2d) W (1c) 
 O  O (2b), (2d) 
 P P (2d) W (1c) 
 O  W (1c) 
 P P (8), (2d), (2c)  
7.2.4. Interaction with medical professionals in the manager role (Q2b) 
While frontline managers’ clinician-self was shadowed by the cloud of managerial 
influences, it was still intact in their interaction with professional peers in terms of acting as 
doctors’ advocates and lobbyists. Being more engaged with the management, they could also 
use their manager role to represent their professional peers in decision making and protect 
professionalism. As shown in the last chapter, they general did so. Therefore, one could also 
argue that management policies in the HA was justified with professionals’ participation in 
the decision making process. After all, frontline managers as a whole did not identify 
themselves as rationalizers of medicine but some of them expressed a higher acceptance of 
management work in the clinical field.  
On the other hand, most pure managers were also undergoing another form of hybridization 
curtailing their manager role and aligning them to professionalism. While pure managers 
generally expressed the organization-compatible belief in the necessity for tighter regulation 
of medical professionals, most of them were not totally free from the influence of 
professionalism but constrained by the collective professional identity and culture, such as 
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flat relations between professional peers, “wearing a clinician hat” with clinician language 
and informal professional network, as well as respect for individual clinician’s autonomy 
and indeterminacy. Those profession-compatible beliefs or actions found among some pure 
managers include:   
I (9)  Maintaining a flat intra-professional relation  
• We should be able to partner together… the basic component is number one, mutual 
respect…second…trust. You need to look from my angle, and vice versa…achieve 
a situation where we agree to disagree.  (Doctor E, CCE)  
• You have to cautiously avoid using your authority even though you have it…If you 
are imposing your authority over others, you lose the chance to learn, and you lose 
the chance to do an open and fair deliberation for the decision…In general, doctors 
are all intelligent people. All their arguments are reasonable in some sense...So if 
you are top-down they won’t be convinced and you can’t manage at all.  (Doctor J, 
HCE; original transcript was in Cantonese)         
P (3b)  Frontline doctors should be left alone to do their jobs 
• Health care providers are intelligent people with specialized expertise. They don't 
need people to guide them. What they need is a facilitating environment to do what 
they consider as professionally appropriate.  (Doctor E, CCE) 
• I always tell them (frontline doctors) if the statistics doesn’t look good, it doesn’t 
matter as long as they can explain to me. Rather, the most important thing is that 
every patient is getting a good care. Sometimes they should even forget about the 
protocols and use their discretion to cater for the patients’ special needs.   (Doctor N, 
HCE) 
I (7) Using institutionalized modes of professional communication  
• Actually I have a lot of clinical experiences, and also in my clinical days I can 
proudly say I was not a bad clinician. They have some respect for my clinical 
background and knowledge...So when we deal with difficult situations, I will speak 
in their languages and then I will discuss some clinical scenarios that they have also 
experienced...So I will say “we” – we experienced these conditions. So you will see 
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me as very compassionate or understanding the situation. They will see me as one 
of them.  (Doctor L, HCE) 
• In the daily hospital operation, do you think doctors are taking orders from HCE? 
They aren’t! If you are a surgeon, you listen to the head of Surgery Department...If 
you are not good at working with your hands, how will they listen to you? So if you 
have to get doctors in line with the whole hospital’s operation, department heads are 
the key. So it won’t work at all if you are top-down but you always have to discuss 
and manage, delivering you message through the department heads. (Doctor J, HCE, 
original transcript was in Cantonese) 
While pure managers saw themselves as the representatives of the organization as shown in 
the last chapter, they stressed in the interviews their flat intra-professional relations with 
frontline doctors. “Partnership”, “mutual respect” and “communication” were their common 
verbiages. In the interaction with frontline medical professionals, who they saw as intelligent 
professionals as well, they consciously avoided “top-down” or “authority” conferred to them 
in the management post. Medical professionals were not seen as subordinates who only took 
order from their boss but respected as professional peers who pure managers had to convince 
before they managed.     
The core of flat professional relations is the respect for individual physician’s autonomy or 
intermediacy. Doctor E’s (CCE) ambiguity in his/her comments on clinical autonomy is an 
interesting example. On the one hand, as discussed in the last chapter, he/she thought that 
doctor’s productivity needed to be measured in view of the accountability for the public 
money they spent. On the other hand, he/she suggested that doctors did not need any guide 
and shall be left alone to do “what they consider as professionally appropriate”. Also, for 
Doctor N (HCE), doctors could override protocols to cater for patients’ special needs, and 
statistics of clinical activities could be ignored sometimes. Tolerance to frontline doctors’ 
indeterminacy might only be given at pure managers’ discretion, limited to those that can be 
explained to pure managers or did not have any significant impact on budget or cost-
efficiency which was pure managers’ major concern. Yet, in reality pure managers could 
hardly micro-manage in the clinical field and the technical aspect of clinical governance was 
often controlled by frontline managers. 
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As Doctor J (HCE) explained in the interview, delegating power to department heads was a 
common strategy employed by pure managers to manage the frontline. In the every-day 
governance of a hospital, HCE did not manage through the organizational hierarchy at all. 
A crucial point here is that COSs were not only a manager in the organizational hierarchy 
but also the clinical supervisor in the institutional hierarchy who could share the legal 
liability for individual frontline doctors’ clinical decisions. Compared to pure managers who 
had already detached from the clinical field, they had more professional authority over and 
consent from frontline doctors in coordinating clinical activities. The clan mode of 
professional governance therefore was more prominent than the bureaucratic one in a 
healthcare organization (Wilkins and Ouchi, 1983) like the HA. This also explains why 
frontline managers were so powerful in rejecting the senior management’s request in some 
occasions as shown in the last chapter.  
As Doctor J went further to elaborate, in the early stage of decision making process in a 
hospital, messages were delivered through the professional network instead of a top-down 
mode. In such an institutionalized mode of professional communication, pure managers had 
to “wear a clinician hat”. In addition to the participatory rituals of symbolic contact to 
clinical activities as shown in the previous section, pure managers like Doctor L (HCE) were 
also using the clinician language, such as discussing clinical scenarios “we” have 
experienced in view of that “they will see me as one of them”. Due to frontline doctors’ 
expectation for pure managers to be clinically competent, although in a senior management 
position, Doctor L was still under pressure to prove his/herself with past clinical experiences 
and the reputation about his/her clinical days as “not a bad clinician clinical”. Being seen as 
a clinician by clinicians and adhering to the norms of the medicine community was still 
important for pure mangers to gain authority over the frontline.  
As a result, pure mangers’ management behaviors were also constrained to a profession-
compatible mode. In the previous section, we have also discussed how pure managers 
managed clinical activities by informal discussion with professional peers and chairing 
clinical unit meetings. Those institutionalized modes of professional communication were 
based on peer reviews and interpersonal contact, adhering to the professional norms instead 
of the organizational one that based on formal procedure. Taking all these together with 
some pure managers’ overpassing clinical protocols or performance data to accommodate 
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individual physicians’ clinical autonomy and indeterminacy, whether managerialism in 
healthcare has brought substantial changes to the traditional mode of daily clinical 
governance is still contentious.    
But was the institutional force of professionalism strong enough to further drive those pure 
managers to identify themselves and act as doctors’ “advocates” and “lobbyists” as most 
frontline managers did?  In our sample, we had a pure manager who clearly did so.  
P (1a)  Physician managers are doctors’ “advocates” and “protectors” 
You have to understand their difficulties and recognize their problems that they are facing 
so that you can do something for them. I think they do have an expectation for me to do 
something in the management. And it is also my wish to be more understanding about the 
doctors with the help of my medical background. (Doctor N, HCE) 
P (1b)  Physician managers are doctors’ “communicators” and “lobbyists” 
I helped the hospital to handle the questionings of the top management and bargain enough 
resources for its reconstruction…At that time I found that the data actually suggest that the 
hospital was not spending too much but was too effective. I showed to the accountants at 
the Head Office that we discharged patients much earlier than other hospital. They are quite 
objective numbers that explain why our unit costs is so high…This is a very telling example 
of how I can help the doctors in my management position. (Doctor N, HCE) 
Rather than using the Rationality Strategy (O9) to counter-challenge doctors’ objection as 
some other pure managers would do, Doctor N used the statistics he/she got in the 
management position to handle the questionings of the top management and bargained 
enough resources for the reconstruction of the hospital he/she served.  He/she also expressed 
a clear stand in supporting professional peers, unlike many pure managers who identified 
themselves as presenting the management, or first management then the profession.  
Yet, evidence from the codified transcripts suggests that most common profession-
compatible values that pure managers shared with frontline managers was limited to a flat 
intra-professional relation (I9) and institutionalized mode of professional communication 
(I7). In the absence of a resilient clinician-self, a strategic use of “the clinician hat” was used 
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by most pure managers to buffer resentment from the frontline to managerialism. As Doctor 
A (HCE) explained in the interview:  
I don't want to be seen to be pushing doctors to do something, or to stretch them too much 
to exceed the limits...You push them too much, you will suffer. They are very powerful 
now.   
Compared to frontline managers’ enthusiasm, pure managers’ alignment to the clinician role 
was rather impassive and moderate. After all, pure managers as a whole identified 
themselves as rationalizers of medicine but most of them were taking a moderate stand as 
they were constrained by the institutionalized mode of collective self-governance.       
Table 20  Codified transcripts: interaction with medical professionals  
Post Identity 
 
 
Professional 
 
Organizational 
Pure M P (1a); I (9) O (8) 
 O 
 
O (2c), (5) 
 O I (9), P (3b) O (1b), (8), (3); W (4), (10) 
 O I (9) W (5); O (8), (2d) 
 O I (9), (7) O (1b), (3); W (3), (5) 
 M I (7) W (5) 
 M I (7); P (1a), (1b) O (3); W (5), (10) 
Frontline P P (1a), (3); I (4), (9)  
 P I (4), (9); P (4b), (8)  W (5), (10) 
 M I (7), (9) O (3) 
 P I (7); P (5), (1a)  
 M I (9); P (1a) W (10); (O9) 
 O  W (10) 
 M I (9), (7); P (3b) O (3), O (8) 
 P I (4), (8), (9) O (1b) 
7.2.5. Attitudes and actions toward management measures or policies (Q3) 
In the previous sections, we have examined the physician managers’ mixed identity work in 
terms of how they constructed the manager-self and enacted the manager role in relation to 
non-medical administrators and medical professionals. As shown, some frontline and pure 
managers were taking a relatively moderate stand in enacting their roles of rationalizers or 
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advocates of medicine. At the end, what is the impact of conflicting identity work on those 
“satisficers” handling of the organization’s management measures or policies?     
In our sample, physician managers did express mixed attitudes towards the organization’s 
management measures or policies. Many pure managers, while appreciating the high cost-
efficiency in the current HA system, doubted whether it should go further to squeeze the 
frontline. Many frontline managers, however, were bought into some management policies 
and expressed their understanding towards the Head Office. Taken together, both 
“satisficing” frontline and pure managers were conscious of each other’s interests and 
perspectives. 
Table 21 Codified transcripts: attitudes and actions towards management and policies 
Post Identity 
 
 
Professional 
 
Organizational 
Pure M I (9) W (3) 
 X   
 O P (1a) W (6), O (8) 
 M I (4) P (2a) 
 M P (3a) W (5) 
 O P (3a); W (6); O (10) 
 M P (3a); I (5)  (O9) 
Frontline P P (10), (2b), (I4) O (4a) 
 P P (1a); (4b); I (9)  
 M P (8) O (2a), (2d) 
 P I (5), (6)  
 M I (6) O (2a) 
 O  O (3), (2a); W (4) 
 M I (5), (4) O (2a) 
 P I (4); P (7)  
Organization-compatible narratives given by frontline managers include:  
O (2a)  Management is a legitimate means of control over other doctors  
• The HA is actually maturing... increasingly I see more and more systems are coming 
out…. increasingly I can say “okay, that may not be a bad thing”. Of course, I have 
to accept their limitations…I see myself a member in the Head Office to help 
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them…The HA got a lot of good intentions. It's their job to improve the system. 
That's why when they have a policy I will take part in the discussion of police. At 
the end of course I will implement the policy.  (Doctor C, COS; CCC) 
• At the end when what we call tracing the data, it is actually very understanding about 
the constraints that make clinical output not actually as expected. In fact, there are 
no consequences as long as the outcomes are explainable. In fact, the Hospital 
Authority fully understands that many of our staffs are over-working...So the HA 
wouldn’t ask for an unreasonable productivity. (Doctor K, COS; original transcript 
was in Cantonese) 
• Accreditation is like your home - you want to tidy up your home from time to time 
especially when some people are coming to visit your home. Although there could 
be some gaps, that's exactly why this is good to have some people telling you where 
your gaps are. And then you want to be improved.   (Doctor I, Consultant; CSC) 
O (4a)  Buying in  
• I always have to defend the policy from time to time. To me I think this is good for 
the service and for the patients. I don't want to see the patients waiting in the A&E 
for us while we have a good sleep in our home. I have to tell them it is a good practice, 
and it is good for patients and a very good experience for doctors as well. They won't 
have this experience if they're not working in this hospital.  (Doctor M, COS)  
• All these changes they must be for something good. They have to be. Why do I want 
to increase productivity? Because patients are out there they need the treatment and 
they're waiting already, isn't it? (Doctor G, Consultant; CSC) 
While sticking to their clinician identity, some frontline managers were at the same time 
exposed to managerial influence as they were also the executors of the policies. They tried 
to reconcile the conflicts in their dual role by justifying some management policies with 
desirable goals for clinicians such as patients’ interests and upholding professional standards.  
Doctor C (COS; CCC), who claimed that he/she would and did “say no to the HA” on 
unreasonable policies as shown in the last chapter, at the same time expressed a gradual 
alignment with the senior management after years of engagement in management work, 
seeing himself as “a member of the Head Office” and systems as “may not be a bad thing”. 
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Out of a resilient clinician-self and “social creativity strategy” (Forbes and Hallier, 2006), 
Doctor C’s reasons for taking part in the policy formulation was still “to help them” and 
having influence in the policies that he/she would have to implement in the future. Yet, their 
manager-role as the executors of the policies had curtailed the clinician-self from objecting 
to the policies. To reconcile the manager role to the clinician-self, some frontline managers 
avoided a radical stand of opposition but justified the policies in the HA as generally 
reasonable. For Doctor K (COS), the frontline’s complaints about long working hours were 
not “true” or “the general situation” as “the Hospital Authority fully understands that many 
of our staff are over-working” and it “wouldn’t ask for an unreasonable productivity”. 
Moreover, some frontline managers internalized the managerial values seeing management 
as something normal and wanted by professionals in view of improving the service. As 
Doctor I (Consultant; CSC) analogized, accreditation programs were not a coercive external 
requirement but something professionals shall follow to uphold the professional standards 
and goals. Similar to tidying up one’s home, it should be done no matter whether someone 
is visiting or not.   
Frontline managers did not only internalize those managerial values but also tried to 
influence their frontline peers. Acting as a manager, they had the responsibility to implement 
and thus defend an unpopular policy in the hospital to extend the department’s night shift to 
support A&E. For example, Doctor M (COS) persuaded doctors in the department on the 
ground that the policy was “good for the service and the patients”. As shown in the last 
chapter, Doctor M had also rejected the Head Office’s requirement for the department to 
increase caseload at the expense of a shortened consultation time. So was it subject to 
frontline managers’ own judgement on whether the policy met the professional goals? In 
Doctor M’s own words, frontline managers had to “defend the policy from time to time”. In 
the occasions where frontline managers had to implement unpopular policies that did not 
meet professional goals or interest, appeals to professional values seemed to be the only 
option for them to convince themselves and their professional peers. In the same way, for 
Doctor G (Consultant; CSC), who thought “all changes must be for something good”, 
increasing productivity was explained as a professional goal because “patients are out there 
they need the treatment and they’re waiting already”. Noticeably, Doctor G had also claimed 
in the interview that he/she “usually” did not stand behind the HA.     
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Similar to pure managers, frontline managers used patients’ interest to justify the managerial 
values of productivity. Yet, compared to pure managers, frontline managers were even more 
conflicted with justifying management policies alongside professional goals. As shown in 
the last chapter, for pure managers, the managerial values that saw management work as 
legitimate means of control over doctors (O2a) was combined with their role use as 
regulating and auditing professionalism, challenging indeterminacy and poor professional 
practice (W6). While pure managers would also justify their management work as an 
alternative to practice medicine, it was not necessary for them to appeal to professional goals 
in every part of their manager work. In pure managers’ narratives, professionalism at the 
same time could also be a sectoral interest jeopardizing the public interest in terms of 
accountability for the public money or population-level performance targets, i.e. cost-
efficiency, access, standards and waiting time. Management therefore in itself was legitimate 
as to regulate professionalism. For pure managers who frankly identified themselves as 
rationalizers of medicine, complementing professionalism or the clinician-self in the 
manager role was not a necessity, while it was a permanent headache for frontline managers.    
On the other hand, pure managers were not totally free from the influence of professionalism. 
While pure managers felt less pressured to align themselves with their role as the doctors’ 
advocates, when they were asked about whether they would stand behind the HA’ policies 
that would affect frontline doctors’ working conditions, a common answer was surprisingly 
to stress that the HK healthcare system had already been the most cost-efficient one, instead 
of fully standing behind the HA: 
P (3a)  Doctors are doing the best they can 
• The finance people tend to have a scarcity mind-set that is to use limited resources 
to meet unlimited demands. In relation to cost-efficiency, there was a Bloomberg’s 
global report on the world’s healthcare systems’ performance and Hong Kong was 
ranked the first. We are only spending 5% of our GDP in healthcare while achieving 
almost the highest life expectancy. But you have to strike a balance as safety and 
quality of care is more important than those targets. So I always tell my staff it 
doesn’t matter if you cannot meet all of them. (Doctor N, HCE) 
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• Before you talk about efficiency, you have to know that Hong Kong is actually the 
most efficient healthcare system in the world. It is always right to pursue efficiency 
and improvements, while you have to know that what our colleagues are doing is 
already the most efficient healthcare system in the world! Lacking this background 
knowledge, you will fail in the management work.  (Doctor J, HCE; original 
transcript was in Cantonese) 
Although no pure mangers went further to denounce the HA’s policies or claimed to be not 
standing behind the HA, some of them did emphasize that physician managers shall be aware 
of the danger of over-driving frontline doctors. It is not surprising if one also appreciates the 
constraints they had in the clan mode of every-day clinical governance. In the face of 
frontline managers who had a solid power base in the clinical field, using administrative 
authority to implement policies would probably fail. So what did pure managers actually do 
in handling conflicts arose between the profession and organization over management 
measures or policies? As revealed in the interviews, pure managers did compromise their 
manager role by taking a brokering role and negotiating strategies that buffered the disputes. 
In the next section, we shall discuss that in detail.         
7.3. Brokering role and negotiating strategies   
In the previous sections, we have discussed how the two groups of physician managers were 
aware of and rationalizing the other half of their identity. In the handling of disputes between 
the profession and organization over management policies, some frontline managers did 
object to the senior management and stand behind the frontline, while in the common 
occasions they had to execute and defend those policies and justify them as meeting 
professional goals. For pure managers, while they were less conflicted in reconciling their 
manager-self and clinician-self, they were still constrained by the clan mode of professional 
governance and the norms or expectations for a clinician. So when the management policies 
and professional goals were difficult to reconcile or very unpopular with the frontline, what 
would be the last resort for physician managers to avoid direct confrontation?  
In our interviews, to protect their dual role from direct identity conflicts, some physician 
managers were consciously escape from the dichotomy as “frontline vs. management” by a 
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brokering role and negotiating strategies. As shown in our codified transcripts, physician 
managers had intra- and inter- dimensional inconsistent identity work. Such inconsistency 
had led to contradictory attitudes and management behaviours and put physician managers 
in a potentially embarrassing position of failing both their professional and organizational 
obligations. To avoid identity conflicts, some physician managers repositioned themselves 
as neither representing the profession nor organization. They “satisficed” by balancing the 
expectations of two parties in policy making or implementation, or sought to avoid being 
embraced in the disputes and were merely middleman.    
Those negotiating strategies that did not fall into the two types of physician managers’ 
identity include:  
 
Not aligning fully with one side 
• It really depends…I have to understand how doctors work in a frontline setting. As 
a doctor you should also know where the sore points are - when they refuse and reject 
something, when they say no to someone, you have to really understand whether it 
is really a “real no” or not. If you understand how they play their tricks, you can 
counteract the objections…When I am dealing with non-medical professionals, I 
also look things from the perspective of non-medical administrators. And of course 
I will explain to them... I will let them see, I will put them into a clinician’s shoe. 
(Doctor L, HCE)  
• I would be just loyal to my patients and the community…but I think it's still 
manageable to maintain the role and try to make them understand that even the 
manager and the so-called front-line are not each other’s enemy. They're actually 
trying to collaborate and trying to serve the same purpose, but just in different roles 
or different perspectives…  (Doctor I, Consultant; CSC) 
Acting as a bridge/ middleman/ messenger/ translator/ communicator  
• I don't want to get involved in those direct conflicts with my colleagues! Ha-
ha...When they have conflicts or differences in opinions, I will try to offer a platform 
for the two sides to communicate, to know each other's position, but not necessarily 
to convince the other party. This is the task I have to do as a communicator to let all 
the parties know the whole picture…not just the picture they are seeing now… 
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I would not say that I'm fighting for them (frontline doctors). I would try to convince 
the people upstairs...There are also administrators above me who want me to help 
them, just like the frontline doctors who want me to help them. I will try something 
in the middle…As a middleman, I will try to convey as a bridge. Sometimes, and 
actually many times, I would say the Head Office would listen. They don’t really 
want to be in an argument with the frontline.   (Doctor A, HCE)   
• Co-workers who are from a pure management background don’t understand clinical 
department’s needs because they don’t have a medical background. They have no 
idea of what’s happening. In the same way, clinical staff don’t understand 
administrators and their considerations. They only express their thoughts in their 
own language and it is not going to work. Our most important role is to bridge the 
two parties by converting the frontline’s needs into a reasonable demand in the 
management perspective. Yet, the final decision is the senior management’s 
responsibility. (Doctor K, COS; original transcript was in Cantonese)                                                               
• So how can you align all the things and reach some consensus? Despite those 
differences, we all want to get the job done instead of giving up. So the key is 
alignment… If you are not a clinician, the problem is that you don't have the ability 
to discuss with a doctor... Yet not every doctor knows how to translate the clinical 
knowledge into another language. Just like you need a translator when you are 
speaking different languages... (Doctor F, Manager at HAHO; original transcript was 
in Cantonese)          
Loose coupling  
There must be someone in the Head Office to make the policy. So what I can do is to follow 
it as possible…For those policies that are very important, of course they will do some 
consultation. But for most guidelines or policies, you just have the documents from the 
Head Office. And you have to judge whether it is important and which part is relevant. For 
example, there is a hundred-page long guideline for injecting vaccines. Who will actually 
look into it?  You look to your colleagues and see what the common practice is in the 
hospital. (Doctor H; COS; original transcript was in Cantonese)                                        
Many physician managers refused to give a definite answer to the question of whether they 
would stand behind the frontline or the organization when disputes arose over management 
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policies. Some claimed to act as both the “rationalizer of medicine” and “protector of 
doctors”. On the one hand, they could use their clinician role as an asset to help the 
management counteract frontline doctors’ objections by spotting the “sore points”. On the 
other hand, they could also use their clinician role to represent or protect professionalism by 
putting management into “a clinician’s shoes”. Therefore, they took sides based on their own 
judgement of a particular policy instead of their stand as a manager or a doctor. Some other 
physician managers claimed to devote their loyalty to patients and the community. They 
tried to reconcile the managers and the frontline by preaching that both parties were not each 
other’s enemies and positioned themselves as the referees who represented the wider public 
interest. Such medical professional’s self-positioning has been conceptualized by Sullivan 
(2000) as “civic professionalism”, a third type opposed to the “collective mobility project in 
guild monopoly” and “scientific and technological rationalization” (p. 674). Other than 
acting as rationalizers or on behalf of sectoral interest, some physician managers did attempt 
to not identify themselves with the dichotomized identities of profession vs organization but 
instead to identify with their patients and the community.  
To get rid of the conflicts between the management and frontline, a common strategy 
adopted by physician managers was to act as a bridge/ middleman/ messenger/ translator/ 
communicator between both parties. They did not claim to be the advocates of one side as 
they thought they had the same obligation for both parties. Instead, they claimed to “try 
something in the middle” and positioned physician managers as the “middleman”, or even 
an object, a “platform”, for both parties to see the whole picture from each other’s 
perspectives. Translator was another analogy some physician managers used to define 
themselves as aligning both the frontline and management to each other. For those physician 
managers, frontline and the management were unable to understand and communicate with 
each other, and physician managers themselves were the key to translating one language into 
another. While such role could also be seen as doctors’ “communicators” or “lobbyists”, 
those physician managers did not pledge themselves to “fight for” the frontline. Rather, they 
suggested that the final decision shall be left to the senior management, who after all would 
probably listen to those physician managers in view of avoiding conflicts with the frontline. 
By taking a brokering role, physician managers did not act as the representatives of one side 
but a leverage by which both sides could influence each other.  
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In an Institutionalist perspective, physician managers were also using their agency to 
maximize healthcare organizations’ legitimacy by decoupling the actual professional 
activities from formal organizational structures (Reay and Hinings, 2005; McGivern and 
Ferlie, 2007; Staniland, 2010). In the previous sections, we have discussed how deviances 
from clinical protocols and performance indicators were tolerated, as well as how formal 
procedures were replaced with informal professional networks by pure managers in 
managing daily professional activities. On the frontline side, as Doctor H (COS) elaborated, 
while physician managers were obliged to follow guidelines as possible, the lack of specific 
instruction left the managerial rhetoric to the frontline’s interpretation in line with common 
professional practice. Noticeably, loose coupling behaviours were not necessarily driven by 
physician managers’ clinician-self to circumvent managerial measures. Rather, the 
Institutionalist interpretation is that close alignment of actual activities to formal structure 
would make inefficiency and inconsistency a public record, e.g. errors or variance in 
injecting vaccines. This had left little choice to physician managers in healthcare governance 
but protecting actual clinical activities from “evaluation on the basis of technical 
performance” where “inspection, evaluation, and control of activities are minimized, and 
coordination, interdependence, and mutual adjustments among structural units are handled 
informally” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p.357), e.g. guidelines’ implementation was ignored 
and delegated to professionals themselves.   
In a relational aspect of identity work, some physician managers were also experiencing 
isolation from both the management and frontline. Although physician managers tried very 
hard to strike a balance between professionalism and managerialism in policies making in 
order to avoid failing any side of their identity, they could not easily fulfil both the frontline’s 
and management’s expectation at the same time. Many physician managers were indeed 
squeezed, rather than accepted by the both parties. As Doctor L (HCE) noted in the interview:  
I have seen a lot of physician managers when they become managers, other doctors think 
that they have betrayed them wearing a manager’s hat; and when physician managers are 
facing other executives or non-medical administrators, the non-medical administrators will 
see he as a doctor, he's thinking for the doctors. So to a certain extent a physician manager, 
if you do not so-called play well, you become squeezed by both parties. 
 
 
249 
 
While a brokering role or negotiating strategies were adopted by “satisficers” to be distant 
from professional-organizational conflicts, does it mean a third type of neutral identity has 
emerged as an alternative to the professional or organizational one?  Our codified transcripts 
have revealed physician managers’ salient self-identification as rationalizers or protectors of 
medicine, and that their identity conflicts mainly arose between clinician and manager roles. 
When there were disagreements between frontline and management, it was common for 
physician managers to “fall back to see what is good for the patients” (Doctor L, HCE) as 
the “general principles” (Doctor N, HCE) or “common purpose” (Doctor I, Consultant; CSC). 
Yet, the interpretation of public or patients’ interest itself was not something neutral at all 
eventually. Trade-off between quality (individual patients) and quantity (population level 
outcomes) was still the main theme of differences between frontline and pure managers. As 
Doctor G (Consultant; CSC) also noted in the interview:  
There are competing demands…. The demands from the patients, and the demands related 
to your job...I think once you have lost contact with the real everyday aspect, the other 
things will affect you more.            
At the end, physician managers primarily swung between professionalism and 
managerialism based on their clinician role and manager role. The occasional adoption of a 
brokering role and negotiating strategies meant mainly an escape from the direct identity 
conflicts in their dual roles.   
7.4. The division of labour and boundary between medical and managerial 
powers 
The implication of negotiating or satisficing behaviours for healthcare governance perhaps 
was not that physician managers could avoid the identity conflicts fully, but the two 
functional sections’ (frontline and pure managers) acceptance of each other. To further 
explore how the two groups of physician managers positioned each other in healthcare 
governance, our interview guide originally included a “self-perception” dimension 
following the core questions:  
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Do you see any differences between those in full-time, senior medical management 
positions and those in first-line supervisory positions? How do you view each role?  
Although we only managed to ask roughly half of the interviewees for the limited time of 
interview, the findings may still shed some light on our discussion of physician managers’ 
self-identification. When asked about their views on frontline and pure manager roles, the 
two groups of physician managers generally appreciated the differences between them. For 
pure managers, reconciling the different roles as a clinician and a manager was relatively 
easy as a kind of division of labour:   
• As line managers, COSs tend to focus on quality control. For full-time managers like 
us, it is to ensure the proper allocation of resources so that adequate support can be 
delivered to the line-managers. We are different but we cooperate. I will see them as 
my friends.’ (Doctor N, HCE) 
• In everyone’s own position we must have our own vision. The only thing in common 
is that we all want get the job done so we have to try our best to communicate. 
(Doctor F, Manager at HAHO) 
Frontline managers, who were sceptical about pure managers’ understanding of the frontline, 
also supported the idea of clinician engagement on the same ground:       
• Both of us are serving the patients - but they serve patients in the policy area; we 
serve patients in front-line patient contacts.  (Doctor M, COS) 
• For senior managers who are sitting in the office, he will have an overview of 
everything while undoubtedly he will lose some of the contact with the very front 
line.  (Doctor I, Consultant; CSC)  
• For the full-time senior management, although they are clinicians, when they make 
decisions, they have a more administrative point of view of the whole system… But 
I buy the concept of physician administration. If you can manage the both systems 
well, you actually can make a much more sustainable system. But the balance is 
difficult. (Doctor O, COS) 
While both groups of managers were sticking to their roles seeing themselves as rationalizers 
or protectors of medicine, they appreciated the coexistence of frontline and pure managers 
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as division of labour in managing healthcare at different levels. Being more aware of the 
management world and the external environment, frontline managers recognized the needs 
for someone to look after the policy area. At the same time, pure managers recognized the 
needs for someone to implement policies and gain support from the frontline. Rather than 
turning into clashes, frontline and pure managers generally expressed understanding 
attitudes towards each other based on the acknowledgement of different positions and 
functions. They actually drew the boundary of their jurisdiction in healthcare governance:      
• Whoever is on the top, it doesn't matter; it’s middle managers that matter: The way 
middle managers perform or behave has a lot of influences on the frontline. And the 
frontline doctors who are in direct contact with patients, yeah...what they do, what 
they say or what they commit will be reflected directly on the results and the 
outcomes of care...no matter whether you have many policies, procedures, guidelines. 
(Doctor L, HCE)  
• Senior management does not really understand the frontline. Because they are not in 
direct contact with patients. If they have already made the decision, or under 
pressures from the government, there will be a very little room for negotiation. But 
if there is something not in that kind of pressures, you may be able to negotiate with 
them. (Doctor M, COS)  
The respective jurisdictions of frontline and pure managers were mutually perceived. Yet it 
was not that frontline managers had the ultimate control as pure managers perceived, or pure 
managers had the ultimate control as frontline managers perceived on the other way round. 
The reality was closer to a system of “separation of powers” or “checks and balances” in its 
everyday operation combining the conflicting pictures offered by the two groups of 
physician managers. While frontline managers’ power to veto policies would be very limited 
when the senior management insisted, equally true is that the implementation of policies 
would be very likely to fail when the frontline resisted. The equilibrium of power dynamics 
between the state and medicine therefore was achieved by the mutual recognition of both 
parities’ jurisdictions. Mixed identity work, satisficing and negotiating here functioned as 
the mechanism that forged the consensus between frontline and pure managers of their 
relative positions in healthcare governance, and as we have discussed in the previous 
sections, smoothed their relations and interchanged their managerial and clinical authority.   
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7.5. Summary 
In this chapter we have proposed an elaborated mode of analysis to comprehend physician 
managers’ mixed identity work and outliers of the dichotomized typology of frontline vs. 
pure management. With the codified transcripts, it is found that, on top of the respective 
managerial and professional values/ actions as discussed in the last chapter, the two groups 
of managers were actually sharing some values/ actions.  
Yet, there were two quite different forms of hybridization for frontline and pure managers 
instead of a general type of fuzziness. Firstly, physician managers did not arbitrarily combine 
managerial and professional values but it was in a limited scope that did not blur their self-
identification as rationalizers or protectors of medicine. Secondly, with some frontline 
managers’ acceptance of management in clinical activities and some pure managers’ 
manager role being curtailed by a professionally defined mode of communication or 
management strategies, physician managers developed “satisficing” behaviours that aimed 
to fulfil both managerial and professional agendas at a minimum level. 
 
Table 22 Common answers shared among two groups of physician managers  
Dimension / role Frontline managers Pure managers 
Motivation and 
experiences 
• Acceptance of 
management work in 
clinical activities  
• Positive experience of 
management work 
 
Interaction with 
non-medical 
administrators  
• Positive experience of 
inter-professional work   
  
Interaction with 
medical 
professionals  
  • Symbolic participation in 
clinical work 
• Flat intra-professional 
relationship  
• Institutionalized modes of 
professional communication 
Handling of 
professional-
organizational 
disputes  
• Awareness of waiting 
list, waiting time, cost 
effectiveness 
• Negotiating strategies   
  
• Sympathy for frontline doctors 
• Negotiating strategies   
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We have also further examined how “negotiating” behaviours were used by physician 
managers to buffer direct conflicts arising from their dual role. In handling professional-
organizational conflicts, some physician managers adopt a brokering role and repositioned 
themselves as neither representing the profession nor organization. They “satisficed” by 
aligning policies making or implementation with both parties’ expectations, or avoid being 
embraced by disputes as a merely middleman, i.e. not aligning fully with one side, acting as 
a bridge/ middleman/ messenger/ translator/ communicator, and loose coupling. Our 
findings in this chapter about the brokering role and negotiating strategies echo previous 
researches that have observed physician managers’ mixed identities work (Ham at el., 2011; 
Sephar et al., 2015; Spyridonidis and Calnan, 2011; Spyridonidis et al., 2015). In Chapter 4, 
such researches are discussed in detail in the scoping review. 
Yet, we hold that McGivern et al.’s (2015) notion of the association between manager role 
and identity is valid and add that mixed identities work are found among two types of 
“satisficers”. While we find some evidences for physician managers’ active use of their 
agency to negotiate between institutional forces of professionalism and managerialism, the 
impact of manager-self or clinician self on frontline and pure managers were tangible in 
terms of their resilient self-identification as rationalizers or protectors of medicine. Apart 
from those occasional escapes from identity conflicts, in different dimensions of their 
identity work, such as their transition to a manager role, interaction with medical 
professionals and non-medical administrators, physicians’ struggle of being a manager were 
mainly set around the conflicting expectations for a clinician and manager. Those two types 
of “satisficers” are not a new identity as they still identify themselves as rationalizers and 
protector of medicine. With a new analysis method as proposed in this chapter, conflicting 
pictures offered by previous studies on the mixed identity can be synthesized.   
After all, physician managers satisficed and negotiated in a way that they could act “first as 
a manager” or “first as a doctor” while fulfilling their secondary role. We argue that such 
hybridization of managerial and professional identities served to confer physician managers 
the managerial or clinical authority they lacked, as well as building up a mutual recognition 
of their respective jurisdictions in frontline operation and policy areas. With the two 
functional sections’ (frontline and pure managers) acceptance of and integration with each 
other, medicine as a whole performed as both of the state’s and medicine’s proxies in 
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healthcare governance, upholding corporatist arrangements where the state and medicine 
colluded to maximize their interests.       
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Chapter 8                                                                                                       
Discussion and Conclusion  
8.1. Introduction  
The intellectual quests of Hong Kong public healthcare governance in this study begins with 
puzzles as outlined in the end of introduction chapter: why do we have a professional-led 
model that is dubbed as “medical hegemony” in local political discourse, while ordinary 
professionals are feeling alienated from the Hospital Authority (“the HA”) in New Public 
Management reforms? This gives rise to wider questions - who governs healthcare? The 
state or medicine?  
Our approach to answering those questions is inspired by the Re-Stratification Thesis 
(Freidson,1994). It sees medicine as being divided into two groups, rank-and-file doctors 
and medical elites who enrol into administrative and regulatory posts, with physicians’ rights 
to self-regulation being preserved at a collective level only alongside the state’s 
modernization/ rationalization agendas of efficiency and transparency/accountability. 
Above all, the dual role of medical elites as doctors’ representatives and managers is a sign 
of both state control and professional hegemony.  
Yet, the Re-Stratification Thesis on its own may not be able to offer an adequate account of 
why and how the balance of power between the state and medicine is maintained. If the 
pivotal players, physician managers, are aligning to one side, the uneasy balance will be 
broken and turn into managerial hegemony or professional capture of the system. The 
identity issue therefore is the key to an empirical approach of investigating the power 
dynamics between the state and medicine. With our findings from elite interviews with 
physician managers in the HA, we confirm a recent notion by researchers in this field that 
physician managers are not a homogeneous group, but split into two roles according to their 
attachment to clinical work: “frontline managers” (departmental) who act as the 
professional’s proxies and “pure managers” (directorial) who act as the state’s proxies 
(McGivern et al., 2015); and we add that the hybridization or mixed identity work of the two 
groups of managers is an important mechanism to integrate the frontline and management 
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interests and agenda with their “satisficing” and “negotiating” efforts, while maintaining a 
boundary of their jurisdictions.  
With a multidimensional framework, this study attempts to extend our understanding of 
public healthcare governance (see Table 23). In the previous chapters, we put the conflicting 
pictures of the triumph of state and sectorial interests in academic perspectives, from the 
macro- level of governance (Chapter 2), the Sociology of professions /healthcare politics 
(Chapter 3) to the micro- level of physician managers per se who mediate the contest 
between the state and sectoral interests (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). In this connection, our findings 
from the elite interviews with physician managers in the HA do not only help address the 
questions about physician managers’ identity conflicts, but also the healthcare politics and 
welfare state governance as a whole.   
In brief, we make four academic contributions in this study. First, we propose Corporatist 
Theory to assimilate the state-centric and society-centric governance theories, and apply it 
to the welfare governance of Hong Kong. Second, we confirm the insights of the Re-
Stratification Thesis as well as research that applies it to the study of physician managers 
regarding the split between frontline and pure managers. Third, we add new findings of how 
the split of physician managers is related to the competitive and co-operative tensions 
between the state and medicine. Fourth, to deduce those new findings, we develop an 
analysis approach to comprehend the pattern of hybridization of professionalism and 
managerialism among the two groups of physician managers.      
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Table 23      Analysis of this study at different levels  
Level / Theory  State-centric  Corporatist Society-centric  
Governance  • Asymmetric Power Model 
(Marsh et. al, 2001) 
• State-Centric Approach of 
Governance 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000) 
Welfare / Neo-Corporatism 
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Williamson, 1989)                    
 
Self-governing Networks 
(Rhodes, 1997)  
Sociology of Profession     • De-Professionalization 
(Haug, 1973)  
• Proletarianization   
(Oppenheimer, 1973; 
McKinley and Stoeckle, 1988) 
Re-Stratification  
(Freidson, 1994) 
• Jurisdiction Wars 
 (Abbott, 1988; Nancarrow 
and Borthwick, 2005)  
• Structural Interests  
 (Alford, 1975)  
 
Healthcare Politics   
(Numerato et al.,2012) 
Managerial hegemony  Co-optation  
• Flexible Corporatism 
(Sheaff et al.,2004) 
• Co-option  
(Harrison, 2009)  
Strategic adaptation  
• Soft Autonomy 
(Levay and Waks, 
2009) 
• Adaptive Regulation   
(Waring 2007) 
 
Professional Resistance 
Physician Managers 
(Hoff, 2000; McGivern et 
al. 2015; Forbes and 
Hallier, 2006) 
Compliance  Organization-compatible 
• Willing  
• Investors 
Profession-compatible   
• Incidental  
• Reluctants  
Resistance  
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8.2. Major findings and methodological contributions (Chapters 4, 5 and 6)   
8.2.1. Building up methodology with scoping review   
Guiding questions for Chapter 4: what can we learn from previous studies of physician 
managers? How can they inform the development of the Re-stratification Thesis? Drawing 
on them, how can we examine their social identification with or loyalty to the organization 
or profession? 
In Chapter 4, we seek to build up the methodology for the empirical part of this study. To 
operationalize the concepts of “soft bureaucracy” that represents the managerial power 
(Courpasson, 2000) and “soft autonomy” that represents the professional power (Levay and 
Waks, 2009), we identify physician managers’ hybrid identity as our research subjects. If 
physician managers identified themselves as a manager, a possible implication will be the 
state “colonizing’ medicine by the co-optation of doctors into healthcare systems 
management to impose tighter self-surveillance regimes; if they identified themselves as a 
physician, then it will be medicine “capturing” the state by the enrolment of themselves into 
it to preserve their control of daily professional activities. 
Using Scoping Review method (Arksey and O’Malley, 2005; Levac et al., 2010), we select 
14 empirical studies from 433 academic journals relating to hybridity or identity of physician 
/medical /clinician / medically qualified managers in three data electronic bases, namely 
Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ProQuest), Scopus and Web of Science.  The 
review of those 14 selected studies is based on a systematic access to empirical researches 
relevant to physician managers’ hybrid identity from the earliest date available in the three 
data bases aforementioned to July 2015 (their characteristics such as year of study, data 
collection method, country/organization, and sampling are listed in Appendix Nine). We 
believe that the review of findings generated by the scoping method is exhaustive regarding 
studies on the same topic in that period of time and can serve as a good reference for future 
studies.       
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Following a review of their findings, those 14 selected studies are categorized into three 
groups: “without clear focus on typology”, “with attention to mixed identity work” and “with 
a clear focus on typology” (see Tables 5 to 7).  The findings in this study of physician 
managers’ satisficing strategies and brokering role validate some previous researches, 
especially the second group that focuses on hybrid identities (Ham at el., 2011; Spehar, Frich, 
and Kjekshus, 2015; Spyridonidis and Calnan, 2011; Spyridonidis, Hendy and Barlow, 
2015). Yet, they do not offer a template of research tools for data collection. Our interview 
guide and questionnaire are mainly drawn from Hoff’s (1999; 2000) and McGivern et al.’s 
(2015) in the third group with minor revisions according to the HA setting. They classify 
physician managers into “Organization-/Profession- Compatible” and “Willing/ Incidental 
Hybrid” respectively with theoretical reference to the Re-Stratification Thesis, as well as 
clearly defined attributes and measurements as listed in Tables 5 to 7. Based on those 
typology and measurements, we have also developed an elaborated mode of analysis to take 
the mixed identity work into consideration and synthesize variant findings offered by 
previous researches.   
8.2.2. Major findings   
Guiding questions for Chapter 6: to what extent physician managers are developing a 
manager-self at the expense of their clinician role, or bringing a clinician-self to their 
manager role? Do their positions as frontline and pure management divide them into two 
different types of identity work? If so, how do they look in different dimensions?   
In Chapter 6, we apply Hoff’s (1999; 2000) and McGivern et al.’s (2015) analysis schemes 
to the sample of physician managers in the HA and find similar results. As measured by the 
14 statements of professional beliefs in the questionnaire developed by Hoff (2000), 
physician managers in the HA hold strong views around the medical profession itself and 
the physicians’ collective rights to self-regulation, except individual physicians’ autonomy. 
The results are in line with Hoff’s original study with a random sample in the US that 
supports the Re-Stratification Thesis: physician managers as a whole see that more 
regulation of clinical activities is warranted while it should not be done by laymen (see Table 
9).  
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Following Hoff’s (1999) interview guide, we structure our interview questions with 5 themes 
regarding different dimensions of physician managers’ identity work, and include attributes 
defined by McGivern et al. (2015) to enrich our conceptualization of the contrasting 
managerial/ professional identities. Echoing the original studies, the two groups of 
interviewees in our sample are giving the same set of common answers as listed in Table 14. 
The findings support McGivern et al.’s (2015) notion that managerial identity is associated 
with manager role: physician managers with a stronger clinician-self tend to occupy frontline 
management positions (departmental; with half of their time doing clinical work) and those 
who hold a stronger managerial-self tend to be pure managers (directorial; basically detached 
from the frontline). 
Guiding questions for Chapter 7: to what extent is the dichotomy of profession-oriented and 
organization-oriented identities valid? At the interface of different social forces driving 
healthcare reforms and the forefront of changes, how do physician managers negotiate 
between them? What are the implications for our understating of the power dynamics in 
healthcare systems and the Re-stratification Thesis? 
In Chapter 7, we further question the dichotomized framework of analysis used by Hoff and 
McGivern et al., and propose an elaborated mode to include the outliers of frontline 
managers (supposed to be professional) and pure managers (supposed to be managerial). 
With Hoff and McGivern et al.’s detailed description of physician managers’ managerial and 
professional values, we codify interviewees’ transcripts and check whether conflicting codes 
exist. It is hypothesized that inconsistencies in identity work may arise in two forms: first, 
holding contradictory views in the same dimension; second, holding contradictory views in 
different dimensions. Tables 17 to 21 have listed the results of analysis regarding the first 
type of inconsistencies in each dimension of identity work. Based on the overall tendency 
combining different dimensions, the second type of intra-dimensional inconsistencies is 
generated and presented in Table 15.  
With the codified transcripts and a systematic comparison, we find that inconsistencies of 
physician managers’ identity work exhibit some patterns rather than an arbitrary fuzziness 
creating a new identity.  While outliers are found among both frontline and pure managers, 
those inconsistencies in identity work are limited to 1) particular dimensions and 2) 
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particular codes that they share with the opposite type managers. As a result, all interviewees 
in our sample hold an overall identity that is associated with their manager role (managerial 
for pure and professional for frontline managers), while two different forms of hybridization 
are found among frontline and pure managers who try to satisfice both managerial and 
professional values.  
Common answers shared among two groups of physician managers in different dimensions 
of identity work are listed in Table 22. In brief, frontline managers share some managerial 
values/ behaviours with pure managers, such as acceptance of management work in clinical 
activities, positive experience of management work and inter-professional work; pure 
managers share some professional values/ behaviours with frontline managers, such as a flat 
intra-professional relationship, clan modes of professional communication/ clinical 
governance. In handling professional-organizational disputes, frontline managers show 
some awareness of waiting list, waiting time, and cost effectiveness, while pure managers 
doctors express some sympathy for rank-and-file doctors. Yet, it is also found that the self-
identification of frontline managers as protectors of medicine and pure managers as 
rationalizers are not blurred by their mixed identity work. Based on this, we hold that the 
typology of frontline and pure managers is still valid and add our notion of “satisficers” to 
make sense of the mixed identity work.  
8.2.3. Methodological contributions   
The proposed elaborated method therefore does not go counter to Hoff’s (1999) and 
McGivern et al.’s (2015) but offers an innovative way to include outliers and the conflicting 
identity work into the analysis of physician managers. Logically speaking, a physician 
manager could have both types of values or behaviours at the same time. The problem of 
those potential conflicting answers or outliers however were not well addressed in previous 
studies. More importantly, the dichotomized framework offers little room for dialogues with 
other researchers who have observed physician managers’ mixed identity work from their 
empirical findings (Ham at el., 2011; Spehar, Frich, and Kjekshus, 2015; Spyridonidis and 
Calnan, 2011; Spyridonidis, Hendy and Barlow, 2015). Yet, in synthesizing their findings 
with ours, we avoid simply reducing interviewees’ conflicting values/ behaviours of 
professionism and managerialism as a general type of hybrid identity. Instead, with the 
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codified transcripts as systematic tools, we examine what particular attributes or dimensions 
those outliers share with other interviewees in their own type and the opposite type. So a 
more meaningful question perhaps is not “whether mixed identity work or inconsistencies 
exist”, but how to deduce certain patterns reasonably: it is about “in what way mixed identity 
work or inconsistencies exist” and how they impact the power dynamics between frontline 
and pure managers.  
With the findings generated by the proposed elaborated mode, we argue that there are two 
types of “satisficers” among frontline and pure managers as listed in Table 16. By means of 
such hybridization process, frontline and pure managers express understanding attitudes 
towards each other based on the acknowledgement of different positions and functions. As 
a result, interchange of clinical and managerial authority is possible alongside a mutual 
recognition of their respective jurisdictions in frontline operation and policy areas. While 
previous researches have offered conflicting depictions of physician manager’s identity as 
reviewed in Chapter 4, they may mainly be a result of different methods they use. This study 
offers an alternative perspective to integrate all those findings into a more coherent picture. 
In the following sections we will discuss the implications of our findings for Corporatist 
Theory and the Sociology of professions, as well as the limitations of this study.    
8.3. Implications for governance theories (Chapter 2)  
8.3.1. Corporatism and welfare state professionals  
Guiding questions for Chapter 2: what are the relative positions / autonomies of the state 
and welfare state professionals in welfare production and politics? To what extent can the 
HA’s governance be defined as a state-centric, society-centric or corporatist models? Are 
policy networks pluralistic or asymmetric in Hong Kong? What are the characteristics of 
the health policy communities where medicine is co-opted? What are their implications?   
In Chapter 2, we discuss the general theories of governance that predict the overall tendency 
of state control or professional capture, and propose Corporatist Theory to assimilate the 
“society-centric” and “state-centric” positions. While NPM is a global Neo-Liberal reform 
movement “hollowing out the state” with pluralistic networks (Rhodes, 1994), it could also 
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be seen as an ever- sophisticated regulation and monitoring system that strengthens the 
state’s steering capacity (Fawcett, 2013, p.6), i.e. “associative governance” as the state’s 
formal partnership with interest groups in the formulation and implementation of public 
policy (Bell and Hindmoor, 2009). In Pollitt’s (2007) terminology, the HA reform in Hong 
Kong in 1991 was in the same way driven by the two contradicting forces of “centralization” 
and “decentralisation”: the delegation of power was “administrative” and “non-competition” 
with the HA’s Board of Members being appointed by the government and central planning 
to ensure a careful control of budget; at the same time, it was “external” and “horizontal” as 
the HA became a semi-autonomous public corporate independent from the civil service, and 
the general management was opened up to the welfare producers, medical professionals 
themselves. To comprehend the complexity of the developments, this study attempts to go 
beyond a simplified state-centric or society-centric account.  
With Corporatist Theory, we argue that healthcare governance is indeed a collusion between 
the state and welfare producers for their functional interdependency (Williamson,1989). 
Physicians as welfare state professionals can always override other interest groups, service 
end users or the general public, while the contest is not “open and free” as a society-centric 
account would suggest. Health policy networks are a closed policy community working in 
an Asymmetric Power Model (Marsh, Richards and Smith 2001) where medical 
professionals are “insiders” (Grant, 1995). At the same time, the state’s authority in 
healthcare governance is largely mediated by medicine. While the state finances, delivers 
and governs healthcare, medical professionals gain a “public status” or “official role” (Offe, 
1981) in healthcare governance as its indispensable partner. In such political bargains, the 
medical profession as a whole obtains clinical autonomy and the rights to 
licensing/disciplining its members who are nominally state employees. In return, medical 
professionals respect the state’s authority to set the global budget and implicitly ration scarce 
healthcare resources in clinical terms on behalf of the state. The entrenchment of physicians 
in the HA’s governance structure is a telling example of such indirect rule strategy of the 
state.  
As revealed in this study, Hong Kong public healthcare governance can be depicted 
effectively as “politics of the double bed” (Klein, 1990), where there is “a series of attempts 
to manage this mutual dependency, to find ways of accommodating the frustrations and 
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resentments of both sides in the partnership, and to devise organizational strategies for 
containing conflicting interests’ in a bipartite corporatist setting” (p.700). Our findings in 
this study suggest that the proxies of the state, “pure managers”, and the proxies of the 
medical profession, “frontline managers”, are contesting while interdependent with each 
other. Identifying themselves as rationalizers or protectors of medicine, the two groups of 
physician managers do appreciate their differences and act differently in their manager roles, 
while mutual understanding as well as the interchange of clinical and managerial authority 
based on hybridization are taking place alongside conflicts and confrontations.  
Here a unique landscape of modern welfare state governance is the dual role of welfare state 
professionals as members of a liberal profession as well as state employees/ agencies. In this 
connection, this study contributes to the discussion of welfare corporatism by bringing 
identity conflicts at an individual level to our analysis: physician managers are not a 
homogenous group affected by managerialism or professionalism uniformly. Some of them 
are being co-opted by the state and some others are strategically adapting for the profession. 
More importantly, they satisfice and negotiate in order to fulfil their roles as “first a 
manager/doctor” as well as their secondary roles. This study adds that such mechanism of 
hybridization is a key component of welfare corporatism by which frontline and pure 
managers can exchange their clinical and managerial authority or resources and both 
professional and state interests are protected.  
Whereas governance literature largely set around the transformation of modern welfare 
states, the corporatist nature of the interplay between the state and welfare state professionals, 
who are the building block of welfare states, deserves more attention from researchers. With 
supranational integration, liberalisation and increased competition in world markets since 
the 1980s, as Falkner (1997) suggests, while the traditional tripartite (state; capital; labour) 
“public-private concertation” in policy-making has increasingly been downplayed to 
sectoral or even issue specific sub-polities that appears to be pluralist sub-systems, 
corporatist patterns may still prevail considering “the degree of integrated participation by 
economic interest groups in the public policy process” (p.3) in the specific sectoral settings. 
Although academic attention subsequently shifted from a corporatist to a pluralist approach 
of policy networks, scholars in governance have offered alternative concepts to capture the 
transformation of corporatism as “competitive corporatism” (Rhodes, 2001) and “lean/ 
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supply-side corporatism” (Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel, 2001) where certain forms of 
“productivity coalitions” (Windolf, 1989) at a meso- (industry) or micro- (firm) level are 
built.  
In this regard, our study of the Hong Kong healthcare system offers some empirical evidence 
for the resilience of corporatist arrangements in the specific field of welfare production, 
stressing that the strategic position of welfare professionals as expert producers is a key 
element of such organized political exchange or coalition between the state and sectoral 
interests. Yet, applying Corporatist Theory to other welfare production sectors such as 
education and social service should be case-sensitive. The coalition between the state and 
medicine may be an exceptional case of “expertise-based co-option” (Seward, 1990) 
considering the high degree of producers’ control of the abstract knowledge (Abbott, 1988) 
and professionalization process (Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005). In the UK context, 
researchers have also noticed the differences between welfare professionals from different 
sectors in their acceptance of new managerialism (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker, 2005). 
While one could imagine the incompatibility between social workers’ and school teachers’ 
professionalism and their manager role, we may need further empirical investigation on 
whether other sectors are replicating the same dynamics or extent of the professional 
managers’ identity conflicts and hybridization as we observe in this study.   
8.3.2. Corporatism and the Hong Kong polity  
A corporatist approach to our understanding of Hong Kong welfare governance, instead of 
a pluralist one, also pays tribute to the unique polity of Hong Kong as “liberal autocracy” 
(Fareed Zakaria, 1997) as discussed in the introduction chapter. Partial democracy in Hong 
Kong largely curtails political exchange through electoral representation but enhances the 
state’s autonomy in building coalition with welfare state professionals. Besides, her liberal 
tradition prevents the state from direct or micro- management of production processes. 
Careful devolution of power to medical professionals in healthcare governance as we 
examined in this study in a corporatist approach, therefore, is unsurprisingly a desirable 
option for the Hong Kong Government to compromise between those conflicting principles 
of social management.  
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Indeed, from the outset, the Hong Kong polity has been characterized as corporatist 
(Goodstadt, 2007; Scott, 1989) for its long tradition of consultative democracy with 
“administrative absorption of politics” (King, 1975; the extensive use of professionals in 
consultation bodies to legitimize bureaucratic-led politics as a substitute for full democracy). 
The introduction of functional constituencies (representation for service professionals and 
businesses associations) in the legislature in the 1980s further institutionalized professionals’ 
privileges in the legislature, and helped marginalize partisan politics after the introduction 
of direct election in 1991.  
Yet, it is arguable whether functional constituencies help uphold Hong Kong welfare 
corporatism. Although impartial, the democratization since the 1990s has seen some 
challenges to the original setting of elite integration and consensus politics under 
consultative democracy (Lam, 2012). Scholars have noticed that welfare state professionals, 
including medical professionals, have been key promoters of democratization in Hong Kong, 
and a populist alliance between welfare state professionals and the grassroots population has 
been formed in election campaigns as “democrats” (So, 1999). Above all, the individual 
instead of corporate voting system in professional constituencies offers some hope for 
overturning the corporatist setting which is based on peak association’s monopolized 
representation for their members. 
The political controversies over Doctors Registration (Amendment) Bill 2016 is a telling 
example of the ever-widened cleavage between the professional peak associations and 
political representatives. Soon after the field work of this study in the second half of 2016, 
political debates arose in Hong Kong around the government’s proposal to remove barriers 
to overseas doctors and increase government-appointed patient representatives in the 
Medical Council of Hong Kong. Under the banner of patients’ interests, the HA itself and 
the Medical Council stood behind the government despite that the proposal had become very 
unpopular among medical professionals (Tsang, 2016). Claiming to safeguard professional 
autonomy, frontline doctors however launched a very successful internet propaganda 
campaign to mobilize public objection. They alleged that the Bill was actually a preparation 
for the secret plan to introduce Mainland Chinese doctors to Hong Kong and extend the 
government’s power against civil society (Fung, 2016). By taking filibuster actions, the 
doctors’ representative in the legislature backed frontline doctors but not the corporatist 
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establishment in health policy (the government, the HA management, and the Medical 
Council). Finally, the government withdrew the Bill but the division between ordinary 
medical professionals and their peak associations havs been further widened.  
Alongside those recent developments in the medical sector that point to the resilience of 
Hong Kong welfare corporatism with the peak associations aligning themselves to the 
government in policy debates, the professionals’ countervailing force through formal 
representation is also revealed. So will functional constituencies help uphold or turnaround 
welfare corporatism in the long run? In the near future, the evidence would point to welfare 
corporatism still being alive in Hong Kong.  
Firstly, conflicts between general public interests and specific sectoral interests prevents the 
professional representatives from building a stable alliance with political parties. In the 
above-mentioned case of Medical Council reform, democratic parties elected by universal 
suffrage were actually wavering over whether they should back the doctors’ representative, 
although medical professionals are generally deemed to be their supporters in direct election. 
On the one hand, political parties were cautious about the potential harms of the 
government’s proposal to professional autonomy for reducing the medical professional’s 
representatives at the Medical Council. On the other hand, they were also alerted by the 
potential backlash of the general public for vetoing a proposal that is beneficial to patients’ 
interests. At the end, the mainstream democratic parties disappointed medical professionals 
by withdrawing their support (ibid). As professional representatives are primarily 
accountable to a relatively small group of people based on specific interests, maintaining 
independence from electoral politics will be a more realistic strategy. Instead, they tend to 
align themselves with the autocratic government for a partnership status in overall policy 
issues alongside their outlook as mouthpieces of sector perspective and guardians of sectoral 
interests (Kowk and Chow, 2007).   
Secondly, as long as the autocratic polity in Hong Kong is preserved, it will continue to 
curtail the capacity of political parties in conducting political exchange between sectoral 
interests and class-based interests in electoral arena. The traditional corporatist concordat 
would still be a more effective or institutionalized way to represent sectoral interests as a 
whole. 
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The last reason perhaps is a more fundamental one questioning whether the electoral arena 
is the only or necessarily the most important domain of policy making. As Pierson (1998) 
suggests, “a focus on voters, public opinion, and party coalitions will fail to capture 
important political dynamics” as “the politics of the welfare state involves a complex ‘two-
level game’” that include both an electoral arena and a corporatist arena (p.556). In an era 
where pro-market right ideologies dominate, partisan politics becomes much less important 
as class-based differences in economic management have narrowed (Rhodes, 2001, p.178). 
On the other hand, corporatist arrangements create powerful interlocutors who direct reforms 
along consensual pathways, offering a platform of continuing dialogue and social learning 
to develop pragmatic solutions to micro-policy reform (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). Those 
developments in contemporary Western parliamentary politics also suggest that policy 
making, even in a full democracy, is largely influenced by past corporatist institutions in 
specific sectoral settings.  
Although the development of electoral politics in Hong Kong, combined with the individual 
voting system for professionals’ functional representatives, will be a potential source of 
challenge to the original corporatist arrangements, it questionable whether the electoral 
system is the principal constituent of Hong Kong corporatism in the first place. Students in 
Hong Kong polity have paid close attention to her corporatist nature in relation to the 
political system, such as functional representatives in the legislature and consultation bodies, 
but we add that corporatist institutions in the production arena perhaps are the major domain 
where we can capture the dynamics of welfare policy making. More studies on the 
governance of welfare sectors themselves, especially the interplay between welfare state 
professionals and state actors as we have examined in this study, are of empirical importance 
in understanding Hong Kong corporatism.    
Following a pessimistic interpretation of the political development in Hong Kong, the real 
threat to Hong Kong corporatism in the future however will rather be authoritarian than 
pluralistic electoral politics. Under the Mainland Chinese authority’s encroachment and tight 
brace, the autonomous territory of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has seen the 
tendency to mould itself in the mainland’s image: while electoral politics is developing, 
demise of its prized autonomy and openness has been observable in terms of Beijing’s 
control of local media and politicians that favour limiting civil liberties and containing the 
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civil society’s capacity to challenge the government (Levin and Yung, 2016). If the liberal 
tradition in Hong Kong continues to decay, the notion of liberal autocracy will be 
problematic as social- or liberal- corporatism we refer in this study may move towards an 
authoritarian one where check and balance by liberal professionals in the state top-down 
integration is missing.  
When we speak of the “liberal” autocratic polity in Hong Kong, one should not overlook 
that its core component is a long tradition of respect for, and extensive use of, the liberal 
professionals’ expertise, as well as their legitimizing functions in social management. 
Alongside its autocratic nature, the liberal tradition has prevented the Hong Kong 
Government from costly direct intervention and regulation of market failure as some may 
observe in the authoritarian mainland. Under the communist regime of China, researchers 
have noticed that the lack of a widely-shared tradition of medical professionalism has 
complicated China’s efforts in decentralization and marketization reforms, as a trustworthy 
healthcare workforce who can discipline themselves to put patients’ interests ahead 
economic welfare is unavailable (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2015). We suggest that the 
institution of medical professionalism is based on a liberal approach of social management 
conferring authority to liberal professionals as self-regulated and autonomous experts. As a 
kind of “public use of private organized interests” (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985), liberal 
professionals can in return serve as a stable partner of the state in corporatist healthcare 
governance endorsing social policy. This study has offered some micro aspects of how such 
“public-private concertation” is operating.  
With a professional-led governance under corporatist arrangements in healthcare, the Hong 
Kong Government manages to cap healthcare spending at 5.4% of the territory’s GDP, with 
admirable outcomes such as the highest life expectancy in the world of 84 in 2016 
(Bloomberg, 2016), universal access to free healthcare, and general public support for the 
public healthcare system (The Harvard Team, 1999). While waiting time, support to patients 
with chronic diseases and the integration between community and hospital care are the main 
areas that require improvements in the system, its cost-effectiveness compares favourably to 
European advanced economies (ibid, p.51). If the “liberal autocracy” in Hong Kong is to 
turn into “illiberal democracy”, by which Fareed Zakaria (1997) depicts a more common 
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type of impartial democracy as electoral authoritarian regimes, the original welfare 
corporatism and its effectiveness will be in doubt.  
One of the major challenges for applying governance analysis to Hong Kong is the 
uncertainties arising from its integration with Mainland China. If the constitutional 
framework of “one country, two systems” was to be disregarded, a different way of life as 
well as social-political structure in the much smaller city-state of 7 million people from the 
mainland, which is the second large economy in the world with a biggest population of 1.4 
billion, could be rapidly overturned. Like any other social-political analyses on Hong Kong, 
our study in welfare governance is not immune from these uncertainties. Cautious validation 
of its applicability from time to time therefore is required, although we believe that the 
depiction of the Hong Kong polity as social-/liberal-/neo-corporatism is basically effective 
and changes will tend to happen according to certain path dependency.   
8.4. Implications for the Sociology of professions (Chapter 3) 
8.4.1. The research tradition of the Re-Stratification Thesis  
Guiding questions for Chapter 3: what are the challenges for medicine’s dominance and 
autonomy in healthcare management from the state control and other social actors? How 
does medicine cope with those challenges? In particular, how do the state and medicine 
manage to stabilize the health policy community?  What are the implications for the power 
dynamics in governing healthcare systems, as well as the internal changes within medicine, 
known as “re-stratification”?    
In Chapter 3, we narrow down the scope of our discussion to the profession system itself. In 
the main theme of state-society interaction, the respective theories we discuss are De-
Professionalization/ Proletarianization Thesis (Haug, 1973; McKinley and Stoeckle, 1988; 
Oppenheimer, 1973) in a “state-centric” account that sees the state has successfully deskilled 
professionals /medicine, and the “society-centric” account that sees the power dynamics as 
wars between “structural interests” (Alford, 1975) and “jurisdiction wars” (Abbott, 1988; 
Nancarrow and Borthwick, 2005) where the medical power prevails. As our discussion at a 
macro level of governance has suggested, the competition between the professional power 
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and other interest groups is not open and free but state-sponsored in view of building a 
coalition or closed policy community. At the same time, the professional power is 
indispensable for the state considering their functional interdependency. In such corporatist 
setting where the state only has influence rather than control over professionals / medicine, 
as its partner cum challenger, the respective theory is the Re-Stratification Thesis (Freidson, 
1994) that sees the physicians’ collective rights to self-regulation as being preserved by a 
group of elites in medicine, who enrol into the general management as the professionals’ 
proxies while exercise a tighter monitoring over rank-and-file physicians as the state’s 
proxies. In this study, we single out this group of pivotal actors in healthcare governance in 
order to examine the balance of power between the state and medicine.      
According to the Re-Stratification Thesis, the professional power is far more extensive than 
theorists of professional decline suggest, while it is much more circumscribed than the notion 
of professional hegemony (Brint, 1993). One the one hand, “the economic terms and 
logistics conditions may be less subject to professional control than before” (Freidson, 1986, 
p.263). On the other hand, external oversight poses “no comprehensive or consistent threat” 
as “a strong system of credentialing still controls who may do practical kinds of work and 
how to do it” and “the basic institution employed by professionals to exercise control over 
training and practice conditions remain intact” (p.268). So whereas expert influence in policy 
making is largely maintained in purely technical areas (i.e. establishment of standards), to 
what extent can the professional power be maintained in organizational arena and shield 
daily professional activities from managerialism? That is a core question of medical 
sociology on the scope of the medical power.   
Based on Freidson’s analyses, the medical profession’s knowledge monopolies are followed 
with subsequent organizational and legal privileges (i.e. control of case records and special 
treatment of expert testimony by the courts), and practicing doctors “characteristically enjoy 
the power to do their work as they see fit” with “considerable power over individual patients” 
as well as “a significant degree of institutionalized power over access to desired resources” 
(Brint, 1993, p.269). At the same time, the medical profession does not “control the 
economic and political context in which knowledge becomes usable in practical life” (ibid) 
as the use of engineering principles and ideas are determined by elite administrators who are 
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“agents of their corporations”, and the professional knowledge is “developed under 
corporate auspices” and “proprietary and protected as trade secrets” (Freidson, 1986, p.222).  
Freidson’s (1994) conclusion is that professionalism is not fading but just being “reborn” in 
a hierarchical form where “everyday practitioners become subject to the control of 
professional elites who continue to exercise the considerable technical, administrative, and 
cultural authority that the professions have had in the past” (p.9). For Freidson, “there is 
little evidence that the special status of rank and file professionals will deteriorate so much 
that they will find themselves in the same position as other workers” as “they will still enjoy 
at least occupational kinship with their superiors” (p.145). In the UK context, Harrison and 
Ahmad (2000, p.137) also confirm that the dominance of the biomedical model at the macro-
level (institutional authority of medicine as an autonomous profession and corporatist 
arrangements of professional-led governance in the NHS) remains largely intact, despite that 
the micro- aspect is under tighter monitoring. As a result, radical organizational changes or 
re-engineering in hospitals are rare and adjustments to services are incremental (Harrison 
and McDonald, 2008, p.47).  
The major problem of the Re-Stratification Thesis, as researchers have noticed, is that 
“occupational kinship” itself may not be a guarantee for physician managers, as medicine 
elites, to act as protectors of their professional peers or the medical profession itself. Medical 
institutions could be “co-opted by external forces into constraining their own members” 
(Coburn, Rappaport and Bourgeault,1997, p.18) with their socialization as a manager. Put 
in a Foucauldian perspective, self-regulation regimes of medicine under NPM could be 
depicted as self-surveillance that “governmentalizes” medicine with managerial ideologies 
(Flynn, 2002). As Courpasson (2000, p. 157) argues, although new self-regulation regimes 
are flexible and decentralised in form, there are “more rigid constraints and structures of 
domination” in substance as “soft bureaucracy”. On the contrary, Sociological 
Institutionalism sees reform efforts in healthcare organizations as a “loose-coupling” process 
that responds to coercive reform demands from the institutional environment by buffering 
daily activities from rigid adherence to the formal structure (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977, p. 357). Alongside the strategic adaptation to reforms rhetoric, “soft 
autonomy” is preserved to uphold the professionals’ rights to self-regulation in substance 
(Levay and Waks, 2009; Waring 2007). While there is no contention that healthcare 
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governance is “by” the doctors, whether it is “for” the doctors would have considerable 
implications for how their pivotal role is enacted, i.e. colonizing medicine for the state or 
capturing the state for medicine. With respect to those theoretical debates over “soft 
bureaucracy” or “soft autonomy” in the re-stratification of medicine, noticeable recent 
research efforts have been focused on the subjectivity issue regarding physician managers 
(Forbes and Hallier, 2006; Hoff, 1999; 2000; McGivern et al., 2015; Waring, 2014).  
8.4.2. The question of the medical power  
Calibrating itself in the aforementioned research tradition of physician managers, our study 
on the HA offers a micro-aspect of how the structure and scope of control of medicine in 
healthcare is being maintained or changed.  
Regarding the new structure of medicine under its re-stratification, firstly, our findings echo 
the recent researches suggesting that the internal split of medicine does not appear between 
medicine elites and rank-and-file only, but also among physician managers themselves. As 
demonstrated in our sample of physician managers, “frontline managers”, who occupy 
departmental management posts, tend to identify themselves as a member of the frontline 
doctors and their protectors; “pure managers”, who occupy directorial management posts 
overseeing more than one clinical department, tend to identify themselves with the senior 
management as the rationalizers of medicine. Therefore, the interaction between the two 
groups of physician managers has become the frontline of conflicts between the state and 
medicine. In Chapter 6, we have examined the two different ways of enacting the manager 
role between frontline and pure managers, i.e. as the proxies of the state or medicine. Such 
positioning of frontline and pure managers as protectors and rationalizers also exists inter-
subjectively as the interviewees are positioning each other according to that typology.             
Secondly, following that advancement of the Re-Stratification Thesis, interviewees in this 
study, from both the frontline and senior management, further confirm Harrison and 
McDonald’s (2008, p.47) notion that the general management can hardly control the day-to-
day operation of the acute medical sector. So, how are frontline managers being engaged in 
a manager role so that incremental adjustments to services can be made in a pervasive way?  
Our proposed notion of mixed identity work in Chapter 7, by which frontline managers are 
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also influenced by managerial values and vice versa, further offers a preliminary depiction 
of how that engagement is working. After all, if frontline and pure managers were so 
conflicting, some explanation would be needed for whether medicine as whole still functions 
as the state’s stable partner in healthcare governance, and how.  
We suggest that the integration of professional and managerial values and interests consists 
of a two-way flow of physician managers’ hybridization: one the one hand, frontline 
managers are exposed to the management values with some positive interpersonal working 
experiences and awareness of budget and the system factors; on the other hand, pure 
managers are also adopting a traditional mode of professional communication. Alongside 
formal consultation process which is deemed by the frontline largely as formality, pure 
managers consult and deliver messages to the frontline through their informal personal 
networks in the profession, wearing a clinician hat, using clinician language and by symbolic 
contact to the clinical field. Going beyond the current major studies applying the Re-
Stratification Thesis to physician managers, this study adds that the structure of the medical 
power as frontline vs. pure managers may involve a more sophisticated mechanism of 
boundary maintenance that allows the exchange of clinical and managerial authority 
between the two sides, creating concertation alongside struggles in a corporatist setting.  
The second question of whether the scope of the state and professional powers is limited or 
expanded is less directly answered by our findings in this study, which largely focus on the 
new structure of the profession. With the proposed notion of integration and hybridization, 
this study portrays “soft bureaucracy” among frontline managers for their alignment to the 
senior management, as well as “soft autonomy” among pure managers for their stickiness to 
the clan mode of professional governance. One may therefore have an impression that the 
balance of power between the state and medicine is achieved with the frontline and pure 
managers being equalized. Yet, this study has also revealed the boundary maintenance based 
on frontline and pure managers’ mutual recognition of each other’s jurisdiction in the clinical 
field and policy arenas. While having different self-identifications as rationalizers or 
protectors of medicine, the two groups of physician managers have respect for each other’s 
differences and realize that healthcare governance cannot be done without each other. It is 
not that frontline mangers have acquired the same power in policy making as pure managers, 
or the pure managers have acquired the same power in the clinical field as frontline managers. 
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It is, indeed, frontline managers follow pure managers in policy arenas and pure managers 
follow frontline managers in the clinical field.  
Here important is the distinction between institutional areas that involve technical issues and 
policy areas that involve high public or political interest in answering the question of the 
medical power (Brint, 1993, p.268). Regarding the “economic terms and logistics conditions” 
(Freidson, 1986, p.263) that are directly relevant to the cost containment agenda, 
professionals as a whole do lose some control. In the interviews of this study, both frontline 
and pure managers support the status quo in the HA by downplaying issues that are heavily 
criticized by doctor trade unions, such as long working hours and overwork payment. Also, 
cost-efficiency measures are generally accepted as necessary by physician managers, 
although those who are from the frontline are somewhat reluctant. In this sense, the 
professional-led governance in the HA means to engage frontline managers in management 
and diminish the weight of purely professional opinion in the fiscal policy area. For areas 
such as clinical governance, service planning and performance measurement, as Freidson 
(1986, p.263) at the same time suggests, the professionals’ control over “training and 
practice conditions” remains strong. This notion also finds some support from the interviews 
in this study, i.e. adherence of pure managers to professionalism in the micro-management 
of clinical activities, such as tolerance of deviations from clinical protocols or performance 
data, delegation of power to frontline managers, and respect for clinical autonomy. 
Considering that doctors are actually the “clinical end-users” (of other health professionals’ 
services and facilities, for example, nurses’ support services and tests; Harrison, Hunter and 
Pollitt, 1990, Ch. 4) and their ultimate control of treatment process, frontline doctors’ 
institutionalized power over access to desired resources is still substantial. In this regards, 
the professional-led governance in the HA also means to retain pure managers as a member 
of medicine despite that they “control the economic and political context in which 
knowledge becomes usable in practical life” as “agents of their corporations” (Freidson, 
1986, p. 222). After all, managerialism in healthcare presents little deterioration of 
professional opinions in policy implementation. As a whole, the managerial and professional 
powers are decisive at different levels of healthcare governance with the tendency that 
physician managers are acting as a manager in policy arena and as a professional in daily 
operation.  
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8.4.3. An Institutionalist interpretation  
Seeing through the lens of Sociological Institutionalism, such equilibrium between the 
medical and managerial powers can be seen as compartmentalization of daily activities and 
formal structure in modern institutionalized organizations. First of all, it is suggested that 
reforms rhetoric, as formal organizational structures (“professions, policies, and programs 
are created along with the products and services that they are understood to produce 
rationally”), is always loosely de-coupled from actual activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 
p.340). On the one hand, under “isomorphism” or institutional peer pressures, organizations 
legitimize themselves by adopting standardized assessment criteria which are widely 
accepted by other organizations. On the other hand, if actual activities were closely 
conformed to formal organizational structure, inefficiency or inconsistency may be exposed 
and “undermines an organization’s ceremonial conformity and sacrifices its support and 
legitimacy” (pp.340-341). Therefore, in modern organizations, “structural elements are only 
loosely linked to each other and to activities, rules are often violated, decisions are often 
unimplemented, or if implemented have uncertain consequences, technologies are of 
problematic efficiency, and evaluation and inspection systems are subverted or rendered so 
vague as to provide little coordination” (p.343). In this connection, the substantial impacts 
of NPM reform rhetoric on daily operations in healthcare organizations should not be 
overestimated.      
Secondly, “organizations in search of external support and stability incorporate all sorts of 
incompatible structural elements” (p.356). Alongside external oversight regimes, the 
credential and profession system itself is a significant source of legitimization for modern 
organizations. It constitutes an essential part of formal organizational structures as kind of 
ritual conformity to standardization, creating good faith that daily activities are produced 
rationally. Unlike “implicit rationing” (depoliticizing the distribution of scarce healthcare 
resources) as scholars of healthcare politics depict (Mechanic,1978; Klein, 1990), such 
legitimatizing function refers to a cognitive aspect that co-ordination of activities is 
conceived to be adhering to certain standards accepted by the wider environment. In this 
connection, professionalism offers not only expertise or endorsement to government policy, 
but also “stabilizing effects” to institutionalized organizations avoiding direct or frequent 
inspection/evaluation from external constituents (p.351). If managerialist reforms go too far 
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to challenge the professional’s performance, healthcare organizations will lose an 
importance source of legitimacy. Equally, if professionalism cannot be ceremonially 
regulated, transparency or responsible autonomy under modern management will in the same 
way be suspect. The implication of Institutional Theory for healthcare governance is not 
only limited to the resilience of professionalism but also its cooperative tension with 
managerialism.        
Thirdly, based on the first and second institutional logics as aforementioned, “specific 
contexts highlight the inadequacies of the prescriptions of generalized myths, and 
inconsistent structural elements conflict over jurisdictional rights”, thus “organization must 
struggle to link the requirements of ceremonial elements to technical activities and to link 
inconsistent ceremonial elements to each other” (p.356). While a tightly coupled system 
would generate conflicts between activities and formal structure and among conflicting 
structural elements, i.e. professionalism and managerialism, a totally de-coupled system 
would lose its institutional connections. A loosely coupled system therefore would be a 
common strategy adopted by healthcare organizations in view of maximizing their 
legitimacy. In the de-coupling process, the cooperation between professionals and managers 
is the key: 
Activities are performed beyond the purview of managers. In particular, organizations actively 
encourage professionalism, and activities are delegated to professionals…Human relations are 
made very important. The organization cannot formally coordinate activities because its 
formal rules, if applied, would generate inconsistencies. Therefore, individuals are left to work 
out technical interdependencies informally. The ability to coordinate things in violation of the 
rules - that is, to get along with other people - is highly valued. (p.357)  
In an institutional setting, whereas activities are informally co-ordinated with the 
professional networks in daily operations, managers’ human relations are of high importance. 
This also explains why professional managers are needed while they are not actually 
applying professional knowledge to their management work at all: human relations in the 
informal professional networks are what makes management of professional activities 
possible and can only be acquired from them. In this regard, this study contributes a micro- 
aspect examination to our understanding of how that complicated co-ordination take places 
in healthcare organizations.  
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Some researches applying Institutional Theory to healthcare study specific programs of 
managerial reform in healthcare organizations, such as quality management (Audet et al., 
2005), accreditation (Pawlson and O’Kane, 2002) and guidelines (Berg et al., 2000). They 
stress the professionals’ selective and ceremonial compliance with managerial/regulative 
procedures or the professionals’ power in adaptively redefining them. In this study, we 
highlight physician managers per-se and their conflicting self-identifications as profession 
vs. organization, arguing that alignment of activities in healthcare organizations is a two-
way-flow where the normative engagement of frontline managers in managerial practices  
should not be overlooked alongside their influence in mediating policy implementation. 
Likewise, pure managers are also aligned to professional modes of clinical governance 
which is based on human relations while they have been socialized into a robust manger-
self. In such hybridization processes, the frontline and senior management are aligned to 
each other, preventing frontline managers’ clinician-self from diminishing their manager-
role or pure managers’ manager-self from diminishing their clinician-role. We see the 
subsequent integration of managerialism and professionalism as a constituent stabilizer of 
the institutional order in healthcare organizations by ensuring that activities are aligned to 
potentially conflicting formal structures.      
Following this, in institutionalized organizations where conflicting logics compete and 
coexist, “triumph of professional power” in the “inconsistency of policy” (Currie and 
Suhomlinova, 2006) may be an incomplete picture of the power dynamics between the 
professional and managerial powers. The proposed notion of “satisficing” physician 
managers, who attempt to achieve at least some minimum level of both professional and 
managerial goals, may be more coherent with the basic proposition of Institutional Theory 
that rejects a rational model of organizational actors as “maximizers” of particular values 
and interests instead of the overall legitimacy.  
Indeed, recent Institutionalist researches have shifted their attention to the institutionalized 
accommodation of incompatible logics by which “field constituents negotiate a reciprocated, 
albeit uneasy, “tolerance” of multiple logics - thereby accepting that only some of their 
demands will be met” (Raynard, 2016, p.324). Studies on coexistence of “care and science” 
in medicine education (Dunn and Jones, 2010) and the “uneasy truce” between advocates of 
“medical professionalism” and “business-like health care” (Reay and Hinings, 2009) are 
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good examples. Above all, “structural hybridity” is conceptualized as a core mechanism to 
deconstruct complexity in institutional organizations regarding multiple institutional logics 
by drawing them in innovative and synergistic ways, including “blending”, 
“compartmentalization” and “selective co-coupling” (Raynard, 2016). In the HA, it is 
observed that the professional hierarchy of medicine is blended with the bureaucratic one 
with the introduction of physician managers to integrate professionalism and managerialism, 
while a boundary of jurisdictions between policy and clinical arenas is maintained between 
frontline and pure managers in view of compartmentalization, and adherence to 
professionalism or managerialism is selective by physician managers. With a focus on 
hybrid physician managers who act as “satisficers” and the boundary maintenance between 
pure and frontline managers, this study has offered a tentative field-level examination of 
how “competitive” and “cooperative” tensions of conflicting institutional logics (Besharov 
and Smith, 2014; Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Jay, 2013; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010) are 
handled by the HA governance as structural hybridity.    
In summary, regarding the question of medical power, an Institutionalist interpretation 
further adds that the stratified structure of healthcare, where professional and managerial 
powers coexist at different levels of policy and clinical governance, is somewhat a 
compartmentalized one or loosely-coupled system. Such interpretation of the new structure 
of medicine enriches our understanding of the scope of the medical and managerial powers 
(who governs) with a following question of how or in what context and conditions the scope 
of power is defined and maintained.    
8.5. Conclusion      
In addition to academic contributions to Corporatist Theory, Re-Stratification Thesis, as well 
as the research of physician managers as discussed in this concluding chapter, this study may 
also have some implications for the wider policy discussion of healthcare reforms in Hong 
Kong.  
As the population in the territory will be aging rapidly in the near future, the sustainability 
of the traditional NHS-style hospital care, which is directly funded by general taxation, will 
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face a real test. In addition, after years of development in a specialist-led model, 
overemphasis on hospital care and its disintegration with primary care have become major 
shortcomings in Hong Kong public healthcare system. The government has proposed reform 
solutions of contributory financing and marketization to address those problems for almost 
two decades (The Harvard Team, 1999). Yet they are not well received by the general public 
and politicians in Hong Kong for the fear of upsetting the universal public healthcare system 
which has been practiced in Hong Kong since the 1970s. Above all, medical professionals’ 
resistance is one of the major obstacles.  
The political deadlock can be broken if policy makers or medicine think beyond the current 
statist-corporatist system. Comparative healthcare studies suggest that different models of 
healthcare governance, i.e. public insurance and national healthcare service, will result in 
different landscapes of corporatism for their different combinations of markets, hierarchies 
and professional networks (Giaimo, 2009). If healthcare financing, as well as the whole 
taxation and welfare arrangement in Hong Kong is moving from the taxation based one 
towards a public insurance model, the scope of the medical power as revealed in this study 
will be subject to considerable changes. Firstly, medical associations will further acquire a 
formal status in setting policy with the government and insurers/ employers regarding the 
parameters of insurance coverage and costs. Secondly, outside “the shadow of hierarchy” 
(Jessop, 1997; Scharpf, 1994), effective regulation of medical professionals who are no 
longer public servants will rely even more heavily on the collective self-regulation of 
medicine. Such moves will probably see some opportunity for the medical profession to 
reshape the power setting in healthcare in view of a higher professional autonomy. The 
sectoral interests and the wider reform agenda can therefore be complementary.  
However, this may also give rise to the question of whether the government can maintain its 
influence over medical elites in view of protecting public interests. As Freidson (2001) 
suggests in his last work, The Third Logic, the soul of medical professionalism is “serving 
some transcendent value and asserting greater devotion to doing good work than to economic 
reward” (p.180). While a statist-corporatist system may curtail professionalism under its 
logic as rational-legal bureaucracy, it may also help buffer the impacts of markets on 
professionalism. Above all, public service ethos among welfare state professionals may be 
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the most valuable public good. In this respect, market forces in a public insurance system 
may also present a new threat to professionalism.  
As Freidson also argues, professionalism, as well as free market and rational-legal 
bureaucracy, are just ideal types that “can but may never fully be” (p.179).  In reality, the 
combination of professionalism with state and market logics takes place in given institutional 
contingencies and historical context. In this connection, which combination is optimal for 
public interests is a more fundamental question for policy makers. In this study on the HA, 
physician managers have demonstrated the medical profession’s capacity to integrate those 
conflicting logics in a statist-corporatist setting. In the British NHS, which is the archetype 
of Hong Kong healthcare system, some market elements have been supplemented to the 
original statist-corporatist system under the banner of the “internal markets” in the past two 
decades to promote choice and efficiency. Policy makers may see the implications for Hong 
Kong from those developments on how we can modernize medicine in path dependency. 
After all, in all types of healthcare governance, how to circumscribe the professional 
interests with state and market forces while maintaining corporatism as the “public use of 
private interest”, i.e. the professional system’s capacity to check and balance other 
conflicting yet fundamental logics or values in social management, is the key to good 
governance.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix One   
Share of social expenditure* in GDP and total general government expenditure, Hong Kong 
and selected developed countries, 1980, 2000 and 2010 
Country  Share in GDP (%) Share in total general  
government expenditure (%) 
 1980 2000 2015 1980 2000 2015*
* France 20.2 27.5 31.7 43.9 54.3 55.2 
Finland 17.7 22.6 30.6 44.4 50.1 51.4 
Austria 22 25.5 28 - 52.3 54.1 
Italy 17.4 22.6 28.9 - 55.4 56 
Sweden 24.8 26.8 26.7 - 51.3 52.3 
Germany 21.8 25.4 25 - 54.9 55.6 
Norway 16.1 20.4 23.9 - 48.7 49.4 
Japan 10.2 16.3 23.1 - 53.9 54.4 
UK 15.6 17.7 21.5 - 47.2 49 
US 12.8 14.3 19 37.2 45 48.1 
Australia 10.3 18.2 18.8 30.8 
 
45.6 
Canada 13.3 15.8 17.2 - 40.9 41.8 
Korea .. 4.5 10.1 - 26.7 29.4 
Hong Kong 5.8 8.5 7.8 44.1 54.4 57.1 
Source: Hong Kong Government Budget 2016-17 and 2001-02; Tang (1998, p.72); OECD (2016b)  
* Social expenditure refers to the public spending in the policy areas of housing, education, health 
and social welfare as defined by Government Budget for Hong Kong; for other countries, it refers 
to the main social policy areas as defined by OECD as follows: old age, survivors, incapacity-
related benefits, health, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment and housing.   
** As all data for 2015 is unavailable for OECD countries, we use OECD figures for 2013 as 
comparison.  
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Appendix Two   
Share of general government expenditure in GDP, Hong Kong and selected developed 
countries, 2014 
Country Government expense as % of GDP 
Austria 52.8 
Finland 58.1 
France 57.3 
Sweden 51.5 
Italy 51.0 
Norway 45.9 
Germany 44.1 
United Kingdom 43.8 
Japan 42.1 
United States 38.1 
Australia 36.2 
Korea 32.0 
Hong Kong 17.8 
Source: Hong Kong Government Budget 2016-17; OECD (2016c)  
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Appendix Three  
Fees and costs of public medical services in Hong Kong (HKD 1= GBP 0.1) 
Source: Chau and Yu (2003, p.205); Hospital Authority Annual Report 2014-15; Hospital Authority 
webpage (http://www.ha.org.hk/haho/ho/cs/v3/serviceguide_feenchg-b5.htm) 
  
Services Fees before 2002 Fees since 2002 Unit cost in 2015 
Accident and 
Emergency 
Free HKD 100/ 
attendance 
HKD 
1,140/attendance 
In-patient HKD 68 / day  HKD 100/ day HKD 4,600/day  
  Admission fee(In-
patient) 
Free HKD 50 
General out-patient   HKD 37/ 
attendance  
HKD 45/ attendance  HKD 410/ 
attendance  
Specialist out-patient   
 
 
 
 
HKD 44/ 
attendance  
HKD 60/ attendance 
(HKD 100/ first 
attendance)  
HKD 10/ drug 
HKD 1,030/ 
attendance 
Dressing and injection  HKD 15  HKD 17  
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Appendix Four  
Public welfare provision in Hong Kong   
Area Major programme(s) Government’s 
role in delivery 
Subsidy Level*   
Eligibility 
Coverage** 
Social 
assistance 
Comprehensive 
Social Security 
Assistance Scheme  
Indirect      
(payments to 
recipients) 
100%             
Means-tested 
7% 
Social 
service  
Subsidy to voluntary 
agencies  
 
Indirect          
(regulation                
/financing) 
90%                        
Means-tested /     
needs assessment 
- 
Housing Public rental housing 
Home Ownership 
Scheme  
Direct                       
(provision) 
90%                       
Means-tested 
50% 
Education Government and 
subsidized primary 
and secondary 
Schools 
Indirect          
(regulation /             
financing) 
100%                           
Non-means-
tested 
80%
Health Hospital Authority Indirect                    
(regulation /             
financing) 
95%                     
Non-means-
tested 
90% 
(Impatient) 
30% 
(Outpatient) 
  
* Subsidy level refers to the share of the cost of welfare services by the government. The subsidy 
level of social welfare is 100% as CSSA is non-contributory. If we take CSSA as unemployment 
insurance or old-age pension, its replacement rate against the income level of economically active 
employees is 37%.  
** Coverage refers to the percentage of the population covered by respective public welfare 
programmes for social welfare and housing; for education and health, it refers to the share of total 
service volume by respective public welfare programmes.  
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Appendix Five   
Extended social benefits* per month by household income in Hong Kong  
Decile Group** Average per household (HKD) Share of total (%) 
 2001 2006 2011 2001 2006 2011 
1st (lowest) 3,500 2,960 3,040 10.6 9.50 8.6 
2nd 3,500 3,580 3,850 10.6 11.6 10.8 
3rd 3,850 3,760 4,210 11.7 12.1 11.8 
4th 4,070 3,690 4,410 12.4 11.9 12.4 
5th 4,050 3,600 4,220 12.3 11.6 11.9 
6th 3,410 3,230 3,760 10.4 10.4 10.6 
7th 3,110 2,990 3,290 9.5 9.6 9.2 
8th 2,820 2,620 3,190 8.6 8.5 9.0 
9th 2,480 2,400 2,930 7.5 7.7 8.2 
10th (highest) 2,140 2,180 2,680 6.5 7.0 7.5 
Overall 3,290 3,100 3,560 100 100 100 
* “Extended Social benefits” refer to public housing, education and healthcare services and exclude 
social welfare as defined by the Census and Statistics Department.  
** Each decile group contains the same number of domestic households, ranked by household 
income. 
Source: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2012b) 
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Appendix Six   
Pool of literature on physician managers  
Inclusion criteria    
Search terms ‘physician manager’ OR ‘clinician manager’ OR ‘medically 
qualified manager’ OR ‘medical manager’   
Date of publication From the earliest date available to 14th July, 2015 
Language English 
Data base No. of hits 
[ProQuest] Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) 968 
Scopus  8,740 
Web of Science 4,831 
Total 14,593 
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Appendix Seven  
Pool of articles for abstract screening   
Research focus Search items No. of hits 
hybrid identities   ‘hybrid’ 217 
 ‘identity’ 216 
 Total  433 
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Appendix Eight   
Selected articles  
Inclusion criteria  No. of articles  
1. Empirical studies on physician managers   
2. Relating to identity work or hybridity 14 
3. Relating to the theme of professionalism versus managerialism    
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Appendix Nine  
Characteristics of selected studies 
Articles   Country/ setting Method  Sampling  Time frame 
Fitzgerald 
(1994)  
UK / NHS 
providers 
Two-stage 
interview  
31 clinical/medical directors 
attending a management 
training programme    
Prior and after 
the training 
programme  
Hoff (1999)   US / 1 MCO 
(Managed Care 
Organization) 
Semi-
structured 
interview; 
observation; 
document 
analysis  
22 physician managers (first 
line supervisors/ middle- and 
upper-level managers) by 
convenience sampling of the 
entire physician-manager 
hierarchy  
Interviews and 
observations 
conducted in 
15 months  
Hoff (2000) US  Close-ended 
questionnaire  
294 respondents from a 
random sample of the 
‘Managed Care Section’ of 
the American College of 
Physician Executives 
(ACPE) 
One-off survey 
in 1996 
Doolin 
(2001) 
Australia / 1 
public hospital  
Informal 
interview; 
document 
analysis; 
observation  
12 physician managers 
(clinical unit directors / 
operation managers 
/consultants) and 23 other 
personnel by an 
opportunistic sampling   
6 months of 
implementing a 
new 
organization 
structure   
Forbes and 
Hallier 
(2006)   
UK / 1 NHS 
acute hospitals 
in Scotland 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
18 clinical directors in a 
hospital from a wide range 
of specialities   
Interviews 
conducted in 5 
years 
Mo (2008) Norway /1 
teaching 
hospital 
Interviews 10 department managers 
from a wide range of 
departments in terms of 
speciality and size assessed 
through the hospital 
Executive Director 
1 year: during 
the first year 
after the 
management 
reform took 
place 
Kippist and 
Fitzgerald 
(2009) 
Australia / 1 
teaching 
hospital  
Semi-
structured 
interviews; 
observation; 
document 
analysis  
7 participants in a clinical 
leadership development 
program (department 
managers), 6 other 
personnel; 1 facilitator of the 
program     
Retrospective 
evaluation of a 
2-year 
programme  
Russell et al. 
(2010) 
Ireland/ 1 
public hospital   
Semi-
structured 
interview  
15 hospital consultants by a 
purposive sampling (from a 
range of specialities) and  
Snowball techniques 
(referred from 4 local 
consultants known to the 
researcher) 
Interviews 
conducted in 3 
months  
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Appendix Nine (continued) 
  
 Characteristics of selected studies 
  
Articles   Country/ setting Method  Sampling  Time frame 
Ham at el. 
(2011)   
UK / NHS  Semi-
structured 
interview 
22 medical chief executives 
identified by key 
informants (Strategic 
Health Authorities) and 
author’s own knowledge 
Interviews 
conducted in 
6 months  
Martinussen 
and 
Magnussen 
(2011)   
Norway / 
hospitals  
Close-ended 
questionnaire  
1,200 respondents (asked 
whether or not department 
chiefs) in a random sample 
of hospital physicians 
drawn down from the 
register of medical 
practitioners  
One-off 
survey in 
2006  
Spyridonids 
and Calnan 
(2011) 
UK / NHS 
PCTs and 
hospitals  
Two phases of 
face-to face 
informal 
interview 
8 hospital consultants, 8 
doctors and 23 other 
personnel by a purposive 
sampling (based on their 
potential involvement in 
NICE guidelines) and 
snowball techniques  
6 months: first 
explored 
retrospectivel
y the 
implementatio
n of NICE 
guidelines and 
follow up how 
the process 
unfolded 
afterwards  
McGivern et 
al. (2015) 
UK / NHS  Open-ended 
interviews 
43 hybrid managers from 
comparable data from three 
studies 
 
Spehar, 
Frich, and 
Kjekshus 
(2015) 
(2015)   
Norway/ 
public 
hospitals  
Face to face 
in-depth 
interview at 
workplace; 
observation of 
meetings  
13 doctor managers 
(department/ first-line 
managers) and 17 other 
personnel from a master 
programme in management, 
by a maximum variation 
sampling of a wide range of 
specialities and work place    
 
Spyridonidis, 
Hendy and 
Barlow 
(2015) 
UK / NHS  Two-stage 
semi-
structured, 
open-ended 
interviews; 
observation; 
document 
62 clinical unit managers 
from ‘Collaborations for 
Leadership in Applied 
Health Research and Care’ 
(CLAHRC) programme 
5 years: 
before and 
after 
CLAHRC 
programme  
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Appendix Ten  
 
Invitation email to interviewees 
 
Dear Dr                  , 
Research Study on Physician Managers in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority   
 
I am writing to seek to your help in the captioned research project on ‘physician managers’ 
(managers with medical background) in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority. The research 
results will be a part of my PhD thesis submitted to the Department of Social Policy and 
Social Work at the University of York (UK).  
Research background and questions  
Engaging medical professionals in public healthcare system management is a common 
strategy of governments in the world including Hong Kong. However, literature suggests 
such approach of professional-led governance has mixed consequences in governance. 
While government’s capacity to handle an ever technically complicated healthcare system 
has been enhanced due to physicians’ expertise and connections to daily operation, 
physicians’ professional identity/subculture and training have considerable impacts on how 
the manager’s role is enacted.  
As a pioneering research collecting data on physician managers in Hong Kong, this project 
aims to have their first person narratives on their management role in healthcare, with special 
attention to their social identification with professional colleagues and organizations. In 
general, the research questions are: do physician managers in Hong Kong face any conflicts 
between their physician and manager roles? How do they settle the conflicts? What are the 
impacts on management work and professional autonomy?  
In addition to academic interests, the findings may also provide important information for 
policy makers to support physician’s management work.  
Proposed research method   
In my research design, there are two ways to collect data on physician managers’ identity 
and their opinion on relevant issues:   
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1) Questionnaire survey. A short questionnaire with 15 statements asking for 
respondents’ opinion (agreed or disagree in 7-point-sclae) on professional identity, 
clinical autonomy and rights to self-regulation of physicians.  
2) Personal interview. Two groups of physician managers are the targeted subjects: a) 
‘pure manager’ - physicians who committee most of their time to management duties 
at the hospital / cluster/ the Head Office level, and b) ‘front-line managers’ - 
physicians who are engaged in departmental management but maintain clinical 
activities, such as Chief of Services and Heads of Department. 
A draft of detailed interview guide and questionnaire is attached.  
Assistance requested 
I would like to invite you to be my interviewee.  If you are happy to go ahead, please 
complete the consent form (copy attached). You can hide your identity by choosing options 
B or C.  You may also find the information sheet in the attachment for more details of the 
research project. Your help will greatly benefit my research project so please spend just 30 
-60 minutes in the interview, at anytime and anywhere convenient for you! 
For any questions, please feel free to contact me at 61770920 or kwf501@york.ac.uk. Thank 
you very much again! 
Yours sincerely,  
Ken, Ka-wo Fung  
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Appendix Eleven  
 
Interviewees’ Information Sheet  
Research Study on Physician Managers in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority   
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study conducted by Ken, Ka-wo FUNG, a 
Doctoral Researcher in the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at the University 
of York (UK). The study is dedicated to examine medical professionals’ influence in 
healthcare management and the impact of their medical background on their management 
work.  
 
Why am I approached? 
 
You are contacted because we appreciate that you have been involved in the management 
work in the Hospital Authority. Although documents will be collected as part of the research, 
a key objective is to hear first-hand accounts of physician managers. Your participation 
therefore is highly valuable. Research results may also help academics and policy makers 
better understand the difficulties physician managers encountered in Hong Kong. I will be 
very grateful if you can support this study by taking part in the interview.  
 
What would be taking part involve? 
 
We would like to conduct a face-to-face interview with you at a time and place convenient 
for you. It is anticipated that the interview will last 30 – 60 minutes.  
 
Before the interview begins there will be further opportunity for you to raise concerns. If you 
are then happy to go ahead, please complete the consent form (copy attached) immediately 
prior to the interview. With your permission, the interview will be digitally recorded and 
later transcribed. If permission is not given then I will be happy to take detailed written notes 
instead.  
 
During the interview you will be asked about your personal experience in healthcare 
management (please see the attached questions for details). A short questionnaire collecting 
basic information is also attached. Please fill in the questionnaire before the interview so that 
the researcher can collect it during the interview.  
 
The language we use in the interview and questionnaire is English. During the interview, 
you may use Cantonese as supplement for particular concepts/names in Hong Kong.  
 
What will happen after the interview? 
 
The data collected will be analysed and used in the researchers’ PhD thesis and associated 
research outputs such as articles, conference papers and web pages. If you so wish, the 
researcher will send you a copy of 1) the audio record of your interview (if permission is 
given), and 2) any publications that quote your words, for your own record. 
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You will be given three options concerning how your words will be quoted within research 
outputs: A) you may use my name and my job title, B) you may use my job title only (rank 
and department; name of hospital will be hidden), and C) you may not use my name or job 
title. If you select option B or C you will be allocated a pseudonym (Dr X, Y, Z etc.). 
However, readers of the research outputs may still be able to identify you due to your 
distinctive insights and association with healthcare management in Hong Kong. Absolute 
anonymity therefore cannot be guaranteed in relation to this study even if you request a 
pseudonym.  
 
The research outputs may be freely available online in the British Library website (EThOS) 
as a PhD thesis submitted to the University of York. 
  
How will my details be kept confidential? 
 
This study has been approved by the Social Policy and Social Work Departmental Ethics 
Committee at the University of York.  
 
All information that is collected form you during this study will be kept confidential in line 
with the Data Protection Act (1998) in the UK and Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 
486) in Hong Kong. Audio recordings and written transcripts will be stored securely at the 
University of York and will only be accessible to the researcher and the supervisor of this 
study if necessary.  
 
On the University’s request, if you disclose any potential for risk of harm of yourself or 
someone else, the researcher will consult the supervisor and may report about it to who may 
well act on this information. Should this rare situation happen the researcher will discuss 
with you first. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No, it is entirely your decision whether you want to participate in the research. If you do 
decide to participate you can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
Who can I contact for more information? 
 
If you have any questions about the research please contact: 
 
Ken, Ka-wo FUNG (Doctoral Researcher) 
Research Centre For Social Sciences  
6 Innovation Close 
University of York 
Heslington 
York 
The United Kingdom 
YO10 5ZF 
Telephone: (852) 61770920 / 
                   (44) 0777843745 
Neil LUNT (Supervisor)  
Department of Social Policy and Social 
Work 
University of York 
Heslington 
York 
The United Kingdom  
YO10 5DD  
Telephone: (44) 01904 321235 
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Appendix Twelve  
 
Interviewees’ Consent Form  
Research Study on Physician managers in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority   
 
Please tick the appropriate boxes 
 Yes No 
I have been given an information sheet about the research and have had time 
to consider it. 
  
I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. I feel that I understand what the study involves. 
  
I understand that my participation in the research is voluntary and that I can 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
  
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project 
to the researcher, Ken, Ka-wo FUNG.   
  
I understand that the researcher may have to speak to another person if I tell 
him that I or someone else is at risk of harm. 
  
I am happy for the interview to be digitally recorded.    
I am happy for the researcher to take detailed notes of the interview.   
I understand that the information I give to the researcher will be treated in 
strict confidence according to the Data Protection Act (1998) in the UK and 
Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486) in Hong Kong. 
  
I understand that data I provide in the interview and questionnaire will be 
used in researcher’s PhD thesis and associated research outputs such as 
articles, conference papers and web pages. 
  
I understand that my words may be quoted in the research outputs of this 
study. 
  
I understand that the research outputs of this study may be openly accessed.   
Please choose one of the following options concerning how you would like your words to 
be quoted in research outputs. Please note that if you select option B or C you will be 
allocated a pseudonym (Dr X, Y, Z etc.).  
 
A) You may use my name and my job title 
B) You may use my job title only (rank and department; name of hospital will be 
hidden)   
C) You may not use my name or job title  
I understand that even if I am allocated a pseudonym my absolute anonymity 
cannot be guaranteed. 
  
I have sought approval from the hospital/ I confirm that there is no approval 
needed from the hospital in relation to this study   
  
I wish to receive a copy of the audio record of the interview.   
I wish to receive a copy of the publications that quote my words.   
I agree to take part in the research.   
Name:    _________________________________     Signature:   _________________ 
Email Address:    __________________________ Date:___________________ 
Telephone no:____________________      
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Appendix Thirteen 
 
Interview guide    
 
Research Study on Physician Managers in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority   
 
Interview Guide for physician managers   
 
 
Administration (5 minutes) 
 
• Introductions 
• Recap the purpose of the research 
• Invite interviewee to ask any questions that they may have 
• Complete the Consent Form  
• Collect the questionnaire  
• Check how much time the interviewee is prepared to spare 
 
Interview questions (30-50 minutes) 
 
1) Reasons for going into management and relevant experiences  
- How did you first get involved in the physician-manager role? What were your 
reasons for getting involved? 
- Can you tell me about your experiences in the transition from a clinical to an 
emerging management role? What did you expected of the management role? 
Were these expectations met? Any conflicts and ambiguities associated with the 
move?  
- Can you tell me about the kinds of things you do in this role? Please describe 
your role in the hospital /HA and your job tasks, i.e., a typical work day/week.    
 
2) Role-related attitudes and behaviours 
- How do you act in this role toward others such as administrators, other doctors, 
and senior management? 
- How do you think you relate to other doctors in your office in this role? Do you 
see yourself primarily as their advocate? Can you give me an example when you 
were/were not acting as an advocate? How do you personally feel about telling 
other physicians what to do or coordinating their work? Does the manager role 
interfere at all in how you get along with them? 
- Do you think physicians as a group are treated fairly in this hospital/ the HA? 
Can you give me an example of both fair and unfair treatment? How about other 
groups in this hospital/ the HA? 
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- Tell me about how you think decisions regarding physicians and providers get 
made here. Do you think senior management communicates enough and seeks 
input regarding decisions that affect physicians? Do you feel that you can affect 
decisions in this hospital/ the HA? 
- How satisfied overall are you in your work here in this hospital/ the HA? How 
about in your role as physician-manager? What was it about this hospital/ the 
HA that attracted you to it in the first place? Have those things changed at all? 
Would you ever leave this hospital/ the HA (example)? What would be some of 
the costs for you in terms of leaving? 
 
3) Feelings toward a variety of actors and entities  
- How do you feel about the changes in this hospital/ the HA is going through, in 
terms of having to focus on things like utilization and productivity among 
physicians? Are you willing to stand behind it, even if it means significant 
changes for physicians and how they do their work as a group in this hospital/ 
the HA? When wouldn’t you stand behind it (example)? Do you feel more 
loyalty to this hospital/ the HA or to your physician-colleagues? How committed 
are you to this hospital/ the HA and its survival?  
- How loyal do you feel toward your local office and the co-workers in that office? 
Do you feel close to the people here? Why (example)? Can you give me some 
examples of things that might happen within this hospital/ the HA that would 
decrease any feelings of loyalty you might have to it? 
 
4) Current concerns, anxieties, and sources of confusion or conflict on the part of 
individuals 
- Do you see a future for yourself in management or in this hospital/ the HA? 
Would you like to move up in management if given the opportunity? How 
important is clinical work to you? Do you like to do it? 
- Do you see any differences between those in full-time, senior medical 
management positions and those in first-line supervisory positions? How do you 
view each role? Would you ever want the other’s job (whichever they don’t have 
now)? Why/why not? 
 
5) Perceptions about the position of physician managers as a group in society  
- What do you think about the position of physician managers as a group in 
society? Do you think the general public respect physician managers? In your 
perceptions, what kinds of social images are associated to physician managers?  
 
Administration (5 minutes) 
 
• Ask the interviewee to nominate prospective interviewees  
• Request potential documentary materials. 
• Thank interviewee for their time and contribution. 
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Appendix Fourteen  
 
Questionnaire  
 
Research Study on Physician Managers in the Hong Kong Hospital Authority 
 
 
A. Personal Information  
 
1) Name:  
1) Hospital and department:  
2) Management position:  
3) Age: under 40  ☐   40-44  ☐   45-49  ☐   50-54  ☐   55 or above ☐ 
4) Gender: Male ☐  Female ☐ 
5) Year(s) you have served in the HA:                             
6) Year(s) you have served in the management position:                             
7) Management training:  Course  ☐   Diploma  ☐   Degree  ☐   No training  ☐ 
8) Proportion of time spent in clinical work:                           %  
 
B. Please select one answer from a seven-point scale to indicate whether 
you agree or disagree to the following statements  
 
1.  ‘I talk up the medical profession to my friends as a great career’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
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2. ‘I feel very loyal to the medical profession’  
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
3. ‘I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in 
order to help my profession be successful’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
4. ‘For me, medicine is the best of all possible professions in which to work’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
5. ‘I am proud to tell others that I am part of this profession’  
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
6. ‘I really care about the fate of the medical profession’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
7. ‘Individual physicians should make their own decisions in regard to what is 
to be done in their work’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
8. ‘Individual physicians should be left alone to exercise their own judgement in 
their work’  
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
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9. ‘Individual physicians should be their own boss in almost every work 
situation’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
10.  ‘Individual physicians' decisions should be subject to reviews by others’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
11.  ‘Physicians' work is something only those trained in the field can evaluate’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
12. ‘Only physicians can make judgements about how well other physicians 
practice medicine’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
13. ‘Only a physician can fully evaluate another's medical judgement’ 
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
 
14.  ‘Non-physicians are able to evaluate a physician's competence in practicing 
medicine’  
Strongly disagree ☐  Disagree ☐ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree or disagree ☐           
Agree ☐   Somewhat agree ☐   Strongly agree ☐    
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Appendix Fifteen  
 
Submission to Department Ethics Committee  
 
SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL WORK 
DEPARTMENTAL ETHICS COMMITTEE 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL OF RESEARCH 
 
This form must be used for all submissions for ethical approval to the Social Policy and Social 
Work Departmental Ethics Committee. Please complete all sections and sign the undertaking (on 
paper and electronically.  
The Social Policy and Social Work Departmental Ethics Committee is intended to consider projects 
which students, supervisors or staff believe may raise some ethical issues but which do not need to 
be subject to external review or review by the University Ethics Committee.  
The completed and signed form and any necessary attachments should be sent to the 
Departmental Ethics Committee Administrator, Nicola Moody, room A/B 125, for consideration by 
the Departmental Ethics Committee Panel.  An electronic copy should be emailed to 
nicola.moody@york.ac.uk at the same time. A decision will normally be made within 10 working 
days.  
 
Checklist (click on the box to enter a cross) 
☐ Have you decided that your project needs ethical approival and that it needs it from the 
Departmental Ethics Committee (not from external bodies or the University Ethics 
Committee)?(See “Does my project need ethical approval” on the VLE (under SPSW Staff 
Intranet/Research/Ethics) or contact Rebecca Tunstall, DEC Chair, if you are not sure. 
☐  Have you attached copies of all additional relevant material, such as research tools (questionnaires 
and topic guides), information sheets and consent forms?  
☐  Have you (and, for students, your supervisor) signed the form? 
☐  Have you provided Nicola Moody with a hard copy and an electronic copy of the form and attachments? 
 
Date of submission:………………………………………………………………. 
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1. Please provide details about the principal investigator (student or lead staff researcher). It is 
possible the ethics committee panel members may get in touch if they have queries 
Name 
Ka-wo FUNG 
If student, course Doctor of Philosophy in Social Policy and Social 
Work 
If student, supervisor for this research Dr Neil LUNT 
If staff, post  
Email 
kwf501@york.ac.uk 
Telephone 
07778437455 
 
2. For staff projects, please provide details for co-investigators (add more boxes if necessary) 
Name  
Post  
Organization if not SPSW  
Email  
Telephone  
 
3.When does the project start??  
The study commenced in October 2013.  Fieldwork will begin in November 2015. 
 
4. For staff: List any SPSW DEC member who might have a conflict of interest so should not act 
as reviewers for the project, such as those consulted in the development of the project, or close 
colleagues.  A list of members can be found on the VLE (under SPSW Staff 
Intranet/Research/Ethics) 
 
 
5. What is the full title of the research project? 
Healthcare governance in Hong Kong: a study on the emergence of ‘hybrid’ physician 
managers  
 
6. If the research is funded, who is the funder and does the funding source create any ethical 
concerns and/or actual or perceived conflicts of interest? 
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7. What are the aims and key methods of the research? 
The emergence of hybrid physician managers in hospital management in western countries 
under New Public Management has attracted researchers’ attention in the past two decades. 
However, it is under-explored outside the West. As a former colony of Britain, Hong Kong has a 
legacy of the NHS style universal public hospital system based on western medicine and a liberal 
profession of medicine. Similar to the U.K., the 1990s and 2000s saw rapid changes in Hong Kong 
that aimed to modernize the healthcare sector in terms of efficiency and 
transparency/accountability. The landscape of healthcare policy and politics in Hong Kong is in 
the same way shaped by the interplay between the state and professional powers.  
 
Although researchers in this niche field are commonly inspired by the re-stratification thesis that 
sees medicine as being divided into two groups, rank-and-file doctors and medicine elites who 
enrol into the administration and regulation posts, only a few empirical studies focus on the 
identity work of hybrid physician managers as the pivotal players in healthcare reforms. Indeed, 
it is not only the capacity but also the loyalty of medicine elites to their peers that decides whether 
or not the collective control of medicine on healthcare management can be preserved.  
 
The Hong Kong case study in this research will then aim to have the physician managers’ first 
person narratives on their management role in healthcare, with special attention to their social 
identification with professional colleagues and organizations.    
 
To collect data on the identity issue, a qualitative case study design will be employed. Two highly 
complementary sources of evidence will be combined to triangulate information  
• Elite interviews. Individual face-to face interview with physician managers will be the main 
source of data collection (please see Attachment C for the interview questions). Front-line 
doctors may also be interviewed in focus groups to explore the validity of their narratives. 
All participants will also be asked to fill in a short questionnaire to collect their personal 
information (e.g. age, year served in the organization) and beliefs in professional values 
(please see Attachment D for the questionnaire). 
• Documentary materials. Potential internal documents that can be accessed through 
informants or interviewees, if approved by the HA, include  minutes of meetings, annual 
reports, business plans, organization charts, strategic plan, management consultant reports 
and project documentation. Considering the uncertainty in my access to internal documents, 
a comprehensive search for a wide range of published documents will be conducted to 
crosscheck the content of interviews: national policy documents, newsletters of medical 
associations, and curriculum of medical education etc.     
As English is the working language of the medical sector in Hong Kong, research materials and 
interactions with participants will be primarily in English. Cantonese, the language commonly 
used in Hong Kong will be a second option for the respondents or supplement in 
communication. 
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8. What kind of research participants will be involved in the research (as interviewees, focus 
group participants, survey respondents etc), and how many?  
Heads or Department/ Chiefs of Service (usually a senior hospital consultant) in Hong Kong 
public hospitals and higher-level managers (Cluster/ Hospital Chief Executives, Senior 
Managers) will be the targeted participants in individual face-to face interview.  
I aim at interviewing at least 20 of them representing four groups of physician managers: 1) pure 
management at a higher level, and Heads or Department/ Chiefs of Service from three 
specialities: 2) Psychiatry, 3) Medicine and 4) Surgery. Each group consists of at least 5 physician 
managers with maximum variation in their speciality, age, gender and medical school.    
Interview with policy makers and at least 6 front-line doctors will also be conducted as 
supplement (at least 3 from each specialty). The maximum variation sampling also applies to 
the interviews with front-line doctors.  
 
9. How will research participants will be identified, approached and recruited? 
Route 1: two senior doctors in HK public hospital system has agreed to serve as the key 
informants/gatekeepers in this research providing important background information and 
referral of interviewees. They are Prof Yun-kwok WING, Associate Dean of the Faculty of 
Medicine at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Chief of Service in the Department of 
Psychiatry at Shatin Hospital and Prince of Wales Hospital, and Dr the Honourable Ka-lau 
LEUNG, Legislative Council Member (Medical Constituency), Council Member of the Hong 
Kong Medical Association, former President of Hong Kong Public Doctors Association. I was 
working for Dr Leung as Research Associate in his Legislative Councillor’s Office from 2008 to 
2013. I also had working relation with Dr Wing in the Office’s research project. Practicing 
medicine in Hong Kong for 30 years and holding senior academic and political positions, they 
have personal contacts to a wide range of medical leaders which are highly valuable to this 
research. While the main targets of the research are physician managers, who are senior 
members of the medicine community, front-line doctors may feel pressured into participating 
by the role/status of the key informants. So the researcher will ask the key informants to clearly 
state to all front line doctors (especially their subordinates) that they are under no obligation to 
partake in the research and a decision not to take part will not have any bearing on their position. 
Route 2: a contact list of consultant doctors or higher-level managers may possibly be obtained 
from the open access hospital websites.   
Route 3: Mr Chris SUN, Head of Healthcare Planning and Development Office, Food and Health 
Bureau, has agreed to be my informant and interviewee. He may also nominate other policy 
makers as my interviewees.  I know him at an academic conference on Jan 22, 2016.  
Physician managers: the first wave of interviews with physician managers will recruit 
interviewees via routes 1 and 2. Then a snowball sampling stage will commence based on the 
nomination of interviewees of the first wave of interview.  
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Front-line doctors: the first wave of interviews with front-line doctors will recruit interviewees 
via route 1 and the nomination of interviewed physician managers. Then a snowball sampling 
stage will commence based on the nomination of interviewees of the first wave of interview. 
Policy makers: the first interviewee will be Mr Chris SUN. Then a snowball sampling stage will 
commence based on his or other informants’ nomination. An information brief (please see 
Attachment A) will be sent to the nominated participants via the key informants. 
 
10. How will informed consent to participate be elicited from participants? If different groups 
are involved in the study (e.g. parents, children, staff), please describe the consent procedures 
for each.  
This information is contained within an Information Sheet for potential participants at the first 
point of contact with a Consent Form asking them to read and complete before their interview 
commences. They will be given the opportunity to decide if they would like to participate and 
will be provided with clear information of:  
• The purpose of the research 
• What will happen to the results and how they will be disseminated 
• What their participation in the research will involve 
• What the potential risks and benefits of their involvement might be 
• How issues of anonymity and confidentiality will be managed  
• The fact that they are not obliged to take part and that they can withdraw from the study 
if they later change their mind about participating  
 
11. State any promise you will make to participants about how their data will be used, including 
in publications and dissemination, for example whether names, job titles, or direct quotations 
will be used, and state what protection of anonymity you are offering.  Please attach any consent 
form or information sheet used. 
(Note: For Research Council funded work, councils want anonymised data to be archived and 
made available to other researchers in addition to the research team) 
Outputs 
Participants will be informed via the Information Sheet that their words may be quoted in my 
PhD thesis and associated research outputs such as articles, conference papers and web pages. 
Anonymity  
All research participants will be given three options concerning how their words will be quoted 
within research outputs (see Attachment B):  
a) You may use my name and my job title  
b) You may use my job title only 
c) You may not use my name or my job title 
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Should a participant prefer option B they will be allocated a pseudonym (Dr X, Y, Z etc.). Yet, 
absolute anonymity will not be guaranteed to participants even if they opt for option B or C, i.e. 
participants may still be possible to be identified for their distinctive insights and the relatively 
small sample size.  
 
12. (Students: You are required to provide participants with a written information sheet and to 
obtain a signed record of consent form from participants. Please attach them.). For staff: Please 
attach the information sheet and consent form. If you do not envisage providing an information 
sheet and/or obtaining a signed (or audio recorded) record of consent from participants, please 
justify and explain the measures to ensure personal data will be collected and processed fairly, 
citing applicable Data Protection grounds from Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act (and 
schedule 3 as relevant) if necessary. 
Please see Attachments A and B 
 
13. Does the way you will handle research data conform to the Data Protection Act? 
Yes 
 
14. What will happen to research participants once you have recruited them to be involved in 
the research? (e.g. invited to an interview, given a questionnaire etc).  Please attach any research 
instruments (eg topic guides, questionnaires). 
Once research participants have been recruited a face-to-face interview will be arranged. The 
interview will last approximately 30-60 minutes and will be audio-recorded with the participant’s 
permission. A semi-structured Interview Guide will be sent to the participants for their reference 
(see Attachment C1 for physician managers,C2 for front-line doctors and C3 for policy makers).  
Before the interview they (except policy makers) will also receive a short questionnaire from the 
researcher via email or mail (see attachment D). It will be collected by the researcher in person 
during the interview or via email or mail.     
Telephone Interviewing (Contingency Plan) 
Every effort will be made to interview participants face-to-face. However, if this is not possible 
telephone interview will be arranged. During the interview the participant will be asked to 
respond to the base list of questions that feature on the face-to-face Interview Guide.  
 
15. If research participants are to receive any payments, reimbursement of expenses or other 
incentives for taking part in the research, please give details. 
N/A – no payments, reimbursement, expenses or other incentives will be offered. 
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16. If the research may involve ‘vulnerable people’ explain how you plan to deal with any 
specific ethical challenges. Please also provide details of the relevant DBS (formerly CRB) 
checks and/or ISA registration that have been undertaken. 
N/A – the research does not involve ‘vulnerable people’. 
 
17. What will you do if in the course of the research information is disclosed to you that legally 
requires further action or where further action is advisable?  
Should this situation arise I will contact (email, skype or telephone if necessary) with my 
supervisor, and also have the research participant involved, before taking any advised action. 
My Consent Form states that I may be legally required to inform someone who may well act on 
this information if the participant discloses the potential for harm to themselves or another.  
 
18. Are there any potential risks for participants? How have they been eliminated or minimised? 
Professional Risk 
As highlighted in Q11, absolute anonymity cannot be guaranteed for individuals who 
participate in this study. As such, the following strategies will be employed to minimise  risk: 
• Participants will be asked to seek any necessary approval form their organization to 
avoid their personal labilities.  
• Where participants do not wish to be directly quoted in research outputs pseudonyms 
will be employed. 
• Participants will keep a copy of the interview audio record to protect themselves from 
any misuse of the quotes of their words, if they so wish.  
Emotional Distress / Psychological Harm 
No risks anticipated. However, a participant’s body language will be monitored for signs of 
distress. Should this occur I will suggest suspending the interview. 
Personal Safety  
No risks anticipated. I will show my University Card to participants. Interviews will be 
conducted in public space and according to the wishes of interviewees (e.g. in the hospital sites 
if allowed, or any public place interviews suggest). 
 
19. Are there any potential benefits to participants? 
There are no immediate, direct benefits to participants from taking part in the research. However, 
non-direct benefits include: having the opportunity to share their personal experience in medical 
management, feeling that their views as an expert are valued, and perhaps helping to inform 
future policy development.   
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20. Are there any potential risks for the researcher(s) involved in the project? What steps will 
you take to eliminate or minimise them? 
(Note: these risks could include personal safety, emotional distress, risk of accusation of harm or 
impropriety). 
Professional Risk 
To protect the integrity of the study and to prevent the threat of ‘veto’, no opportunity for pre-
publication scrutiny of outputs will be provided to research participants. 
Emotional Distress / Psychological Harm 
No risks anticipated.  I will seek advice from supervisor for problems arise.  
Personal Safety 
• During the field work in my home country, Hong Kong, I will be living with my wife 
Janice DAO in our rented property. I will let her know who I will be going to interview 
(the doctor’s name, hospital, department etc.) and contact her immediately after each 
interview. If she cannot contact me for 2 hours she will contact the interviewee, if failed, 
the hospital/location of interview, and local police then.  
• A frequent contact (at least once for every  week via email or Skype) will ensure my 
supervisor knows my updated satiation.  
• In emergency my wife and my supervisor can contact each other.   
• Interviews will be conducted in public places (e.g. in the hospital sites, or any public 
place the participants suggest). No interviews will be conducted in interviewee’s homes 
or a private space.  
• My mobile phone will be switched on at all times (on silent mode) during the field work 
in Hong Kong. 
• Interviews will be abandoned immediately if any safety concerns arise. 
• Equipment and valuable items will be kept out of sight.  
• Public transport, reputable taxis and a private car and will be utilised as appropriate. All 
routes will be carefully planned in advance. I will ensure that they have access to paper 
and electronic maps. 
• I will carry enough money for expected and unexpected expenses (i.e. taxis).  
 
21. In most cases, as soon as possible during the research, and by the time research is completed, 
you should anonymise the data taken from your participants (data such as paper or electronic 
interview transcripts, notes of discussions, videos, sound recordings etc). You should do this by 
removing names, addresses and other identifiers, and replacing them with a number, code or 
pseudonym. You should prepare a key linking the code to the data from the person.  (Further 
guidance is available from 
http://www.ico.org.uk/Global/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical_application/a
nonymisation_code.ashx). (Note:  sound and video recordings in which people may be directly or 
indirectly identifiable are also covered by the Data Protection Act.)  If you do not intend to 
anonymise data in this way, please explain why. If you do, when will you make this separation? 
What will you do to protect personal data in the interim? How will you keep the key safe? How 
long will you keep the key?  
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Audio records of interviews 
Following the completion of each interview the audio records will be transferred to my personal 
account on the University of York server and placed in a password protected file as soon as 
possible, within one day after interview. Each audio recording will be allocated a code. A data 
key will be prepared linking the code to the data from the participant. The data key will be stored  
in my google drive .  Only I have the access to my personal account in the University of York 
server/ google drive.  
Documentary evidence 
The same process as outlined above will be followed: 
• When electronic transcripts of the audio data are produced  
• When any electronic non-published documentary evidences are obtained from 
interviewees or informants 
• When a soft-copy or any digital record of filled-in questionnaire is collected from 
interviewees 
• When a soft-copy or any digital record of Consent Forms is collected from interviewees 
Hard copies of documentary evidence (questionnaires, my research notes or any other paper-
based data /personal information) will be assigned codes and they will be separately stored in 
the drawer in my rented property in Hong Kong once obtained. Only I have the key to the drawer.     
The data key will be kept for 3 years following my graduation. 
 
22. Where will participant contact details, anonymised data, consent forms and data keys be 
kept during the research, and in what form?  
(Note: The best method for contact details is to use first name only, or code, in a phone, or paper 
diary, and to destroy details once fieldwork is complete. The best protection for anonmysied data 
is to store electronic data in a single site only, on a UoY server in password protected form. If other 
sites are used, they should be password protected and backups should be encrypted. Commercial 
Dropboxes should be avoided for personal data because they are cloud-based.  You can encrypt 
your equipment using an open source application TrueCrypt.  Avoid laptops and data sticks.  
Please make a special note if data are likely to be stored (including on servers) or otherwise 
transferred outside the EU). Consent forms and data keys contain participant names and should be 
kept safe and separate from anonymised research data. The best protection is to store paper data in 
a locked filing cabinet eg in the main departmental office, and to store electronic data on a UoY 
server in password protected form). 
Anonymised Electronic Data  
• Audio recordings, electronic transcripts and electronic documentary evidence will be 
stored on the University of York server. This is regularly backed up by IT Services. 
• All electronic data will be held in password protected files.  
• No electronic data will be stored on hard drives or portable devices. 
Paper-Based Data 
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• Consent Forms, questionnaires and other paper-based data or personal information (e.g., 
hard copies of documentary evidence, my research notes and contacts of interviewees) 
will be assigned codes and they will be separately stored in the drawer in my rented 
property in Hong Kong once obtained. Only I have the key to the drawer. After I return 
to York they will be separately stored in the drawer in my office in the Research Centre 
for the Social Sciences (ReCSS). Entry to this building is restricted to key card holders. 
Only I have the key to the drawer. 
 
23. Where will anonymised data, consent forms and data keys be kept after the research in what 
form and for how long? If there are plans to archive data, how and where will they be kept and 
will there be restrictions on access and use? 
(Note: Students should keep their data for a year after their mark has been finalised. For Research 
Council funded work, councils usually want anonymised data to be archived and made available 
to other researchers in addition to the research team. Councils want consent forms kept for 10 
years).  
Storage of data and Consent Forms  
The anonymised interview data, the documentary evidence, my research notes, Consent Forms, 
other paper-based data/ personal information and the keys to those archives will be kept for 3 
years following my graduation. Once 3 years has passed these items will be destroyed. I will first 
look for secure storage options in the University of York. If a secure storage system in the 
University of York is not available I will make arrangements for my supervisor to take 
responsibility for these items until they are due to be destroyed (in a box stored in my supervisor’ 
office). 
 
24. Who within the University will have responsibility for the anonymised data, consent forms 
and keys after the study? What will happen if the person responsible for the project leaves the 
University of York?  
(Please make a special note if the data may be transferred outside the European Economic Area.) 
I will remain responsible the anonymised interview data, the documentary evidence, my research 
notes, Consent Forms, other paper-based data/ personal information and the keys to those 
archives. If a secure storage option in the University of York is not available I will make 
arrangements for my supervisor to take responsibility for these items until they are due to be 
destroyed. 
 
25. Will results will be made available to participants and the communities from which they are 
drawn, and if so, how? 
I will send my publications to interviewees whose words are quoted for their reference.    
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26. Are there any other specific ethical problems likely to arise with the proposed study? If so, 
what steps have you taken or will you take to address them?  
 N/A  
 
27. When does the project finish? Documents relating to this request for ethical approval will 
kept for 10 years after this end date. 
I aim at submitting the project as my PhD thesis by the end of 2016.   
 
Signature of Student/Principal 
Investigator: ………………………………………………………………………...... 
 
For Supervisor (for 
Students) …………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
I have checked this form carefully and I am satisfied that the project meets the required ethical 
standards. 
 
Signature of 
Supervisor: ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date of 
Completion: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………
... 
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Abbreviations 
CCC - Chairman of the HA Co-ordinating Committee on a specialty 
CCE - Cluster Chief Executive   
CCGs - Clinical Commissioning Groups  
CHI - Commission for Health Improvement, UK 
CHRE - Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence  
COS - Chief of Service 
CSC - Clinical Service Co-ordinator/ Director  
CQC - Care Quality Commission, UK 
DOH - Department of Health, UK 
GMC - General Medical Council, UK  
GP - General Practice/ Practitioner 
HA - Hospital Authority  
HAHO - Hospital Authority Head Office 
HCE - Hospital Chief Executive 
PCTs - Primary Care Trusts   
PSA - Professional Standards Authority, UK  
 
 
314 
 
Bibliography 
Abbott, A. (1988). The system of professions: an essay on the division of expert labour. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Acker, J. (2006). Inequality regimes: Gender, class, and race in organizations. Gender 
and Society, 20(4), pp. 441–464. 
Alasuutari, Pertti (2004). The globalization of qualitative research. In Gobo, G., Seale, C. 
Gubrium, J. and Silverman, D. (Eds.), Qualitative Research Practice. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage, pp.595-608. 
Alford, R. (1975). Health care politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Allen, A. (1995). Doctors in management or the revenge of the conquered. Journal of 
Management in Medicine, 9(4), 44-50. 
Allen, D. (2009). From boundary concept to boundary object: the practice and politics of 
care pathway development. Social Science & Medicine, 69 (3), 354-61. 
Allsop, J. (1999). Identity maintenance under conditions of change: the medical profession 
in the UK in the late twentieth century. In I. Hellberg, M. Saks, and C. Benoit, (Eds.) 
Professional identities in transition: cross-cultural dimensions. Goteborg: Almquist and 
Wiksell International, pp.157-73. 
Allsop, J., Baggott, I. and Jones, K. (2002). Health consumer groups and the national policy 
process. In S., Henderson and A. Peterson, (Eds.). Consuming health. London: Routledge, 
pp. 48-65. 
Allsop, J., Jones, K. and Baggott, R. (2004). Health consumer groups in the UK: a new social 
movement? Sociology of Health and Illness, 26, 737-756. 
Anderson, E., Shepherd, M., and Salisbury, C. (2006). ‘Taking off the suit’: engaging the 
community in primary health care decision-making. Health Expectations, 9, 70-80. 
Archer, M. (2003). Structure, agency and the internal conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Arksey, H. and O'Malley, L. (2005) Scoping studies: towards a methodological framework. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 8 (1), 19-32. 
Armstrong, D (2002). Clinical autonomy, individual and collective: the problem of changing 
doctors’ behaviour. Social Science & Medicine, 55, p.1771-1777. 
Arnstein, S. (1971). Eight rungs on the ladder of citizen participation. In S. Cahn, E. Cahn, 
and B. Passett, (Eds.). Citizen participation: effecting community change. New York: 
Praeger Publications, pp.79-91.  
 
 
315 
 
Askim, J., Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2015). Accountability and performance 
management: the Norwegian hospital, welfare, and immigration administration. 
International Journal of Public Administration, 38 (13-14), 971-982.  
Aspalter, C. (2006). The East Asian welfare model. International Journal of Social Welfare, 
15, 290-301. 
Audet, M., Doty, M., Shamasdin, J. and Schoenbaum, C. (2005). Measure, learn, and 
improve: physicians’ involvement in quality improvement. Health Affairs, 24(3), 843-
853. 
Baggott, R. (2005). A funny thing happened on the way to the forum? Reforming patient 
and public involvement in the NHS. Public Administration, 83, 533-551. 
Bauld, L., Judge K., Barnes, M., Benzeval, M., Mackenzie, M. and Sullivan, H. (2005). 
Promoting social change: the experience of Health Action Zones in England. Journal of 
Social Policy, 34, 427-445. 
Beasley, B. (2013). Elective surgery commissioning guidance - clinical engagement in high-
value commissioning - Right care case book series. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.rightcare.nhs.uk/downloads/Right_Care_Casebook_High_Value_commissi
oning_final_15052013.pdf [Accessed 5 July 2015]. 
Becker, H. (1963). Outsider: studies in the Sociology of deviance. New York: Free Press. 
Bell, S. and Hindmoor, A. (2009). Rethinking governance: the centrality of the state in 
modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Berg, M., Horstman, K., Plass, S. and van Heusden, M. (2000). Guidelines, professionals 
and the production of objectivity: standardisation and the professionalism of insurance 
medicine. Sociology of Health and Illness, 22(6), 765-791. 
Berry, M. (2002). Validity and reliability in elite interviewing. Political Science and 
Politics, 35(4), pp. 679–682. 
Besharov M. and Smith W. (2014). Multiple institutional logics in organizations: explaining 
their varied nature and implications. Academy of Management Review, 39(3), 364-381.  
Bloomberg (2016). Bloomberg Healthcare Efficiency Index. [Online]. Available at:  
http://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/iNK1THx4aD20/v3/-1x-1.png 
[Accessed 4 December 2016]. 
Blumenthal, D. and Hsiao, W. (2015). Lessons from the East - China’s rapidly evolving 
health care system. New England Journal of Medicine, 372(14), 1281-1285.  
Bovaird, T. (2007). Beyond engagement and participation: user and community 
coproduction of public services. Public Administration Review, 67, 846-860. 
Bovaird, T. and Loeffler, E. (2012). From engagement to co-production: the contribution of 
users and communities to outcomes and public value. Voluntas, 23(4), 1119-1138. 
 
 
316 
 
Brint, S. (1993). Eliot Freidson’s contributions to the sociology of profession. Work and 
Occupations, 20(3), 259-278.  
Bryman, A. (2005). Research Methods and Organization Studies. Taylor & Francis e-
Library. 
Burt, S. (1992). Structural holes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Byrkjeflot, H. and Jespersen, K. (2014). Three conceptualizations of hybrid management in 
hospitals. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 27 (5), 441-458. 
Byrne, D. (2004). Evidence-based: what constitutes valid evidence? A. Gray, and S. 
Harrison, (Eds.). Governing medicine: theory and practice. Buckingham: Open 
University Press, pp.81-92. 
Campbell, S. McDonald, R. and Lester, H. (2008). The experience of pay for performance 
in English family practice: a qualitative study. Annals of Family Medicine, 6, 228-234.  
Carroll, J. (2007). A Concise History of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press.  
Castro, P., Dorgan, S. and Richardson, B. (2008). A healthier health care system for the 
United Kingdom. The McKinsey Quarterly, February, 1-5. 
Cawson, A. (1982). Corporatism and welfare: social policy and state intervention in Britain. 
London: Heinemann Educational Books. 
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2012a). Hong Kong monthly digest of 
statistics: feature article, statistics on Comprehensive Social Security Assistance 
Scheme, 2001 to 2011. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B71209FB2012XXXXB0100.pdf [Accessed 4 
December 2014]. 
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong (2012b). Hong Kong 2011 Population Census 
- Thematic report: household income distribution in Hong Kong. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp170.jsp?productCode=B1120057 [Accessed 4 
December 2014]. 
Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong. (2016).  Population By-census - Summary 
Results. [On-line] Available at:   
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp459.jsp?productCode=B1120094 [Accessed 
on 22 May 2017] 
Chamberlain, J. (2009). Doctoring medical governance: medical self-regulation in 
transition. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
Chan, C. (2003). Managing Welfare in Post-colonial Hong Kong. In A. Walker, and C. 
Wong, (Eds.). East Asian welfare regimes in transitions. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp.95-
116.   
 
 
317 
 
Charlton, R, Imison, C. and Curzon, J. (2011) How to get the best outcomes when 
measuring productivity. Health Service Journal, July. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.hsj.co.uk/topics/workforce/how-to-get-the-best-outcomes-when-
measuring-productivity/5031573.article [Accessed 23 October 2014]. 
Charles, M. and Grusky, B. (2004). Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation 
of Women and Men. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Chau, R. and Yu, S. (2003). Marketisation and residualisation - recent reforms in the medical 
financing system in Hong Kong. Social Policy and Society, 2(3), 199-207. 
Checkland, K., Harrison, S. and Coleman, A. (2009). Structural interests in health care: 
evidence from the contemporary National Health Service. Journal of Social Policy, 38, 
607-625.  
Checkland, K., Harrison, S., McDonald, R., Grant, S., and Guthrie, B. (2008). Biomedicine, 
holism and general medical practice: responses to the 2004 general practitioner contract. 
Sociology of Health and Illness, 30, 788-803. 
Cheung, A. (1995). Politics of administrative reforms in Hong Kong – corporatization of 
public services during the 1980s. PhD. London School of Economics and Political 
Science.  
Cheung, A. (2002a). The politics of New Public Management; some experience from 
reforms in East Asia. K. McLaughlin, S. Osborne, and E. Ferlie, (Eds.). The New Public 
Management: current trends and future prospects. London: Routledge, pp.243‐273. 
Cheung, A. (2002b). Modernizing public healthcare governance in Hong Kong: a case study 
of professional power in the New Public Management. Public Management Review, 4(3), 
343-365. 
Chiu, S. and Wong, V. (2005). Hong Kong: from feministic to Confucian welfare. In A. 
Walker, and C. Wong, (Eds.). East Asian welfare regimes in transitions. Bristol: The 
Policy Press, pp.73-93. 
Chiu, S. Ho, K. and Lui, T. (2011). Reforming health: contrasting trajectories of neoliberal 
restructuring in the city-states. In B. Park, R. Hill, and A. Saito, (Eds.). Locating 
neoliberalism in East Asia: neoliberalizing spaces in developmental states. Malden, 
Mass.:Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 225-256.    
Chow, N. (1995). Shehui fuli de gainian he zhidu (Social welfare: concept and system). Hong 
Kong: Zhonghua Book Company. (In Chinese) 
Clarke, J., Newman, J., Smith, N., Vidler, E. and Westmarland, L. (2007). Creating citizen-
consumers: changing publics and changing public services. London: Sage. 
Coburn, D., Rappaport, S. and Bourgeault, I. (1997). Decline vs retention of medical power 
through re-stratification: an examination of the Ontario case. Sociology of Health and 
Illness, 28(2), 178-202. 
 
 
318 
 
Coburn, S. (1993). State authority, medical dominance and trends in the regulation of the 
health professions: the Ontario case. Social Science & Medicine, 37(7), 841- 850. 
Coleman, W. (1999). Internationalised policy environments and policy network analysis. 
Political Studies, 47 (4), 691-713. 
Conklin, A., Morris, Z. and Nolte, E. (2015). What is the evidence base for public 
involvement in health-care policy? Results of a systematic scoping review. Health 
Expectations, 18, 153-165. 
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (2012). An approach to assuring continuing 
fitness to practise based on right-touch regulation principles. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.professionalstandards.org.uk/docs/default-source/publications/policy-
advice/continuing-fitness-to-practise-based-on-right-touch-regulation-
2012.pdf?sfvrsn=4 [Accessed 10 March 2016].  
Courpasson, D. (2000). Managerial strategies of domination: power in soft bureaucracies. 
Organization Studies, 21(1), 141-161. 
Crawford, M., Aldridge, T., Bhui, K. et al. (2003). User involvement in the planning and 
delivery of mental health services: a cross-sectional survey of service users and providers. 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 107, 410-414. 
Currie, G. and Suhomlinova, O. (2006). The impact of institutional forces upon knowledge 
sharing in the UK NHS: the triumph of professional power and the inconsistency of policy. 
Public Administration, 84 (1), 1-30. 
Currie, G., Finn, R. and Martin, G. (2009). Professional competition and modernizing the 
clinical workforce in the NHS. Work, employment and society, 23 (2), 267-284. 
Currie, G., Finn, R. and Martin, G. (2010). Role transition and the interaction of relational 
and social identity: new nursing roles in the English NHS. Organization Studies, 31(07), 
941-961. 
Danon-Leva, E., Cavico, F. and Mujtaba, B. (2010). Business ethics: a cross-cultural 
comparison between Hong Kong and the United States. Journal of Business Studies 
Quarterly, 1(4), pp. 1-20.  
Davies, C. (2003). Introduction: a new workforce in the making? In C. Davies, (Ed.). The 
future health workforce. Houndmills: Palgrave, pp.1-13. 
Davies, J. (2011). Challenging Governance Theory. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Dent, M. (1993). Professionalism, educated labour and the state: hospital medicine and the 
new managerialism. Sociological Review, 41(2), 244-273. 
Department of Health, UK (2000a). The NHS plan. London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health, UK (2000b). Patient and public involvement in the new NHS. London. 
Department of Health. 
 
 
319 
 
Department of Health, UK (2001). Shifting the balance of power within the NHS: securing 
delivery. London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health, UK (2002). Liberating the talents. London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health, UK (2004a). Agenda for change ﬁnal agreement. London: 
Department of Health. 
Department of Health, UK (2004b). General Practitioner with Special Clinical Interest in 
Genetics - Framework document. London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health, UK (2006). Our health, our care, our say. London: Department of 
Health. 
Department of Health, UK (2010). Equity and excellence: liberating the NHS. [Online]. 
Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213823/d
h_117794.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2016]. 
Department of Health, UK (2013). Effective clinical and financial engagement: a best 
practice guide for the NHS. [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255655/e
ffective_clinical_financial_engagement.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2016]. 
Department of Health, UK (2015). Culture change in the NHS: applying the lessons of the 
Francis Inquiries. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/403010/c
ulture-change-nhs.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2016]. 
Dexter, A. (2006). Elite and specialized interviewing. Colchester, UK: European 
Consortium for Political Research. 
DiMaggio, J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In J. Zucker, (Ed.). 
Institutional patterns and organizations: culture and environment. Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger, pp. 3-22.  
DiMaggio, J. and Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited - institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147-160.  
Doolin, B. (2001). Doctors as managers: new public management in a New Zealand hospital. 
Public Management Review, 3(2), 231-54. 
Drennan, V. Grant, R. and Harris, R. (2014). Trends over time in prescribing by English 
primary care nurses: a secondary analysis of a national prescription database. BMC 
Health Services Research, 14 (54). [Online]. Available at: DOI: 10.1186/1472-6963-14-
54 [Accessed 5 July 2015]. 
Du Gay, P. (1996). Consumption and identity at work. London: Sage.  
 
 
320 
 
Dunn, M. and Jones, C. (2010). Institutional logics and institutional pluralism: the 
contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967–2005.  Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 55, 114-149. 
Eckstein, H. (1958). The English Health Service: Its Origins, Structure, and Achievements. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Eckstein, H. (1960). Pressure Groups politics: the case of the British Medical Association. 
London: George Allen and Unwin.  
Elston, M. (1991). The politics of professional power: medicine in a changing medical 
service. In J. Gabe, M. Calman, and M. Bury, (Eds.). The Sociology of the Health Service. 
Routledge, pp. 187-273.  
Enany, N., Currie, G. and Lockett, A. (2013). A paradox in healthcare service development: 
professionalization of service users. Social Science & Medicine , 80, 24-30. 
Evetts, J. (2003). The sociological analysis of professionalism. International Sociology, 18 
(2), 395-415. 
Evetts, J. (2009). New professionalism and new public management: changes, continuities 
and consequences. Comparative Sociology, 8, 247-266.  
Exworthy, M. and Powell, M. (2012). Case studies in health policy: an introduction. In 
Exworthy, M. Peckham, M., Powell, Hann, A. (Eds.), Shaping Health Policy: Case Study 
Methods and Analysis. Policy Press at the University of Bristol, pp. 3-20. 
Falkner, G. (1997). Corporatist governance and Europeanisation: no future in the multi-level 
game? European Integration Online Papers, 1(11). [Online]. Available at: 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/1997-011.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2016].  
Fawcett, P. (2013). How are we governed? Decentred theory and the core executive. 
[Online]. Available at: https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/684_358.pdf [Accessed 
23 October 2014]. 
Ferlie, E., Firlzgerald, L., Mcgivern, G., Dopson, S. and Bennett, C. (2011). Public policy 
networks and ‘wicked problems’: a nascent solution? Public Administration, 89 (2), 307-
324. 
Fitzgerald, L. (1994). Moving Clinicians into Management. Journal of Management in 
Medicine, 8 (6), 32-44. 
Flynn, R. (2002). Clinical governance and governmentality.  Health, Risk and Society, 4(2), 
155-173. 
Flynn, R. (2004). “Soft bureaucracy”, governmentality and clinical governance: theoretical 
approaches to emergent policy. In A. Grey, and S. Harrison, (Eds.) Governing medicine: 
theory and practice. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, pp. 11-26. 
 
 
321 
 
Food and Health Bureau, Hong Kong (2008). Your health, your life: healthcare reform 
consultation document. Hong Kong: Govt. Printer. 
Food and Health Bureau, Hong Kong (2012). For discussion on 18 December 2012, 
Legislative Council Panel on Health Services: issues relating to the development and 
operation of private hospitals. [Online]. Available at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-
13/english/panels/hs/papers/hs1218cb2-334-1-e.pdf [Accessed 23 October 2014]. 
Foot, C., Sonola, L., Maybin, J. and Naylor, C. (2012). Service-line management: can it 
improve quality and efficiency? [Online] Available at: 
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/files/kf/service-line-management-quality-efficiency-
kings-fund-january2011.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2016].  
Forbes, T. and Hallier, J. (2006). Social identity and self-enactment strategies: adapting to 
change in professional-manager relationships in the NHS. Journal of Nursing 
Management, 14(1), 34-42. 
Fotaki, M. (2011). Towards developing new partnerships in public services: users as 
consumers, citizens and/or co-producers in health and social care in England and Sweden. 
Public Administration, 89 (3), 933-955. 
Fournier, V. (2000). Boundary work and the (un)making of the professions. In N. Malin, 
(Ed.). Professionalism, boundaries and the workplace. London: Routledge, pp.67-86.  
Freidson, E. (1961). Patients’ Views of Medical Practice: A Study of Subscribers to a 
Prepaid Medical Plan in the Bronx. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Freidson, E. (1984). The changing nature of professional control. Sociology, 10, pp.1-
20 
Freidson, E. (1985). The Reorganization of the medical profession. Medical Care Review, 
42(1), 1-20. 
Freidson, E. (1988). Profession of medicine: a study of the sociology of applied knowledge. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Freidson, E. (1994). Professionalism reborn: theory, prophecy and policy. Oxford: Polity 
Press. 
Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism: the third logic. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Friedman, M. and Friedman, R. (1980). Free to choose: a personal statement. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
Fudge N., Wolfe C. and McKevitt, C. (2008). Assessing the promise of user involvement in 
health service development: ethnographic study. British Medical Journal, 336-313. 
Fung, K. (2016). Controversies over Medical Council reform (in Chinese). HK01, 13 July 
2016. [Online] Available at: http://www.hk01.com/article/31283 [Accessed 13 July 
2016].  
 
 
322 
 
Gemmell, I., Campbell, S., Hann, M. and Sibbald, B. (2009). Assessing workload in general 
practice in England before and after the introduction of the pay-for-performance contract. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 65 (3), 509-515. 
General Medical Council (2016). The State of Medical Education and Practice in the 
UK. [Online]. Available at: http://www.gmc-
uk.org/SOMEP_2016_Full_Report_Lo_Res.pdf_68139324.pdf  [Accessed 9 July 2017] 
George,V. and Wilding, P. (1994). Welfare and Ideology. New York; London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Gerada, C., Wright, N. and Keen, J. (2002). The General Practitioner with a Special Interest: 
new opportunities or the end of the generalist practitioner? British Journal of General 
Practice, 52 (483), 796-798. 
Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? American Political Science 
Review, 98 (2), pp. 341-354. 
Gerring, J. (2007). Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Giaimo, S. (2002). Markets and medicine: the politics of health care reform in Britain, 
Germany, and the United States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: An Outline of a Theory of Structuration. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1993). New Rules of Sociological Method. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Goodrick, E. and Reay, T. (2011). Constellations of institutional logics: changes in the 
professional work of pharmacists. Work and Occupations, 38, 372-416.  
Goodstadt, L. (2007). Business friendly and politically convenient - the historical role of 
functional constituencies. In C. Loh, and Civic Exchange (Eds.). Functional 
constituencies: a unique feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, pp.41-57.  
Grant, W. (1995). Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy. London: Harvester Press. 
Greenway, J., Salter, B. and Hart, S. (2007). How policy networks can damage democratic 
health: a case study in the government of governance. Public Administration, 85, 717-
738. 
Griffiths, L. and Hughes, D. (2000). Talking contracts and taking care: managers and 
professionals in the British National Health Service internal market. Social Science & 
Medicine , 51, 209-222. 
Haig, B. (1995). Grounded theory as scientific method. Philosophy of Education, 28 (1), 
pp.1-11.   
 
 
323 
 
Ham, C., Clark, J., Spurgeon, P., Dickinson, H. and Armit, K. (2011). Doctors who become 
chief executives in the NHS: from keen amateurs to skilled professionals.  Journal of the 
Royal Society of Medicine, 104, 113-119. 
Ham, C. and Hunter, J. (1988). Managing clinical activity in the NHS - Briefing Paper 8. 
London: King’s Fund Institute. 
Hammersley, M. (1992). What's Wrong with Ethnography? Methodological Explorations. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Hardyman, W., Daunt, K. and Kitchener, M. (2015). Value co-creation through patient 
engagement in health care: a micro-level approach and research agenda. Public 
Management Review, 17(1), 90-107. 
Harrison, S. (1999). Clinical autonomy and health policy: past and futures.  In M. Exworthy, 
and S. Halford, (Eds.). Professionalism and the New Managerialism in the public sector. 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Harrison, S. (2002). New Labour, modernisation and the medical labour process. Journal of 
Social Policy, 31(2), 1-24. 
Harrison, S. (2009). Co-optation, communication and the medical model: governing UK 
Medicine since 1991. Public Administration, 87, 184-197. 
Harrison, S. and Ahmad, W. (2000). Medical Autonomy and the UK State 1975 to 2025. 
Society and Sociology, 34 (1), 129-146. 
Harrison, S. and Dowswell, G. (2002). Autonomy and bureaucratic accountability in primary 
care: what English General Practitioners say. Sociology of Health and Illness, 24 (2), 217-
241. 
Harrison, S. and Lim, J. (2000). Clinical governance and primary care in the English 
National Health Service: some issues of organization and rules. Critical Public Health, 
10(3), 321-329.  
Harrison, S. and Lim, J. (2003). The frontier of control: doctors and managers in the NHS 
1966 to 1997. Clinical Governance International, 8 (2), 13-17. 
Harrison, S. and McDonald, R. (2008). The Politics of Healthcare in Britain. London: Sega.  
Harrison, S. and Smith, C. (2003). Neo-bureaucracy and public management: the case of 
medicine in the National Health Service. Competition and Change, 7(4), 243-254. 
Harrison, S. and Wood, B. (2000). Scientific-bureaucratic medicine and U.K. health policy. 
Review of Policy Research, 17, 25-42. 
Harrison, S., Hunter, D. and Pollitt, C. (1990). The Dynamics of British Health Policy. 
London: Unwin Hyman. 
Harvey, W. (2010). Methodological approaches for interviewing elites. Geography 
Compass, 4 (3), pp. 193 -205. 
 
 
324 
 
Harvey, W. (2011). Strategies for conducting elite interviews, Qualitative Research, 11 
(4), pp.431-441. 
Haug, M. (1973). Deprofessionalisation: an alternative hypothesis for the future. 
Sociological Review, 20, 195-211. 
Healey, J. and Robinson M. (1992). Democracy, governance, and economic policy: sub-
Saharan Africa in comparative perspective. London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Healey, P. (1997). Collaborative planning: shaping plans in fragmented societies. 
Macmillan: England. 
Health Education England (2015). District Nursing and General Practice Nursing Services 
Education and Career Framework. [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.hee.nhs.uk/sites/default/files/documents/District%20nursing%20and%20G
P%20practice%20nursing%20framework_0.pdf  [Accessed 12 December 2016].  
Herod, A. (1999). Reflections on interviewing foreign elites: praxis, positionality, validity, 
and the cult of the insider. Geoforum, 30, pp. 313–327. 
Héritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008). The shadow of hierarchy and new modes of 
governance. Journal of Public Policy, 28 (1), 1-17. 
Hirst, P. (2000). Democracy and Governance. In J. Pierre, (Ed.). Debating governance: 
authority, steering and democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.13-35. 
Hoare, K., Mills, J. and Francis, K. (2012). The role of government policy in supporting 
nurse-led care in general practice in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia: an 
adapted realist review. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 68 (5), 963-980. 
Hoff, T. (1999). The social organization of physician-managers in a changing HMO. Work 
and Occupations, 26 (3), 324-351. 
Hoff, T. (2000). Professional commitment among US physician executives in managed care. 
Social Science & Medicine, 50, 1433-1444. 
Hofstede G. and Hofstede G. (2005). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Hoggett, P. (1991). A new management in the public sector? Policy & Politics, 19 (4), 243-
256. 
Holliday I. (2003). Healthcare.  In I. Holliday, and P. Wilding, (Eds.). Welfare capitalism in 
East Asia: social policy in the tiger economies. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 70-98. 
Holliday, I. (2000). Productivist welfare capitalism: social policy in East Asia. Political 
Studies, 48 (4), 706-723. 
 
 
325 
 
Holtman, M. (2011). Paradoxes of professionalism and error in complex systems. Journal 
of Biomedical Informatics, 44 (3), 395-401. 
Hong Kong Hospital Authority (2015). The Annual Report 2014-15. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.ha.org.hk/ho/corpcomm/AR201415/html/en/index.html [Accessed 10 March 
2016]. 
Hong Kong Housing Authority (2013). Housing in figures. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/en/common/pdf/about-us/publications-and-
statistics/HIF.pdf [Accessed 4 December 2014]. 
Hsiung, P. (2012). The globalization of qualitative research: challenging Anglo-American 
domination and local hegemonic discourse. Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 13(1), 
Art. 21. 
Huang, K, Keith, G. and Provan, G. (2007). Resource tangibility and patterns of interaction 
in a publicly funded health and human services network. Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 17, 435 -54. 
Hunter, B. and Segrott, J. (2014). Renegotiating inter-professional boundaries in maternity 
care: implementing a clinical pathway for normal labour. Sociology of Health Illness, 36 
(5), 719-737. 
Hunter, D. (1994). From tribalism to corporatism: the managerial challenge to medical 
dominance. In J. Gabe, D. Kelleher, and G. Williams, (Eds.). Challenging medicine. 
London: Routledge, pp.1-22. 
Jay, J. (2013). Navigating paradox as a mechanism of change and innovation in hybrid 
organizations. Academy of Management Review, 56 (1), 137-159.  
Jessop, B. (1997). Capitalism and its future: remarks on regulation, government and 
governance. Review of International Political Economy, 4, 561-581. 
Jessop, B. (2004). Multi-level governance and multi-level metagovernance  - changes in the 
European Union as integral moments in the transformation and reorientation of 
contemporary statehood. In I. Bache, and M. Flinders, (Eds.). Multilevel Governance. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49-74.  
Jones, L. and Exworthy, M. (2015). Framing in policy processes: a case study from hospital 
planning in the NHS. Social Science & Medicine, 124, 196-204.  
Jones, N. and Charlesworth, A. (2013). The anatomy of health spending 2011/2012: a review 
of NHS expenditure and labour productivity. Nuffield Trust. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/sites/files/nuffield/publication/130305_anatomy-health-
spending_0.pdf [Accessed 10 March 2016]. 
Jordan, A. (1981). Iron triangles, woolly corporatism and elastic nets. Journal of Public 
Policy, 1, 95-123. 
 
 
326 
 
Marinetto, M. (2012). Case studies of the health policy process: a methodological 
introduction. In Exworthy, M. Peckham, M., Powell, Hann, A. (Eds.), Shaping Health 
Policy: Case Study Methods and Analysis. Policy Press at the University of Bristol, pp. 
21-40. 
Kanter, M. (1977). Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books. 
Kelleher, D. (1994). Self-help groups and their relationship to medicine. In J. Gabe, D. 
Kelleher, and G. Williams, (Eds.). Challenging medicine. London: Routledge, pp.104-
117.  
Miles, M. (1979). Qualitative data as an attractive nuisance: the problem of analysis. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24 (4), pp. 590-601.  
Miles, M. and Huberman, A. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Source-book. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Miller, G. (1997). Contextualizing texts: Studying organizational texts. In Miller, G. and 
Dingwall, R. (Eds), Context and Method in Qualitative Research. London: Sage, pp.77-
91.  
Miller, J. and Glassner, B. (2004). The “insider” and “outside”: finding realities in 
interviews. In Silverman, D. (ed.), Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice. 
London: Sage, pp.125-139.  
King, A. (1975). Administrative absorption of politics in Hong Kong: emphasis on the grass 
roots level. Asian Survey, 15 (5), 422-439.  
King, O., Nancarrow, S., Borthwick, A. and Grace, S. (2015). Contested professional role 
boundaries in health care: a systematic review of the literature. Journal of Foot and Ankle 
Research, 8 (2). [Online]. Available at: DOI: 10.1186/s13047-015-0061-1 [Accessed 10 
March 2016].  
Kippist, L. and Fitzgerald, A. (2009). Organizational professional conflict and hybrid 
clinician managers: the effects of dual roles in Australian health care organizations. 
Journal of Health, Organization and Management, 23 (6), 642-655. 
Kirkpatrick, I., Ackroyd, S. and Walker, M. (2005). The new managerialism and public 
service professions: change in health, social services, and housing. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Kitchener, M. (2000). The bureaucratization of professional roles: the case of Clinical 
Directors in UK hospitals. Organization, 7 (1), 129-154. 
Kjaer, A. (2004). Governance. Cambridge: Polity.   
Klein, R. (1990). The state and the profession: the politics of the double bed. British Medical 
Journal, 301 (6754), 700-702. 
 
 
327 
 
Klein, R. (1995). Big bang health care reform-does it work? The case of Britain’s National 
Health Service reforms. Millbank Quarterly, 73 (3), 301-337. 
Knoke, D. (1994). Networks of elite structure and decision-making. In S. Wasserman, and 
J. Galaskiewicz, (Eds.). Advances in social network analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, pp.274-294. 
Kuan, H. and Lau, S. (1990). Public attitude toward laissez faire in Hong Kong. Asian Survey, 
30 (8), 766-781. 
Kuhlmann, E. (2006). Modernising health care: reinventing professions, the state and the 
public. Bristol: The Policy Press.   
Kuhlmann, E. and Allsop, J. (2008). Professional self-regulation in a changing architecture 
of governance: comparing health policy in the UK and Germany. Policy & Politics, 36 
(2), 173-189. 
Mullings, B. (1999). ‘Insider or outsider, both or neither: some dilemmas of interviewing 
in a cross-cultural setting’ in Geoforum, 30, pp. 337–350. 
Kurunmäki, L. (2004). A hybrid profession: the acquisition of management accounting 
expertise by medical professionals. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29 (3-4), 
327-347. 
Knoke, D. (1994). Networks of elite structure and decision-making. In S. Wasserman, and 
J. Galaskiewicz, (Eds.). Advances in social network analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, pp.274-294. 
Kwok, R. and Tak, C. (2006). The dynamics of social policy making in Hong Kong: The 
role of functional representatives (1998–2004). In C. Loh, and Civic Exchange, (Eds.). 
Functional constituencies: a unique feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, pp.199-264.  
Kwon, H. (1998). Democracy and the politics of social welfare: a comparative analysis of 
welfare systems in East Asia. R. Goodman, G. White, and H. Kwon, (Eds.). The East 
Asian welfare model: welfare orientalism and the state. London; New York: Routledge, 
pp.27-74.  
Lam, J. (2012). District Councils, advisory bodies, and statutory bodies. In W. Lam, P. Lui, 
and W. Wong, (Eds.). Contemporary Hong Kong Government and politics: expanded 
second edition. Hong Kong Hong Kong University Press, pp.111-132.  
Landell-Mills, P. and Serageldin, I. (1991). Governance and the external factor. In L. 
Summers, and S. Shah, (Eds.). Proceedings of the World Bank annual conference on 
development economics 1991, supplement to the World Bank Economic Review and The 
World Bank Observer. Washington DC: World Bank, pp.303-320. 
Latimer, J. (2014). Nursing, the politics of organization and meanings of care. Journals of 
Research in Nursing, 19(7-8), 537-545. 
 
 
328 
 
Lau, S., Kuan, H. (1990). Public attitude toward laissez faire in Hong Kong. Asian Survey, 
30(8): 766-81. 
Laughlin, R. Broadbent, J. and Willig-Atherton, H. (1994). Recent financial and 
administrative changes in GP Practices in the UK: initial experiences and effects. 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 7 (3), 96-124. 
Ledger, A., and Slade, B. (2015). Coproduction without experts: a study of people involved 
in community health and wellbeing service delivery. Studies in Continuing Education, 
37(2), 157-169. 
Lemer C., Allwood D., Foley. T (2012). Improving NHS productivity: the secondary care 
doctor’s perspective. [online]. Available at: www.kingsfund.org.uk/leadershipreview  
[Accessed 17 April 2014]. 
Lehmbruch, G. (1984). Concertation and the structure of corporatist networks. In J. 
Goldthorpe, (Ed.). Order and conflict in contemporary capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp.60-80.  
Levac, D., Colquhoun, H., and O’Brien, K. (2010). Scoping studies: advancing the 
methodology. Implementation Science, 5 (69). [Online]. Available at: DOI: 
10.1186/1748-5908-5-69 [Accessed 4 December 2014]. 
Levay, C. and Waks, C. (2009). Professions and the pursuit of transparency in healthcare: 
two cases of soft autonomy. Organization Studies, 30 (5), 509- 527. 
Levi-Faur, D. (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012. 
Levin, N. and Yung, C. (2016). An era in Hong Kong is ending, thanks to China’s tight 
embrace. Wall Street Journal, 23 September 2016. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/an-era-in-hong-kong-is-ending-thanks-to-chinas-tight-
embrace-1474647072 [Accessed 15 November 2016].   
Lindberg, K., Styhre, A. and Walter, L. (2012).  Assembling health care organizations 
practice, materiality and institutions. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lui, T. (2010). Ning ju li liang. Hong Kong: San lian shu dian Xianggang you xian gong si. 
(In Chinese) 
Maisey, S., Steel, N., Marsh, R., Gillam, S., Fleetcroft, R. and Howe, A. (2008). Effects of 
payment for performance in primary care: qualitative interview study. Journal of Health 
Service Research and Policy,13, 133-139. 
March, J. and Olsen, J. (1995). Democratic Governance. New York; London: Free Press.  
Marinetto, M. (2003). Governing through the centre: a critique of the Anglo-governance 
School. Political Studies, 51, 592-608. 
Marsh, D. (2008). What is at stake - a response to Bevir and Rhodes. The British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, 10, 735-739. 
 
 
329 
 
Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. (1992). Policy communities and issue networks: Beyond typology. 
In D. Marsh and R. Rhodes, (Eds.). Policy networks in British Government. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 1-26. 
Marsh, D., Richards, D. and Smith, M. (2001). Changing patterns of governance in the 
United Kingdom: reinventing Whitehall? Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave. 
Marshall, C. and Rossman, G. (2006). Designing qualitative research. London: Sage 
May, N. (2009). Interest groups and civil society in public health policy. G. Carrin, K. Buse, 
K. Heggenhougen, S. Quah, (Eds.). Health systems policy, finance, and organization. 
Geneva: Elsevier, pp.115-123.  
Martin, G. (2008). Representativeness, legitimacy and power in public involvement in 
health-service management. Social Science & Medicine, 67, 1757-1765.  
Martin, G., Currie, G. Finn, R. (2009). Reconﬁguring or reproducing intra-professional 
boundaries? Specialist expertise, generalist knowledge and the ‘modernization’ of the 
medical workforce. Social Science & Medicine, 68, 1191-1198.   
Martinussen, P.  and Magnussen, J. (2011). Resisting market-inspired reform in healthcare: 
the role of professional subcultures in medicine. Social Science & Medicine, 73(2),193-
200. 
Masterson, A. (2002). Cross-boundary working: a macro-political analysis of the impact on 
professional roles. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 11, 331-339. 
McDonald, D., Barnes, M., Crawford, M., Omeni, E., Wilson, A. and Rose, D. (2014). 
Service user governors in mental health foundation trusts: accountability or business as 
usual? Health Expectation, 18, 2892-2902.  
McDonald, R. (2012). Restratiﬁcation revisited: the changing landscape of primary medical 
care in England and California. Current Sociology, 60(4), 441-55. 
McDonald, R., Campbell, S. and Lester, H. (2009). Practice nurses and the effects of the 
new general practitioner contract in the English National Health Service: the extension of 
a professional project? Social Science & Medicine, 68, 1206-1212. 
McDonald, R., Checkland, K., Harrison, S. and Coleman, A. (2009). Rethinking collegiality: 
Restratiﬁcation in English general medical practice 2004-2008. Social Science & 
Medicine, 68, 1199-1205. 
McDonald, R., Harrison, S. Checkland, K. Campbell, S., and Roland, M. (2007). Impact of 
financial incentives on clinical autonomy and internal motivation in primary care: 
ethnographic study. British Medical Journal, 334 (1357). [Online]. Available at: doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.39238.890810.BE. [Accessed 12 December 2016] 
McDowell, L. (1998). Elites in the City of London: some methodological considerations. 
Environment and Planning, A30(12), 2133-2146.  
 
 
330 
 
McGivern, G. and Ferlie E. (2007). Playing tick-box games: interrelating defences in 
professional appraisal. Human Relations, 60 (9), 1361-1385.  
McGivern, G., Currie, G., Ferlie, E., Fitzgerald, L. and Waring, J. (2015). Hybrid manager-
professionals’ identity work: the maintenance and hybridization of medical 
professionalism in managerial contexts. Public Administration, 93 (2), 412-432. 
McGregor, W., Jabareen, H., O'Donnell, C., Mercer, S. and Watt, G. (2008). Impact of the 
2004 GMS contract on practice nurses. British Journal of General Practice, 58 (555), 
711-719.   
McKinlay, J. and Stoeckle, J. (1988). Corporatization and the social transformation of 
doctoring. Health Services, 18, 191-205. 
McLaughlin, E. (1993). Hong Kong: a residual welfare regime. In A. Cochran, and J. Clarke, 
(Eds.). Comparing welfare states: Britain in international context. London; Newbury 
Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.  
McLaughlin, J. (2001). EBM and risk: rhetorical resources in the articulation of professional 
identity. Journal of Management in Medicine, 15 (4-5) 352-363. 
McLeod, H. (1995). Speech of the Finical Secretary at the Budget Debate in the Legislative 
Council, 29 March, 1995. Hong Kong: Govt. Printer.     
Mechanic, D. (1978). Approaches to controlling the costs of medical care: short-range and 
long-range alternatives. New England Journal of Medicine, 298, 249-254. 
Medical Development Advisory Committee, Hong Kong (1974). The Further Development 
of Medical and Health Services in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Govt. Printer. 
Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. (1983). Institutional organizations: formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340-363. 
Meyer, R. and Höllerer, M. (2010). Meaning structures in a contested issue field: a 
topographic map of shareholder value in Austria. Academy of Management Journal, 53 
(6), 1241-1262. 
Mort, M. and Harrison, S. (1999). Healthcare users, the public and the consultation industry. 
In T. Ling, (Ed.). Reforming health care by consent: involving those who matter. Oxford: 
Radcliffe Medical Press, pp.107-120. 
Mo, T. (2008). Doctors as managers: moving towards general management? Journal of 
Health Organization and Management, 22 (4), 400-415. 
Mok, K. (2003). Education. In I. Holliday, and P. Wilding, (Eds.). Welfare capitalism in 
East Asia: social policy in the tiger economies. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 37-69. 
Moran, M. (1999). Governing the health care state: a comparative study of the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. New York: Manchester University Press.  
 
 
331 
 
Milewa, T. (2004). Local participatory democracy in Britain's health service: innovation or 
fragmentation of a universal citizenship. Social Policy and Administration, 38, 240-252. 
Mitton, C., Smith, N., Peacock, S., Evoy, B. and Abelson, J. (2009). Public participation in 
health care priority setting: a scoping review. Health Policy, 91(3), 219-228. 
Nancarrow, S. and Borthwick, A. (2005). Dynamic professional boundaries in the healthcare 
workforce.  Sociology of Health and Illness, 27, 897-919. 
 
NHS Confederation (2010). Clinical Responses to the Downturn. London: Joint Medical 
Consultative Council, British Medical Association, Academy of Royal Medical Colleges, 
and the NHS Confederation. 
 
NHS Confederation. (2016). 2016/17 General Medical Services (GMS) contract Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF) - guidance for GMS contract 2016/17. [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://www.nhsemployers.org/~/media/Employers/Documents/Primary%20care%20con
tracts/QOF/2016-17/2016-17%20QOF%20guidance%20documents.pdf [Accessed 16 
December 2016].  
 
NHS Digital (2016). General and Personal Medical Services, England 2006-2016, as at 30 
September, Experimental Statistics.  [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.content.digital.nhs.uk/searchcatalogue?productid=24768&q=general+medical+
&sort=Relevance&size=10&page=1#top [Accessed 9 July 2017] 
Nelson, E., Batalden, P. and Lazar, J. (2007). Practice-based learning and improvement: a 
clinical improvement action guide. Illinois: Joint Commission Resources, Inc. 
 
Newman, J. and Kuhlmann, E. (2007). Consumers enter the political stage? The moderni-
zation of health care in Britain and Germany. Journal of European Social Policy,17 (2), 
99-111. 
Newman, J. and Clarke, J. (2009). Publics, politics and power: remaking the public in public 
services. Sage: London. 
Newman, J., Glendinning, C. and Hughes, M. (2008). Beyond modernisation? Social care 
and the transformation of welfare governance. Journal of Social Policy, 37 (4), 531-557. 
Niezen, M. and Mathijssen, J. (2014). Reframing professional boundaries in healthcare: a 
systematic review of facilitators and barriers to task reallocation from the domain of 
medicine to the nursing domain. Health Policy, 117, 151-169.  
Noordegraaf, M. (2007). From ‘pure’ to ‘hybrid’ professionalism: present-day 
professionalism in ambiguous public domains. Administration and Society, 39 (6), 761-
785. 
Noordegraaf, M. (2015). Hybrid professionalism and beyond: (new) forms of public 
professionalism in changing organizational and societal contexts. Journal of Professions 
and Organization, 0, 1-20. 
 
 
332 
 
Numerato, D., Salvatore, D. and Fattore, G. (2012). The impact of management on medical 
professionalism: a review. Sociology of Health and Illness, 34 (4), 626-644. 
Offe, C. (1981). Attribution of public status to interest groups. In S. Berger, (Ed.). 
Organizing interests in Western Europe - Pluralism, Corporatism, and the 
transformation of politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 123-158.  
OECD (2016a). Income distribution. OECD Social and Welfare Statistics (database). 
[Online]. Available at: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00654-en [Accessed 17 
December 2016]. 
OECD (2016b). Social expenditure: aggregated data. OECD Social Expenditure Statistics 
(database). [Online]. Available at: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00166-en 
[Accessed 17 December 2016].  
OECD (2016). National accounts at a glance. OECD National Accounts 
Statistics (database). [Online]. Available at: DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00369-
en [Accessed 18 December 2016).  
Oliver, K., de Vocht, F., Money, A. and Everett, M. (2013). Who runs public health? A 
mixed-methods study combining qualitative and network analyses. Journal of Public 
Health (Oxford), 35 (3), 453-459. 
Oppenheimer, M. (1973). Proletarianization of the professional. In P. Halmos, (Ed.). 
Professionalization and Social Change. Keele, England: University of Keele, pp. 213-
227.  
Ouchi, W. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control 
mechanisms. Management Science, 25 (9), 833-848. 
Pawlson, G. and O’Kane, E. (2002). Professionalism, regulation, and the market: impact on 
accountability for quality of care. Health Affairs, 21 (3), 200-207. 
Peckham, S. Exworthy, M., Powell, M. and Greener, I. (2008). Decentralizing health 
services in the UK: a new conceptual framework. Public Administration, 86 (2), 559-580. 
Perkin, H. (1996). The third revolution: professional elites in the modern world. London: 
Routledge.  
Park, H. and Rethemeyer, K. (2012). The politics of connections: assessing the determinants 
of social structure in policy networks. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 24, 349-379.   
Pollitt, C. (2007). Decentralization: a central concept in contemporary public management. 
The Oxford handbook of public management. In E. Ferlie, E. Laurence and C. Pollitt, 
(Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.372-393.  
Ramesh, M. and Holliday, I. (2001). The health care miracle in East and Southeast Asia: 
activist state provision in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Journal of Social Policy, 
30, 637-651. 
 
 
333 
 
Raynard, M. (2016). Deconstructing complexity: configurations of institutional complexity 
and structural hybridity. Strategic Organization,14 (4), 310-335.  
Reay, T. and Hinings C. (2009). Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics. 
Organization Studies, 30, 629-652.  
Renedo, A.  and Marston, C. (2011). ‘Healthcare professionals’ representations of ‘patient 
and public involvement’ and creation of ‘public participant’ identities: implications for 
the development of inclusive and bottom-up community participation initiatives. Journal 
of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 21, 268-280. 
Renedo, A. and Marston. C. (2015). Developing patient-centred care: an ethnographic study 
of patient perceptions and influence on quality improvement. BMC Health Services 
Research, 15, 122. [Online]. Available at: DOI: 10.1186/s12913-015-0770-y [Accessed 
18 December 2016].   
Reskin, F. and Roos, A. (1990). Job Queues, Gender Queues: Explaining Women’s 
Inroads into Male Occupations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Rhodes, R. (1996). The new governance: governing without government. Political Studies. 
44 (4), 652-667. 
Rhodes, R. (1997). Understanding Governance. Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open 
University Press. 
Rhodes, R. (2007). Understanding governance: ten years on. Organization Studies, 28, 1243-
1264. 
Rhodes, M. (2001). The political economy of social pacts: ‘competitive corporatism’ and 
European welfare reform. In P. Pierson, (Ed.). The new politics of the welfare state. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 165-194.  
Park, S. and Lunt, N. (2015) Confucianism and Qualitative Interviewing: Working Seoul 
to Soul. Qualitative Research Method, 16 (2;7). [On-line]. Available at: 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/2166 [Accessed on 22 
Dec 2016] 
Richardson, L. (1990). Writing Strategies: Reaching Diverse Audiences. SAGE 
Publications.  
Riska, E. (2001). Medical Careers and Feminist Agendas: American, Scandinavian, 
and Russian Women Physicians. New York : Aldine de Gruyter. 
Riska, E. (2008). The Feminization Thesis: Discourses on gender and medicine.  Nordic 
Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 16(1), pp. 3-18.  
Pierson, P. (1998). Irresistible forces, immovable objects: post-industrial welfare states 
confront permanent austerity. Journal of European Public Policy, 5 (4), 539-560. 
 
 
334 
 
Pierson, P. (2001). Coping with permanent austerity welfare state - restructuring in affluent 
democracy. In P. Pierson, (Ed.). The new politics of the welfare state. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 410-456.  
Pierre, J. and Peters, B. (2000). Governance, Politics and the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Pierre, J. and Peters, B. (2005). Governing complex societies: trajectories and scenarios. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave. 
Richards, A., Carley, J., Jenkins-Clarke, S. and Richards, D. (2000). Skill mix between 
nurses and doctors working in primary care-delegation or allocation: a review of the 
literature. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 37, 185-197. 
Poocharoen, O. and Ting, B. (2015). Collaboration, co-production, networks: convergence 
of theories. Public Management Review, 17 (4), 587-614. 
Powell, W. and DiMaggio, P. (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 
Chicago. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Professional Standards Authority, UK. (2015). Right-touch Regulation. [Online] Available 
at: http://www.professionalstandards.org.uk/docs/default-source/publications/thought-
paper/right-touch-regulation-2015.pdf  [Accessed 10 March 2016]. 
Provan, G., Huang, K. and Milward. B. (2009). The evolution of structural embeddedness 
and organizational social outcomes in a centrally governed health and human services 
network. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19, 873-93. 
Provan, K., Fish, A. and Sydow, J. (2007). Interorganizational networks at the network level: 
a review of the empirical literature on whole networks. Journal of Management, 33 (3), 
479-516. 
Provan, K. and Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: structure, management, and 
effectiveness. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18 (2), 229-252. 
Rose, M., Barnes, M., Crawford, M., Omeni, E., MacDonald, D. and Wilson, A. (2014). 
How do managers and leaders in the National Health Service and social care respond to 
service user involvement in mental health services in both its traditional and emergent 
forms? The ENSUE study. Health Services and Delivery Research, No. 2.10. 
Southampton (UK): NIHR Journals Library. [Online]. Available at: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK259692/ doi: 10.3310/hsdr02100 [Accessed 
16 December].  
Russell, V., Wyness, L. McAuliffe, E. and Fellenz, M. (2010). The social identity of hospital 
consultants as managers. Journal of Health Organization and Management, 24 (3), 220-
236. 
Salter, B. (2001). Who rules? The new politics of medical regulation. Social Science & 
Medicine, 52, 871-83. 
 
 
335 
 
Salter, B. (2003). Patients and doctors: reformulating the UK health policy community?  
Social Science & Medicine, 57, 927-936. 
Sanders, T., Harrison, S. and Checkland, K. (2008). Evidence-based medicine and patient 
choice: the case of heart failure care. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy,13 
(2), 103-108. 
Sandström, A., and Carlsson, L. (2008). The performance of policy networks: the relation 
between network structure and network performance. Policy Studies Journal, 36 (4), 497-
524. 
Saltman, R. and Bankauskaite, V. (2006). Conceptualizing decentralization in European 
health systems: a functional perspective. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 1, 127-147. 
Saward, M. (1990). Cooption and power: who gets what from formal incorporation. Political 
Studies, 38, 588-602. 
Saz-Carranza, A. and Ospina, S. (2011). The behavioral dimension of governing 
interorganizational goal-directed networks: managing the unity-diversity tension.  
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 21, 327-65. 
Scharpf, F. (1994). Games real actors could play: positive and negative coordination in 
embedded negotiations. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6, 27-53. 
Schön, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner. New York: Basic Books. 
Scott, I. (1989). Political change and the crisis of legitimacy in Hong Kong. London: Hurst.  
Scott, R. Ruef, M., Mendel, M. and Carol, C. (2000). Institutional change and healthcare 
organizations: from professional dominance to managed care. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Scott, W. & Co. (1985). The delivery of medical services in hospitals: a report for the Hong 
Kong Government. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Govt. Printer.   
Scourfield, P. (2007). Social care and the modern citizen: client, consumer, service user, 
manager and entrepreneur. British Journal of Social Work, 37(1), 107-122. 
Shaw, I. and Gould, N. (2001). Qualitative Research in Social Work. London: Sage. 
Sheaff, R., Charles, N., Mahon, A., Chambers, N., Morando, N., Exworthy, M., Byng, R., 
Mannion, R. and Llewellyn, S. (2015). NHS commissioning practice and health system 
governance: a mixed-methods realistic evaluation. Health Service and Delivery Research, 
3 (10). [Online]. Available at: DOI: 10.3310/hsdr03100 [Accessed 10 December 2016].  
Sheaff, R., Marshall, M., Rogers, A., Roland, M., Sibbald, B. and Pickard, S. (2004). 
Governmentality by network in English Primary Healthcare. Social policy & 
Administration, 38(1), 89-103.  
Simon, H. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological 
Review, 63 (2), 129-138. 
 
 
336 
 
Sackett, D., Rosenberg, W., Gray, A. Haynes, R. and Richarsdon, W. (1996). Evidence-
based medicine: what it is and what it isn’t. British Medical Journal, 312, 71-2. 
Sackett, D., Straus, S., Richardson, W., Rosenberg, W. and Haynes, R. (2000). Evidence-
based medicine: how to practise and teach EBM. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone. 
So, Y. (1999). Hong Kong’s embattled democracy: a societal analysis. Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Social welfare Department, Hong Kong. (2016). Salary Scale of Common Posts in the 
Non-governmental Organizations w.e.f. 1.4.2016. [On-line]. Available at:     
http://www.swd.gov.hk/doc/ngo/PayWage/Salary%20Scale%20of%20Common%20Post
s%20wef%2001-04-2016(clean).pdf [Accessed on 22 May 2017] 
Solomon, J., Knappc, P., Raynorb, D. and Atkin, K. (2013). Worlds apart? An exploration 
of prescribing and medicine-taking decisions by patients, GPs and local policy makers. 
Health Policy, 112, 264-272. 
Solomon, J., Raynor, K., Knapp, P. and Atkin, K. (2012). The compatibility of prescribing 
guidelines and the doctor-patient partner-ship: a primary care mixed-methods study. The 
British Journal of General Practice, 62 (597), 275-281.  
Southon, G., Perkins, R. and Galler, D. (2005). Networks: a key to the future of health 
services. Australian Health Review, 29 (3), 317-326. 
Spehar, I., Frich, J. and Kjekshus, L. (2015). Professional identity and role transitions in 
clinical managers. Journal of Health, Organization and Management, 29(3), 353-366.  
Spyridonidis, D. and Calnan, M. (2011). Are new forms of professionalism emerging in 
medicine? The case of the implementation of NICE guidelines. Health Sociology Review, 
20 (4), 394-409. 
Spyridonidis, D., Hendy, J. and Barlow, J. (2015). Understanding hybrid roles: the role of 
identity processes amongst physicians. Public Administration, 93 (2), 395-411. 
Staniland, K. (2009). A sociological ethnographic study of clinical governance 
implementation in one NHS Hospital Trust. Clinical Governance: An International 
Journal, 14 (4), 271-280. 
Staniland, K. (2010). Studying organizations: the revival of institutionalism. In I. Bourgeault, 
R., Dingwall, and R. De Vries, (Eds.). The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Methods in 
Health Research. London: SAGE Publications, pp.249-264.  
Staniland, K. (2008). Clinical governance and nursing - a sociological analysis. (unpublished 
PhD Thesis). England: University of Salford. 
Strauss, A., Schatzman, L., Bucher, R., Ehrlich, D. and Sabshin, M. (1964). Psychiatric 
Ideologies and Institutions. London: Collier-Macmillan/Free Press. 
 
 
337 
 
Streeck, W. and Schmitter, P. (1985). Community, market, state and associations? The 
prospective contribution of interest governance to social order. European Sociological 
Review, 1(2), 119-138.  
Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: five propositions. International Social Science 
Journal, 50 (155), 17-25.  
Stone, D. (1980). The limits of professional power: national health care in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Sullivan, W. (2000). Medicine under threat: professionalism and professional identity. 
Canadian Medical Association Journal, 162 (5), 673-675. 
Sørsensen, E. and Torfing, J. (2005). Democratic anchorage of governance networks.  
Scandinavian Political Studies 28, 195-218. 
Tam, T. and Yeung, S. (1994). Community perception of social welfare and its relations to 
familism, political alienation, and individual rights: the case of Hong Kong. International 
Social Work, 31(7), 47-60.   
Tang, K. (1998). Colonial state and social Policy: social welfare development in Hong Kong 
1842-1997. Lanham, Md.; Oxford: University Press of America.  
Temple, B., Edwards, R. and Claire, A. (2006). Grasping at context: cross language 
qualitative research as secondary qualitative data analysis. Forum Qualitative 
Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 7(4). [Online]. 
http://nbnresolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0604107 [Accessed 17 December 2016].  
Temple, B. and Young, A. (2004). Qualitative research and translation dilemmas. 
Qualitative Research, 4(2), 161-178. 
Ten Have, H. (2000). Re-evaluating professional autonomy in health care. Theoretical 
Medicine and Bioethics, 21(5), 503-513. 
The Harvard Team (1999). Improving Hong Kong's health care system, why and for whom? 
Hong Kong: Printing Department.  
The Health Foundation (2013). Involving patients in improving safety: an evidence scan. 
London: Health Foundation. 
The Heritage Fund (2016). 2016 Index of Economic Freedom. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking [Accessed 15 November].  
The Hong Kong Government (1964). The development of health services. Hong Kong: Govt. 
Printer.  
The Hong Kong Government (1965). Aims and policy for social welfare in Hong Kong: a 
white paper. Hong Kong: Govt. Printer.  
The Hong Kong Government (1973). Social welfare in Hong Kong: the way ahead. Hong 
Kong: Government Printer.  
 
 
338 
 
The Hong Kong Government (1977). The personal social work among young people. Hong 
Kong: Govt. Printer.  
The Hong Kong Government (1991). Social welfare into the 1990s and beyond: a white 
paper. Hong Kong: Govt. Printer.  
The Hong Kong Government (2013a). Hong Kong Yearbook 2012. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2012/en/ [Accessed 15 November]. 
The Hong Kong Government (2013b). Government Budget 2013-14. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.budget.gov.hk/2013/eng/speech.html [Accessed 15 November]. 
The Hong Kong Government (2016). Hong Kong - the Facts. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm [Accessed 15 November]. 
The Hong Kong Hospital Authority (2016). Hong Kong Hospital Authority website. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.ha.org.hk/visitor/ha_index.asp [Accessed 15 November]. 
The King’s Fund (2011). The future of leadership and Management in the NHS: report from 
The King’s Fund Commission on leadership and management in the NHS. London: The 
King’s Fund. 
The National Assembly for Wales (1999). An introduction to clinical pathways, putting 
clients first. Cardiff: NHS Wales. 
The World Bank (1992). Governance and development. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. [Online]. Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604951468739447676/Governance-and-
development [Accessed 16 December].  
The World Bank (2016). Data: GNI per capita, PPP (current international $). [Online]. 
Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?year_high_desc=true 
[Accessed 10 December 2016]. 
Thorne, M. (2002). Colonizing the new world of NHS management: the shifting power of 
professionals. Health Services Management Research, 15(1), 14-26. 
Traxler, F., Blaschke, S. and Kittel, B. (2001). National labour relations in internationalized 
markets: a comparative study of institutions, change, and performance. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Tsang, M. (2016). Doctors opposing medical council reform are ‘irrational’: ex-council head. 
South China Morning Post, 14 July 2016. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/health-environment/article/1989911/doctors-
opposing-medical-council-reform-are [Accessed 14 July 2016].  
Tu, J., Liu, S. and Ting, M. (2009). A Comparative Analysis of Culture among Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Mainland China: Employing Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions. Journal of 
 
 
339 
 
Science and Technology and Humanities of Transworld Institute of Technology, 9, pp.43-
59.  
United Nations (2016). Human development reports. [Online]. Available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data [Accessed 10 December 2016].   
Veronesi, G. and Keasey, K. (2015). Patient and public participation in the English NHS: an 
assessment of experimental implementation processes. Public Management Review, 
17(4), 543-564. 
Visser, J. and Hemerijck, A. (1997). A Dutch miracle: job growth, welfare reform and 
corporatism in the Netherlands. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Wallerstein, M. (1988). Review by: Michael Wallerstein. American Journal of Sociology, 
93 (6), 1499-1501. 
Waring, J. (2007). Adaptive regulation or governmentality: patient safety and the changing 
regulation of medicine. Sociology of Health and Illness, 29 (2),163-179. 
Waring, J. (2014). Restratification, hybridity and professional elites: questions of power, 
identity and relational contingency at the points of ‘professional-organizational 
intersection’. Sociology Compass, 8, 688-704. 
Waring, J. and Currie, G. (2009). Managing expert knowledge: organizational challenges 
and managerial futures for the UK medical profession. Organization Studies, 30(7), 755-
778. 
Watkins, P. (1993). Centralized decentralization: Sloanism, marketing quality and higher 
education. Australian Universities Review, 36 (2), 9-17. 
Welsh, V., Sanders, T., Richardson, R., Wynne-Jones, G., Jinks, C. and Mallen, C. (2014). 
Extending the authority for sickness certification beyond the medical profession: the 
importance of ‘boundary work’. BMC Family Practice, 15(100). [Online]. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.39238.890810.BE  [Accessed 12 December 2016]  
Williamson, P. (1989). Corporatism in perspective: an introductory guide to corporatist 
theory. London; Newbury Park: Sage Publications.  
Windolf, P. (1989). Productivity coalitions and the future of European Corporatism. 
Industrial Relations, 28, 1-20. 
Witz, A. and Annandale, E. (2006). The challenge of nursing. In D. Kelleher, J. Gabe and 
G. Willliams, (Eds.). Challenging medicine. London: Routledge, pp. 23-45.  
Wong, L. (2008). Hong Kong’s welfare model reconsidered - what model? What Traits? 
And what functions. Paper presented in East Asian and Social Policy 5th Conference, 3 
November, 2008. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.welfareasia.org/5thconference/session-1/stream-4/ [Accessed 15 
November]. 
 
 
340 
 
Wood, B. (2000). Patient power? Patients associations in Britain and America. Bucking-
ham: Open University Press. 
Woods, M. (1998). Rethinking elites: networks, space, and local politics. Environment and 
Planning, A 30, pp. 2101- 2119.Wright, J., Dempster, P., Keen, J., Allen, P. and 
Hutchings, A. (2012). The new governance arrangements for NHS Foundation Trust 
hospitals: reframing governors as meta-regulators. Public Administration, 90 (2), 351-69. 
Yip, W. and Hsiao, W. (2003). Autonomizing a hospital system: corporate control by central 
authorities in Hong Kong. In A. Harding, and A. Preker, (Eds.). Innovations in health 
service delivery: the corporatization of public hospitals, Volume 1. Washington DC: The 
World Bank, pp.391-424.      
Yuen, P. (1995). The corporatization of public hospital services in Hong Kong: a possible 
public choice explanation. The Asian Journal of Public Administration, 6 (2), 165-182. 
Yuen, P. (2005). Dissatisfaction of health providers and consumers: health care reform 
impasse and SARS outbreak mismanagement. In Cheng, J. (Ed.). The July 1 Protest Rally: 
Interpreting a Historic Event. City University Press, Hong Kong, pp.443-468.  
Yeung,  C. (1995). Qualitative personal interviews in international business research: some 
lessons from a study of Hong Kong transnational corporations. International Business 
Review, 4(3), pp. 313–339. 
Yin, R.K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. London: Sage. 
Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76 (6), 22-43.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
